

Nigidius Figulus' Naturalism: Between Grammar and Philosophy

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► **To cite this version:**

Alessandro Garcea. Nigidius Figulus' Naturalism: Between Grammar and Philosophy. Giuseppe Pezzini; Barnaby Taylor. Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World, Cambridge University Press, pp.79-102, 2019. halshs-02160874

HAL Id: halshs-02160874

<https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02160874>

Submitted on 4 Feb 2020

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CHAPTER 3

*Nigidius Figulus' Naturalism
Between Grammar and Philosophy*

Alessandro Garcea

Introduction

'A frustratingly mysterious figure, though he was a friend of Cicero and praetor in 58' (Rawson 1985: 94), Nigidius Figulus died in exile, in May or June 45, before Cicero could utter any *oratio ad clementiam Caesaris* in his favour. Nevertheless, in the extant beginning of his *Timaeus* (§1 = *test.* 9 Swoboda), Cicero included a vibrant eulogy of his friend, whose character well suited that of the Pythagorean Timaeus of Locri Epizephyrii.¹

Nigidius' learning was unanimously acknowledged. Even if he does not always agree with him, Aulus Gellius praises him as *homo eruditissimus* (15.3.2): *Nigidius is iuxta M. Varronem doctissimus* (4.9.1), so that this couple of *uiri Romani generis doctissimi* (4.16.1) form the *columnina* of the late Republican culture (19.14.2), the sole difference between them being the abstruse character (§3 *obscuritas subtilitasque*) of Nigidius' writings that hindered their survival.

Putting Nigidius' *Commentarii grammatici* together with the astronomical and theological works that gave him the reputation of *Pythagoricus et magus* (Hier. Chron. *a. Abr.* 1972 (45) = *test.* 8 S.), modern critics generally interpret Nigidius' linguistic thought from a Pythagorean point of view, even if our evidence about a supposed preoccupation with grammar by the Pythagoreans is very thin, apart from their interest in the mystic power of words – an aspect that, in any case, is absent from Nigidius' fragments.² What is unquestionable is rather Nigidius' allegiance

¹ Yet Nigidius' Pythagoreanism presents some problems: see Musial 2001, Flinterman 2014: 343–7.

² Carcopino (1926: 199–200) is quite representative of this stance: 'Jusque dans les étymologies qu'il propose pour les mots de la langue latine, il reconnaît, soit l'action des puissances dont Pythagore lui a livré le secret, soit l'ébauche des commandements que sa sagesse surhumaine défendit d'enfreindre.' Della Casa (1962: 55–69) associates Nigidius' fragments with the following testimonies, allegedly representing the 'studi linguistici del pitagorismo': Iamblichus *VP* 82 (58C 4 DK) τί τὸ σοφώτατον; ἀριθμός· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενον, also found in Proclus, *In Cra.*, who adds (16.20–2): οὐκ ἄρα, φησὶ Πυθαγόρας, τοῦ τυχόντος ἐστὶ τὸ ὀνοματουργεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν

to a naturalistic point of view, whereby Stoic influences are combined with some original ideas on the overall grammar of the Latin language. The following attempt at a systematic presentation of this approach will start from Nigidius' theory of natural articulatory symbolism (§1), an adaptation of Chrysippus' use of language as a philosophical argument (§2); then, after a reconstruction of Nigidius' lost work on Latin grammar (§3.1), the ethical character of his etymologies will be taken into account (§3.2), as well as their relation to Varro's contemporary explanations (§3.3); finally, a study of the presence of naturalistic theories in Nigidius' morphological fragments on derivation (§4.1), inflection (§4.2), and word classes (§4.3) will be undertaken.

1 Nigidius' Theory of Natural Articulatory Symbolism

In his *Commentarii grammatici*, Nigidius Figulus openly treated the philosophical question of the natural or arbitrary character of language and pleaded for the first conception with different arguments, from which Aulus Gellius singles out a very peculiar one. According to Nigidius, when uttering the personal pronouns, our speech organs change shape depending on whether we are designating someone else (protrusion) or ourselves (protraction):

nomina uerbaque non positu fortuito, sed quadam ui et ratione naturae facta esse P. Nigidius in *grammaticis commentariis* docet, rem sane in philosophiae disertationibus celebrem. (2.) quaeri enim solitum apud philosophos, φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα sint ἢ θέσει. (3.) in eam rem multa argumenta dicit, cur uideri possint uerba esse naturalia magis quam arbitraria. (4.) ex quibus hoc uisum est lepidum et festiuum: “uos” – inquit – cum dicimus, motu quodam oris conueniente cum ipsius uerbi demonstratione utimur et labeas sensim primores emouemus ac spiritum atque animam porro uersum et ad eos, quibuscum sermocinamur, intendimus. at contra cum dicimus ‘nos’, neque profuso intentoque flatu uocis neque proiectis labris pronuntiamus, sed et spiritum et labeas quasi intra nosmet ipsos coercemus. hoc idem fit et in eo, quod dicimus ‘tu’, ‘ego’ et ‘tibi’ et ‘mihi’. nam sicuti, cum adnuimus et abnuimus, motus quidam ille uel capitis uel oculorum a natura rei, quam significat, non abhorret, ita in his

νοῦν ὀρώντος καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων· φύσει ἔρα τὰ ὀνόματα; Cicero *Tusc.* 1.62 (see below, n. 35). For a justified scepticism, see Thesleff 1965: 46. Dillon (1977: 181) finds some passages περὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων θέσεως in Philo (esp. *Leg. alleg.* 2.14–15; *QG* 1.20), which would show that ‘there is . . . a consensus among Platonists, Stoics and Pythagoreans by Philo’s time that words are attached to things by nature, not by convention’. On the complexity of this debate among the Middle Platonists see van den Berg 2008: 31–59.

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uocibus quasi gestus quidam oris et spiritus naturalis est. eadem ratio est in Graecis quoque uocibus, quam esse in nostris animaduertimus.

