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, If 1 < j < J :P r[y = j|Z, under, baseline] = ?(c j ? X?) ? ?(c j?1 ? X?) If j = J :P r

, For an overachiever, the associated probabilities write: If j = 1 :P r

, If 1 < j < J :P r[y = j|Z, over

. If-j-=-j-:p-r,

, The change in probabilities for overachievers for each choice in the baseline treatment is given by P r[y = j|Z, over, baseline] ? P r[y = j|Z, under, baseline

, ? 3 ) ? ?(c j?1 ? X? ? ? 3 ) ? ?(c j ? X?) + ?(c j?1 ? X?) If j =< J :M E j (baseline) = 1 ? ?(c j?1 ? X? ? ? 3 ) ? 1 + ?

, We thus obtain all changes in probability associated with each choice for the baseline treatment: ?j, M E j (baseline)

, Example: A judge parHcipant decides to redistribute 18% of the surplus from player A to player B. When making a decision, the player judge does not know how much ECU player A has in addiHon to B. His decision is selected to be implemented

, All par1cipants receive a random assignment

, The par1cipants carry out their task

, Par1cipants answer a few ques1ons

, Judge par1cipants decide how to redistribute the ECUs that Player A has in addi1on to Player B

, One of the redistribu1on proposals is drawn and put in place: the judge players keep their money from the task, the two target players get the money corrected for the redistribu1on