KTÈMA

CIVILISATIONS DE L'ORIENT, DE LA GRÈCE ET DE ROME ANTIQUES

La rhétorique de la diplomatie en Grèce ancienne

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Political Exiles and Their Use of Diplomacy in Classical Greece

RÉSUMÉ-. Cet article porte sur la diplomatie des exilés politiques à l'époque classique. Quoique leur activisme ait suscité un certain intérêt chez les chercheurs modernes, le recours à la voie diplomatique a été largement ignoré. Les exilés politiques ont fréquemment utilisé la diplomatie pour obtenir un soutien et des chances de réintégration dans leur pays. Après une introduction où je place ce sujet dans la question plus générale de l'activisme des exilés politiques (§I), je présente trois manières différentes dont les exilés politiques utilisèrent la diplomatie (§II), en me concentrant sur deux cas – Épidamne et Phlionte – qui expliquent le fonctionnement de leur discours (§III).

MOTS-CLÉS-. exilés politiques, diplomatie, activisme, Épidamne, Phlionte

ABSTRACT-. This paper focuses on diplomacy by political exiles during the Classical Age. Although their agency has attracted some interest from modern scholars, recourse to diplomatic channels has been largely neglected. Yet political exiles often relied upon diplomacy to gain support and chances of reintegration at home. After an introduction where I include this topic in the broader issue of political exiles' agency (§I), I present three different ways in which political exiles made recourse to diplomacy (§II) and I focus on two case studies—Epidamnos and Phlious—that explain how their discourse worked (§III).

KEYWORDS-. political exiles, diplomacy, agency, Epidamnos, Phlious

Although Greek exiles generally adopted a wide range of conduct during their exile and their behaviours cannot be reduced to a single trend, it is a well known fact that, as concerns political exiles the most common tendency in Classical Greece was to continue behaving as citizens of a polis even in exile.¹ And we have to admit that such a tendency continued even later, in the Hellenistic period, when a more individualistic lifestyle went hand in hand with the traditional model of citizenship, a sign of both the persistency and rootedness of this phenomenon.² But what did it exactly mean for an exile to behave as a citizen during his exile? This not only meant, I think, reproducing the political, military and social organization of his native land and the forms in which a citizen of a Greek polis lived, but also engaging in a complex form of activism, imitative of the practices conducted by settled citizens at home and in dialogue with interstate affairs.³ In

(1) SEIBERT 1979, p. 312-314; GEHRKE 1985, p. 224-229; GRAY 2015, p. 310-329.

(2) See on this point the corrections made by GRAY 2015, p. 293, to the view expressed by BALOGH 1943, p. 35-37 and McKECHNIE 1989, p. 3 and *passim* in his introduction. Likewise, LINTOTT 1982, p. 256-257 released the rise in importance of mercenary soldiers from the decline of the city-state, while he linked it rather to the consequences of expulsions following civil wars.

(3) For a survey of political activism perpetrated by exiles see GRAY 2015, p. 310-329.

this contribution I intend to examine recourse to diplomatic channels by political exiles as a form of their political activism abroad, a topic that has been largely neglected by previous scholarship.⁴

Scholars have paid attention, in fact, to other forms of political activism, mainly its political and military features,⁵ even as a consequence of a *stasis*.⁶ So, the existence of governments in exile is a well-known phenomenon.⁷ In particular, the Athenians celebrated the *demos* in exile, on various occasions between 480 and 318 BC, as an example of the preservation of democratic structures and ideals neglected at home in the same periods. Although it cannot be denied that traditions about governments in exile suffered from ideological distortions, this phenomenon was widespread and is well documented.⁸ Moreover, it is undeniable that exiles could serve as mercenaries,⁹ though it is not easy to determine the scale of their number, due to the absence of secure data in the sources.¹⁰ However, from the perspective employed in this paper, it is more interesting to point out the frequency with which political exiles made recourse to recruitment of mercenaries for winning back their homeland.¹¹ In this process it was quite normal to resort to the use of arms by

(4) Some exceptions have to do with Gazzano's treatment of embassies by exiles in Herodotus' work (GAZZANO 2002, p. 47-50) and with Gray's survey on "participation of *poleis*-in-exile in interstate affairs" (GRAY 2015, p. 315-316). However, Gray mentions only a few cases from the Classical period: an embassy by exiled Samian democrats to Sparta (RHODES-OSBORNE 2, ll. 45-48); a Samian embassy to the Spartan navarch Alkidas in Anaia (Thuc. 3.3.32). Some remarks about Alcibiades' discourse in Sparta (Thuc. 6.89-92) are in RUBINSTEIN 2016, p. 120-121, in particular his anxiety to demonstrate that "he adheres to a basic code of trust and allegiance between states" (p. 120), despite his decision to betray Athens.

(5) Besides some general considerations by BALOGH 1943, p. 41 ff. and McKECHNIE 1989, p. 16-29, see also SEIBERT 1979, p. 372-400; GRAY 2015.

(6) According to LINTOTT 1982, p. 226: "In general a great deal of *stasis* must have been fuelled by the desire of those previously defeated or their relatives to repair their status. The nature of the Greek polis was such that it was not easy to acquire a new citizenship; there was not the space in Greece now, as there was in the West, to create new settlements, and there would have been anyhow powerful emotions urging refugees to recover their birthright. For these reasons the existence of a few hundred political exiles was always a threat to any but the most populous states". See also GEHRKE 1985, p. 224-229; BERGER 1992 with regard to *stasis* in Sicily; HANSEN-NIELSEN 2004, p. 124-129.

(7) On Athenian *demos* in exile see GARLAND 2014, p. 68; GRAY 2015, p. 300-306. On the *demos* of Zacynthians in Nello as members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, attested in RHODES-OSBORNE 2, l. 131-134, see HANSEN-NIELSEN 2004, p. 28-29; GRAY 2015, p. 317 with further bibliography. A similar discourse is valid for the Samian in exile that the Athenians seemed to consider as the proper Samian government (RHODES-OSBORNE 2 with commentary by RHODES-OSBORNE 2003, p. 14-17), cf. HANSEN-NIELSEN 2004, p. 29. In general, on the topic of the polis in exile see SEIBERT 1979, p. 372-374; GRAY 2015, p. 310-329.