Publius Nigidius in his *Grammatical Notes* shows that nouns and verbs were formed, not by accidental imposition, but by a certain power and design of nature, a subject very popular in the discussions of the philosophers; for they used to inquire whether words originate by nature or by imposition. Nigidius employs many arguments to this end, to show that words appear to be natural rather than arbitrary. Among these the following seems particularly neat and ingenious: 'When we say *uos* (you) – says Nigidius –, we make a movement of the mouth appropriate to the indication of the word; for we gradually protrude the tips of our lips and direct the impulse of the breath towards those with whom we are speaking. But on the other hand, when we say *nos* (us), we do not pronounce the word with a powerful forward impulse of the voice, nor with the lips protruded, but we restrain our breath and our lips, so to speak, within ourselves. The same thing happens in the words *tu* (thou), *ego* (I), *tibi* (to thee), and *mibi* (to me). For just as when we assent or dissent, a movement of the head or eyes is not alien to the nature of the thing signified, so too in the pronunciation of these words there is a kind of natural gesture made with the mouth and breath. The same principle that we have noted in our own speech applies also to Greek words.' (Nigidius fr. 41 S. = *GRFF* 23 = *FDS* 562 *ap.* Gell. 10.4.1–4; transl. after Rolfe 1927: 229)

Like other Republican scholars and men of letters, Nigidius was very interested in phonetics, as many extant fragments prove.³ Yet here his

³ He observed that vocalic *I* and *V* are always in a secondary position (*subditae*) in descending diphthongs but come first (*praeuunt*) in ascending diphthongs, and in this case cannot be deemed to be vowels (fr. 53 S. = *GRFF* 16 *ap.* Gell. 19.14.6): *A et O semper principes sunt, I et V semper subditae, E et subit et praeit; <praeit> in 'Euripo', subit in 'Aemilio'. si quis putat praeire V in his: 'Valerius', 'Vennonius', 'Volusius', aut I in his: 'iampridem', 'iecur', 'iocus', 'iucundum', errabit, quod hae litterae, cum praeuunt, ne uocales quidem sunt.* He also studied the relation between phonetics and orthography. Like Accius (*GRFF* 25 *ap.* Prisc. *GL* 2.30.15–21 through Varro's *De origine linguae Latinae I*, *GRFF* 3 = 46 Goetz-Schoell), he was interested in the velar nasal [ŋ], noted by the sign of the voiced velar plosive in the same way as in Greek (fr. 54 S. = *GRFF* 17 *ap.* Gell. 19.14.7): *inter litteram N et G est alia uis, ut in nomine 'anguis' et 'angari' et 'ancorae' et 'increpat' et 'incurrit' et 'ingenuus': in omnibus enim his non uerum N, sed adulterinum ponitur. nam N non esse lingua indicio est; nam si ea littera esset, lingua palatum tangeret.* He also studied another old topic that dates back to Accius' (*GRFF* 24 *ap.* Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.14) and Lucilius' (*GRFF* 10: see below n. 57) times, i.e. how Greek and Latin represent long vowels (fr. 55 S. = *GRFF* 18 *ap.* Gell. 19.14.8): *Graecos non tantae inscitiae arcesso, qui OY ex O et Y scripserunt, <quantae> qui EI ex E et I; illud enim inopia fecerunt, hoc nulla re subacti.* Concern for articulation caused Nigidius (fr. 56 S. = *GRFF* 19 *ap.* Mar. Victorin. *Ars GL* 6.8.16 = §4.5 Mariotti), like Varro (*GRFF* 49 = 112 G.–S. *ap.* Cassiod. *Orth. GL* 7.152.16–153.6 = §§1.84–7 Stoppacci through Cornutus *GRFM* 16), to ban <X> for being diphonemic. Likewise, <K> and <Q>, which represent allophones of the velar /k/, noted <C>, were proscribed by both Nigidius (*ibid.*) and Varro (*GRFF* 240 = 43 G.–S. *ap.* Prisc. *GL* 2.13.8–11), albeit Lucilius had already suggested that <QV> should be strictly reserved for transcribing the labio-velar (*GRFF* 14 = 382 Marx = 9 fr. 18 Ch. *ap.* Cassiod. *Orth. GL* 7.149.1–3 = §§1.23–5 S. through Cornutus *GRFM* 4, where MSS give *Lucio*, emended by Keil to

approach is unique. He starts by contrasting [wōs] with [nōs]: the protrusion and roundedness of the lips at the beginning of the second-person plural pronoun manifests, by a physiological sign, the act of speaking to someone else; conversely, because of its internal nasality and lack of protrusion (*neque profuso intentoque flatu uocis neque proiectis labris*), the first-person plural pronoun designates the speaker her/himself. The same seems to apply to the singular: in [tū], [t] is contextually labialized and assumes the same character of [wōs], whereas [ego] has no labialization nor roundedness, and therefore self-designates the source of an utterance. In the dative, the opposition [tibi] *vs.* [mihi] seems again to rely on the nasality, the bilabial [m] being allegedly taken as a self-reference.⁴

Nigidius also observes that the same principles hold for Greek pronouns (*eadem ratio est in Graecis quoque uocibus*), an additional remark reminding his readers of the origins of this debate. In fact, in a well-known passage of Plato's *Cratylus*, Socrates defined the phonemes not on the basis of the acoustic impressions that they engender, but according to the movements of the speech organs (426c–427c). This indeed shows that words are motivated by nature, since the signifier establishes with its *denotatum* the same relation that a specific articulatory feature has with the same *denotatum* and this correspondence is supposed to prove the truthfulness of the denominations.⁵ More specifically, however, Nigidius' reference to articulatory symbolism, which is different from the phonetic or acoustic symbolism treated elsewhere by Plato, presupposed an important demonstration provided by Chrysippus in his treatise *On Soul*. In order to understand the meaning of this argument, it is necessary to give a brief outline of Chrysippus' work.

2 Chrysippus' Linguistic Argument

When he first arrived in Rome during the summer of 162, Galen performed several experiments on the human spinal column and nerves whose ultimate purpose was to replace the physicians', Peripatetic, and Stoic

Lucilio). A desire to create a one-to-one relationship between phonology and alphabet also led Varro (ibid. and *GRFF* 279 = 78 G.–S. *ap.* Cassiod. *Orth. GL* 7.152.8–12) and Nigidius (fr. 57 S. = *GRFF* 20 *ap.* Mar. Victorin. *Ars GL* 6.8.16–9.1 = §4.5 M.) to deny <H> as a *littera* and treat it instead as a sort of prosodic marker. See also Nigidius fr. 39 S. = *GRFF* 21 *ap.* Gell. 13.6.3 *P. Nigidius in commentariis grammaticis: 'rusticus fit sermo – inquit – si adspires perperam'*. For a general survey see Della Casa 1962 : 76–82.

