China’s government and companies’ strategic communications and grass-roots lobbying strategies in Africa in the digital age: a case study on China’s Confucius Institutes

Zhao Alexandre Huang (1, 2, 3)

1 DICEN-IDF - Dispositifs d'Information et de Communication à l'Ère du Numérique - Paris Île-de-France
2 UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée
3 UPE - Université Paris-Est

This thesis focuses on China’s hybrid lobbying strategies (economic and cultural, hard and soft power) in the sectors of media and telecommunication in Africa, particularly in Kenya and South Africa. It intends to analyse changing Chinese soft power influence strategies in the digital and social media age. I rely on different perspectives and theoretical approaches: public policies cognitive analysis, media framing effects on political debates, critical analysis of the uses of information and communication tools in different socio- historical backgrounds, prospective analysis of PR techniques evolution (Davidson, 2016; Olsson & Eriksson, 2016; Yeomans, 2016; Kantola, 2016; Bernays, 2013; Berg, 2009). We mean to examine the innovative way in which the Chinese “party-state” spreads a certain vision of its culture and ideology on the African continent in order to promote its economic interest. This grass-roots lobbying (Barnes & Balnave, 2015; Schneider, 2015; Jalali, 2013; Reddick & Norris, 2013) can be described accurately with the metaphor of the Trojan horse. As the essential destination of the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, the official ways to name Chinese international relations’ strategy, Kenya has become a hub for China. China’s cultural institutions opened their first African Confucius Institute there. Being one of the members of BRICS, South Africa also grew into the business centre of China in Africa. Many important branches of Chinese Telecom companies are based in the country. It seems that these institutions, no matter public or private, were eventually being an essential channel for China’s local PR actions. As the core channels of “soft power”, culture and knowledge encapsulate values, ideologies and beliefs (Desmoulins & Huang, 2017; Gupta, 2013; Martel, 2013; DeLisle, 2010; Courmont, 2009; Bläser, 2005; Keohane, Jr, & Keohane, 1998; Nye, 2006, 2004, 1991). China’s cultural associations, training institutes, humanitarian foundations, companies as well as government’s propaganda are mutually reinforced and seem to be aimed to enhance China’s cultural, political and economic influence spheres indifferently. This could not be possible without a high level of centralisation and of governmental control, pervasive media propaganda and well-funded and staffed information censorship institutions. As a matter of fact, China remains a one-party state, its constitution determines the Communist Party of China (CCP) as China’s sole ruling party, although Chinese economic development after the reform and opening up of 1978 shows the characteristics of capitalism. Most Chinese companies are owned by the state. Furthermore, even through Chinese Constitution protects the freedom of speech and of the press (see Chapter 2, Article 35), the status of Chinese press is extraordinary and difficult to tackle from a western viewpoint. In China, media plays as the spokesman filtering all negative news and led by the CPC, which means it defends politically governmental issues and positions, even participates in all political propaganda. One hypothesis is that since China is the birthplace of the Confucian culture and since Chinese people see themselves as the continuator of Confucianism, interests’ groups PR strategies rely on different action lever than in Western Europe. Common interests are more valued than individual interests, political authority is more important than individual freedoms, also social responsibility wins over individual rights (Chu, 2016, p. 198; Huntington, 1997, p. 10). Functioning as the vanguard of Chinese image’s promotion, all people are considered as the spokesman of the CPC, no matter whether they are working for a media company, a cultural public agency or the diplomatic corps. They carry out a gatekeeping process (Brown, 1979, p. 595; Lewin, 1997) to promote CPC ideas and to promote the development in Africa of a kind of socialism that presents Chinese genuine characteristics. The thesis examines the current logic of China’s and China’s companies’ soft power strategies, and the related PR actions. The main research question is: what is so special with the Chinese soft power strategies (one-party system, censorship, propaganda, state monopolies, centralisation of the decision-making process, economic boost, ecological crisis, millennium Confucian philosophy and appealing non-individualistic culture in a context of capitalist crisis)? How are China’s governmental diplomacy and corporate PR strategies conceived, deployed and intertwined? How do second-track diplomacy and PR strategies differ and interact? I chose to adopt a comparative approach (two countries and two sectors of activity). How do these strategies interact with other resources of power in the digital and social media age? A multidimensional theoretical framework was mobilized, I aim to associate different approaches of public relations, lobbying, communication, international relations and foreign policy (political science, political theory). Secondly, fieldworks in Kenya and South Africa will take place in Spring 2018 to interview local residents, such as African branches of Chinese enterprises and media (China Telecom, Huawei, StarTimes, CGTN, CCTV, Xinhua), as well as representatives of Confucius Institutes and China’s local embassies. I will also analyse the rhetoric and semiotic of Chinese soft power strategies as it reveals itself on sites, forums, blogs and social media platforms, where PR strategies of China’s companies and governmental agencies are revealed. In short, I intend to analyse the institutional, rhetorical and technical innovative strategies deployed by China, its second-rack diplomacy, its soft power strategy (local PR actions and digital grass-roots lobbying). My study encompasses the PR actions of Chinese companies and governmental agencies in Africa by focusing on two sectors (telecoms, media), and two main countries: Kenya and South Africa.

Mots clés: Strategic Communication; Soft power; Lobbying; Media; ChinAfrica

Domaines: Sciences de l'Homme et Société; Sciences de l'information et de la communication

Zhao Alexandre Huang. China’s government and companies’ strategic communications and grass-roots lobbying strategies in Africa in the digital age: a case study on China’s Confucius Institutes. The 11th EUPRERA Ph.D. Annual Workshop, Oct 2017, Londres, United Kingdom. ⟨halshs-02307531⟩