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# Urbanization and land disputes in Việt Nam : compromises and protests

Yves Duchère

**Key words:** moral economy, urbanization, Việt. Nam, Party-State authoritarianism, resistances

## Summary

Urbanization is the *modus operandi* of Việt. Nam 's integration into globalization and the “urban civilization” project is part of the expression of a new authoritarian norm.

The first part of the article discusses how the Vietnamese Party-State justifies its hegemonic urbanization project.

The second part returns to the modalities of strengthening the control of the political-administrative apparatus over the urban manufacturing process by the way of compromise and arrangements between actors.

The last part focuses on the authoritarian nature of urbanization and addresses the increasingly sensitive question of the resistance (material, statutory, ideological) of subordinates to a domination that is no longer bearable for them.

Based on the results of five-year doctoral research in geography conducted in the Red River Delta on the issue of acting in the urban factory in Hanoi, this research has been the subject of a book detailing stakeholder strategies, power relations and the resulting geography <sup>1</sup>.

The objective of this communication is to make Vietnamese political economy clearer in the field of urban manufacturing <sup>2</sup> by identifying the techniques and strategies of the authorities to impose "urban civilization" as a new authoritarian norm and thereby strengthen their legitimacy.

The second objective proposes to underline the existence of resistance and infra-politics among subordinates.

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<sup>1</sup> Duchère (Y.), 2019, *Hanoi and its region. A geography of compromise in authoritarian regime*, Les Indes Savantes, 265 p.

<sup>2</sup> "Process by which the interaction between urban society and the city, in its material reality, spaces and territories, produces a specific urban in perpetual transformation" (H. Noizet, 2003).

The research uses a combination of methods including field surveys, bibliographic research and careful observation of socio-political events. The situations of domination that interest us are approached through the prism of the concept of "moral economy"[J. Scott, 1992] and Antonio Gramsci's theory of "hegemony".

This paper is partly in line with the work of Kleinen [John Kleinen, 2015], B. Kerkvliet [2014, 2015] on the "dialogical" politic, J. Ségard and M. Gibert [2015] on "negotiated authoritarianism", M. Gainsborough about the non-monolithic organization of the VCP or Marie Lan Nguyen Leroy [M. Nguyễn Leroy Lân, 2015] and Nguyễn Hồng Anh [2006] on dysfunctions or collusions between institutions of the political-administrative machine. With regard to the relationship between urban civilization, authoritarian evictions and property rights, we refer to the work of E. Harms, whose book published in 2016 explains, among other things, how land use rights crystallize democratic aspirations linked in particular to the right to the city in a illiberal context. Other Vietnamese research, without systematically being complacent towards the authorities, prefers to give land-based resistance movements an economic meaning rather than question what they tell us about the deterioration of relations between the population and its management structures [Lê Hiếu, 2010 ; Nguyễn Duy Thăng, 2004 ; Nguyễn Văn Sửu , 2009].

## **I. Urbanization, between voluntarism and state project**

### **a. Urbanization and administrative reforms**

The urban growth rate in Việt Nam (3,5 %/year since 2000) [World Bank, 2015, 2] and the share of urban dwellers (35,2 % in 2017)<sup>3</sup> attest to the progress of urban transition, which is accompanied by powerful metropolitan dynamics, particularly at Hồ Chí Minh city (economic capital), Hà Nội (political capital) and

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<sup>3</sup> 14,7 % in 1960, 20,2 % in 1990, 33 % in 2014 (<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=VN>, consulted on 01/15/19)

Đà Nẵng (city in the center of the country benefiting from the development of coastal industrialization).

The authorities still operate on a highly centralized model and governed by five-year plans, which does not necessarily make it possible to think of the city in accordance with the speed of its development. The lack of transversality of urban planning (sectoral plans) also does not favour the design of development plans and effective master plans. In any case, these plans are most often bypassed by interest groups (*nhóm lợi ích*)<sup>4</sup>.

But the Vietnamese city is not only the result of "top-down" urban planning, the inhabitants also take part in the urban factory by sneaking between laws and regulations (*lách luật*). *In situ* urbanization, from below or endogenous urbanization, then covers the same reality: urban development that is beyond the control of the authorities and that contributes to urban sprawl and building densification.