⁴ See Belardi and Cipriano 1990: 61–2. For another hypothesis see Biville forthcoming.

⁵ See Belardi 1985: 24–43; more generally, on 'referential naturalism' see the Introduction to this volume.

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doctrines of the heart as the seat of the main psychic functions (ἡγεμονικόν) with the Platonic tripartite location of the soul in brain (reason), heart (passions), and belly/liver (desire). He also wrote a treatise *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, where he dealt with the first two parts of the soul in books 1 to 3, with passions in books 4 to 5, and with the appetitive part of the soul in book 6.⁶ Chrysippus' *Περὶ ψυχῆς* appeared there as a polemical target, since it mainly relied on instances of primary notions (προλήψεις) stemming from common experience, such as 'the testimony of women, non-experts, etymologies, motions of the hand, upward or downward movements of the head and poets' (*PHP* 3.5.22).⁷ In fact, when the absence of perceptions prevented him from producing proofs, Chrysippus resorted to common speech, even if this expedient had the sole function of 'providing only a systematic account of the types of correspondences between known properties of objects and known properties of their names' (Atherton 1993: 97), not of being 'scientifically heuristic, on a par with syllogisms or sense-experience' (ibid. 95).

Galen observes that Chrysippus used this method in order to prove that most people perceive passions like anger in their heart:⁸ 'The multitude of men seem to me to be brought together to this view since they perceive, as it were, the affections of the mind happening to them in the region of the chest and especially in the place assigned to the heart. I mean especially in fear and distress, in anger, and inflamed anger most of all' (transl. De Lacy 1978: 153). At the end of this demonstration (*PHP* 3.5.2), Chrysippus presented the heart as the centre of speech, starting again with the average person's opinion:⁹ 'The multitude of men, cajoled by common usage, and holding close to the tendency mentioned above, truthfully apply such terms to many of these (things)' (transl. De Lacy 1978: 201). The first step of this new argument consisted in quoting some idiomatic expressions with καταβαίνειν 'go down', which becomes appropriate

⁶ Galen wrote the main part of this work during the Roman period in 162–6; ten years later, having become court physician to Marcus Aurelius, he added three further books on other points of agreement between Plato and Hippocrates.

⁷ Galen's *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* 2–3 is the main source of Chrysippus' *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, from which it takes long excerpts, all from the second half of book 1: see *SVF* 2.881–909 (fr. 911 being a tentative reconstruction of the original textual structure). For an outline of the entire *Περὶ ψυχῆς* see Gourinat 2005; see also Blank, in this volume.

⁸ Chrysippus *SVF* 2.887 *ap. Gal. PHP* 2.7.8 κοινή δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ φέρεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦθ' ὥσανεὶ αἰσθανόμενοι περὶ τὸν θώρακα αὐτοῖς τῶν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν παθῶν γιγνομένων καὶ μάλιστα καθ' ὃν ἡ καρδία τέτακται τόπον, οἷον μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῶν φόβων καὶ τῶν λυπῶν λέγω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ θυμοῦ.

⁹ Chrysippus *SVF* 2.891 *ap. Gal. PHP* 3.5.3 σαινόμενοι δὲ φήμη οἱ πολλοὶ τούτων πολλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐπιλέγουσι τοιαῦτα ἐχόμενοι τῆς ῥηθείσης φορᾶς.

(cf. §5 οἰκειότερον . . . οἰκείως *vs.* ἄλλοτριώτερον) only once the mind, where the auditory perception takes place, is located in the chest. The womanly habit of pointing a finger in the direction of the heart, so as to emphasize that an utterance ‘does not go down’, also corroborates this point of view (*SVF* 2.892 *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 3.5.8).

For his next argument Chrysippus relied on etymology. Unfortunately, Galen’s testimony here is disconnected: he only recalls the example of the word ἐγὼ pointing to the heart at the beginning of book 2, after having affirmed that he had already refuted this interpretation in his *Περὶ ὀνομάτων ὁρθότητος*. Then, he briefly returns to this issue in book 3 (5.24–6). A tentative reconstruction of the lost evidence would imply that, at first, Chrysippus developed the general concept of δειξίς, illustrated by the deictic (ἐνδεικνύμεθα) nod of the head towards the chest in the act of assent:¹⁰ ‘If the act of pointing is sufficient evidence for discovering a governing part of the soul, it is not right that it be sufficient in the case of the chest but inadequate in the case of the nose. It should be just as valid for the latter too; or if it does not hold for the nose, it ought not to hold for the chest either. And why is it that when we nod the head in assent we indicate that the rule of the soul is rather in that member toward which we move the head, and not in the member which is moved?’ (transl. De Lacy 1978: 109).

Only then (οὕτως δὲ καὶ . . .) could Chrysippus have taken into account the case of ἐγὼ:¹¹ ‘We also say *ego* (I) in this way, pointing to ourselves at that place in which thought appears to be, the gesture being carried there naturally and appropriately; and apart from such a gesture of the hand, we

¹⁰ Chrysippus *SVF* 2.895.2 *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 2.2.20–1 ἡ δειξίς ἰκανὴ πίστις εἰς εὐρεῖαν ἡγεμονικοῦ μορίου ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν στέρνων αὐτὴν ἰκανὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἀσθενὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ρίνος, ἀλλὰ κάπὶ ταύτης ἰσχύειν ὁμοίως ἢ εἴπερ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ ταύτης, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῶν στέρνων. (21.) διὰ τί δὲ ἐν ταῖς συγκαταθέσεσιν ἐπινεύοντες τὴν κεφαλὴν, ἐφ’ ὃ φέρομεν αὐτὴν μέρος, ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπάρχειν ἐνδεικνύμεθα μᾶλλον καὶ οὐκ <ἐν> αὐτῷ τῷ κινουμένῳ; See Dahlmann 1932: 22–4, Tieleman 1996: 206 n. 42.

