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Decision Under Normative Uncertainty

Abstract : While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. Normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) uncertainty in the 'original position', where one's values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty — normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle — maximising expected value ( 'Expectationalism') — has rival formulations, namely Ex-Ante Expectationalism, Ex-Post Expectationalism, and hybrid theories. These rival theories recommend differend decisions, reasoning modes, and attitudes to risk. But they converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02905431
Contributor : Lucie Label <>
Submitted on : Monday, July 12, 2021 - 2:16:40 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, July 20, 2021 - 2:59:41 PM

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  • HAL Id : halshs-02905431, version 3

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Franz Dietrich, Brian Jabarian. Decision Under Normative Uncertainty. 2021. ⟨halshs-02905431v3⟩

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