(8) On the distorted and ideologically shaped representations of governments in exile see THOMAS 1989, p. 131-138, 252-254; WOLPERT 2002, p. 91-95; FORSDYKE 2005, p. 200-201, 260-267 (for the comparison of the Athenian case in 404 BC with other cases in which tyranny was linked to mass exiles); GRAY 2015, p. 301-303.

(9) For the issue of the employment of the wanderers (*planomenoi*) see McKECHNIE 1989, p. 16-33; BEARZOT 2001, p. 50-58; EAD. 2010, p. 69-79. For the case of the Samian exiles (365 BC) served as mercenaries see GARLAND 2014, p. 84.

(10) PARKE 1970² [1933], p. 227-228; McKECHNIE 1989, p. 22-29; TRUNDLE 2004, p. 62, 69; BETTALLI 2013, p. 405; TRUNDLE 2017, p. 40.

(11) Some examples of recourse to mercenaries by political exiles in Classical Greece: oligarchic Samians in Anaia hired 700 mercenaries to return to the island (Thuc. 1.115-117; Diod. 12.27.3); Evarcos, an exile from Acarnania, recruited mercenaries and was reinstalled at home by Corinthians (Thuc. 2.33.1); Colophonian exiles in Notion were supported by Persians and mercenary forces (Thuc. 3.34.1); Corcyraian exiles in Corcyra's *peraia* employed one hundred mercenaries to attack the island after the failure of diplomatic negotiations with Sparta and Corinth (Thuc. 3.85.2-4); exiles from Mitylene and Lesbos attacked Antandros after recruiting mercenaries from Peloponnese (Thuc. 4.52.3); exiles from Chaeronea hired soldiers from Peloponnese in the framework of the Athenian plan to overthrow the constitutional order of Boiotia (Thuc. 4.76.1); exiles from Metymna attacked their native land with the help of a number of mercenaries (Thuc. 8.100.3); during his exile Hermocrates gets money from Persians for hiring mercenaries to go back to Syracuse (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.27-32); Siphnian exiles hired mercenary, perhaps starting from Troizen, planning a *coup d'état* against Siphnos (Isoc. 19.38); Eleian exiles hired Phoikian mercenaries (Diod. 16.63.4).

exiles against their native country.¹² Therefore, frequently ancient sources make reference to exiles' warmongering, their involvement in military campaigns and their physical and military training.¹³

On the contrary, the recourse to diplomatic channels has often been overlooked, presumably because of the episodic and unsystematic character of such actions in ancient narratives. Nonetheless, Greek political exiles seem to have engaged in intense diplomatic activity not so much to renew their relations with the government in power, but to intimidate their opponents, gain restoration at home and guarantee more equitable treatment for themselves in the case of disputes concerning the recovery of their property. In the following pages I start by explaining the ways by which political exiles resorted to diplomacy (section I), then I move on to analyse two case studies that effectively illustrate how their diplomacy worked (Epidamnos, section II; Phlious, section III) and I offer some conclusive remarks on the importance of diplomatic channels during exile (section IV).

I. DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES BY POLITICAL EXILES: THE THREE MAIN PATTERNS

Some preliminary remarks are worth making. When I talk of diplomacy by political exiles I do not mean either the set of proceedings through which a state maintains relations with other subjects of international law, as happened in modern times, in order to solve conflicts or to favour mutual collaboration, or the dispatch of envoys, authorised by the polis and chosen for their respectability and their knowledge of political matters, to deal with specific issues with a foreign city-state.¹⁴ When a political exile made recourse to diplomacy, his action was inspired by personal reasons – especially, but not only, in the case of famous exiles – or was representative of the interests of his group or political faction. In this sense, we can rightly speak of “informal diplomacy” as diplomatic agents exercised it without the authorisation and against the interests of their countries of origin. However, this label could lead to some confusion because in modern studies on contemporary diplomatic discourse there is the tendency to connect informal diplomacy (or pragmatic diplomacy) with propaganda,¹⁵ especially in dealing with governments that have not yet gained recognition by the international community.¹⁶

(12) McKECHNIE 1989, p. 22, has stated: “Many such people (*scil.* οἱ ἀπόλιδες) were desirous of war, then it was by no means irrational that they should be so: to the political exiles, like the Siphnians in the *Aegineticus*, the overthrow of the home government would mean their chance to return; to others, war meant employment and hence a means of support”. With regard to the use of violence and armed forces in Sicily's *staseis*, see BERGER 1992, p. 88-92.

(13) On this point we can mention what Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.17 reports regarding what King Agesilaos made with Phliasian exiles: he instructed them to form common messes (*syssitia*), gave physical training (*gymnazesthai*) to those who wanted and offered arms and money to them. The result was that Sparta could take advantage of an additional contingent of one thousand men well trained and well armed, likely as peltasts if we accept the argument of BETTALLI 2013, p. 426-427. This was clearly facilitated by the general lack of official military training for Greek militia, save Spartan ones. On this point see VAN WEES 2004, p. 89-93; KONIJNENDIJK 2017, p. 39-71, especially p. 60-61 for the lack of soldiers' military training. However, this point is very debated in modern studies: for a survey of different views, see KONIJNENDIJK 2017, p. 39 ff. On Phlious' exiles see below section III.

(14) On the differences between ancient and modern diplomacy see PICCIRILLI 2002, p. 15-20; OTTE 2006, p. 231-232.

(15) What we mean by propaganda here, with no negative connotation, is any official government line by which a state projects a distinctive image of itself in order to keep its system of international relations unaltered, even though in practice it engages in relations with other partners who do not enjoy the same degree of international recognition and with whom there is otherwise no chance to maintain formal relations. In concrete terms one can speak of informal diplomacy when a state carries on a double level of political communication, one pursued formally with its traditional interlocutors, and another suited informally for specific and contingent interests. For a similar view about the relations between South Africa and Taiwan see RAWNSLEY 2000, p. 1-2, 22-48.