¹¹ Chrysippus *SVF* 2.895.1 = *FDS* 560 *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 2.2.10–11 οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν, κατὰ τοῦτο δεικνύντες ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ᾧ φαίνεσθαι διάνοιαν εἶναι, τῆς δειξεως φυσικῶς καὶ οἰκείως ἐνταῦθα φερομένης· καὶ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν χεῖρα τοιαύτης δειξεως νεύοντες εἰς αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν, εὐθύς καὶ τῆς ἐγὼ φωνῆς τοιαύτης οὔσης καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐξῆς ὑπογεγραμμένην δειξίν συνεφερομένης. (11.) τὸ γὰρ ἐγὼ προφερόμεθα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν κατασπώντες τὸ κάτω χεῖλος εἰς αὐτοὺς δεικτικῶς· ἀκολούθως δὲ τῆ τοῦ γενείου κινήσει καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ στήθος νεύσει καὶ τῆ τοιαύτη δειξίς ἢ ἐξῆς συλλαβῆ παράκειται οὐδὲν ἀποστηματικὸν παρενημαίνουσα, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐκείνος συντέτευχεν. According to Galen, since ἐγὼ and ἐκείνος have the same first syllable, in order to forestall objections, Chrysippus insisted on the function of the second syllable, where -κεῖ- is different from -γῶ-. Nevertheless, ‘nothing in the quoted passage itself suggests that for Chrysippus the second syllable is at issue . . . The “impression of distance” in ἐκείνος may simply reside in its relation to ἐκεῖ (“there”)’ (Tieleman 1996: 207).

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nod toward ourselves as we say *ego* (I); indeed, the very word *egô* (I) is of this description and its pronunciation is accompanied by the gesture next described. For as we pronounce *ego* (I), at the first syllable we drop the lower lip in a way that points to ourselves, and in conformity with the movement of the chin, the nod toward the chest, and such gesturing, the next syllable is juxtaposed; and it gives no suggestion of distance, such as that produced by the second syllable of *ekeinos* (that person, he)' (transl. De Lacy 1978: 106–7). In the case of ἐγώ, the imitation is based not on an onomatopoeia, but on a form of δεῖξις: in the interior self-perception of the soul, which is the semantics of 'I', the motion of the soul towards its seat or self-directed designation matches – φυσικῶς καὶ οἰκειῶς – the movements of the speech organs that utter ἐγώ (§10).¹²

After treating the case of ἐγώ (*PHP* 3.5.27 ἐξῆς τῶν προειρημένων), Chrysippus added a new, different etymology. According to him, καρδία was derived from κράτησις 'power' and κυρεία 'authority', because the heart is the seat of the dominant part of the soul:¹³ 'Concordant with all this, the heart (*kardia*) got its name by virtue of a certain power and sovereignty, from the fact that the sovereign and ruling part of the soul is in it; it is called, as it were, *kratia* (power)' (transl. De Lacy 1978: 207).

Although this etymology is closely connected with the self-direction of the soul that is presupposed by the explanation of ἐγώ, it is evident that καρδία needs specific cognitive procedures in order to be clarified. Yet the naturalistic approach can still hold. The representations of the physical objects (σώματα) that are activated by the sensorial perceptions (φαντασῖαι αἰσθητικαί) result in onomatopoeic formations and words that affect us in the same way as their *designata* affect our senses; for the rest of the vocabulary, other types of cognitive relationships are pertinent, especially with the rational representations (φαντασῖαι λογικαί) of incorporeals (ἄσώματα) produced by the elaboration of the sensory perceptions. These are paralleled by the ways in which new notions are created (Chrysippus *SVF* 2.87 = *FDS* 255 *ap.* Diog. Laert. 7.52–3: καθ' ὁμοίτητα, by

¹² Available sources (Chrysippus *SVF* 2.204 = *FDS* 914 *ap.* Diog. Laert. 7.70; *SVF* 2.205 = *FDS* 915 *ap.* Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8.96) establish a link between deixis and definite propositions, where a personal or a demonstrative pronoun occurs, and contrast them with indefinite propositions, where an indefinite pronoun or ἐκεῖνος is the subject. Only the first ones presuppose the existence, here and now, of the designated object (Matthaios 1999: 499 n. 337). On the Latin tradition see Garcea 2015.

¹³ Chrysippus *SVF* 2.896 = *FDS* 561 *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 3.5.28 τοῦτοις πᾶσι συμφώνως καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦτ' ἔσχηκεν ἡ καρδία κατὰ τινα κράτησιν καὶ κυρείαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι τὸ κυριεῦον καὶ κρατοῦν τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὡς ἂν κρατία λεγομένη.

resemblance; κατ' ἀναλογία, by analogy; κατ' ἐναντίωσιν, by contrariety) and by specific rhetorical strategies.¹⁴

Interestingly enough, Galen notes that Chrysippus also developed the etymology of ἐγὼ in his *On Etymologies* (*PHP* 3.5.25 ἐν τοῖς ἐτυμολογικοῖς = *SVF* 2.884 = *FDS* 561, see also 2.2.10–11 = *SVF* 2.883 = *FDS* 560). These could refer to the six books of his Περὶ τῶν ἐτυμολογικῶν πρὸς Διοκλέα or to the four books ἐτυμολογικῶν πρὸς Διοκλέα that are quoted in the catalogue of his works by Diogenes Laertius, under the first ethical section 'on the articulation of ethical concepts' (7.199–200 Περὶ τῆν διάρθρωσιν τῶν ἠθικῶν ἐννοιῶν). The word διάρθρωσις 'articulation' specifically designates the conceptual operation performed through the clarification of lexical relations: this raises awareness of the conceptions that are naturally embedded in us and that, as a consequence, could be used as criteria of truth (Tieleman 1996: 200–1). So, if in Chrysippus' *On Soul* 'the expressions whose literal and physical sense . . . is still to some extent present in the speaker's mind appear to have predominated' (*ibid.* 217), it is probable that the *Etymological Inquiries* focused specifically on etymological analyses of the καρδιά type, that apply to the greatest part of the vocabulary.

