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# Mutual Aid: when does resource scarcity favour group cooperation?

Etienne DELAY<sup>a,b,c,\*</sup>, Cyril PIOUS<sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup>*CIRAD UPR GREEN, F-34398 Montpellier, France*

<sup>b</sup>*GREEN, CIRAD, Univ. Montpellier, Montpellier France*

<sup>c</sup>*Laboratoire GEOLAB, UMR 6042 CNRS, Chaire "Capital Environnemental et gestion durable des cours d'eau", Université de Limoges, FLSH. 39E rue Camille Guérin, 87036 Limoges, France*

<sup>d</sup>*UMR CBGP, Univ. Montpellier, CIRAD, INRA, IRD SupAgro, 34398 Montpellier Cedex 5, France*

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## Abstract

Understanding the origins, conditions, advantages and limitations of cooperation in natural and social systems has motivated many investigations in the biological and social sciences. To investigate individual cooperative behaviour in the face of temporal and spatial heterogeneity of resources we considered a definition of cooperation at the same ontological level as competition. We define a cooperative behaviour when an agent acts upon one or more resource(s) with a beneficial result in at least one resource for a recipient of this action, and with a selection process for this behaviour on the side of the acting agent.

We implemented an agent-based model that represents the interactions of agents through their use of resources. With this model, we illustrated how scarcity of resources in space and time might create situations where cooperative behaviour is beneficial to individuals or to egalitarian groups.

Simulations highlighted that temporal scarcity as spatial scarcity of the resource procures advantages to egalitarian groups over competitive individuals. Additionally, the factors favouring equity among agents for the access to the resource promote the success of cooperation. Simulations also showed the limitations imposed by group size on cooperation in the context of a common-pool

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\*Corresponding author : [etienne.delay@cirad.fr](mailto:etienne.delay@cirad.fr), phone : +33 467 593 881

management system.

The possibility of using indicators of (spatio-temporal) resource variability to characterize the potential for the emergence of cooperation is an interesting research objective for future work.

*Keywords:* Agent-based model, Spatial heterogeneity, Temporal heterogeneity, Resources, Cooperation, Competition.

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## 1. Introduction

Competition has been a leitmotif process of selection in evolutionary theories of Darwinism since 1859 and in neo-Darwinism during the 20th century. Keddy (2001) synthesizes competition as a negative interaction among organisms  
5 through the use of a same resource. For him,

“All life forms consume resources such as water, oxygen, and nitrogen. This consumption reduces the supplies available for neighbors. In order to maintain access to resources, organisms must sometimes interfere with their neighbors. These three sentences summarize the  
10 state of affairs [...]. Without resources, organisms will die, and so the contest to find, harvest, transport, store and retain possession of resources is an essential part of the struggle for survival.”(p.1)

These words, which open Keddy’s book, are a synthesis of the resource-based definition of competition (Fig. 1(a)).

15 Scientific interest for cooperation and mutual aid begins more or less at the same time than Darwinism with the works of Kropotkin (1902). As a naturalist, he was among the first to argue about the potential effect of cooperation in the evolution of natural and human systems. Nowadays, cooperation is defined as :

“a behavior which provides a benefit to another individual (recipient), and which is selected because of its beneficial effect on the  
20 recipient” (West et al., 2007) (e.g. fig. 1(b)).

This definition is highly compatible with works on common-pools resources made by Ostrom (1990); Poteete et al. (2010), and research made in game theory (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Cohen et al., 2001). It does not base the  
25 interaction on a resource but on a behaviour. In all those works that investigate cooperation, the alternative to cooperation is generally considering behaviours such as “defection” or “betrayal”. They set aside competition as it is not *per se* only a behaviour.

An ontological disjunction appears when we wish to use cooperation and  
30 competition together. For the ones working on competition what matters most is the interaction through or for the resources. For the others working on cooperation, the behaviour is put forth. Nevertheless, behind the usual benefits/costs matrix used in game theory, there is obviously one or several resources to consider. Some previous works in ecology proposed to consider resources as media  
35 of cooperation (Holland and DeAngelis, 2010). We follow the same line by considering a definition of cooperation at the same ontological level than competition. For that, we propose that cooperation occurs when an agent acts upon one or more resource(s) with a beneficial result in at least one resource for a recipient of this action, and with a selection process for this behaviour on the  
40 side of the acting agent (e.g. fig. 1(c)). We consider through this definition a large range of positive interactions. The selective aspect may be evolutionary in natural systems, but could also be through learning or coercive forces in animal or human societies (Hauert et al., 2007; Simon, 1990).

Setting the definition of cooperation in a resource-based context enables  
45 transdisciplinary comparisons and cross-fertilization among scientific fields. Indirect effects on common resources or on a shared “enemy” (Jeffries and Lawton (1984), enemy-free time or space act as a “resource”) are included in this definition. The “multiple resources” aspect is important, particularly in complex systems where exchanges of resources are common (carbonic compounds vs.  
50 nutrients in plant interactions or host-symbiont interactions, survival favouring benefits vs. nutritional resources in animal interactions, economic capital vs. social or cognitive capitals in human societies, etc.).




Figure 1: Competition is a situation when agent A acts upon a resource (R) that generate a negative impact on a second agent B ((a) ; e.g.(Keddy, 2001)). Cooperation, as defined by West et al. (2007), is when a behaviour of A impacts B positively and a selection process exist on this behaviour (b). Our proposition (c) of definition of cooperation is to base the interaction upon a resource so that it is compatible with the formalism proposed in (a). The dashed arrows represent the selection process. The black arrows represent the interactions.

Understanding the origins, conditions, advantages and limitations of cooperation in natural and social systems has motivated many investigations in the biological and social sciences. In both animal and plant ecology the main research question is to understand the selective forces that create cooperative situations, focusing on individuals and genes. From these considerations, a corpus of complementary theories has been developed (from Hamilton (1964) to Allen et al. (2017)) to explain the conditions to observe cooperation situations in nature.

On the other hand, social scientists focus on cooperative organisations and institutions (Ostrom et al., 1994). Positive interactions are generally considered as an intrinsic characteristic of sociability. Hence, social scientists focus on understanding the social constructions and the mechanisms for the persistence of cooperation among interacting entities (Rogin-Anspach, 2002).