(16) See the case of Taiwan that engaged informal relations with the international community in the absence of its full recognition as a state. Cf. RAWNSLEY 2000, p. 23-28.

However, as concerns ancient diplomacy, this concept has sometimes been used as a synonym for an unofficial but authorised mission.¹⁷ In the case of diplomatic activities performed by political exiles we should talk instead of unauthorised delegations that represented neither the interests of their native countries nor those of a central authority, but that rather acted as promoters of their own claims in search of help and formal recognition.¹⁸

We can distinguish at least three different ways in which the diplomatic activities of political exiles took place. First, embassies acted in secret by sending envoys or letters to homeland citizens or receiving information from friends and relatives in order to keep abreast of events at home. Second, representatives of small groups of refugees used legal supplication to plead for help and refuge from the host country.¹⁹ Third, unofficial embassies of political exiles' representatives were dispatched to a friendly country to make demands, normally for restoration or military and economic aid.

Informal exchange of information by letters or movement of people is evidently less attested, as it left few traces in ancient sources and its consequences are not always so tangible. However, some cases can show the importance of contacts with the homeland in influencing and shaping exiles' actions. In this regard, what happened to the Theban exiles in 382 BC, around mid-August, is very indicative.²⁰ After the conquest of Cadmeia by Phoebidas a pro-Spartan government was installed under the leadership of Leontiades. The main leader of the opposite faction, Ismenias, was arrested, and about 300 other dissidents left Thebes as exiles, for fear of being put to death, and found refuge some in the north,²¹ but most in Athens.²² Notwithstanding, it is unclear if exile was the result of formal condemnations or a voluntary choice of political dissidents who did not tolerate the escalation of violence by the new regime.²³ In any case, when Theban exiles reached Athens, they were considered refugees. It is highly probable that an inscription dated back to 383/382 BC and concerning honours for pro-Athenian exiles includes Theban exiles.²⁴ Despite the fragmentary status of the inscription, we can infer from the surviving lines that some exiles were fully assimilated with the Athenians (l. 3-4: καθ'ἅπερ Ἀθην[αῖ]οι), while others received fiscal and military assimilation (*isoteleia*) and juridical protection (l. 5-16),²⁵ and still others obtained fiscal

(17) Eduard Rung used it with regard to the diplomacy between Persia and the Greek city-states after the end of Persian Wars, e.g. in the case of Arthmios of Zeleia. Cf. RUNG 2008, p. 30-31.

(18) For an analogous view see GAZZANO 2002, p. 48, who has emphasized that personal initiative in diplomatic discourse was considered a legitimate form of communication, at least at Herodotus.

(19) I use the term "refugee" to indicate those exiles who presented themselves as *phygades* in search of help and refuge in a friendly country.

(20) SCHACHTER 2016, p. 50 has argued that 382 was Klion's year on the basis of his revision of the Myron-Karditsa hoard of coins.

(21) Maybe in Olynthus, cf. SCHACHTER 2016, p. 50, 180, n. 49 on the basis of Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.15.

(22) Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25-32; Diod. 15.20.2; Nep. *Pel.* 1.4; Plut. *Pel.* 5.3; Plut. *de genio Socratis* 575f-576b. For a discussion of this episode see SEIBERT 1979, p. 112-114; GEHRKE 1985, p. 175-177; BUCK 1994, p. 64-72.

(23) The nature of these exiles is described differently in ancient sources. While according to Xenophon the exiles left Thebes on their own initiative, Diodorus and Plutarch speak of formal exiles in which the exiled faction seems to suffer an undesired expulsion. The aggression against Androcleides could be a sign that these exiles were voluntary and unauthorised.

(24) *IG II²* 37. The identity of exiles who were given such honours is debated: scholars have argued that they were those exiled from Apollonia (WILHELM in *IG II² Addenda* 656-657 n. 37), from Thebes in 379 BC (SEIBERT 1979, p. 113, 481, n. 901) or from Boiotia, including Theban exiles (WALBANK 1982, p. 269-270; STEINBOCK 2013, p. 255-256). For the hypothesis that this inscription should be considered as an amendment of a previous decree concerning only Theban exiles, a kind of extension of rights to other exiles from Boioitia, see GEHRKE 1985, p. 176 n. 175. The inscription is closed by a list of 30 names that indicates the recipients of the grants.

(25) It is matter of debate whether *isoteleia* always included the privilege to fight with the Athenians, as MAFFI 1973, p. 945-957, maintained or whether the possibility to στρατεύεσθαι μετὰ Ἀθηναίων constituted a privilege in itself, as most scholars argued (for this view see most recently DE MARTINIS 2018 with a full discussion of scholarship). Anyway, I think it is not demonstrable that such honour meant that foreign residents—be they metics or exiles—could fight in the same

exemption (*ateleia*) like that previously granted to Theban and Boiotian exiles (l. 16-20).²⁶ Theban exiles received support from the Athenians as a reward for their pristine help in 404 BC, when the Thebans refused Sparta's request to expel the Athenian exiles as officially declared common enemies by the allied cities.²⁷ On that occasion, they enacted a counter-decree by which Athenians who intended to fight against the tyrants in Athens were allowed to march through Boiotia.²⁸ It is possible that Pelopidas' desire to return to Thebes in order to overthrow Leontiades' regime was inspired by Thrasiboulos' example.²⁹ In any event, exchange of information played a key role in the liberation of Thebes. In Plutarch's dialogue *On the daimonion of Socrates*, one of the characters, Archidamus, states that Gorgidas, the leader of the moderate faction, who remained in Thebes even after Phoebidas' coup, informed exiles through letters (διὰ γραμμάτων) about the most important events at home, especially of Sparta's replacement of Phoebidas with Lysanoridas at the command of the expedition to Olynthus and of Ismenias' unhappy end.³⁰ Likewise, Plutarch reports that Pelopidas and the other exiles in Athens sent secret messages to their friends in Thebes telling them what they intended to do.³¹ A similar pattern can be found in the exiles' habit of choosing to remain in the vicinity of their homeland during their exile. This behaviour was typical of those exiles who continued living in marginal areas of their native countries or those who emigrated towards nearby territories, where control by the central authority was less strong.³² In the case of exiles from Sicily, the tendency was to remain on the island and find refuge in friendly cities.³³ It is easy to imagine how useful proximity to the homeland could be in maintaining relations with family, friends and people who shared one's political beliefs. In this regard, Aeneas Tacticus's warnings should be taken seriously. He suggests that magistrates make formal proclamations (κηρύγματα) to deter plotters³⁴: in particular, they should not allow citizens engaging with exiles or their envoys during a siege and sending to or receiving letters from them. Moreover, he recommends checking all the letters sent or received.³⁵ Aeneas identified those who left the city in time of crisis as people who were unsatisfied with the political asset and eager for change.³⁶ This is not to exclude that Aeneas was motivated in his warnings by the realities of his day. Xenophon, for example, reports that while Agesilaus' army