3 Return to Nigidius

3.1 *Nigidius*' Commentarii Grammatici

With Chrysippus' theory in the background, it is now possible to make some comments on Nigidius' extract. First of all, Aulus Gellius seems to have condensed his source, where he also found references to the original etymology of Greek ἐγὼ: *eadem ratio est in Graecis quoque uocibus* (§4) seems also to suggest that possible formal differences between languages do not invalidate the basic principle of the articulatory symbolism, which holds for both Greek and Latin. Like Chrysippus, Nigidius referred as well

¹⁴ See Barwick 1957a: 32–3. The fullest taxonomy is found in an otherwise polemical presentation by Aug. *Dial.* 6 (9.18–11.8 Creelius = pp. 92–6 Jackson–Pinborg). It includes *similitudo soni* (*res cum sono uerbi aliqua similitudine concinat*: onomatopoeic expressions like *tinnitus*, *hinntus*, *balatus*, *clangor*, *stridor* or phonosymbolic expressions, like *mel* 'honey', with smooth phonemes); *similitudo tactus* (*ita res ipsae adficiunt, ut uerba sentiuntur*: e.g. *crura* 'legs', whose length and hardness remind us of the wood of a *crux* 'cross'); *similitudo rerum* (κατάχρησις: μεταφορά, μετάληψις); *uicinitas* (μετωνυμία: *per efficientiam* – *per effecta* – *per id quo continetur* – *per id quod continetur* – *a parte totum* – *a toto pars*, e.g. *piscina* 'bath' from *piscis* 'fish', since it contains water, where fishes live); *contrarium* (ἀντιφρασις: e.g. *lucus* 'sacred grove' from *minimum lucere* 'to have very little light').

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to the nod of the head towards the chest in the act of assent. Gellius does not explain why *motus quidam ille uel capitis uel oculorum a natura rei, quam significat, non abhorret* (ibid.), but Nigidius almost certainly knew that deixis was connected to this topic, because he used the technical term *uerbi demonstratio* with *uos*.¹⁵ On the other hand, he probably omitted all the psychological aspects of his Stoic source: *spiritus* and *anima* are more related to the breathing in phonation than to the process of self-recognition to which Chrysippus alluded.

Even if Gellius' intermediation does not give all the explanations required for a proper understanding of Nigidius' theories, it is feasible that the latter included Chrysippean etymologies in his grammatical commentaries. Since this work was alien to psychological theories, it is likely that it relied on Chrysippus' *ἐτυμολογικά*, whose main object was Greek vocabulary.

Be that as it may, Gellius undeniably testifies that, like other ancient sources,¹⁶ Nigidius conflated phylogenesis and the ontology of language: *nomina uerbaque non posito fortuito . . . facta esse* (§1), like parallel Greek expressions such as οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχεν . . . αἱ Ἑλληνικαὶ λέξεις ἐπετέθησαν (*GG* 1.3.14.27–8; 471.1–2) and πεποιημένα, refer to the origin of language and the lexical imposition by a mythological or historical benefactor, or also by a group of human beings. The fact that those people, whoever they were, assigned names *quadam ui et ratione naturae* (ibid.) then becomes a strong argument in favour of the natural correspondence between language and reality that justifies any etymological research: *uerba esse naturalia magis quam arbitraria* (§3); *motu quodam oris conueniente cum ipsius uerbi demonstratione* (§4); *in his uocibus quasi gestus quidam oris et spiritus naturalis est* (ibid.).

In order to find other instances of this conception in the scanty fragments of the *Commentarii grammatici*, one should start with an overview of this rather obscure work in at least 29 books.¹⁷ Like other similar works of the late Roman Republic, this one did not have an immediate

¹⁵ Swoboda (1889: fr. 41 app. crit.) cites the parallel example of Gell. 13.29.2 *multitudinis demonstrationem* 'designation of the plural'; more specifically Nigidius *GRFF* 8 = 34 S. ap. Gell. 17.7.5 has *temporis demonstrationem* 'designation of the time', but Gell. 10.4.4 *uerbi demonstratio* is probably the equivalent of δειξις in Chrysippus' model. See Tieleman 1996: 206 n. 41.

¹⁶ See Fehling 1965; specifically on Stoic sources: Allen 2005.

¹⁷ New edition by A. Garcea and V. Lomanto in preparation for the Collection des Universités de France. The quotations by Gellius include a reference to *in commentariorum undetricesimo* (10.5.1). There is no proof that there were only 29 books, or that their total was necessarily 30.

pedagogic aim. Gellius considers it as a sort of personal and colossal notebook, where Nigidius wrote everything that he deemed interesting to himself, without putting the material in order or thinking about his possible readership.¹⁸ Trying to reconstruct an overall structure, scholars have been forced to admit that the references to specific books in the ancient sources do not permit us to identify any thematic coherence. Only the following references are explicitly given by the available sources:¹⁹

E NIGIDII LIBRO ARGUMENTVM

4	<i>sempiternum / perpetuum</i> (below, n. 43)
9	<i>irascere / irasci</i> (below, n. 38)
10	<i>uetustiscere / ueterascere</i> (below, n. 50)
11	<i>religentem / religiosus</i> (below, n. 51)
18	<i>tintinnire</i> (below, n. 42)
19	<i>fit / facitur</i> (below, n. 39)
20	adverbs ending in <i>-im</i> (below, nn. 53–4)
23	<i>subruptum erit</i> past or future? (below, n. 41)
24	orthography, accent: <i>Valéri / Vàleri : amici / amicei : terrai / terrae ; mi / miei</i> (below, nn. 58–61)
25	<i>nixurit, qui niti uult</i> (below, n. 50)
29	etymologies of <i>auarus</i> and <i>locuples</i> (below, nn. 23–5)

This meagre evidence seems at least to rule out two possibilities: different topics are not treated in the same book and the same topic is not developed in completely separate books. Nigidius rather devoted one or more books to a single, specific topic, like the inchoative forms that are studied in *Commentarii* 9–10. The fact that he took his notes while reading one or more sources on a given subject does presuppose a certain order. In turn, Gellius seems to quote his 15 extracts in the order in which he read Nigidius; for this reason, the same topic, which he found in a specific book – or series of books – of the *Commentarii*, ends up being treated within the same book of the *Noctes* or in adjacent books.²⁰

¹⁸ Gellius 17.7.5 *anguste perquam et obscure disserit, ut signa rerum ponere uideas ad subsidium magis memoriae suae quam ad legentium disciplinam*. See also Gellius 19.14.2–3, quoted above, Introduction.

¹⁹ See Swoboda 1889: 5–6, Della Casa 1962: 68. ²⁰ See Swoboda 1889: 12–13.