The two topics of “conditions” for and “mechanisms” promoting cooperation can be explored with many approaches: the social evolution theory, ecological approach, game theoretic approach, and social scientist approach (Bshary and Bergmüller, 2008). However, our definition of cooperation means that the conditions and mechanisms can be clearly defined in terms of resource variability and/or availability. It is then possible to explore the favourable environmental conditions for cooperation to outweigh competition. It is also interesting to look at how resource variability may promote selection at group level (West et al., 2007).

Agent-based models and simulations can be used to introduce constraints in a controlled world (Veldkamp and Verburg, 2004), and assess the impacts of different variables on the system under consideration (Delay, 2015). Some ABM studies have already explored the effect of resource heterogeneity on cooperation. For example, Bousquet et al. (1998), using a game theoretic approach explored the effect of resource spatial heterogeneity on the tragedy of the commons concept (Hardin, 1968). They showed that cooperative behaviours can be prosperous in a population when resources are not quickly renewed, creating heterogeneous local dynamics. The question of spatial heterogeneity and co-

operation was further explored by Pepper and Smuts (2000). They illustrated  
85 that the spatial heterogeneity of a resource was a possible driver favouring the  
evolution of cooperative behaviours in natural populations through a balance  
among between-group and within-group selection.

In another multi-agent simulation, Smaldino et al. (2013) explored the effect  
of temporally variable environments on prisoner’s dilemma types of interactions.  
90 They showed that cooperation could be beneficial in an extremely harsh envi-  
ronment, but after a long negative impact of that environment. Their tempo-  
ral variation was homogeneous through space, and the cooperate-defect games  
were not directly resource-based. The same year Touza et al. (2013) used an  
ABM to explore cooperation emergence in red deer (*Cervus elaphus*) density  
95 management scenarios. They show that cooperation in spatial and temporal  
heterogeneous situations is highly context-dependent.

Complementing these studies, it appeared interesting for us to illustrate  
how resource scarcity in space and time could provide benefits for cooperative  
behaviour. Without simulating evolutionary process, we wished to explore in  
100 which resource conditions the cooperative groups may be selected. For this, we  
considered that equity among agents was a favourable condition for the groups  
through the appearance of potential feedback loop of selection at the individual  
level. This egalitarian access to resources suppose that all individuals within  
a cooperative group have homogeneous chances of being selected. Hence, we  
105 tested the hypothesis that resource variability provides benefits at both the  
individual and group level to cooperative use of resource. We explored this with  
an agent-based model setting cooperation among individuals depending on their  
spatial location and through their use of a theoretical resource. The resource-  
based approach of inter-individual interactions allows this model to go further  
110 than a game-theory approach on the impacts of agents on the resource and on the  
dynamics of this resource. However, this model was developed for illustration  
purpose (Edmonds et al., 2019) and do not claim to make any prediction on the  
real world.

## 2. Materials and methods

115 The model was motivated by reality but we chose to develop a purely abstract  
model inspired by the Epstein and Axtell (1996) “sugarscape” model. Hence,  
the resource here is “sugar”, though the parallel with water management is  
possible. We used the Netlogo platform (Wilensky, 1999) to implement the  
model and R (Team, 2016) with RNetlogo (Thiele et al., 2012) to conduct our  
120 experiment plan. The formalization of the model description complies with the  
ODD (overview, design concept, details) description protocol (Grimm et al.,  
2006, 2010).<sup>1</sup>.

### 2.1. Overview

#### 2.1.1. Purpose

125 The objective was to illustrate how the spatial distribution of agents under  
spatial and temporal variability of resource accessibility affected their success in  
cooperating instead of competing. We were not interested in the emergence of  
cooperation and mutual aid *per se*. Rather, we explored in diverse socio-spatial  
and temporal configurations the benefits for individual agents of being part of  
130 a group sharing resources and the possibility for this group to create equity  
among agents.

#### 2.1.2. Entities, state variables and scales

**Entities** : There were two types of entities in the model: individual agents  
and patches of resources. The individuals could not choose to be part of a group.  
135 The distance between agents defined their belonging to a group and cooperative  
behaviour. The agents were not mobile, and they could only harvest and use  
resources in their direct environment.  
The patches were the spatial units of our model and represented small land  
portions.

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<sup>1</sup>Our model development evolution and exploration scripts are available at [URL TO DOCUMENT AFTER ACCEPTANCE OF MANUSCRIPT]



140     **State variables** : As in the “sugarscape” model (Epstein and Axtell, 1996)  
each patch was characterised by the sugar resource present at each time step  
( $ps_t$ ). Additional characteristics were the maximum and minimum sugar poten-  
tially available in the patch and the initial sugar value.

Each agent had its own ID, its size ( $S$ , which reflected its fitness and need  
145 of resources), its cooperation expression ( $Ec$ ), and a variable that stocked the  
available resource in the agent group accessible to all agents in that group ( $Sc$ ).

**Scale** : The model was spatially explicit in a square space of 10000 resource  
patches ( $100 \times 100$ ). The space was with periodic boundary conditions (toroidal  
world). The interacting agents evolved over time with a theoretical time step  
150 corresponding to the time necessary to use their resource and change their size.

### 2.1.3. Process overview and scheduling

Our model was subdivided into four main processes (identified in detail in  
the submodel section for two of them, referred to with SM numeration). They  
were organized as follows for each time step:

- 155     • For patches :
  - *ReSugar* (SM1) regenerated the resource available in patches taking  
into account the seasonality and the actual resource value.
- For agents :
  - *Cooperate* prepared the agents that were able to cooperate to share  
160 their resource. Each cooperative agent shared its resource stock ( $Sc$ )  
with all its cooperative neighbours so that they all had the same  
amount across the group.
  - *Grow* (SM2) defined how agents could harvest, stock and use the  
resource.
- 165     • For patches:

- *Patch-diffusion* forced each cell to give an equal percentage share of its sugar to its eight neighbours with a diffusion rate ( $dr$ ) fixed for each simulation between 0 and 0.5.

## 2.2. Design concepts

### 170 2.2.1. Basic Principles

To explore the effects of spatial and temporal variability in the resource as well as the effects of agent numbers and distributions, we compared simulations that were modified only for the criteria: *i*) without allowed cooperation *ii*) with allowed cooperation for some agents. With this benchmarking approach,  
175 we had the opportunity of exploring and understanding how the spatial and temporal availability of resources can influence the benefits of “*sharing capacity*” in theoretical groups.