Faced with the social, economic and environmental challenges of urban development, the Party-State undertook a decentralization process from the 1990s onwards, aimed at giving local authorities, led by the provinces, more room for manoeuvre. These changes can be analyzed as a draft of decentralization (or rather deconcentration), they can just as easily be likened to a political lure allowing the central power to maintain its hold while giving the impression of opening up<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> For TS. Lê Đăng Doanh "Interests groups in Việt. Nam are characterized by people who have a position, some power and relations with public servants in the budget, banking, investment, real estate, mine, forest, sea fields" (Lê Đăng Doanh, 2012, p 277 and 278). Interests groups aim private and local interest at the expense of public interest and operate in an informal and illegal space. In real estate, interests groups, thanks corruption and their relations, obtain lands and build, for example, ghost residential area, ineffective economic exclusive zones or useless infrastructures (An Giang airport for example : <https://tuoitre.vn/them-san-bay-an-giang-khi-san-bay-can-tho-dang-e-20171004111319674.htm>, consulted on 3/10/19). In agreement with Nguyễn Quang A (former director of the IDS research institute), it seems that the first interests group is the Communist Party of Việt. Nam.

<sup>5</sup> About decentralization and recentralization, we refer to the reading of *Vietnam. Rethinking the State* [M. Gainsborough, 2010, chapter 3]. Nevertheless, it's important to keep in mind that localism is very developed in Việt. Nam.

Political decision-making and the room for manoeuvre enjoyed by local authorities are conditioned by their connections with the central government and by their ability to modulate decisions from higher levels. It is therefore an ambivalent system based on a mixture of compromise, ideological voluntarism, trial and error and adaptation to local requirements that is being put in place.

**b. “Urban civilization”, a state project that is a source of legitimacy**

Hà Nội, or rather its metropolitan modernization, is a state project. This modernity project led by the Ministry of Construction and the Prime Minister is embodied by the slogan: "green, civilized, modern and cultural city". This leitmotiv, chanted by the supporters of a metropolis of international standing, semantically and publicly records certain popular expectations of urban modernity (*hiện đại*). The population and the public authorities discuss and exchange ideas around a more or less shared reference framework. Through persuasion and propaganda, the authorities forge the "common sense" of populations (such as making people believe a civilized society is necessarily an urban society). “Urban civilization” is not only a marketing slogan which emphasizes life quality and lifestyle, it’s also the conceptualization of a form of citizenship founded on exclusion [E. Harms, 2016, chapter 2] because it’s the result of authoritarian practices such as evictions or changes in functions imposed on land <sup>6</sup> [M. Gibert, J. Ségard, 2016, 6].

The urban project of the Vietnamese capital is presented by the authorities as a bearer of the modern values of a contemporary society integrated into the world economy. The legitimacy of the CPV is not only based on its ability to create wealth, comfort and prosperity. Its legitimacy also depends on its ability to engage

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<sup>6</sup> *Văn minh đô thị* (urban civilization), is derived from the chinese *wenming* (文明). For the regime, as there are some civilized spaces, there are some non-civilized spaces. The concept of *văn minh* has been used to denigrate ethnic minorities of the margins of Viet Nam. This concept is also part of a process of social distinction, particularly between the rural world populated by *nhà quê* and the urban world inhabited by civilized city dwellers. This distinction operates between the new urban area (Khu đô thị mới) and the rest of the city too.

in dialogue with the people and to allow a "controlled relaxation of domination in certain spheres of social life" whose purpose is to "provide an escape from the regime's control"[M. Grawitz, J. Leica, 1985]. So, we can define the authoritarianism of the Vietnamese regime as a soft and dialogical authoritarianism.

**Figure 1: Enlargement of the province of Hà Nội (August 2008)**

**Figure 2: Planning project of the new Hanoi city**

If the discourses <sup>7</sup> praising the merits of a modern city connected to the world can be associated with an obvious process of legitimization of the central power, they can also serve to conceal political and economic mechanisms that are more or less clear and justifiable to the population.

Thus, the expansion of Hà Nội (Figure 1) in August 2008 is a striking example in several respects, in particular because it makes it possible to identify the values and semantic field mobilized both by the population and by the authorities through different media such as the press or Internet forums. The slowness with which the authorities communicated on the subject reminds us that this project was an authoritarian measure not intended to be discussed. because it was hiding important political and land deals that benefited a handful of insiders and, at the same time, allowed a recentralization of the power [D. Labbé, C. Musil, 2011].