military bodies of the Athenians, as DE MARTINIS 2018, p. 43-44 maintained, but only that recipients gained the theoretical right to participate in the same military campaigns as the Athenians, as is clearly shown by the formulation ὅταν καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύωνται in IG II² 505, l. 54-56.

(26) That recipients of these grants were exiles is quite sure: καθάπερ τοῖς] ἐξεληλυθόσ[ι] (l. 17).

(27) See now BEARZOT forthcoming.

(28) Plut. *Pel.* 6.4-5. On the Spartan extradition request of the Athenian exiles and on the Theban "counter-decree" in support of Athenian exiles, see BEARZOT forthcoming. For the extradition practices in ancient Greece, see LONIS 1988, who has stressed the scarce frequency with which extradition was granted. For the idea that Athenian support for Theban exiles was motivated by the desire to repay them for their help to the democratic exiles in 404 BC, see STEINBOCK 2013, p. 254-260. It is in the same framework that we can place two fragments of a court speech *For Pherenicus on Androcleides' inheritance* (Lys. 135 fr. 286-287 Carey) where an unknown Athenian citizen plead the case on behalf of Pherenicus, a Theban exile located in Athens, who later participated in the liberation of Thebes (Plut. *Pel.* 7.4). On this discourse see TODD 2000, p. 352-354; STEINBOCK 2013, p. 257-259.

(29) Plut. *Pel.* 7.1-2. Cf. GEORGIADOU 1997, p. 100-103. A desire to imitate Athenians has been identified as the reason for introducing alphabetic reforms by pro-Athenian Theban exiles when they returned home. Cf. PAPAZARKADAS 2016.

(30) Plut. *de genio Socratis* 576A. On Gorgidas' role after the coup, see GONZÁLEZ 1996.

(31) Plut. *Pel.* 7.3.

(32) On the occupation of marginal areas by exiles see VAN WEES 2008, p. 15 and n. 27 (with reference to the 6th century BC); GRAY 2015, p. 309-310. On Hellenistic countryside as a place of political conflict see CHANIOTIS 2008, p. 116-117. On exiles' habit to settle *peraiiai* see LODDO 2019a with further bibliography.

(33) BERGER 1992, p. 102-103.

(34) On the meaning of κήρυγμα in the framework of oral communication, see LIDDEL 2017, p. 129-130.

(35) Aen. Tact. 10.6 with commentaries by WHITEHEAD 1990 and BETTALLI 1990.

(36) PRETZLER 2017, p. 153-155, has pointed out that people who could betray the city during a crisis were those who had nothing to lose.

was at the gates of the city of Phlious together with the Phliasian exiles, any Phliasians who came out from the city for friendship or kinship with the exiles were invited to join with their friends and relatives among them in common messes.³⁷

However, we know of another form of communication concerning exiles. Sometimes they could rely on the intercession of authoritative persons who enjoyed international prestige. Isocrates, for example, used his reputation to ensure the safe return home of Agenor of Mytilene, his grandsons' music teacher, when he wrote to Mytilene's *archontes* something like a "letter of recommendation".³⁸ It is interesting to note that Isocrates, in his request, makes reference not only to the personal merits of his *protégés*, namely their ability and celebrity as musicians, but also to Mytilene's recent political history, when he mentions its decision to recall some exiles in order to promote reconciliation and to restore their confiscated property.³⁹

At other times, exiles could promote their cause on their own by presenting themselves as refugees in need of protection and support. On this point, we should make reference to the several requests for help made to Athens by political exiles in the course of the fourth century as a reward for their loyalty to the Athenians. This is the case, for example, of some refugees from Abdera (*IG* II³ 1 302), Delphi (*IG* II² 109), Akarnania (*IG* II³ 1 316) and Thessaly (*IG* II² 545). These inscriptions deal with honours and provisions in favour of loyal exiles that were taken as valid until they returned home, but for the present discourse it is worth pointing out the difficulty of understanding the manners in which negotiations took place because of their formulaic phrasing.⁴⁰ In some cases, we know that the spokesman for the refugees addressed a legal supplication to the Athenian council and assembly with a call for assistance. In a similar formulaic manner, the Athenians expressed the reasons for granting what the exiles pleaded for: they could be labelled as benefactors (εὐεργέται) or friends (φίλοι) of the Athenians, their good will (εὐνοία) towards the *demos* could be praised, or their exile could be attributed to their loyalty to Athens.⁴¹

The third manner is better attested, although, with few exceptions, we have no direct speech of a diplomatic nature from political refugees.⁴² Sometimes the diplomatic negotiations of these exiles are only mentioned in the sources, as in the case of those Samians, expelled by the tyrant Polycrates, who went to Sparta to ask for help. Herodotus focuses on the loquacity of these refugees, who spoke at length (ἔλεγον πολλά) of their situation, so that at the end of their speech the Spartans stated they had forgotten what the Samians had said at the beginning.⁴³ Herodotus seems more interested in considering the humorous effects of the laconic response to the Ionic wordiness of the Samians rather than to the embassy in itself. Fortunately, on other occasions we are well informed about the manner and consequences of the exiles' embassies about their fate and the repercussions on the international stage. In this respect, I would like to focus on two episodes that show these features: embassies by Epidamnian and Phliasian exiles.