### 2.2.2. Objective

Each agent tended to maximize its size by harvesting the resource, with  
180 harvest size proportional to agent size. Under cooperation, the agent’s behaviour was modified to include sharing a fraction of the resource with its neighbouring agents.

### 2.2.3. Emergence

Depending on spatial resource heterogeneity, temporal resource heterogeneity and agent spatial configuration, a set of situations appeared in which cooperation and sharing was more efficient than being selfish in term of size incrementation.  
185

### 2.2.4. Observation

Simulations of 2000 steps were analysed by summarizing agent size every 10  
190 steps (see Fig. 2). For each observation, we summarized data in three groups: *i*) for all agents (gp1), *ii*) only grouped agents (gp2) and *iii*) only lone agents (gp3). For each of these groups we looked at the mean size of gp1, gp2 and gp3 to obtain information about the benefits these agents derived from use of

the resource. As an indicator of inequity between agents, we computed the  
195 Gini index on the size distributions of gp1, gp2 and gp3. This index could take  
any value between 0, in the case of perfect equity, and 1 in the case of strong  
inequity.

### 2.3. Details

#### 2.3.1. Initialisation

200 Our agents were all initialized with the same size ( $S = 1$ ) and no shared  
resource stocks ( $Sc = 0$ ). As our agents were not mobile, their initial positions  
were maintained within and between the simulations. These individual positions  
were read from one of 90 different spatial distributions generated to represent  
random, regular or clustered positions (see simulation plan sect. 2.4).

205 We used two types of space for the initialization of patches: *i*) a random  
distribution of the resource through space based on a uniform distribution and  
*ii*) the legacy sugarscape (Epstein and Axtell, 1996) resampled with the raster  
package (Hijmans, 2015). Once the patches received an initial sugar level (*ops*),  
we defined the minimum and maximum amount of the resource for each patch.

210 Once patches and individuals were initialized, a “scaling distance” ( $Sd$ ) was  
computed to define the cooperative agents and create groups. The scaling dis-  
tance was the average of the minimum distance from the nearest neighbours  
of each agent. Agents then received an  $Ec$  designation. Cooperative agents  
( $Ec = 1$ ) were the agents that had a minimum distance from their nearest  
215 neighbours that was smaller than the scaling distance. The others were not  
cooperative ( $Ec = 0$ ). Hence, by construction, the nearest neighbour of a coop-  
erative agent was also cooperative, and groups of mutually-cooperative agents  
were formed.

At the same time, a resugar factor ( $Rs$ ), later implicated in the restoration of  
220 the resource, was computed as four times the number of agents divided by the  
number of patches. This recovering resource approach offered the opportunity of  
understanding group benefit without generating an additional carrying capacity  
effect other than the space map loaded during initialization.

### 2.3.2. Input data

225 There was no external input to the system once the simulation began.

### 2.3.3. Submodels

**SM1 ReSugar** : Resource regeneration was linked to the original space map through the value of sugar at initialization ( $ops$ ) and an additional factor allowing for temporal heterogeneity in resource availability ( $Tv$ ) creating seasonal cycles of 360 ticks (when  $Tv = 1$ ). The computation of the new sugar  
230 content of a patch ( $ps_{t+1}$ ) was given by:

$$ps_{t+1} = ps_t + Rs \times \frac{ops}{Mps} + Tv \times \frac{\sin(p) \times 40}{\sum_{x=0}^{x=180} \sin(x)} \quad (1)$$

where  $Rs$  was the scaling factor set at initialisation,  $ops$  was the initialized sugar level for this patch,  $Mps$  was the average of  $ops$  across all patches,  $p$  was a time counter reset to zero after 360 time steps and  $Tv$  (of value 0 or 1) was used to  
235 activate the temporal heterogeneity function. The iterative sum of  $\sin(p)$  and the scaling parameter of 40 were used to obtain seasonal variations of resource regeneration of +/- 20 points of sugar within half a season of 360 ticks. For mathematical stability, the range of  $ps$  was limited to 0 and 100.

**SM2 Grow** : In this procedure, every agent size ( $S_{i,t}$  for agent  $i$  at time  
240  $t$ ) was increased or decreased following a growth rate ( $rS_{i,t}$ ) in a Verhulst-type equation:

$$S_{i,t+1} = S_{i,t} + rS_{i,t} \times S_{i,t} \times \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{S_{i,t}}{maxSz} & \text{if } rS_{i,t} > 0 \\ 1 - \frac{minSz}{S_{i,t}} & \text{if } rS_{i,t} \leq 0 \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

where  $maxSz$  and  $minSz$  are the maximum and minimum possible sizes of the agents (arbitrarily fixed at 10 and 0.5), respectively. The growth rate  $rS_{i,t}$  was computed for each agent as follows (see Appendix A for visualisation):

$$rS_{i,t} = maxR \times \begin{cases} \min\left(1, \frac{gS_{i,t}}{vR \times ((1+maxR)^2 - 1) \times A_{i,t}}\right) & \text{if } gS_{i,t} > 0 \\ \max\left(-1, \frac{gS_{i,t}}{vR \times (1 - (1-maxR)^2) \times A_{i,t}}\right) & \text{if } gS_{i,t} \leq 0 \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

245 where  $maxR$  was the maximum growth rate (fixed arbitrarily to 0.1 in our  
simulations),  $vR$  was the necessary resource needed by an agent of  $A = 1$  to  
keep itself at the same size (arbitrarily fixed at 2),  $A_{i,t}$  was the area covered by  
the agent ( $A_{i,t} = \pi \times (\frac{S_{i,t}}{2})^2$ ),  $gS_{i,t}$  was the available sugar (from the  $Np$  patches  
under its influence (within area  $A_{i,t}$ ) plus the shared stock  $Sc_{j,t}$ ) allocated to  
250 growth by the individual  $i$ . This  $gS_{i,t}$  was calculated for each agent taking into  
account the local resource and, if the agent was in a group ( $j$ ), the value shared  
by the group ( $Sc_{j,t}$ ):

$$gS_{i,t} = \begin{cases} \sum_k^{Np} ps_{k,t} - vR \times A_{i,t} + Sc_{j,t} \times C_2B & \text{if } \sum_k^{Np} ps_{k,t} < vR \times A_{i,t} \\ \sum_k^{Np} ps_{k,t} - vR \times A_{i,t} + (1 - Sc_{j,t} \times C_2S) & \text{if } \sum_k^{Np} ps_{k,t} \geq vR \times A_{i,t} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