## **II. State-party corporatism and decentralization of power**

### **a. Urban manufacturing and "state-party corporatism": from the National Assembly to the district**

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<sup>7</sup> See this article (URL: <http://tphcm.chinhphu.vn/muon-hien-dai-nghia-tinh-phai-xay-dung-van-minh-do-thi>, consulted on 12/5/18) from the city's website Hồ Chí Minh and entitled: "Modernity requires the construction of urban civilization".

The urban fabric in Việt. Nam is ambivalent, revealing consultation mechanisms coupled with forms of authoritarianism that are themselves modulated according to the territories and their challenges. What we call corporatism, once analyzed, offers the possibility of illustrating how the political center maintains its hold on the peripheries, in particular by linking the various actors to each other around political and economic interests. The aim here is therefore to analyze how, like what is observed in Vietnamese society, the administration functions more on the basis of consultation/persuasion than coercion in accordance with the “negotiated authoritarianism” [M. Gibert, J. Ségard, 2016].

The actors of the political-administrative machine are linked to each other by sectoral or regional interests that show a political and territorial administration marked by entryism, corporatism<sup>8</sup> and above all by the control of the center on all its peripheries. Indeed, the transfer of power from which these local authorities benefit is in fact one of the conditions for strengthening the weight and control of central power. This paradox is explained by the Vietnamese electoral process which, as Marie Lan Nguyen Leroy [M. Nguyễn Leroy Lân, 2015, 60] points out, gives major importance to the provinces in the choice of candidates eligible for a seat as a deputy in the National Assembly (list voting). This mechanism allows reciprocity and creates mutual dependence between the National Assembly and the provinces whose interests are essentially the same.

The proximity between high instances of the party and these same local authorities is also striking. As is the case in the provinces of the region of Hà Nội, there are many political executives with a seat on the Central Committee of the Communist Party and responsibilities at the local level. This accumulation creates obvious conflicts of interest which give to some provincial People's Committee

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<sup>8</sup> However, if the entryism and verticality of power ensures that the centre has control over its peripheries, we must not believe and let believe that the political actors constitute a monolithic bloc. In reality, just as society is diverse, the regime is also affected by different currents and is mainly confronted with factional struggles.



presidents more power than a minister. The development of the metropolitan area of Hà Nội is in fact a patchwork of sectoral and regional interests linked to the clienteles that the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party represent.

The liberalization of the land market and the increasing involvement of market forces <sup>9</sup> in the urban factory must not obscure the "fiscal socialism" [A. Kim, 2009]. The relations between the different levels of the administration are characterized by a system of constraints/incentives that systematically places the commune, district and provincial levels in a situation of dependence on the orientations desired by the central authorities.

In this system, if the districts and communes are responsible for implementing provincial guidelines but receive no incentives, they will try to solicit them from the population and construction-promotion companies. It is precisely when incentives are too low that acts of corruption seem to be most prevalent. However, other systems based on obtaining facilities, infrastructure or constructions, in exchange for building land for example, may exist.

#### **b. "Refocusing" of the State at the communal and village level**

The commune and ward level is the subject of particular attention by provincial authorities and even by the central State since it is the territory in which planning policies are tested, most often on an *ad hoc* basis, but also because it is here that representations relating to land use planning and management are the most conflictual.

In recent years, the metropolization of Hà Nội has been accompanied by an expansion of urban space that has most often ignored the existing situation and has been accompanied by land conflicts as a result of the absence of private land ownership in a market oriented country. It is in this context that we observe a

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<sup>9</sup> Foreign direct investments in real estate increased from 0.3% in 2004 to 23.6% in 2008 [World Bank, 2015, 23].

descent of the State at the village level as well as a confusion of roles and functions at this same level (the population can be an investor and the investor can be a public servant...).

Faced with social unrest due to land issues (between 2008 and 2011, the number of complaints and charges about land issues increased from 187,037 to 236,466)<sup>10</sup> - the State and its agencies try to participate as actively as possible in local life, whether festive or associative. It is also, of course, a way to continue the work of persuasion and thus to participate actively in the making of "common sense". Rites, feasts and other celebrations, some of which were banned during the communist period, are central in Vietnamese villages and are reactivated from *Đổi Mới*. As Benoit de Tréglodé [B de Tréglodé, 2014] reminds us, the cult of national heroes pursues a political objective since this type of cult is most often organized by the local party and proposes to unite around the tradition of the centralizing state.