(37) Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.17. For the expulsion of relatives and friends of exiles in 310 BC Syracuse, see Diod. 20.15.3. Cf. BERGER 1992, p. 50.

(38) For this definition see CECCARELLI 2013, p. 286-292.

(39) Isoc. *ep.* 7.1-4.

(40) LODDO forthcoming.

(41) For the representation of loyal refugees in the public discourse of host *poleis* see GRAY 2015, p. 297-299.

(42) See mainly Alcibiades' discourse in Sparta (Thuc. 6.89-92), on which see LODDO 2019b.

(43) Hdt. 3.46.1.

II. DIPLOMATIC DISCOURSE AND EPIDAMNIAN POLITICAL EXILES

The city of Epidamnos was founded in 627 or 625 BC by Corcyra, along with some Corinthians and Dorians; the Corinthian Phalios was the oecist.⁴⁴ Thucydides reports the story of the founding of Epidamnos in the framework of his account of the civil strife that took place in the city in 436/435 BC, a few years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.⁴⁵ This episode of *stasis* probably was the result of a constitutional change.⁴⁶ With regard to this point, Aristotle, in reflecting on the constitutional change in general, deals with the Epidamnos case in the framework of the changes affecting only a part of the constitution, through the abolition or introduction of a charge.⁴⁷ At Epidamnos, indeed, the people overthrew the oligarchic government, replaced a body of phylarchs with a council, and probably introduced a popular assembly.⁴⁸ It is disputed whether or not another reference to a *stasis* episode in Aristotle's *Politics* should be linked to the events of 436 BC.⁴⁹ Aristotle makes reference to the same constitutional change when in Book 5 he writes that the cause of the constitutional change at Epidamnos was a dispute between two citizens concerning matrimonial affairs: a citizen had betrothed his daughter to a man whose father, once he became an *archon*, sentenced him to a fine; hence, the father of the girl, thinking he had been treated badly formed a party with those who were outside the civic group (ἐκτὸς τῆς πολιτείας) to help him in the riot.⁵⁰ However, it is not Aristotle who gives us a description of the following civil strife in the city. Our main sources for this episode are Thucydides' report in Book 1 and the corresponding account by Diodorus in Book 12.⁵¹ The *stasis* provisionally ended with the expulsion of the defeated party, after the *demos* had forced the oligarchic faction (οἱ δυνατοί) into exile and established a democratic regime.⁵² We do not know precisely where those who were expelled took refuge, but they likely settled not far from Epidamnos, since they recruited mercenary troops among the Illyrians and engaged with them in plundering the territory of Epidamnos by land and sea.⁵³ The constant harassment by these exiles and their alliance with the neighbour barbarians constituted a matter of concern for the settled citizens, who turned to their mother-country Corcyra to solve the dispute with them. Some ambassadors, in fact, were sent to the Corcyraians with a request for reconciliation with the exiles (τοὺς φεύγοντες ξυναλλάξαι σφίσι), but this attempt was unsuccessful, although they addressed a formal supplication to the Corcyraians.⁵⁴ In response to Corcyra's refusal to intervene,⁵⁵ Epidamnos addressed the same request to the Corinthians, and after questioning

(44) On the foundation of Epidamnos see GIUFFRIDA 2002; COCCIOLI 2009. On the traditions about its foundation see INTRIERI 2002, p. 44-46; ANTONETTI 2007, p. 93-96.

(45) The different chronology offered by Diodorus who puts the episode under the archonship of Glaucides in 439 BC is mistaken.

(46) For a detailed account of this episode see GEHRKE 1985, p. 60-62; WILKES-FISHER HANSEN 2004, p. 330. For the role of this episode in the framework of the war between Corcyra and Corinth see HORNBLLOWER 1991, p. 66-97.

(47) On the Aristotelian passages about episodes of *stasis* in Epidamnos, see REGGIANI 2016, p. 376-378.

(48) Arist. *Pol.* 5.1.1301b 21-26. GEHRKE 1985, p. 60 has argued that a popular assembly replaced the phylarchs.

(49) *Status quaestionis* in REGGIANI 2016, p. 377-378.

(50) Arist. *Pol.* 5.1.1304a 13-17.

(51) Thuc. 1.24.5-30.4; Diod. 12.30.2-31.

(52) On the brief democratic interlude at Epidamnos (436-433 BC), see ROBINSON 2011, p. 128-129.

(53) Thuc. 1.24.5. On the relationship between Epidamnos and the Illyrians see BAKHUIZEN 1986.

(54) Thuc. 1.24.7: ταῦτα δὲ ἰκέται καθεζόμενοι ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον ἐδέοντο. Recourse to supplication turns out to be problematic, as such an instance concerned relations between a colony and the mother-country. It cannot be ruled out that the Epidamnians presented themselves as *hiketai* because they recognized difficulties in their relationship with Corcyra, cf. INTRIERI 2002, p. 41-42. The argument concerning family ties or friendship was often employed by suppliants (see NAIDEN 2006, p. 86-88), but it was rare for a colony to use it. On the relationship between embassies and supplication, see GAZZANO 2019, who also considers this case.

(55) Thuc. 1.24.6; Diod. 12.30.3.

the Delphic oracle offered them the city in return for military support.⁵⁶ The Corinthians agreed to intervene and sent a military contingent to Apollonia, but their intervention was interpreted as an interference in the political affairs of Corcyra.⁵⁷ So, the Corcyraians ordered the Epidamnians in the city to receive the exiles and expel the Corinthian troops from the island.⁵⁸ But the Epidamnians did not obey these orders and the Corinthians issued a proclamation for sending a colony to Epidamnos.⁵⁹ The ensuing events led to the outbreak of the war between Corinth and Corcyra.

