Whistleblowing vs random audit : An experimental test of relative efficiency

Cécile Bazart (1) , Mickaël Beaud (1) , Dimitri Dubois (1)

1 CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier

This paper reports an experimental test of the relative efficiency of a whistleblowing-based audit scheme compared to a random-based audit scheme. We design a between-subjects laboratory experiment with two treatments: a benchmark with a random-based audit scheme and an alternative treatment in which taxpayers can blow the whistle. Compared to the benchmark, the whistleblowing-based audit scheme (i) improves the targeting of evaders, (ii) decreases the monetary amount of tax evasion, and (iii) raises the tax levy.

Mots clés: Tax evasion; tax compliance; deterrence; detection; audit policy; denouncement; laboratory experiments

Domaines: Economies et finances

Cécile Bazart, Mickaël Beaud, Dimitri Dubois. Whistleblowing vs random audit : An experimental test of relative efficiency. Kyklos, 2020, 73, pp.47-67. ⟨10.1111/kykl.12215⟩. ⟨halshs-02311618⟩