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Robust Mechanism Design: An Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium Perspective

Abstract : In this short essay, I revisit the idea of robust mechanism design explicitly taking into account that it may be hard to access the beliefs held by agents in previous plays of the mechanism. I propose modelling such an environment using the apparatus of the analogy-based expectation equilibrium with payoff-relevant analogy partitions. Such an approach allows to move away from impossibility results that arise with ex post implementation.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02491939
Contributor : Caroline Bauer <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, February 26, 2020 - 2:52:53 PM
Last modification on : Friday, February 5, 2021 - 3:33:40 AM

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Philippe Jehiel. Robust Mechanism Design: An Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium Perspective. Jean-François Laslier; Hervé Moulin; M. Remzi Sanver; William S. Zwicker. The Future of Economic Design, Springer, pp.321-325, 2019, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_44⟩. ⟨halshs-02491939⟩

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