While during the communist period, population management structures were most often used to contain and organize village activities, the post-*Đổi Mới* period is characterized by the emergence of new associative actors (NGOs, clubs, "volunteer associations")<sup>11</sup> that are sources of social innovations. These new village organizations are in addition to the mass associations organized under the aegis of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front, which they do not compete with. Presented as independent of the public authorities, these new social structures are in fact often placed under the supervision of a ministry. Created at different levels around the defence of heritage, the promotion of crafts or the practice of a sport, art or religion, these associations are regularly invited to participate in meetings at

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<sup>10</sup> Based on report 304/BC-CP dated 26 October 2012. According to the same report, 70% of complaints and other administrative appeals filed with various public institutions related to land issues.

<sup>11</sup> According to Wischermann and Nguyễn Quang Vinh [Wischermann and Nguyễn Quang Vinh, 2003, 4], more than 700 civic organizations were created between 1986 and 2005 at Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh city.

district and provincial level. Through a process of nationalization of associations, the public authorities maintain their control over these structures, which are thought to be independent and for which the analogy with a possible counter-power is unthinkable.

Agreeing with a descent of the State into the village where it was already present, or a "refocusing" <sup>12</sup>, these new social spaces are nevertheless the place where social changes and innovations are promoted that allow the political-administrative machine to delegate certain missions to the local level without calling into question the major balances of power.

Finally, development and construction companies, public authorities and residents jointly participate in the urban factory. In some cases, the actors can be at the same time residents, administrators and investors. This is not without a number of conflicts of interest, particularly when local politicians are actively involved in investment projects requiring "land releases". Nevertheless, when local administrators are involved in investment projects, they are most often involved indirectly, as partners, associates or "facilitators" <sup>13</sup>. In fact, members of the local administration try to negotiate their place in the metropolization process, taking advantage of their network of influence and their power of coercion and decision-making in municipal affairs. Thus, gradually, we are witnessing a reactivation of relations with local notabilities.

### **III. Authoritarian urbanization and popular response**

#### **a. "Liberations" of land or evictions?**

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<sup>12</sup> For M. Gainsborough, « recentralization » is when the center try to reassert its control on lower levels, as the village level [M. Gainsborough, 2010, chapter 3].

<sup>13</sup> They facilitate the implementation of projects by providing investors with the benefit of their political networks at higher levels or by showing clemency and understanding (*thông cảm*) with regard to compliance with construction or environmental legislation.

Since the land laws of 2003 and 2014, land recuperations and the feeling of injustice has increased <sup>14</sup>. The land has become a notorious lever of enrichment that allows a small emerging middle class <sup>15</sup> to accumulate capital by taking advantage of its relationships with power. The State grants land to investors, sets up a system of dual land prices, facilitates "land liberations" and creates an institutional environment that is largely beneficial to market forces <sup>16</sup>. The prices proposed by the administration (*giá nhà nước*) are much lower than those of the market and the land then appears to be "priceless" [L. Pandolfi, 2009]. This situation gives rise to a feeling of injustice among the population, particularly in agricultural villages on the outskirts of urban areas where land has become one of the modern levers of capital accumulation. The method of calculating the price of land differs according to the type of land. In this system, agricultural land is significantly undervalued compared to other land.

The need to build "urban civilization" justifies what the authorities call "liberations" of land presented as essential for the modernization of the country. "Attractiveness", "competitiveness", "investment", "modernization" are all terms <sup>17</sup> used by public authorities to shape representations of the transition to the urban era in which "the power to evict is founded on the right to own" [E. Harms, 2016, introduction]. Vietnamese urban civilization is built on a denial of the right to the

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<sup>14</sup> The report 304/BC-CP reflects the increase in the population's feeling of injustice and points out that, of the total number of land-related complaints related to expropriations carried out by the State, 70 % relate to the amount of compensation and relocation (compensation is indeed considered too low compared to "free market" prices); 20 % of the complaints concern households that have been expropriated in a less favourable legislative context than that in force at the time of the investigations; 6 % concern land recovered during the *bao cấp* period which no compensation was paid; 3% concern households that have still not been relocated and 1% concern suspected discrimination and inequalities in land recovery arrangements

<sup>15</sup> Above 15 USD per person and per day (7.7 % of the population in 2010 and 13 % of the population in 2016) [World Bank, 2018]. More than a simple range of revenue, the middle class is also a social group which adheres to a certain lifestyle. For more details on the question of middle class in Việt. Nam, please report to *The reinvention of distinction : Modernity and the middle class in urban Vietnam* [Van Nguyen Marshall and al., 2012].

