Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment

Adam Zylbersztejn (1) , Zakaria Babutsidze (2, 3, 4) , Nobuyuki Hanaki (5)

1 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
2 SKEMA Business School
3 GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion
4 OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po)
5 Osaka University [Osaka]

We experimentally investigate how much value people put in observable information about others in strategic interactions. The incentivized experimental task is to predict an unknown target player's trustworthiness in an earlier hidden action game. In Experiment 1, we vary the source of information about the target player (neutral picture, neutral video, video containing strategic content). The observed prediction accuracy rates then serve as an empirical measure of the objective value of information. In Experiment 2, we elicit the subjective value of information using the standard stated preferences method ("willingness to accept"). While the elicited subjective values are ranked in the same manner as the objective ones, subjects attach value to information which does not help predict target behavior, and exaggerate the value of helpful information.

Mots clés: Prediction; observable information; individual characteristics; stated preferences; willingness to accept; experiment

Domaines: Economies et finances

Adam Zylbersztejn, Zakaria Babutsidze, Nobuyuki Hanaki. Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment. 2019. ⟨halshs-02420074⟩