Robust Mechanism Design: An Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium Perspective
Philippe Jehiel
(1, 2)
Philippe Jehiel
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1151454
Résumé
In this short essay, I revisit the idea of robust mechanism design explicitly taking into account that it may be hard to access the beliefs held by agents in previous plays of the mechanism. I propose modelling such an environment using the apparatus of the analogy-based expectation equilibrium with payoff-relevant analogy partitions. Such an approach allows to move away from impossibility results that arise with ex post implementation.
Domaines
Economies et finances| Format du dépôt | Notice |
|---|---|
| Type de dépôt | Chapitre d'ouvrage |
| Titre |
en
Robust Mechanism Design: An Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium Perspective
|
| Résumé |
en
In this short essay, I revisit the idea of robust mechanism design explicitly taking into account that it may be hard to access the beliefs held by agents in previous plays of the mechanism. I propose modelling such an environment using the apparatus of the analogy-based expectation equilibrium with payoff-relevant analogy partitions. Such an approach allows to move away from impossibility results that arise with ex post implementation.
|
| Auteur(s) |
Philippe Jehiel
1, 2
1
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1171428 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
| Langue du document |
Anglais
|
| Titre de l'ouvrage |
The Future of Economic Design
|
| Vulgarisation |
Non
|
| Audience |
Internationale
|
| Date de publication |
2019-11
|
| Page/Identifiant |
321-325
|
| Domaine(s) |
|
| Éditeur commercial |
|
| Éditeur scientifique |
|
| DOI | 10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_44 |
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