<sup>16</sup> Truong and Perera [Truong and Perera, 2011] argued that the land pricing mechanism is intentionally designed by the state to attract investment.

<sup>17</sup> We note also that the word "capitalism" still remains highly connoted and is therefore not used in this context.

city. The land seizures illustrate the symbolic and physical violence from which it is built. For Erik Harms, “mass evictions and emergence of property rights go hand in hand. Likewise, the production of civilized spaces of new urban living is founded on mass dispossession” [E. Harms, 2016, 219]. The expression of this new authoritarian norm is justified in an ambivalent way by the authorities and shows the use of different, even opposing, ideological registers. The phase of justification, awareness and pedagogy borrows from the values and concepts of the market economy, while in response to popular criticism and resistance, the words of the market economy are abandoned in favour of those of nationalism, socialism and revolution.

In a classic way, we also find in the press certain recurring qualifiers that dishonour those who dared to rise up, such as in the town of Đồng Tâm in April 2017 for example. Among these adjectives are: reactionaries (*phản động*), traitors to the nation, extremists (*quá khích*) and are described <sup>18</sup> as "disorder professionals" ("*nghe ăn nên làm ra của mấy mấy kẻ chính trị*") working for the collapse of the state, social instability and the disintegration of national unity while being financed by foreign and reactionary organizations.

## **b. From daily resistance to revolt**

If many peasants in the suburban area of Hà Nội appear to be victims of the modalities of land seizure, the analysis of their speeches and representations makes it possible to better define the framework of the exploitation of which they are victims and above all the limits beyond which domination is no longer, for them, "tolerable".

Concealment, cunning, the art of sneaking into the law (*lách luật*) or even the use of force (*phá rào*), are the possibilities open to the inhabitants and constitute

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<sup>18</sup> For example in *Nhân Dân* newspaper on 11 September 2018 in the article *Phản nước, hại dân và phục vụ mưu đồ chính trị cá nhân* (Against the State and the People, and in the service of their personal interests).

as many material resistances. But, when the inhabitants of the peri-urban area, for example, put in place spatial strategies for the extension of housing or craft spaces, what is important to highlight is the way in which these strategies are justified (statutory resistance). The inhabitants construct their statements from and within the framework of the dominant ideology according to which the party is the central institution to which authority legitimately belongs. Individuals involved in informal and illegal forms of urbanization on agricultural land do not hesitate to recall that these lands have been won by the struggle:

*"We, the humble peasants of the Vietnamese people, had to live under Chinese rule for a thousand years and under colonial oppression for a hundred years. Today, we own the country, we live in a socialist regime, but we become "homeless" in the very place where we fought a few decades ago, in the very place where we sacrificed our lives"* (letter of protest sent to Prime Minister M Nguyễn Tấn Dũng, 2012).

While some well-known national artists such as the singer Mai Khôi <sup>19</sup> or the rappers Son Nah <sup>20</sup> and Sendoh <sup>21</sup> try to echo the "voiceless", it is also important to note that the villagers also produce real protest songs sung during sit-ins, occupations and other demonstrations. The song of the village inhabitants of Đồ Sơn (province of Hải Phòng) is an example <sup>22</sup>:

Một lũ quan tham, một bọn người người

A crowd of gourmet mandarins

Một bầy tham nhũng, một một bầy tôi

Huge corruption

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<sup>19</sup> Mai Khôi is constantly harassed and regularly arrested for taking a stand against the regime. We strongly recommend listening to the album "Dissent" produced with his group "The dissidents".

<sup>20</sup> Known in particular for his song "Địt Mẹ Cộng Cộng Sản" ("Fuck Communism").

<sup>21</sup> Listen « Việt Nam Lạ Lẫm ».

<sup>22</sup> Author's translation

Đục nước béo cò nên cố bám  
Bầu không trúng cử vẫn không thôi  
Thật là đau lắm Sơn Đồ Sơn Sơn ơi!

In troubled waters, storks hold  
Even unelected they continue  
Đồ Sơn, it's painful!