where  $Sc_{j,t}$  is the resource shared by the group  $j$ ,  $C_2S$  (*Coop. to Stock*)  
defines the proportion of the harvested resource pooling in the group's shared  
255 resource,  $C_2B$  (*Coop. to Burn*) is the proportion of the resource shared by  
the group available for each agent if its own harvested resource was not enough.  
The stock reserve of the group  $Sc_{j,t}$  was depleted by each cooperative agent (i.e.  
each agent with property  $Ec = 1$ ) if it was using the stock for growth ( $Sc_{j,t} > 0$   
and  $\sum_k^{Np} ps_{k,t} < vR \times A_{i,t}$ ) (the  $\rightarrow$  symbol means here that the variable was  
260 updated by each agent):

$$Sc_{j,t} \times (1 - C_2B) \rightarrow Sc_{j,t} \quad (5)$$

On the other hand, if the cooperative agent did not need the stock ( $\sum_k^{Np} ps_{k,t} >$   
 $vR \times A_{i,t}$ ), it added to it depending on the available sugar and the proportion  
fixed for all the cooperative agents for a simulation ( $C_2S$ ) :

$$Sc_{j,t} + \left( \sum_k^{Np} ps_{k,t} - vR \times A_{i,t} \right) \times C_2S \rightarrow Sc_{j,t} \quad (6)$$

$Sc_{j,t}$  was bound to a maximum value arbitrarily fixed at 10 000 for mathematical  
265 stability. The non-cooperative agents ( $Ec = 0$ ) did not use or update  $Sc$ . In  
this case  $gS_{i,t}$  was then fixed at  $\sum_k^{Np} ps_{k,t} - vR \times A_{i,t}$ . All of this mathematical

construction ensured that agents grew and decreased their size depending on the available resource, their size and the reserve of the group for cooperative agents.  $C_2S$  and  $C_2B$  parameters represent the ability of cooperators to stock part of their harvest and use a stocked part of their harvest in the event of spatial and temporal scarcity. These parameters were considered as social cooperation rules. The resource content of the  $Np$  patches affected by the growth of an agent were updated considering the agent's harvest. For a given patch  $u$  affected by an agent  $a$  and before being affected by an agent  $b$ :

$$ps_{u,t,a} - \frac{\sum_k^{Np} ps_{k,t}}{Np} \rightarrow ps_{u,t,b} \quad (7)$$

The random order of updating agents for each time step cancelled out the inequality in front of the use of shared patches.

The main global parameters of the model are listed in the Appendix B.

#### 2.4. Simulation plan

As explained in the initialization section of the ODD, the spatial distribution of individuals and resource were factors that we explored to evaluate the benefits of cooperation in different resource availability and distribution scenarios. The other factors to explore were the resource diffusion rate ( $dr$ ), the fact that resource replenishment varied over time ( $Tv$ ) and cooperative behaviours ( $C_2S$  and  $C_2B$ ).

Before looking at the cooperation situations, we ran each simulation without cooperation ( $Ec = 0$  for all agents) in order to compare the situations with and without cooperation. For these simulations, 3 spatial distributions of agents (random, regular, clustered), 3 agent numbers (100, 506, 992) and 10 random replicates of each combination (distribution and number) were generated with R (Team, 2016) and the spatstat package (Baddeley et al., 2015) (see Appendix C). With these 90 fixed spatial configurations of agents, 2 resource distribution types (homogeneous or clustered), the 2 resource replenishment types ( $Tv = 0$  or 1) and 6 diffusion rates values ( $dr = 0, 0.1, 0.2 \dots 0.5$ ), the total number of runs was 2160 for situations without cooperation. For each run we recorded the




Figure 2: Explanation of the three indicators used to summarize the outcomes of simulations:  $\Delta S$ ,  $DS$  and  $\Delta G$ . The dashed lines indicate the attributes of agents ( $S = \text{size}$ ). The  $G$  measures the Gini index of sizes within a group of agents. The continuous lines indicate computations of difference. The curly braces indicate computations of average.

295 mean agent size and Gini index of size distribution in the three agent groups gp1, gp2 and gp3 (see section 2.2.4) during the second half of the simulation (from step 1001 to 2000).

The simulations with cooperation replicated the same situations but also allowed  $C_2S$  and  $C_2B$  to vary. Both parameters were fixed at 0.1, 0.5 or 0.9. For the  
 300 resulting 19440 simulations with cooperation, the same indicators (mean agent size and Gini index for each of the three groups) were recorded. To summarize the effect of cooperation from all these simulations we focused on three indicators (Fig. 2).

The first one,  $\Delta S$ , was an indicator of gain in size for the gp2 individuals

305 with cooperative behaviour allowed.  $\Delta S$  was computed as a difference among  
simulations without cooperation and with cooperation behaviour allowed for  
identical parametrisation. At each observation time (100 measurements in the  
second half of the simulations), for each individual of gp2 the difference in  
size with and without cooperation was computed. Then, the mean of these  
310 differences was computed per observation time. Finally,  $\Delta S$  was the mean over  
time of these mean differences. This indicator was positive when cooperation  
made agents larger than when cooperation was not included and negative when  
agents lost size with the inclusion of cooperation.

The second indicator,  $DS$ , was a measure of the advantage in cooperating  
315 obtained by comparing the size of gp2 agents (cooperative individuals) and  
gp3 agents (non-cooperative individuals). It was computed as the mean over  
time of the difference between the mean sizes of cooperative individuals and  
the mean sizes of non-cooperative individuals. This indicator was positive when  
cooperative individuals were larger on average than non-cooperative agents.

320 The third indicator,  $\Delta G$ , was a measure of the changes in the inequalities  
(size differences) between cooperative agents (gp2).  $\Delta G$  was computed as the  
mean over time of the difference between the Gini index of a simulation with  
cooperation allowed and the Gini index of the corresponding simulation without  
cooperation. Negative values indicated that inequality increased with cooper-  
325 ation being allowed in the simulations. Positive values indicated a more equal  
distribution of sizes with cooperation than without.

