Format du dépôt |
Fichier |
Type de dépôt |
Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?
|
Résumé |
en
Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others' votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling - the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions - to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.
|
Auteur(s)
|
Alessandra Casella
1
, Antonin Macé
2, 3
1
Columbia University [New York]
( 75524 )
- Columbia University in the City of New York, 2960 Broadway, New York, NY 10027-6902
- États-Unis
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( 7550 )
;
-
École normale supérieure - Paris ( 59704 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
École des Ponts ParisTech ( 301545 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( 441569 )
;
-
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement ( 577435 )
3
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne UMR8545 ( 7550 )
;
-
École normale supérieure - Paris ( 59704 )
;
-
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres ( 564132 )
;
-
École des hautes études en sciences sociales ( 99539 )
;
-
École des Ponts ParisTech ( 301545 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( 441569 )
;
-
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement UMR1393 ( 577435 )
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2021
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D47 - Market Design
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D70 - General
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
-
P - Economic Systems/P.P1 - Capitalist Systems/P.P1.P16 - Political Economy
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Domaine(s) |
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
|
Mots-clés |
en
Bundling, Quadratic voting, Logrolling, Vote trading, Storable votes, Vote markets, logrolling, vote trading, storable votes, quadratic voting, bundling, vote markets
|
DOI |
10.1146/annurev-economics-081720-114422 |
UT key WOS |
000685106100004 |