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A. , 3 Treatment intensity based on other years Figure A4: Robustness to alternative definitions of the instrument, 2009.

, A.2.5 Impact on Sales Figure A6: Impact on sales, 2009.

, Notes: This figure reports the estimated impact of the CICE tax credit on wages of high-skill workers

, A.2.6 Retention Rate Figure A7: Impact on employee retention rate by skill group

, Notes: This figure reports the estimated impact of the CICE tax credit on wages of high-skill workers. Other notes as in Figure 5. (b) low-skill workers, 2009.

, Notes: This figure reports the estimated impact of the CICE tax credit on wages of low-skill workers

, Notes: This figure reports the estimated impact of the CICE tax credit on wages of high-skill workers

, Notes: This figure reports the estimated impact of the CICE tax credit on wages of low-skill workers. Other notes as in Figure 5. 1. Hourly wage variable: we define hourly wage as the ratio of gross earnings (salaire brut) over worked hours in a given job

, New hire: Hires are defined as jobs starting in February or later at year t taken up by workers not employed in the same firm at t?1. Firms with no employment at year t ? 1 are excluded

, Incumbents: Incumbents are defined as workers in permanent contract working full-time (32 hours per week or more) who kept the same occupation within the same firm between t and t ? 1

, Firm-level analysis: 1. Occupation variable: we define low-skill workers as those whose occupation (variable CS) is documented in DADS database as employee (employé) and blue collar (ouvrier) occupations, we define high-skill workers as those whose occupation is documented as intermediary occupations (professions intermédiaires) or executives and intellectual occupations

, Average hourly wage at the firm-level: this variable is equal to the ratio of the sum of the gross wages accruing to workers in permanent contract (contratà durée indéterminée) to the sum of worked hours for the same set of workers. We defined low and high-skill mean wage analogously (DADS)

, Actual treatment intensity: the ratio of the amount of CICE claimed to the tax services and recorded in the MVC database over the sum of gross wages (DADS)

, Instrument for treatment intensity: the instrument of exposure intensity is the CICE rate times the ratio of the sum of gross wages accruing to workers whose hourly wage is between .85 and 2.5 MW over the sum of overall gross wages (DADS)

, We compute for each firm the share of the wage bill below 2.2 MW and below 2.8 MW in 2012 (alternative specification with 2.3 and 2.7MW points), the year prior the reform (DADS)

. Sectoral-variable, The sectoral variable is the variable APEN (DADS) documenting the main activity of the firm through a 3-digit classification

, Size variable: The size variable takes on 3 values and is defined based on the full-time equivalent employment variable (DADS). The three values are defined as follows: 1-less than, vol.50, pp.3-250

, Cell variables: The cell variable is the interaction of grid, sectoral and size variables

, We include 3 main lagged control variable (1) share of employees paid less than 1.5 MW (DADS) , (2) the log value of assets (valeur des immobilisations in FARE), and (3) the log productivity (value-added over average employment in FARE), Control variables