Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples

Fatma Aslan (1) , Jean Lainé (2, 3)

1 BME - Budapest University of Technology and Economics [Budapest]
2 LIRSA - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en sciences de l'action
3 Murat Sertel Center - Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies

We investigate the existence and properties of competitive equilibrium in Shapley-Scarf markets involving an exogenous partition of individuals into couples. The presence of couples generates preference interdependencies which cause existence problems. For both cases of transferable and non-transferable income among partners, we establish properties for preferences that are sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium. Moreover, we show that these properties define a maximal preference domain.

Domaines: Sciences de l'Homme et Société; Economies et finances

Fatma Aslan, Jean Lainé. Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.002⟩. ⟨halshs-02613918⟩