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IN GELLII LIBRO	E NIGIDIJ LIBRO	ARGUMENTVM
3.12	?	de adiectiuus <i>bibax</i> et <i>bibosus</i> (below, n. 52)
4.9	11	de adiectiuus <i>religens</i> et <i>religiosus</i> (below, n. 51)
8.14 <i>lemma</i>	?	de etymo adiectiuorum <i>uanus</i> et <i>stolidus</i> (see below, n. 44)
9.12.6	?	de etymo adiectiuus <i>infestus</i> (below, n. 28)
10.4	?	uerba sunt naturalia magis quam arbitraria (above, §1)
10.5	29	de etymo adiectiuorum <i>auarus</i> et <i>locuples</i> (below, nn. 23–5)
10.11.2	?	de primaria significatione uocis <i>mature</i> (below, n. 29)
11.11	?	quid differat inter <i>mentiri</i> et <i>mendacium dicere</i> (below, n. 45)
13.6.3	?	<i>rusticus fit sermo, si adspires perperam</i> (above, n. 3)
13.10.4	?	de etymo <i>fratris</i> uocabuli (below, n. 26)
13.26	24	de accentu et orthographia (below, nn. 59–61)
15.3.4	?	de uerbo <i>autumo</i> (below, n. 66)
17.7	23	de tempore quod <i>esse</i> et <i>erit</i> sign. cum p.p. coniuncta (below, n. 41)
17.13	?	de particula <i>quin</i> (below, n. 65)
19.14.6–8	?	de litteris (above, n. 3)

This is particularly true of the forms ending in *-osus*, studied in *Commentarius* 11 (*Noctes* 3–4), the orthographic problems, including aspiration, treated in *Commentarius* 24 (*Noctes* 13),²¹ and especially the etymologies included in, at least, *Commentarius* 29 (*Noctes* 8–10). Given the proximity of Nigidius' etymological extracts in Gellius 10.4 and 10.5, it is feasible that the passage on personal pronouns has been taken from *Commentarius* 29 or 28.²² This would suggest that, like Chrysippus, Nigidius thought of etymology in a broad, inclusive sense, embracing, under the category of referential naturalism, both the deictical value of the speech organs' movements and the possible modifications of the signifier, whereby one has to find the linguistic motivation of human vocabulary.

3.2 *The Ethical Character of Nigidius' Etymologies*

Just as Chrysippus explained καρδία as being a conflation of κράτησις and κυρεία (see above, p. 85), so Nigidius interpreted the adjective *auarus* as a conflation of *auidus* and *aeris*, with the elimination of the second element

²¹ The presence of the terminus technicus προσωδία / *uoculatio* both in Gell. 13.6.1 and 13.26.3 would appear to prove the common origin of these extracts: see Kretzschmer 1860: 55, Swoboda 1889: 12–13 and fr. 39 app. crit.

²² See Swoboda 1889: 13.

of the diphthong of *aeris* (still pronounced at the end of the Republican period with two distinct phonemes).²³ This etymology entails an ethical implication, as confirmed by Nigidius' *differentia* between *parcior* and *auarus*, that lies in the insatiable appetite of the latter.²⁴ Another adjective, *locuples*, is also taken as a conflation of *loca* and *plera*, suggesting the idea of wealth as an abundance of possessions. The same interpretation is found in Cicero, in a passage that seems to presuppose common knowledge.²⁵ A sort of variation of the ἔτερος ἐγὼ topos²⁶ is found in Nigidius' explanation of *frater* as *fere alter*, that is probably quoted by heart by Gellius, as a complement to Antistius Labeo's juridical etymology of *soror* (*IAR*⁶ 26 *ap. Gell.* 13.10.3).²⁷ Finally, Nigidius relates the adjective *infestus* to *festinare*,

²³ fr. 42 S. = *GRFF* 14 *ap. Gell.* 10.5.1 'auarus' non simplex uocabulum, sed iunctum copulatumque esse P. Nigidius dicit in commentariorum undetricesimo. 'auarus enim – inquit – appellatur, qui auidus aeris est. sed in ea copula E littera – inquit – detrata est'.

²⁴ fr. 43 S. = *GRFF* 25 *ap. Serv. Dan. G.* 1.47 Nigidius: quia qui parcior est, suo contentus est, quod auarus non facit. This interpretation may help us to understand why Nigidius did not choose the obvious derivation of *auarus* from *auere*, as Gellius also suggests (10.5.3): nam de auaro ambitur: cur enim non uideri possit ab uno solum uerbo inclinatum, quod est auo, eademque esse fictura, qua est amarus, de quo nihil dici potest, quin duplex non sit? According to a *differentia* that was widely known in Antiquity, the *uox media auidus* derives from *auere*, whereas *auarus*, always a pejorative term, stands apart: Nonius p. 442.9–13 Mercier = 710 Lindsay *auarum et auidum ita discernuntur. auarum enim semper in reprehensione est; auidum autem ab auendo, quod est etiam honeste cupiendo, et a dilectione intellegi potest, ac per hoc aliquando malis, aliquando bonis adiungitur causis.*

²⁵ fr. 44 S. = *GRFF* 15 *ap. Gell.* 10.5.2 item 'locupletem' dictum ait [sc. Nigidius] ex compositis uocibus, qui pleraque loca, hoc est, qui multas possessiones teneret. See Cicero *Rep.* 2.16 tum erat res in pecore et locorum possessionibus, ex quo pecuniosi et locupletes uocabantur.

²⁶ fr. 50 S. = *GRFF* 28 *ap. Gell.* 13.10.4 'fratris' autem uocabulum P. Nigidius ... interpretatur: 'frater' – inquit – est dictus quasi fere alter. Without quoting Nigidius, Lossmann (1962: 35) gives the following parallels: Theognis 1.97–9 ἄλλ' εἴη τοιοῦτος ἐμοὶ φίλος, ὃς τὸν ἑταῖρον | γινώσκων ὄργην καὶ βαρύνοντα φέρει | ἀντὶ κασιγνήτου; Euripides *IT* 497–8 πότερον ἀδελφῶ μητρός ἐστον ἐκ μῆδης; | φιλότῃ γ' ἐσμέν δ' οὐ κασιγνήτω, γύναι; Aristotle *EN* 1161b27–1162a1 γονεὺς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρισθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεὺς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφύκτα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταῦτο ποιεῖ· ὅθεν φασὶ ταῦτον αἷμα καὶ ρίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰσὶ δὲ ταῦτο πῶς καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις. μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἥλιξ γὰρ ἡλικία, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ὁμοιοῦται; Cicero *Fam.* 2.15.4 (*ad Caelium Rufum*, 3/4 August 50) quem [sc. Quintum] tamen si reliquissem, dicerent iniqui non me plane post annum, ut senatus uoluisset, de prouincia decessisse quoniam alterum me reliquissem. As Thesleff (1965: 46) rightly remarks, the fact that the Aristotelian definition ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός (*EN* 1166a32) was an allegedly Pythagorean ἀκουσμα ([Plutarch], *Vit. Hom.* 151; Porphyry, *Vit. Pyth.* 33; Jerome, *adv. Rufin.* 3.39) is 'certainly not much to build upon'.