To summarize all of these results and focus on which conditions made coop-  
eration individually advantageous thus leading to better sharing of the resource,  
we extracted the simulations in which the three indicators  $\Delta S$ ,  $DS$  and  $\Delta G$  were  
330 above 0 in at least 75% of the simulations in a given parametrisation. The choice  
to use  $\Delta G$  as one of these indicators implies that cooperation needed to increase  
equity among cooperative agents to be considered beneficial. This egalitarian  
access to resources meant that all individuals within a cooperative group had  
an equal chance of being selected. This choice was made also to avoid the case  
335 where an average increase in the size of cooperative agents (shown by a positive



$\Delta S$ ) is not due to benefits accruing only to one or a few individuals, which could then be seen more as a parasitic situation than as cooperation.

### 3. Results

In this section, we present some simulation results for the three different  
340 indicators regarding three different points of view. We finish this section with  
a summary of the conditions propitious to cooperative behaviour.

#### 3.1. Cooperation vs. individualism depending on agent wealth

Focusing on the simulations with 506 randomly distributed agents and the  
 $\Delta S$  indicator, we were able to look at the effect of the  $C_2S$  and  $C_2B$  parameters  
345 on the difference in success of gaining size for identical individuals between  
conditions where cooperation was allowed or not allowed. These differences in  
size were positive when cooperation was individually beneficial for the agents  
involved in cooperation. For each cooperation setting (combination of  $C_2S$  and  
 $C_2B$ ) and spatio-temporal variation in the resource, we were able to identify a  
350 maximum gain in size of the cooperative agents with an optimal spatial diffusion  
of the resource ( $dr$ , Fig. 3).

Without temporal resource variation (Fig. 3 a-b), the gain in size for co-  
operators increased under intermediate values of tested resource diffusion ( $dr$ ).  
With clustered spatial distribution of the resource (Fig. 3b) the gain in size  
355 increase for high  $C_2S$  and low  $C_2B$ . This latter result highlights the effect of  
spatial distribution of the resource on the agent's potential gain from cooper-  
ation. There was a combined effect of resource distribution and cooperation  
rules on optimum access to the resource. For example, with cooperation rules  
of  $C_2S$  of 0.5 and  $C_2B$  of 0.5, an optimum appeared at a spatial  $dr$  of 0.2 (Fig.  
3a). This optimum shifted to a  $dr$  of 0.1 with a clustered spatial distribution of  
360 resources (Fig. 3b). But a  $C_2S$  of 0.9 and  $C_2B$  of 0.9 shifted the optimum  $dr$   
back to 0.2 (Fig. 3b).

Temporal heterogeneity (Fig. 3c-d) clearly favoured the gain in size of co-  
operative agents and increased the variability of that gain depending on the

365 resource access parametrisation (comparing Fig. 3c to 3a). The gain in size  
reached more than 0.1 for a  $dr$  of 0.2, a  $C_2S$  of 0.9 and a  $C_2B$  of 0.1 (Fig.  
3c). The introduction of resource spatial clustering (Fig. 3d) led to even higher  
size gain for the same configuration of  $dr$ ,  $C_2S$  and  $C_2B$ . High  $C_2S$  and low  
 $C_2B$  mean a fairly stable shared stock, allowing more temporal averaging of  
370 the cooperative use of the resource and hence high values of  $\Delta S$  in the face  
of temporal scarcity. Different  $C_2S$  and  $C_2B$  parameters (e.g.  $C_2S = 0.1$  and  
 $C_2B = 0.5$ ) might however lead to very low gains in size.

The effects of spatial and temporal variability of resources in interaction with  
specific values of  $C_2S$  and  $C_2B$  illustrates how the “social” rules of cooperation  
375 can be used to compensate for the geographical determinism of resource avail-  
ability and its spatial variability. The  $dr$ ,  $C_2S$  and  $C_2B$  parameters correspond  
to different spatial and temporal averaging settings. The cooperation rules pro-  
vide an averaging among cooperative agents but generate costs at the individual  
level. Increasing the resource diffusion ( $dr$ ) increase the averaging of resource  
380 for all and at no explicit cost (see Appendix D for an illustration of the effect  
through time of  $dr$ ). Hence, cooperation is most beneficial when averaging is  
necessary in the face of temporal or spatial scarcity and not provided already  
by a diffusion process. In other words, when the diffusion process is low and  
resources are clustered in space or time, the extra costs of cooperation is worth  
385 to let circulate faster this resource among cooperative agents, who then gain in  
size. In such cases, the high  $C_2S$  and low  $C_2B$  are the most successful.

### 3.2. Cooperative vs. non-cooperative behaviour in a cooperative world

The initial population size and spatial arrangement of agents had an ef-  
fect on the difference in size between cooperative agents and non-cooperative  
390 agents in simulations with cooperation allowed. To illustrate this, we looked  
at constant social rules of cooperation  $C_2S$  and  $C_2B$  (both fixed at 0.5 in Fig.  
4). In a random resource map without temporal resource variation (Fig. 4a),  
a regular agent distribution led to an almost identical size of cooperative and  
non-cooperative agents while clustered or random distribution of agents led to




Figure 3: Effects of spatial and temporal resource variability, cooperation behaviour ( $C_2S$  (*Coop. to Stock*) and  $C_2B$  (*Coop. to Burn*)) and resource diffusion rate (the grey colours in each group of 6 successive box-plots within each colour column represent a variation in  $dr$  from 0 (black/left) to 0.5 (whitish/right)) on the difference in mean size of the cooperative agents among the non-cooperation-allowed and the cooperation-allowed simulations ( $\Delta S$ ) for a selected condition of spatial distribution and number of agents (506 individuals with random distribution). Positive values indicate that cooperation promoted an increase in size of the cooperative individuals. The top row (a,b) shows simulation results without temporal resource variability, while the bottom row (c,d) had temporal resource variability. The left columns (a,c) are with a randomized spatial resource while the right columns (b,d) are with two clusters of the resource (“sugarmap”).

395 a larger size of non-cooperative agents than cooperative agents (negative  $DS$ ).  
In the other cases of spatial and/or temporal variability of the resource (Fig. 4  
b,c,d) the  $DS$  was always larger for regularly distributed agents than clustered  
or randomly distributed agents. Without temporal variation but with spatial  
heterogeneity of the resource (Fig. 4b), a regular distribution of 506 or 992  
400 agents led cooperative agents to have larger sizes than non-cooperative agents  
( $DS > 0$ ). In these cases, an optimum  $dr$  value appeared at 0.1. With tem-  
poral resource variation (Fig. 4 c-d), a small number of randomly distributed  
populations of agents had an advantage in cooperating with a  $dr$  of 0.2. With  
100 agents, the maximum  $DS$  at  $dr$  of 0.2 was true for all resource distribu-  
405 tions. However, the regular distribution of agents still enhanced the advantage  
of cooperative agents ( $DS > 0$ ).