Since the 1990s, the Vietnamese Party-State as demonstrated a renewed pragmatism and rethought in the light of the challenges posed by economic and social development. Exchanges, negotiations, compromises and other consultations with the people modulate the political authoritarianism of the authorities but do not protect them from demonstrations of anger on the part of the people when they believe that the public theatre of domination and injustice must stop. Generally, the public expression of the feeling of injustice occurs when, on a specific subject, here land evictions, all remedies have been exhausted and when the taboo must be broken publicly in order to engage the public responsibility of the authorities. But, in Việt Nam, as in other authoritarian regimes, the possibility of free popular expression is severely limited.

**Figure 3, 4 and 5: Demonstration and resistance in peripheries of Hanoi**

The expression of this anger, riot or even revolt is not in fact economically determined. These violent demonstrations are moments of expression of dignity that reflect a general and increasingly obvious disavowal by the population towards its management structures. In addition to the riots in Thái Bình in April 1997 and those in the highlands in 2001, a series of events must now be added to the riots in the highlands which agree in the sense of an ever-increasing defiance of the population towards their management structures. Thus, the case Đoàn Văn Vươn in 2012 at Hải Phòng, the clashes and hostage-taking at Đồng Tâm (district of Mỹ Đức, Hà Nội, 2018) or the tensions surrounding the Ecopark project (Hà Nội) add to the population's long list of outbursts of anger against its administration.

If, according to press reports, popular protest rallies are, for the authorities, the work of "scum" or "extremists", it must be noted that these events are multiplying, intensifying and that citizens are diversifying their modes of action, in particular by broadening the base of their demands. Indeed, like E. Harms, we argue that "the agitation over land use rights and civility [...] operate as a surrogate for the kind of political life citizens in other countries normally enjoy"[E. Harms, 2016, introduction]. Land claims are political claims in the sense that they point to the connections and corruption between the administration and the private sector, the authoritarian nature of evictions and the relationship between the VCP and the CCP. The events of June 2018 began with opposition to a proposed SEZ (Special Economic Zone) project in which Chinese investors are benefiting from 99-year leases<sup>23</sup>. The risk feared by the demonstrators is that these areas will be managed autonomously by Chinese nationals, so it is a question of sovereignty that is obviously part of a historical conflict between China and Việt. Nam. However, beyond the land claims and national momentum observed during these events, other messages, less relegated by the Vietnamese press, were conveyed. If in the processions one could read "No land rental to China, even for a day" or "China, out of Vietnam! ", other slogans openly criticized the cyber-security law adopted on June 12, 2018 or, and this is rare enough to mention, the Vietnamese Communist Party itself.

## Conclusion

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<sup>23</sup>From 23 to 28 may 2018, the Vietnamese Parliament met to discuss a draft law on the creation of three special economic and administrative zones "called the Law on Administrative and Economic Units" to be granted for 99 years to foreign companies, located in three strategic coastal areas of the country: in northern Việt. Nam Đồn (2.200 km<sup>2</sup>, of which 551.33 km<sup>2</sup> on land and 1620 km<sup>2</sup> on sea, Quảng Ninh province) in the bay of Hạ Long near the Chinese border, in the centre in Vân Phong Nord (11,000 ha of which 56,000 ha on land and 55,000 km on sea, Khánh Hòa province) 30 km from Nha Trang, facing the Spratly, and in the south Phú Quốc island (58,923 ha, Kiên Giang) off Hà Tiên in the Gulf of Thailand.



With a growth rate of 6.88 % in 2018, a GDP per capita of USD 2343 <sup>24</sup> and an urban transition already well under way, Việt Nam is undoubtedly working on its development and integration into the networks of globalization. The urban and civilizational ambition of the Party-State contributes to its legitimacy but does not protect it from the increase in inequalities and, above all, from the growing sense of injustice among populations that do not all benefit from urbanization. To address the threats facing it, the VCP monitoring and trying to anticipate the possibility of an overflow from the population. Through iterative governance, arrangements and compromises, authorities till manages to convince within its administration but faces greater difficulties with regard to a part of the population that does not benefit from the economic spin-offs of growth.

Those left behind in development policy and urbanization, through their everyday speeches and resistance strategies, point to the failure of the authorities to build consent in the field of urbanization. It is also noted that, unlike a commonplace frequently mentioned, manifestations of anger or revolt are not only the consequence of economic situations but also have much to do with dignity and respect for the social contract that binds, in principle, the population to its management structures. Like Leon Trotsky, we believe that "if the cause of revolutions were poverty, there would be revolutions every day".

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