²⁷ This would explain the absence of the title *Commentarii* and of the book number: see Kretzschmer 1860: 66, Swoboda 1889: 14, pace Mercklin 1860: 653, who thinks that Nigidius' quotation comes from Labeo. Nonius (pp. 35.32–36.1 M. = 51 L.) echoes Gellius' passage: see Hertz 1886: 101. The same etymology, with a Greek alternative option, is given by Paul. Fest. 80.11 Lindsay *frater a Graeco dictus est φρήτηρ, uel quod sit fere alter*. When treating the *fratres aruales* in his *De lingua Latina*, Varro preferred the derivation from *ferre* but also gave a possible Greek origin, from φρατρία: *fratres aruales dicti qui sacra publica faciunt propterea ut fruges ferant arua: a 'ferendo' et 'aruis' fratres aruales dicti. sunt qui a 'fratria' dixerunt. 'fratria' est Graecum uocabulum partis*

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either because an *infestus* takes an aggressive action against someone else (active meaning) or because he is a designated victim of an impending event, causing a sudden damage (passive meaning).²⁸

The polar pattern is a recurrent one in Nigidius' explanations, either for words with double meaning or as a way to express, *ex negativo*, a medial meaning. So, in order to show that the adverb *mature* means not 'so as to anticipate the expected or natural course of events, quickly' (*OLD* s.v. 1), which is taken as a secondary development, but 'in good time' (*OLD* s.v. 2), Nigidius probably established a connection between *maturus* and *maturatus*, the image of the ripened apples being particularly suggestive.²⁹

3.3 *Nigidius' and Varro's Etymological Studies*

Nigidius' etymological method does not differ from Varro's³⁰ any more than it does from that of other ancient grammarians. They applied for their own purposes the Chrysippean method of analyzing καρδία as a conflation of κράτησις 'power' and κυρεία 'authority'.³¹ They differ, nevertheless, in their respective purposes, as the well-known Varronian taxonomy of the four levels of explanation (*L.* 5.7–8) clearly shows.³² The first degree of etymological explanation is that of the *populus* and applies to transparent

hominum, ut <Ne>apoli etiam nunc (*L.* 5.85). This is not a reason to consider Nigidius as an advocate of purely Latin etymologies: *pace* Roehrig 1887: 46 n. 3.

²⁸ fr. 47 S. = *GRFF* 29 *ap.* Gell. 9.12.6 *ita in Nigidianis scriptum inuenimus: 'infestum est a 'festinando' dictum; nam qui instat – inquit – alicui eumque properans urget opprimereque eum studet festinatque, aut contra de cuius periculo et exitio festinatur, is uterque 'infestus' dicitur ab instantia atque imminencia fraudis, quam uel facturus cuipiam uel passurus est'*. Nonius (p. 51.16–17 M. = 73 L.) echoes this passage, adding a personal interpretation: *infesti proprietatem hanc esse Nigidius uoluit, quasi nimium festinantis ad scelus uel ad fraudem*. According to Swoboda 1889: 7, the list of 'reciproca' adjectives ending in *-ōsus* quoted in Gellius 9.12.1 cannot stem from Nigidius, since it is inconsistent with his interpretation of this suffix (fr. 4–5 S., below, nn. 51–2).

²⁹ fr. 48 S. = *GRFF* 30 *ap.* Gell. 10.11.2–3 *P. Nigidius . . .: "mature" – inquit – est quod neque citius neque serius, sed medium quiddam et temperatum est'*. (3.) *bene atque proprie Nigidius. nam et in frugibus et in pomis 'matura' dicuntur, quae neque cruda et inmitia sunt neque caduca et decocta, sed tempore suo adulta maturataque*. The passage is echoed by Macrobius *Sat.* 6.8.8; Serv. Dan. *G.* 1.260–1. On these Virgilian lines and the meaning of *mature* see Nonius p. 51.18–25 M. = 73 L.; see also Julius Romanus *ap.* Char. 265.21–26 Barwick; *TLL* 8.502.80–503.3. Hertz (1845: 46) demonstrates that the *Commentarii grammatici*, not an alleged commentary on Virgil by Nigidius, are the source of this passage. Kretzschmer (1860: 57) rightly considers the explanation at §3 as being Nigidian: see also *TLL* 8.495.45; 498.25–7.

³⁰ Since they were written before summer 45, Nigidius' *Commentarii* predate Varro's *De lingua Latina*: Varro does not refer explicitly to Nigidius in this work, but many parallels show that both agreed on grapho-phonetic issues (see above, n. 3), as well as on some, but not all, morphological choices (see below, nn. 55, 59–61).

³¹ The best systematic survey on ancient etymological methods is still Wölfflin 1893.

³² See most recently Piras 1998: 57–71, Lazzarini 2017.

words like *uiocurus* and *argentifodinae*. Then comes the level of the Alexandrian grammar (*grammatica antiqua*), whose focus is on poetical neologisms, like onomatopoeic expressions (e.g. *sibilus*), compounds (e.g. *incuruiceruicum*), and derivations (e.g. *clupeare*). The third level, that of *philosophia*, takes into consideration the ordinary linguistic usage (*quae in consuetudine communi essent*), where one finds non-transparent and apparently unmotivated words like *oppidum*, *uicus*, *uia*. Finally, the fourth, mysterious level allows Varro to reconstruct the origins of Rome.

The majority of scholars make a twofold assumption that consists (1) in taking for granted a general, alleged Pythagorean background for this incipit of *De lingua Latina* book 5, and (2) thus associating Varro and Nigidius, who were both interested in Pythagorean philosophy.³³ Varro does indeed mention Pythagoras at §11, just before announcing the quadripartition *tempus motus locus corpus* (§12) that he will apply in books 5–7; nevertheless, ‘the quadripartition is not actually attributed to Pythagoras, but is rather superimposed by Varro himself on what he says is the Pythagorean principle of the bipartition of the elements of things’ (Blank 2008: 59); moreover, the four etymological levels are completely independent of any Pythagorean reference.