In term of mechanisms behind these results, the regular distribution of agents  
allowed optimal sharing of resources in cooperative groups of small size. Indeed,  
the regular distribution created smaller groups than the two other distribution  
410 types (see Appendix E). When comparing the success of growth of cooperative  
agents to non-cooperative ones, small cooperative groups could do overall better  
than large groups. Large cooperative groups created some spatial configuration  
with individuals in the centre of many other, and hence not accessing resources.  
The intermediate  $dr$  values effect was a bit similar: the resource accessibility  
415 needed to be high enough but not too high so that all agents could benefits from  
the resources coming from empty areas.

### 3.3. Inequality in the cooperation kingdom

Positive changes in the Gini index brought about by cooperation ( $\Delta G$ , Fig.  
5) indicated a more equal distribution of sizes with cooperation than without,  
420 among the cooperative agents (and only these agents, see Fig. 2).

Without temporal or spatial resource variation (Fig. 5 a), the variations of  
 $\Delta G$  were highly influenced by the  $dr$  and spatial distribution of agents. In the  
cases of random and clustered distribution of agents, cooperation generated a  
decrease in size equity among cooperative agents for small values of resource




Figure 4: Effects of spatial and temporal resource variability, spatial distribution and number of agents and resource diffusion rate (identical to figure 3) on the difference in mean size between the cooperative agents and the non-cooperative agents ( $DS$ ) for a selected condition of cooperation behaviour ( $C_2S = 0.5$ ,  $C_2B = 0.5$ ). Positive values indicate that cooperative individuals were larger overall than non-cooperative agents. Graph layout (a-d) is identical to figure 3.

425 diffusion (when  $dr \leq 0.2$ ,  $\Delta G < 0$ ). This decrease was less visible with only  
100 agents. However, high diffusion rates ( $dr > 0.3$ ) led to a small advantage  
for cooperation in terms of size equity. For these spatial configuration (random  
and clustered agents) a low resource diffusion  $dr$  made that resources were more  
accessible to border agents of cooperative groups. When  $dr$  increases, this ad-  
430 vantage disappeared and the groups received more resources, hence the equity  
increased within the cooperative groups. The regular distribution of few agents  
(100 or 506) also homogenized the access to resources. With 992 regularly dis-  
tributed agents, the effect of  $dr$  was visible again.

The clustered spatial distribution of the resource (Fig. 5 b) had a decreasing  
435 effect on the dispersion of  $\Delta G$  but also decreased the number of cases with  
positive  $\Delta G$ . Clustered resources were not conducive to equity among agents  
in general, but cooperation increased these inequities in this case (Fig. 5b).  
Here, the decrease in  $\Delta G$  was due to a difference of resource access among  
cooperative agents. The cooperative agents on top of the high resource areas  
440 had more resources to share, grow and hence access new resources than the  
agents in lower resource areas. This created inequity among all the cooperative  
agents (between groups).

With temporal resource variation, the optimum resource diffusion to obtain  
a reduction in inequity in the simulations seemed to decrease (comparing Fig.  
445 5 a and c). This was particularly true with 100 individuals. However with 906  
individuals, whatever their spatial distribution, inequity was increased with co-  
operation (Fig. 5c). Adding spatially explicit resource distribution to temporal  
resource variation did not modify these patterns (Fig. 5d). However, as without  
temporal variation, a clustered resource was not an opportunity for agents to  
450 decrease inequity with cooperation.

We saw previously that cooperation promoted a larger size of cooperators  
with heterogeneous resource distribution than with homogeneous distribution  
(Fig. 3 & 4). We see now that these large sizes were built on greater inequity  
between agents.




Figure 5: Effects of spatial and temporal resource variability, spatial distribution and number of agents and resource diffusion (identical to figure 3) on the difference in the mean Gini index among the non-cooperation-allowed and the cooperation-allowed simulations ( $\Delta G$ ) for a selected condition of cooperation behaviour ( $C_2S = 0.5$ ,  $C_2B = 0.5$ ).  $\Delta G$  is computed as the difference of Gini index of sizes of the cooperative agents (only, see Fig. 2). Positive values indicate a more equal distribution of sizes with cooperation than without for the selected agents (that are cooperating when cooperation is allowed). Negative values indicate that inequality increased with cooperation being allowed in the simulations.

455 *3.4. When does it pay to cooperate?*

In the results presented above, the simulations were with the same configuration for  $C_2S$  (0.5) and  $C_2B$  (0.5). It cannot therefore be seen whether agents could use the lever of cooperation rules to reduce inequity. We were interested in finding situations where cooperation was the best solution for agents in terms  
460 of a gain in size ( $\Delta S$ ), a larger size for cooperators than non-cooperative agents ( $DS$ ) and reduced inequity ( $\Delta G$ ). Blank squares in Fig. 6 imply that no configuration with these parametrisations led simultaneously to a larger size with cooperation than without, a larger size of cooperative individuals than non-cooperative individuals and lower inequality among the cooperative individuals  
465 when cooperation was allowed. On the contrary, the grey squares indicate a favourable situation for cooperation. For each grey square, Fig. 6 indicates the resource diffusion rate ( $dr$ ) value(s) that comply with the rule of 75% of simulation results conducive to cooperation for the three indicators.

We can see a clear opposition between simulation without temporal variability (Fig. 6 a-b) and simulation with temporal variability (Fig. 6 c-d) as  
470 noted in section 3.1. In the first case, no parametrisations appeared beneficial for cooperation. The second case with temporal variability clearly introduced some positive configurations. However, they were restricted to small numbers of agents (100 or 506) and a regularly spaced distribution of them. In the case  
475 with spatial clustering of the resource (Fig. 6d), this was even more strictly confined to the simulations with 100 agents. The regular spatial distribution of agents favours cooperation through two mechanisms: a decrease of spatial competition for resource and the creation of small groups with few connections. These enhance the equity among cooperative agents and hence come out as a  
480 major factor in Fig. 6. Lastly, an effect of cooperation rules was also visible. Some cases of  $C_2S$  and  $C_2B$  did not favour cooperation while others did. More specifically, in the case of a spatially and temporally heterogeneous resource (Fig. 6d), it was good to stock the shared resource a lot (high  $C_2S$ ) and use it moderately (low  $C_2B$ ) in order to have beneficial cooperation for a large number  
485 of agents.






