R. J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol.1, pp.67-96, 1974.

R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, Bi-Convexity and Bi-Martingales, Israel Journal of Mathematics, vol.54, pp.159-180, 1986.

, Long Cheap Talk, Econometrica, vol.71, pp.1619-1660, 2003.

R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler, Game Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament, Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pp.1-55, 1966.

R. J. Aumann and M. B. Maschler, Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: A Survey of Recent Results, Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pp.287-403, 1967.

R. J. Aumann, M. B. Maschler, and R. Stearns, Repeated Games of Incomplete Information, 1995.

R. M. Bell and T. M. Cover, Competitive optimality of logarithmic investment, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol.5, pp.161-166, 1980.

D. Bergemann and S. Morris, Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games, Theoretical Economics, vol.11, pp.487-522, 2016.

, Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, The American Economic Review, vol.106, pp.586-591, 2016.

, Information design: A unified perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, vol.57, pp.44-95, 2019.

R. Boleslavsky and C. Cotton, Grading standards and education quality, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol.7, pp.248-279, 2015.

, Limited capacity in project selection: Competition through evidence production, Economic Theory, vol.65, pp.385-421, 2018.

R. Boleslavsky, C. S. Cotton, and H. Gurnani, Demonstrations and price competition in new product release, Management Science, vol.63, pp.2016-2026, 2016.

R. Boleslavsky and K. Kim, Bayesian Persuasion and Moral Hazard, 2018.

L. Doval and J. Ely, , 2016.

J. C. Ely, Beeps, American Economic Review, vol.107, pp.31-53, 2017.

F. Forges, Note on Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information, International Journal of Game Theory, vol.13, pp.179-187, 1984.

, An Approach to Communication Equilibria, Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example, vol.54, pp.375-398, 1986.

, Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information, Theory and Decision, vol.35, pp.277-310, 1993.

, Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion, 2019.

M. Gentzkow and E. Kamenica, Competition in persuasion, The Review of Economic Studies, vol.84, pp.300-322, 2017.

S. Hart, Discrete Colonel Blotto and general lotto games, International Journal of Game Theory, vol.36, pp.441-460, 2008.

M. Heuer, Asymptotically optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information, International Journal of Game Theory, vol.20, pp.377-392, 1992.

E. Kamenica, Bayesian persuasion and information design, Annual Review of Economics, p.11, 2018.

E. Kamenica and M. Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review, vol.101, pp.2590-2615, 2011.

F. Koessler, M. Laclau, and T. Tomala, , 2019.

R. Laraki, The splitting game and applications, International Journal of Game Theory, vol.30, pp.359-376, 2001.

, Variational inequalities, system of functional equations and incomplete information repeated games, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, vol.40, pp.516-524, 2001.

, On the regularity of the convexification operator on a compact set, Journal of Convex Analysis, vol.11, pp.209-234, 2004.

R. Laraki and J. Renault, Mathematics of Operation Research, forthcoming, 2019.

L. Treust, M. , and T. Tomala, Persuasion with limited communication capacity, Journal of Economic Theory, p.184, 2019.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01633656

M. Makris and L. Renou, Information design in multi-stage games, 2018.

L. Mathevet, J. Perego, and I. Taneva, On Information Design in Games, Journal of Political Economy, 2019.

J. Mertens, S. Sorin, and S. Zamir, Repeated games, 2015.

J. Mertens and S. Zamir, The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides, International Journal of Game Theory, vol.1, pp.39-64, 1971.

J. F. Mertens and S. Zamir, A duality theorem on a pair of simultaneous functional equations, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, vol.60, pp.550-558, 1977.

R. B. Myerson, Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol.10, pp.67-81, 1982.

, Social goals and social organization: Essays in memory of Elisha Pazner, pp.229-260, 1985.

, Multistage Games with Communication, Econometrica, vol.54, pp.323-358, 1986.

M. Oliu-barton, The Splitting Game: Uniform Value and Optimal Strategies, Dynamic Games and Applications, pp.1-23, 2017.

J. Ponssard and S. Sorin, Some results on zero-sum games with incomplete information: The dependent case, International Journal of Game Theory, vol.9, pp.233-245, 1980.

J. Renault, E. Solan, and N. Vieille, Optimal dynamic information provision, Games and Economic Behavior, vol.104, pp.329-349, 2017.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01025797

N. Sahuguet and N. Persico, Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics, Economic Theory, vol.28, pp.95-124, 2006.

S. Sorin, On a pair of simultaneous functional equations, Journal of mathematical analysis and applications, vol.98, pp.296-303, 1984.

, A First Course on Zero-Sum Repeated Games, 2002.

I. Taneva, Information Design, AEJ: Microeconomics, forthcoming, 2019.

M. Whitmeyer, Dynamic competitive persuasion, 2019.