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National Constitutional Courts As Veto Players in the EMU Crisis

Abstract : The European Union’s response to the crisis of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been met with intense criticism. Critics highlight that both the reforms of the EMU legal framework and national austerity measures implemented under Memoranda of Understanding have limited national governments’ discretion in shaping national policies to an unprecedented degree. National actors in many member states therefore challenged EMU crisis response before national courts. While courts are considered reluctant to interfere with momentous legislative decisions, especially in a sensitive field like that of budgetary and fiscal rules, some judgments did indeed strike down individual crisis measures. The EMU case therefore allows us to better understand court behaviour in times of economic crises. Drawing on the literature on courts as veto players, the article analyses when, and under what conditions, national constitutional courts exercise their veto powers in the constitutional review of EMU reforms.
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Contributor : Sabine Saurugger <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, September 8, 2020 - 2:50:36 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, November 24, 2020 - 4:00:18 PM





Sabine Saurugger, Andreas Hofmann, Thomas Warren. National Constitutional Courts As Veto Players in the EMU Crisis. SSRN : Social Science Research Network, Elsevier, 2020, ⟨10.2139/ssrn.3599037⟩. ⟨halshs-02933515⟩



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