What is important for our discussion is that the return of the exiles to Epidamnos was the result of the negotiations of the exiles with a foreign country. This element becomes even more significant if we turn our attention to the fact that the foreign power here concerned was the mother country, which at first had refused to intervene in favour of the *demos* of Epidamnos, despite its bond of consanguinity with him, but then supported the cause of the exiles.⁶⁰ This behaviour was in fact inappropriate and against the law of the Hellenes.⁶¹ One of the most crucial differences between the appeal of the *demos* and that of the *dynatoi* lies in the form by which they addressed Corcyra. While in the case of the democratic faction, as I said earlier, Thucydides states that its representatives made a supplication to the Heraion, the exiles' appeal is not described by the historian in the same way, but in terms of an equal partnership.⁶² I actually think that a part of the *dynatoi* already were in Corcyra when they addressed their request for reintegration, since they were previously received in the island as refugees. This argument would better explain not only Corcyra's refusal to accept the supplication of the democrats, but also their need to address a legal supplication to their mother country. These exiles appeared to really be active during their exile. As we have seen, they came into contact with the Illyrians and represented a constant danger for those settled in Epidamnos. Their incessant movements between Epidamnos' coasts and countryside and their base camp in Corcyra allowed them to maintain contacts with their partisans in Epidamnos and to stay informed about politics there. In their discourse – strictly speaking, in what remains of such discourse in Thucydides' account – the exiles' delegates appeared to act as promoters of their interests in the same terms as ordinary envoys would and to reproduce the same political actions that they would have taken as citizens *de optimo iure*. In the middle of a war, in fact, they would have appealed to a foreign power, *in primis* to their mother country, to seek military and economic help. Besides, they showed themselves to be well informed on the political situation in the country. This assertion is confirmed by the concomitance between the news concerning Corinth's intervention in favour of the *demos* of Epidamnos and the delivery of the city to the Corinthians and the request for reintegration addressed by the exiles to Corcyra. In using the verb αἰσθάνομαι (“to realize”), Thucydides does not explicitly credit the exiles with the information given to the Corcyraians regarding the delivery of Epidamnos to Corinth, but it cannot be a coincidence that the exiles made demands to be reintegrated at home to Corcyra just at a time when the residents at Epidamnos were changing their system of alliance. Presumably, a delegation of those exiles who had just returned from Epidamnos went to Corcyra to ask for support and reintegration. It is clear that the main aim of the diplomatic discourse by the Epidamnians in exile was to get a chance to go back (κατάγειν) to Epidamnos. However, this goal could not be reached without a clear legitimization of their

(56) Thuc. 1.25.1-2. For the role of the Delphic oracle see INTRIERI 2002, p. 47-49.

(57) Thuc. 1.26.1; Diod. 12.30.4.

(58) Thuc. 1.26.3.

(59) Thuc. 1.26.4-27.1.

(60) On this argument see below n. 68.

(61) NAIDEN 2006, p. 87, 132; FRAGOULAKI 2013, p. 76.

(62) This contrast has already been recognized by INTRIERI 2016, p. 255, who has pointed out the tendency of Epidamnos' aristocrats to connect themselves with the founders of the colony. In her perspective it is interesting to stress the persistence in Epidamnos of an aristocratic cult of the oecist up to the Hellenistic period (IG IX, I², 4, 1140).

status as refugees. In particular, the diplomatic strategy of the refugees focused on showing that the expulsion they suffered was illegal and that they were the true owners of the land. The very aim of the discourse on the ancestral tombs concerns the exiles' claim to legitimate themselves as the only political force with which to engage in dialogue.

In this respect, Simon Hornblower has pointed out that Thucydides' use of the verb ἀποδείκνυμι indicates that the exiles made their speeches in the theatre at Corcyra precisely in order to show the Corcyraians the tombs of their common ancestors located in the necropolis outside the city walls.⁶³ This stands to reason, since Thucydides strictly links the presence of the delegates at Corcyra to the issue of the tombs.⁶⁴ I suggest that the aristocratic exiles presented themselves as the descendants of the Corcyraian colonists of Epidamnos by leading it to believe that the democratic faction in Epidamnos was linked to the Corinthian element.

A variation on this theme can be found in the so-called Plataean debate, in which the tombs at issue are not used for marking the identity of a community but for outlining the good behaviour towards an ally. In particular, this is part of Plataea's attempt to show off its previous benefits towards Sparta.⁶⁵ The Plataean delegates Astimachos and Lacon refer to the presence at Plataea of the tombs of the Spartan dead in the Second Persian War, by stressing that "each year the Plataeans honored them with garments and all other dues, as friends from a friendly country and allies to our old companions in arms".⁶⁶ The honours paid to the Spartan ancestors not only help shift the focus onto a period when Sparta and Plataea were united against a common enemy, but can be used as an argument to prove that Plataea has always observed its old alliance with Sparta. However, this argument was not unchallengeable. The Theban ambassadors' reply includes a firm rebuttal of this issue: "Nor let them fare ever the better for their lamentation or your compassion when they cry out upon your fathers' sepulchres and their own want of friends".⁶⁷

The second topic presented by the delegates in their discourse is that of kinship (ξυγγένεια).⁶⁸ Generally, we can say that these two themes – ancestral tombs and kinship—are closely linked, as kinship presupposes common customs and shared religious beliefs. In the case of Epidamnos, political exiles could claim not only a common Dorian origin, but also their descent from the Heraclidai. Strabo credits the Heraclidai with the foundation of Corcyra, and Appian attests to the fact that the citizens of Dyrrachium claimed Heracles as their founder.⁶⁹ This could be said because, according to Thucydides, the Corinthian Phalios, a descendant of Heracles, was the oecist of Epidamnos.⁷⁰ Such a claim may seem meaningless if we consider that not only the aristocratic exiles, but all Epidamnians shared the same origins and could purport to be ξυγγενεῖς of the Corcyraians. However, Corcyra's refusal to provide help to the envoys of the *demos* makes evident that this topic was better exploited by the exiles, who evoked the theme of common kinship as a way of defining their identity as a group and of achieving legitimacy in the eyes of their mother country. To mention both common kinship and sharing of common ancestors in their discourse was the way exiles chose to present themselves as the only real political interlocutor for Corcyra and to

(63) HORNBLOWER 1991, p. 77.

(64) Thuc. 1.26.3.

(65) Thuc. 3.58.4-6, 59.2. Cf. GRETHLEIN 2012, p. 62.

