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Concurrence 'hybride', innovation et régulation : Un modèle de duopole

Abstract : This paper presents a duopoly model in which a commercial organization and a community compete by providing digital products while being able to share their innovation outputs to develop their own activities. The commercial organization always benefits from either a ‘closed’ or an ‘open’ institutional regime shift. Our numerical analysis evidences that the ‘closed’ shift provides the best levels of innovation and welfare whereas it is not found to be profit-improving when product differentiation is small. This result partially qualifies the conventional idea according to which public policies may be designed to defend commercial interests rather than public ones.
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Contributor : Ludovic Ragni <>
Submitted on : Monday, December 2, 2019 - 11:49:10 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, October 14, 2020 - 4:22:38 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Tuesday, March 3, 2020 - 4:04:37 PM


Art Le Texier Ragni Concurrenc...
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  • HAL Id : halshs-02389002, version 1


Thomas Le Texier, Ludovic Ragni. Concurrence 'hybride', innovation et régulation : Un modèle de duopole. Séminaire GREDEG, Oct 2019, Nice, France. ⟨halshs-02389002⟩



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