Figure 6: Effects of spatial and temporal resource variability, spatial distribution and number of agents ( $N.$  and  $Spatial$ ) and cooperation behaviour ( $C_2S$  and  $C_2B$ ) on a summary test showing the resource diffusion rate ( $dr$ ) when all three indicators ( $\Delta S$ ,  $DS$  and  $\Delta G$ ) showed a 1st quartile distribution above 0. Blank squares imply that no configuration with this parametrisation led simultaneously to a larger size with cooperation than without, a larger size of cooperative individuals than non-cooperative individuals and lower inequality among the cooperative individuals. The top row (a,b) shows simulation results without temporal resource variability, while the bottom row (c,d) had temporal resource variability. The left-hand columns (a,c) are with a randomized spatial resource while the right-hand columns (b,d) are with two resource clusters (“sugarmap”).

## 4. Discussion

In this paper our objective was double : *i*) support an ontological approach of cooperation compatible with actual consideration on competition, *ii*) illustrate with a model that there may be some conditions when cooperative agents are  
490 successful compared to competitive agents. In accordance with previous works (Touza et al., 2013; Pepper and Smuts, 2000; Boza and Scheuring, 2004), our simulations showed that heterogeneity of spatial resources is necessary for the success of cooperation at the group level. We included equity ( $\Delta G$ ) as part of the success of cooperation at the group level to consider potential natural selection  
495 on all agents of cooperative groups. In this context, we illustrated that in some settings, temporal scarcity of the resource can have a greater influence over cooperation success than the spatial variability of the resource.

We observed that spatial averaging of resources can be interesting for cooperative agents in the face of scarcity when the diffusion of these resources is  
500 not too high. In addition, our model made possible to explore the influence of another dimension in resource heterogeneity: the variability in agent access, especially through their spatial configuration. We observed that the factors favouring equity in access to the resource was conducive to the success of cooperation. So our results illustrate “when does resource scarcity favour group  
505 cooperation”.

### 4.1. Configuration of the interactions' topology matters

In a heterogeneous temporal resource context, we found that the regular agent layout concentrated all favourable conditions for cooperation especially for 100 and 506 agents. These results can be interpreted in the light of the  
510 rule of Ohtsuki et al. (2006) of a necessary benefit-to-cost ratio above the mean number of interacting neighbours in a network reciprocity configuration. Indeed, our regular spatial configuration of a few agents created a regular lattice in terms of the topological network of interaction. The mean number of interacting neighbours was thus relatively small and the benefits did not need to be

515 as high as in a clustered spatial configuration of agents for cooperation to be  
more beneficial than individualistic behaviour. Recent work on the topologi-  
cal structure of populations implies that clustered situations could even be, in  
themselves, never conducive to cooperation (Allen et al., 2017).

We cannot say whether a regular layout is an initial need for cooperation  
520 or whether it is the emergent result of local competition like proposed by the  
“Central place theory” (Christaller, 1933) or the self-thinning rule in ecology  
(Yoda, 1963; Stoll and Bergius, 2005), but in any event the link between regular  
spacing and the benefits of cooperation is strengthened by our results. It is  
thus possible to put forward the hypothesis that it is only when competition  
525 is reduced with regular and egalitarian access to the resource that cooperation  
can be beneficial to all. It would be interesting to investigate empirically the  
other outputs of the model concerning group size in cooperation. The fact that  
cooperation is favoured in and beneficial for groups of small numbers of agents  
should be considered in political policy and particularly in the case of stake-  
530 holder empowerment. On the contrary, the current trend in collective irrigation  
management is to merge small groups to achieve an economy of scale (Delay  
and Linton, 2019; Campardon et al., 2012). This opposite trend can become  
critical for maintaining cooperation in large management groups (Axelrod and  
Keohane, 1985; Allen et al., 2017; Reia and Fontanari, 2017).

535 Empirical observations by Hamburger et al. (1975) or Smaldino and Lubell  
(2011) illustrated the role of group size in cooperation. Barnes et al. (2017)  
questioned cooperation in harvesting common-pool fishery resources consider-  
ing the fact that fishing is a highly competitive economic activity, in which  
uncertainty linked to spatial and temporal heterogeneity of the resource is high.  
540 In the same way as Ohtsuki et al. (2006), Barnes et al. (2017) used the costs  
and benefits approach based on resource management. They highlighted in this  
context some sociological conditions conducive to cooperative behaviour. These  
interesting observations confirm the theoretical work of Allen et al. (2017) about  
the limitations of network size and topology on cooperation and illustrate them  
545 in the context of a common-pool management system. Our results regarding

the number of agents and resource accessibility corroborate these findings. The largest numbers of agents never succeed to obtain cooperation entirely beneficial to cooperative groups in our simulations.

#### 4.2. *Temporal scarcity as engine of cooperation*

550 In our model, the sharing capacity of cooperative groups created a temporal buffer for the agents to deal with lack of resources. This explains the important role of temporal scarcity of the resource in favouring cooperation and creating equity within cooperative groups. The temporal variability of the resource necessary for cooperation to be beneficial can also be understood through the  
555 benefit-to-cost ratio rule of Ohtsuki et al. (2006) in network reciprocity. In our model, as in many real systems, the costs of setting aside part of the potential resource for harder days to come are temporally immediate. On the other hand, the benefits are temporally worthwhile only if these resources do indeed become scarce at some time. Hence, the benefit-to-cost ratio can favour cooperation at  
560 the group level only if those resources are temporally variable. Specific network configurations are necessary for individual benefits of cooperation Allen et al. (2017). But we show that at the group level, the temporal effects of resource availability are important drivers of cooperation, particularly considering the criteria of reducing inequity among cooperative agents ( $\Delta G$ ).

565 This surprising link between temporal heterogeneity and collective management opens up various avenues of investigation. Indeed, as Springer (2016, 8) says "[...] *any given commons is a geographical matifestation of mutual aid*". Among other things, the possibility of characterizing potential for the emergence of cooperation through some indicators of spatial-temporal variability of  
570 resources is an interesting research objective. The theoretical work initiated by Ohtsuki et al. (2006) or Allen et al. (2017) towards characterizing interactions and network configurations lacks the temporal aspects of the resource.