(66) Thuc. 3.58.4.

(67) Thuc. 3.67.2.

(68) On the argument of kinship in the Epidamnos episode, see PICCIRILLI 2002, p. 80-82; SAMMARTANO 2012, p. 505-508; FRAGOULAKI 2013, p. 64-81, and in general in the diplomatic discourse, see among others JONES 1999, p. 6-80; PICCIRILLI 2002, p. 79-88. For the importance of the concept of *syngeneia* in the system of relations among Greek states see GIOVANNINI 2007, p. 62-68.

(69) Strab. 6.2.4; Ap. BC 2.6.39.

(70) See *supra* p. 13 n. 44.

legitimate their position on the international stage. Their strategy was successful. The Corcyraians not only supported their plea, by imposing their return on the democratic faction, but also probably reintegrated them after their victory over the Corinthians.⁷¹

III. THE *STASIS* OF PHLIOUS AND RECOURSE TO DIPLOMACY

The case of the Epidamnian exiles shows how recourse to a foreign power could play a decisive role in gaining reintegration at home. Most frequently in the course of fifth and fourth centuries political exiles could consider a hegemonic power as a privileged interlocutor for seeking redress, especially when their expulsion resulted from civil strife. We should place in the same context the plea of the Phliasian exiles to Sparta in the years following the Peace of Antalcidas (387/6 B.C.). Our best source of information on the events concerning Phliasian exiles is Xenophon's *Hellenika*, which uses the examples of *staseis* in Thebes and Phlious to analyse the goodness of the prevalent hegemonic model before the rise of Thebes as hegemonic power.⁷² According to him, after the end of the Corinthian war a group of exiles from Phlious, who presumably had never left the Peloponnese, resorted to diplomacy to gain their return. It is not perfectly clear when this group was formed, if during the Corinthian war or right after it. Likewise, the real causes of the *stasis* are unknown, and it is not easy to determine if the expulsions were linked to a constitutional change in Phlious.⁷³ The traditional view maintains that the exiles who asked for help from Sparta were an oligarchical faction that had been expelled by the new democratic government.⁷⁴ Alternatively, some believe that Phlious was a moderate democracy when the exiles were expelled, but that its democracy did not result from a constitutional change, since it was already a long-standing achievement.⁷⁵ Lastly, some scholars prefer to think that these expulsions were provoked by a dispute within the oligarchic faction in power in Phlious without any revolutions.⁷⁶ What is certain is the exiles' pro-Spartan alignment in foreign policy, an issue they used to request assistance from the Lacedaemonians. To this end their delegates went to Sparta in the belief that it was a propitious moment to make claims (καὶρὸν ἡγησάμενοι).⁷⁷ This statement implies that the exiles, though they had been expelled some time before, were waiting for the appropriate occasion to come forward. And what better time than when Sparta decided to examine its allies' behaviour in the aftermath of the recent war? The example of the extremely harsh treatment of Mantinea, which Sparta had broken up into its constituent villages, likely became the tinder for resuming hostilities with the government in power in Phlious.⁷⁸ So shortly afterwards, in 385 BC, the envoys of the Phliasian exiles said that they had gone to Sparta to declare that "so long as they were at home in Phlious, the city had received the Lacedaemonians within its walls, and its people had gone with them on their campaigns wherever they led the way; but that after the Phliasians had driven them into exile, they had declined to follow anywhere, and had refused to receive the Lacedaemonians—and them alone

(71) Thuc. 1.29.5; Diod. 12.30.5. The complete victory of the Corcyraians over the Corinthians and the capitulation of the democrats in Epidamnus led to believe that exiles' reintegration was among the conditions imposed on Epidamnus. Cf. ROBINSON 2011, p. 129.

(72) BUXTON 2017.

(73) On the possible explanations of this *stasis* see GRAY 2015, p. 208-209.

(74) Among others see LEGON 1967, p. 324-337; RICE 1974, p. 171-175; CARTLEDGE 1987, p. 226-229, 262-266; DAVERIO ROCCHI 2004.

(75) GEHRKE 1985, p. 127-128.

(76) THOMPSON 1970; PICCIRILLI 1974; FONTANA 2014, p. 200-235.

(77) Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.8-10.

(78) Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1-7, 6.4.18; Diod. 15.5.1, 12. Cf. BEARZOT 2004, p. 37-43.

of all men—within their gates”.⁷⁹ Despite the conciseness and indirect form of the speech, we can observe that exiles used some technical terms typical of diplomatic language. Thus they claimed to have gone to Sparta to illustrate (ἐδίδασκον) the situation in Phlious. Ambassadors normally use the verb διδάσκειν to offer an explanation or to persuade their interlocutor.⁸⁰ The most obvious context for their speech is probably the Spartan assembly, as shown by the fact that it was the ephors who passed judgment on their reasons. The exiles, in fact, denounced an official infringement of Phlious’ alliance with Sparta. In addition, they cast doubts on the loyalty of the government in charge towards Sparta by suggesting that a change of alliances was already under way. In so doing, they probably made implicit reference to the lack of participation of Phlious in the battle of Nemeia in 395 BC, which the Phliasians had justified under the guise of religious duties.⁸¹ Moreover, they assumed that the government in charge refused a stable Spartan presence in Phlious. This could be a reference to the refusal of a Spartan garrison in the city rather than the ban prohibiting any Spartan citizen from entering Phlious. Anyway, it is worthy observing that the envoys opened a *de facto* international crisis: the Spartan envoys went to Phlious to make note of the political friendship between the exiles and the Spartan government (ἔλεγον ὡς φίλοι μὲν οἱ φυγάδες τῇ Λακεδαιμονίῳ πόλει εἶεν). The first Spartan embassy to Phlious is particularly interesting because it offers some clues of the arguments used by the exiles in their speech in Sparta.⁸² We can infer that the exiles not only presented themselves as friends of Sparta, but also linked their expulsion to their pro-Spartan political line. This statement is consistent with what Xenophon says in Book 4, on the occasion of Iphicrates’ invasion of Phlious, where he openly mentions *lakonismos* as the main reason for the expulsion of the exiles (ἐπὶ λακωνισμῷ).⁸³ Obviously such an explanation for their exile justifies the Spartan judgement on this matter, i.e. that their supporters had been exiled for no wrong-doing (ἀδικοῦντες δ’ οὐδὲν φεύγοιεν) and explains why the Spartans stated that they considered it a right (ἄξιοῦν δ’ ἔφασαν) to facilitate their return in Phlious. The outcome of the embassy was successful and the Phliasian exiles were able to return home.

