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Whistleblowing vs random audit : An experimental test of relative efficiency

Abstract : This paper reports an experimental test of the relative efficiency of a whistleblowing-based audit scheme compared to a random-based audit scheme. We design a between-subjects laboratory experiment with two treatments: a benchmark with a random-based audit scheme and an alternative treatment in which taxpayers can blow the whistle. Compared to the benchmark, the whistleblowing-based audit scheme (i) improves the targeting of evaders, (ii) decreases the monetary amount of tax evasion, and (iii) raises the tax levy.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02311618
Contributor : Laurent Garnier <>
Submitted on : Friday, October 11, 2019 - 10:09:52 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, September 29, 2020 - 2:53:30 PM

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Cécile Bazart, Mickaël Beaud, Dimitri Dubois. Whistleblowing vs random audit : An experimental test of relative efficiency. Kyklos, Wiley, 2020, 73, pp.47-67. ⟨10.1111/kykl.12215⟩. ⟨halshs-02311618⟩

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