#### 4.3. *About our positioning*

Among our modelling hypotheses, the nearest neighbour distance used to  
575 impose cooperative behaviour between agents (sect. Design concepts 2.2) is

a highly structuring hypothesis. This choice corresponds to general beliefs in different research fields. In geography, socio-economics or ecology, cooperation is strongly tied to the spatial proximity of agents (Tobler, 1970). It would be interesting in future work to analyse the effect of a different topology of social  
580 networks on the benefits of sharing resources.

Another modelling assumption to explore further is the choice of using one kind and one use of resource. Obviously, real resources and access to them can be complementary between agents, plural and temporally variable (Torre and Wallet, 2014). Our resource-based assumption of relationships among agents  
585 was influenced by Epstein and Axtell (1996) and their artificial society where agents eat and metabolize a renewable resource. Our agents' optimum behaviour was resource-oriented. This modelling choice was justified by the simple representation of agent interactions.

Our objective was to illustrate in which cases cooperation was successful  
590 compared to competition in some spatial and temporal environments. For a given model or system, once the settings favouring cooperation are identified, it could be possible to explore in these domains and margins if cooperation can emerge in the face of competition. Working on resource-based definitions, one could balance the debate between competition and cooperation in  
595 the same terms. This ontological equilibrium between cooperation and competition, without having to rely on “games theory” and “prisoner’s dilemma” approaches (Waldeck, 2013; Ohdaira and Takao, 2009; Cohen et al., 2001; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) can be seen as the settings for fertile interdisciplinary approaches. Indeed, ecologists as well as social scientists can use our framework  
600 to filter their own reality (Varenne, 2017). Hence, this work can be seen as an extension of Epstein and Axtell (1996) focusing on cooperation rather than markets and trade. Models developed considering the resource-based definition of cooperation could also serve to explore spatial pattern formation (Rietkerk and van de Koppel, 2008) in the conditions where cooperation increase the speed of  
605 resource exchange among agents compared to the diffusion process (see e.g. for review Kondo and Miura, 2010).

Our model highlights that there are, in general, few circumstances in which cooperation is beneficial. It is worth noting that we gave importance to equity between individuals in our interpretation of beneficial cooperation (through  $\Delta G$ ). In human cooperation, such equity is not always a reality. Indeed, in different cooperative institutions, the equity between individuals is not the objective of the cooperation. The objective is more often a mutual benefit increasing the fitness of each cooperator (Delay, 2015; Gide and Tenin, 2014).

To conclude, our model illustrates that the link between temporal and spatial uncertainty can be understood as a driver leading to the creation of a cooperative group. However, our results do not claim to illustrate how an environmental resource should be sustainably managed, and further studies should explore the emergence of cooperative institutions that manage resources.

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## 810 **Appendix A. Visualisation of Submodels**

The figure A.1 presents the illustration of the result of equation 3 with different values of  $gS$  and depending on the size of the agent ( $S$ ).

## **Appendix B. Parameters**

We present here the table of the global parameters used in the model.




Figure A.1: Illustration of the mathematical function giving growth rate value ( $rS$ ) depending on agent size ( $S$ ) and available sugar ( $gS$ , or missing sugar when  $gS < 0$ ).

### 815 Appendix C. Initialisation of spatial distribution of agents

The positions of agents was always at the centre of a patch. The random distributions of agents was obtained with a Poisson process of complete spatial randomness.

820 For the creation of 10 different clustered spatial distributions of  $n$  agents, we used a Matern Cluster Process of intensity of  $\frac{n}{10}$ , a radius parameter of the clusters of 0.2 and a number of points per cluster of 10. We kept only simulations of these processes that gave the expected number of agent ( $n = 100, 506$  or  $992$ ).

825 For the creation of the regular spacing distributions, we started with an implementation of a hexagonal close packing of the requested  $n$  agents. To obtain the 10 different distributions and have agents that could have a minimum neighbour distance below a mean value, we inserted noise around these regular positions. Each agent was then "moved" with a random value of  $\pm 0.5$ .

Parameter name	Description	Values
$dr$	Diffusion rate of the resource	0, 0.1, ..., 0.5
$Ec$	Binary parameter to allow or not the sharing of resources	0 or 1
$Tv$	Binary parameter to allow or not the seasonal variation of resource replenishment	0 or 1
$C_2B$	Proportion of the shared resource used by an agent when in cooperation	0.1, 0.5 or 0.9
$C_2S$	Proportion of available resource allocated by an agent to the shared resource	0.1, 0.5 or 0.9
$maxSz$	Maximum size of agents	10
$minSz$	Minimum size of agents	0.5
$maxR$	Maximum growth rate of agents	0.1
$vR$	Necessary resource needed for maximum growth	2

#### Appendix D. Resource visualisation

830 We present here (Fig. D.2) some examples of resource spatial distribution in different scenarios of diffusion ( $dr$ ) and with either an initialisation with randomized spatial resource or two resource clusters (“sugarmap”). The spatial distribution of resource is dependant on initialized settings, growth of the agents and diffusion rate. The higher the diffusion rate, the more homogenized the resource.

#### 835 Appendix E. Network analysis of spatial distributions of agents

We present here (Fig. E.3) some mean characteristics of the cooperative networks (groups of cooperative agents) created in the initialization setting with random, regular or clustered spatial distributions of all agents.




Figure D.2: Evolution of the spatial resource distribution in different scenarios (a): initialized conditions with randomized spatial resource; (b): simulation with  $dr = 0.1$  at  $t = 1100$ ; (c): simulation with  $dr = 0.5$  at  $t = 1100$ ; (d): initialized conditions with two resource clusters (“sugarmap”); (e): simulation with  $dr = 0.1$  at  $t = 1100$ ; (f): simulation with  $dr = 0.5$  at  $t = 1100$ . The red agents are the cooperative agents whereas violet ones do not share resources. All simulations with  $Tv = 1$ ,  $C_2B = C_2S = 0.5$  and 992 randomly distributed agents.






Figure E.3: Mean number of connections, mean number of agents in the networks and mean number of networks of cooperative agents created with the different settings of number and spatial distribution of agents.