, changed the ultimate fate of the enclave and its population, and that the use of the evacuation plans prepared by the general staff would have lead to an even larger catastrophe. By contrast, the opposition deputies shared a certain number of doubts with SDA deputies concerning the conduct of civilian and military authorities in the enclave. Igor Rajner declared for example that "all of us who spent the war near Srebrenica know that there were problems
, , vol.23
, Institute for research of crimes against humanity and international law published three edited volumes devoted to the Srebrenica massacre, These include the proceedings of an international conference organized in July 1997, the ICTY's indictments of Radovan Karad?i?, Ratko Mladi?, Radislav Krsti? and Dra?en Erdemovi?, an annotated translation of the UN report on the fall of Srebrenica as well as various documents and testimonies, 1998.
, ] and transferring war crimes documentation to The Hague. In the end, it will turn out that the only guilty people are Mladi?, Karad?i? and Du?an Tadi? [sic! Safet Isovi? is probably thinking of Dra?en Erdemovi? here -translator's note], and that they killed all of these people by themselves. I beg this parliamentary commission and I beg this Parliament as the supreme organ of power to order this commission or to the government and, through it, all institutions responsible for collecting information about war crimes, to send proof as quickly, efficiently and completely as possible concerning the enormous number of people who took part in war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, During the 1 August 1996 parliamentary debate, the deputy Safet Isovi? (SDA) was shocked by "the inertia of our institutions in identifying and publishing the names
, Srebrenica se branila sama
, Magnetofonski snimak 20. sjednice, 26/2, Muharem Cero (SBiH)
, Alija Behmen (SDP) comment as reported in Oslobo?enje, 1995.
, Da li su pored teritorije
, , 1995.
, Parlamentarne stranke Tuzle i pad Srebrenice: ne dozvoliti anarhiju" [The Parliamentary Parties of Tuzla and the Fall of Srebrenica: Not Tolerating Anarchy], Front slobode, 1995.
, Da li je Skup?tina vlast ili alibi za vlast?" [Is the Parliament the Power or An Alibi for the Power?, pp.10-11, 1995.
, Magnetofonski snimak 20. sjednice, 21/1
, , vol.23
, , vol.21
, , vol.25
, , vol.23
, , vol.19
, The metaphysical guilt about which Izetbegovi? spoke in his 11 July 1996 speech reminds that evoked in 1946 by Karl Jaspers, for whom "each finds himself co-responsible for all injustice and all evil committed in the world" and the simple fact "that I still live, after such things have happened, bears down on me like unpardonable guilt, 1990.
, Izetbegovi?'s capacity to prevent any act of revenge against the Serb population of Sarajevo must be situated. Miro Lazovi?, President of the Parliament, recounted in an interview to Radio Free Europe that, 1995.
, worried about the situation of Srebrenica and ?epa as well as what could happen in Sarajevo, we met with Izetbegovi? and informed him of the letter's contents, and I must say that during our meeting with the representatives of ?epa and Srebrenica, he clearly said that not a single hair of a Serb or a Croat from Sarajevo should be touched. He was really firm on this point and I must say that, after that, the anger shown by this group subsided, Miro Lazovi?: utopisti i buhe
, , 1996.
, Witnesses Claim that Naser Ori?'s People Stay Behind Nineteen Assassination Attempts in Srebrenica, Ljiljan, pp.18-22, 1996.
, Zlatni ljiljani brane istinu i Nasera Ori?a, Slobodna Bosna, pp.37-38, 1996.
, These "confessions" are, in fact, a transcription of a conversation recorded shortly after the fall of the enclave between Naser Ori?, Sefer Halilovi?, the first chief of the army's general staff, and Rusmir Mahmut?ehaji?, former Minister of War Industry who broke with the SDA during the war. Oslobo?enje presented this document as a third version of events in Srebrenica, after those presented by Ibran Mustafi? in Slobodna Bosna and Rasim Deli? before the Parliament, 1995.
, Intentions of Burial: Mourning, Politics, and Memorials Following the Massacre at Srebrenica, Death Studies, vol.27, issue.2, pp.125-167, 2003.
, Incertitudes publiques et privées sur les disparus en Bosnie-Herzégovine, Crises extrêmes. Face aux massacres, aux guerres civiles et aux génocides, pp.287-301, 2006.
, In the Midst of Injustice: The ICTY from the Perspective of some Victim Associations, The New Bosnian Mosaic. Identities, Memories and Moral Claims, pp.211-245, 2007.
, In this well-documented dossier, Esad He?imovi? minutely reconstitutes the attitude of the SDA leadership during the crisis of summer, 1995.
, The Bo?nja?ki sabor (Bosniak assembly) brought together the major political, intellectual, religious and military leaders of the Bosniak nation, 1993.
, , p.109, 1997.
, President Izetbegovi? received us and, immediately after greeting us
, For a critical discussion of the various conspiracy theories surrounding the fall of Srebrenica, including those blaming Bosniak authorities, see, among others, David Rohde, Endgame. The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre since World War II, 1997.
, On the national project of the SDA leadership, see, for example, Xavier Bougarel, Le Nouvel Islam balkanique. Les musulmans, acteurs du postcommunisme, pp.79-132, 1990.
, Halilovi? then once again upped the stakes by declaring that his own mistake had been to negotiate Izetbegovi?'s liberation in May 1992 while he was detained as a prisoner by the Yugoslav People's Army. Eight years after the Srebrenica massacre and four months before the death of Izetbegovi?, Izetbegovi? accused Halilovi? of having made remarks before the ICTY which could have helped Milo?evi? develop his own version of events. A few days later, p.12, 2003.