A Theory of Cultural Revivals

Murat Iyigun (1) , Jared Rubin (2) , Seror Avner (3)

1 University of Colorado [Boulder]
2 Chapman University
3 AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques

Why do some societies fail to adopt more efficient institutions? And why do such failures often coincide with cultural movements that glorify the past? We propose a model highlighting the interplay—or lack thereof—between institutional change and cultural beliefs. The main insight is that institutional change by itself will not lead to a more efficient economy unless culture evolves in tandem. This is because institutional change can be countered by changes in cultural values complementary to a more "traditional" economy. In our model, forward-looking elites, who benefit from a traditional, inefficient economy, may over-provide public goods that are complementary to the production of traditional goods. This encourages individuals to transmit cultural beliefs complementary to the provision of traditional goods. A horse race results between institutions, which evolve towards a more efficient (less traditional) economy, and cultural norms, which are pulled towards "tradition" by the elites. When culture wins the horse race, institutions respond by giving more political power to traditional elites—even if in doing so more efficient institutions are left behind. We call the interaction between these cultural and institutional dynamics a cultural revival.

Mots clés: institutions; cultural beliefs; cultural transmission; institutional change

Domaines: Economies et finances

Murat Iyigun, Jared Rubin, Seror Avner. A Theory of Cultural Revivals. 2019. ⟨halshs-02356500⟩