D. Lati?, Borba za bolju politi?ku poziciju', Muslimanski glas, vol.1, p.3, 1991.

I. Baki?, Gra?ani BiH o me?unacionalnim odnosima', Sveske instituta za prou?avanje me?unacionalnih odnosa, vol.VIII, p.299, 1990.

D. Lati?, Za?to se izvr?ni odbor SDA odlu?io za konfederaciju, Muslimanski glas, vol.II, p.3, 1991.

. Deklaracija-o-dr?avnoj-suverenosti-i-nedjeljivosti-bosne-i-hercegovine, Muslimanski glas, vol.II, p.1, 1991.

, Yugoslavia is historically completely justified as a common state of republics and states, which are completely equal in rights, and we engage ourselves to preserve and develop this community

, Were the negotiations between the SDS and the MBO originally supported by Izetbegovi? or by Abdi? ? 38 Was the final refusal of the SDA due to pressures from its 'Croat lobby' or to the advice of American diplomats ? 39 Could the accord have protected Bosnia-Herzegovina from war or would it simply have surrendered itself to Serb hegemony ? Whatever the answers, the rejection of the historical by the SDA marks the Muslim political elites' definitive break not only with the idea of Yugoslavia but also with all their other strategies elaborated in the post-Ottoman era. Until this time, Muslim political elites, in order to facilitate tactical alliances, had always avoided any direct confrontation with the Serb or Croat political forces and occupied an intermediate space between them. However, by opting for independence the SDA leaders made a clear stand against the SDS and therefore had actively to seek the protection of the Democratic Croat Community (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica -HDZ). The Croat nationalist party found itself in the position of an intermediary : close to the SDA because it favoured Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence and close to the SDS because it also favoured its division into several territorial entities. In addition, the SDA abandoned the traditional choice of Muslim political elites, which was to renounce any political sovereignty and any national-state policy in order to be able to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina as a specific territorial entity. In contrast, the SDA chose to give priority to the affirmation of sovereignty of the Muslim nation, at the risk of territorial partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina, it declares: 'The basis of this life (common to its three constitutive nations) is the mutual recognition of the sovereignty of each nation and the total preservation of the territorial integrity et political subjectivity of our republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina'. Lastly, it adds: 'whatever the situation of the Croatian Republic the initiative, and irreversibly set themselves on the road towards independence, p.41, 1991.

, the SDS started to create 'Serbian autonomous regions' (Srpske autonomne oblasti -SAO) and the HDZ did the same two months later. However, this does not mean that the SDA leaders at the inside or outside Yugoslavia, the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina constitute a nation with equal rights' and are therefore entitled to participate in this accord, Sporazum MBO-SDS, issue.2, 1991.

M. Djilas-/-nade?da-ga?e, Bo?njak: Adil Zulfikarpa?i?, pp.203-214, 1994.

F. Fejzi?, Tronozac pada kad je na dvije noge, Muslimanski glas, vol.II, p.2, 1991.

, Milovan Djilas / Nade?da Ga?e, op

, Uz prijedlog srpsko-muslimanskog sporazuma, MBO, p.2, 1991.

F. Fejzi?, Takozvani istorijski srpsko-muslimanski dogovor, Muslimanski glas, vol.II, p.2, 1991.