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, For all j ? S and i ? T : ?(j ? i) ? 0. (A) For all j ? S c and i ? T c : ?(j ? i) ? 0. (B) For all j ? S c and i ? T : ?(j ? i) ? 0. (C) For all j ? S and i ? T c : ?(j ? i) ? 0. (D) These assumptions on ? can be expressed by sets inclusions w.r.t B i and B i : (A) and (C) together give S ? (M i ) (c) for all i ? T