The Phliasian exiles turned to diplomacy again after their return. Although the settled Phliasians promised to restore the exiles’ confiscated property and to resolve any disputes by legal means,⁸⁴ the exiles complained that the people of Phlious refused to grant them any concessions and had assigned the role of judges to the very persons who had abused them.⁸⁵ It was in this framework, and for fear of retaliation, that the exiles’ envoys turned once again to Sparta. The content of their speech, despite its indirect form, can be reconstructed in broad terms.⁸⁶ They essentially complained of their wrong treatment by the ruling class in Phlious, first mentioning the denial of rights, as agreed upon with the Spartans (λέγοντες ὅτι πολλοῖς καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐ δοκοῖεν δίκαια πάσχειν), and then complaining of the lack of separation between the political power and the judicial one, such as the political authority that had decreed their banishment and the confiscation of their properties, which was the very same that later denied the exiles the right to recover them. Lastly, they denounced their obligation to be judged by a court in the city (ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει). This point in particular was perceived as an unfair measure, as the exiles had asked to be

(79) Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.8 (translation is by C.L. Brownson).

(80) Orsi 2002, p. 72-73.

(81) Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16.

(82) Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.9.

(83) Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15. The Phliasians claimed that it was because they had feared the recall of the exiles that they did not receive the Lacedaemonians within the walls. For an analogous claim by the pro-Athenian faction in Corinth during the Corinthian war, see Dem. 20.52-53. Cf. LDDO forthcoming.

(84) Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.10.

(85) Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.10.

(86) Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.10-12.

judged by an impartial court (ἐν ἴσῳ δικαστηρίῳ κρίνεσθαι). This is a frequent claim by restored exiles, after a reconciliation or an amnesty has taken place. Based on the comparison with other pieces of evidence, it has been suggested that the returned exiles asked their disputes to be judged by foreign judges or by a foreign court located in Phlious⁸⁷ or, alternatively, by an internal court composed equally of former exiles and residents.⁸⁸ However, we can observe that those restored deplored the fact that they had been judged ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει, convinced that they had thus not been able to receive fair treatment within Phlious. In this respect, the proper interpretation of ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει may be that the exiles had refused to be judged in Phlious, requesting instead that any controversies should be decided by a court located outside their city. Evidence from fourth century Tegea can represent a good parallel for our case. During the reconciliation, which apparently occurred after the promulgation of Alexander's Exiles Decree, Tegea elaborated a complex system for judging disputes concerning the recovery of property: in addition to a civic tribunal (πολιτικὸν δικαστήριον), they established a foreign court (ξενικὸν δικαστήριον) in operation for sixty days, probably located in Tegea, and made up of foreign judges, and a tribunal located in Mantinea to oversee disputes that arose after the period of activity of the foreign court.⁸⁹ In the case of foreign judges, they were requested to remain even for long periods,⁹⁰ but Tegea's case shows that sometimes their stay could be for a fixed limit. Yet the exiles' refusal to be judged in Phlious could conceal their aspiration to leave to Sparta the task of solving disputes. In the case of Phlious, it was logical to suppose that the pro-Spartan exiles expected the Spartan intervention to be favourable to them. The Phliasian exiles' recourse to diplomacy was essentially successful. The argument of an alleged injustice had the merit of making Sparta well-disposed towards them, facilitating their return and protecting them from judicial abuses by the other Phliasians.

CONCLUSION

The activism of political exiles is quite evident, not only from their involvement in politics and military affairs, but also in their recourse to diplomacy. Of the three main patterns that we can observe, recourse to the help of a foreign power was the most frequent. Although we lack diplomatic discourses by political exiles in *oratio recta*, their speeches in indirect form show that diplomacy was a possible path to follow before, though not in place of, resorting to arms. Generally, we can say that the diplomacy practised by exiles tended to reproduce the same formats followed by official ambassadors. This applies also to the lexicon used by their envoys, which does not differ from that of ordinary envoys. Their arguments for requesting aid relied upon kinship and friendship, but they were prompt to outline the unfairness of their expulsions. Likewise, a strategy often employed was to associate their exile with their loyal behaviour towards their allies, presenting the wrong suffered by them as a wrong made against their allies. The main goal of such diplomacy was to obtain military and economic support enabling them to return to their homeland. For this purpose, exiles explained their situation, expressed opinions and value judgments, criticised the behaviour of their opponents, complained about the wrongful treatment they had suffered, and asked for assistance.

(87) For this interpretation see PICCIRILLI 1974, p. 67; GEHRKE 1985, p. 129; LONIS 1991, p. 106 n. 6; FONTANA 2014, p. 216; GRAY 2015, p. 206.

(88) GRAY 2015, p. 206 has considered this as a possibility.

(89) *Syll.*³ 306 = RHODES-OSBORNE 101, l. 24-36. On the judicial machinery that operated in Tegea see LODDO 2016, p. 247-250 with further bibliography. See also MAGNETTO 2015, p. 31-32.

(90) SCAFURO 2014, p. 267. This habit of sending judges to any city that requested their intervention is reflected in terminology, as these judges were called *μετάπεμπτοι* or *ἀποσταλέντες*, literally "sent". Cf. MAGNETTO 2015, p. 30.

However, political exiles rarely used diplomacy to communicate with those who had expelled them. Their prevalent strategy was to harass their native countries in order to scare them into seeking reconciliation. If this did not work, they preferred to turn to a foreign power—the mother country in the case of the Epidamnians, or a hegemonic power in the case of the Phliasians—heedless to the dangers that such behaviour could wreak upon their countries of origins. The only thing that mattered was, after all, to return home.

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