New Electoral Systems and Old Referendums
Gabrielle Demange
(1, 2)
Gabrielle Demange
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1216203
- IdHAL : gabrielle-demange
- ORCID : 0000-0003-2382-4988
Résumé
I discuss the future of social choice theory in the design of electoral systems. Two routes are promising. First, thanks to computing facilities, new voting procedures can be designed. I present two positive recent experiments, and hope some are to come. Second, the well-known referendum, which is being increasingly popular on a variety of situations, needs to be investigated more thoroughly; I discuss some issues and directions for improvement.
Domaines
Economies et finances| Format du dépôt | Notice |
|---|---|
| Type de dépôt | Chapitre d'ouvrage |
| Titre |
en
New Electoral Systems and Old Referendums
|
| Résumé |
en
I discuss the future of social choice theory in the design of electoral systems. Two routes are promising. First, thanks to computing facilities, new voting procedures can be designed. I present two positive recent experiments, and hope some are to come. Second, the well-known referendum, which is being increasingly popular on a variety of situations, needs to be investigated more thoroughly; I discuss some issues and directions for improvement.
|
| Auteur(s) |
Gabrielle Demange
1, 2
1
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1171428 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
| Langue du document |
Anglais
|
| Titre de l'ouvrage |
The Future of Economic Design
|
| Vulgarisation |
Non
|
| Audience |
Internationale
|
| Date de publication |
2019-11
|
| Page/Identifiant |
67-73
|
| Domaine(s) |
|
| Éditeur scientifique |
|
| DOI | 10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_11 |
Loading...