As regards the parallels between Nigidius and Varro, it is important to remember that Varro does give explanations of ordinary words, including those quoted in *L.* 5.8,³⁴ but that his ultimate goal is ‘to discover and investigate the divine and cultic things from which and for which names were invented by Rome’s founders’ (Blank 2012: 280). This endeavour is beyond the lexical world studied by Chrysippus, since it is attained by a sort of revelation of the mysteries belonging to the primitive kings and name-givers. Varro’s stance was Chrysippean only in that it justified the use of etymological inquiries in cases where ‘things are obscure of their own nature – such as the truths about the gods – or have been forgotten over time and disappeared from our world – as have many early Roman customs, rituals, and divinities’ (ibid. 69). Nigidius’ etymologies, for their part, focus on the ordinary language for its ethical implications. They are

³³ See e.g. Della Casa 1962: 60: ‘Nigidio, da buon pitagorico, bene informato sulla leggenda del re legislatore religioso, entra nei penetranti (*adyrum*) del re Numa (*regis*) e dedica i suoi studi etimologici a quel settore che Varrone poneva tanto in alto.’ On the supposed parallel between the king’s fourth level and the name-giver *qui primus, quod summae sapientiae Pythagorae uisum est, omnibus rebus imposuit nomina* (Cic. *Tusc.* 1.62), see esp. Michel 1965 and Boyance 1975, followed by Lehmann 1997: 304–9.

³⁴ See *L.* 5.35 *qua uehebant, uiae dictae*; 5.141 *oppidum ab opi dictum, quod munitur opis causa ubi sint et quod opus est ad uitam gerendam ubi habeant tuto*; 5.145 *in oppido uici a uia, quod ex utraque parte uiae sunt aedificia*.

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truly 'philosophical' etymologies in that they not only correspond to the type of linguistic research that arose historically thanks to the Stoics (Varro's third degree), but are part of an ethical discourse where linguistic awareness and rightful behaviour combine.³⁵

Unlike Varro, Nigidius' interest in the archaic language of the ancients rather reveals a purely philological approach, focusing on diachronic linguistic changes such as the evolution of fricative initials in Latin,³⁶ the simplification of the infinitive passive ending,³⁷ the passage from active to deponent verbal forms,³⁸ and the disappearance of passive forms,³⁹ as well as certain expressions that needed an explanation,⁴⁰ the ambiguities of

³⁵ For this reason, Rawson (1985: 123) rightly describes Nigidius' lexical studies as 'prescriptive as well as descriptive'.

³⁶ Reconstructing a development $\varphi\theta\beta\eta > \text{fibra} > \text{herba}$, Nigidius observed that the intermediate stage survived as a dialectal parallel form: fr. 62 S. = GRFF 27 ap. Serv. Dan. G. 1.120 *fibris* alii *fibras herbas adserunt, ut Nigidius commentario grammaticali: 'φθβη <herba> [add. Commelin]. sed antea fibra dicta est, ut nunc etiam rustici dicunt'*. Saumaise 1689: 280 D: 'Hesychius [Φ 751] φθβη βοτάνη. Latini antiqui dicebant *ferba*, ut *fircus, foedus*, ex Aeolico φέρβη; Della Casa 1962: 80–1. This reminds us of the parallel drawn between Sabine *fasena* and Latin *harena* by Varro GRFF 280 = 77 G.–S. ap. Vel. Long. GL 7.69.4–9; 81.10–11.

³⁷ fr. 59 S. = GRFF 35 ap. Don. Ter. Phorm. 182 *celari* Nigidius 'celari' quaerit, utrum plenum sit an *pressum*. TLL 10.2.1183.4–6 convincingly supposes that here Nigidius compared the short infinitive *celari* with the archaic and fuller *celarier*. Developing Swoboda's (app. crit.) point of view, who considers this fragment as an etymological remark, Della Casa (1962: 78) suggests: 'Probabilmente Nigidio aveva presente *celare* = *occultare*, per lui *celare* era *pressum*, mentre *occultare* rappresenta il frequentativo.' It is difficult to believe that Nigidius asked himself if [e] in the first syllable was open or closed (pace Roehrig 1887: 43). Other Nigidian remarks on Terentius' Phormio are preserved: fr. 60 S. = GRFF 36 ap. Don. Ter. Phorm. 190 *protinus in pedes* *protinam fuit, et sic Nigidius legit* (also Paul Fest. p. 253 Lindsay, but *protinus* in Terence's MSS and, among others, Julius Romanus ap. Charisius 273.14–22 B. *protinus trium temporum significationem capit, instantis* [Verg. Aen. 3.291] . . . : *praeteriti* [Verg. Aen. 3.416] . . . : *futuri* [Ter. Phorm. 190]); fr. 61 S. = GRFF 37 ap. Don. Ter. Phorm. 233 *non pudere* *hic Nigidius adnotauit neminem uideri pudere ante delictum*. Obviously, this is not enough to imagine a Nigidian commentary on Terence (see already Schopen 1821: 41–2).

³⁸ fr. 2 S. = GRFF 2 ap. Non. p. 127.11 M. = 184 L. Nigidius commentariis grammaticis lib. VIII: 'ita irascere. quid [quod Rutgers] nunc irascitur? [nunc irasci dicitur Quicherat]', with the example of Pomponius Com. CRF³ 30. See TLL 7.2.26–33; Keller (1992: 323) quotes this passage as the only example of an ancient active *irascere*. Since he was interested in the *-sc-* suffix, Nigidius could treat *irascere* with *uetustiscere* and *inueterascere* (fr. 3, below, n. 50).

³⁹ Priscian quotes the form *faciatur* of Titinius [Com. CRF³ 97] twice (GL 2.376.24–377.4; 398.20–2; see also 402.9–10), in order to prove that the *uetustissimi* used the passive of *facio*. Nonius cites the same example, preceded by Nigidius' explanation: fr. 10 S. = GRFF 6 ap. Non. p. 507.13–15 M. = 815 L. Nigidius commentariis grammaticis lib. XIX: 'id quod dico huiusmodi est: uti 'facit' ποιε<τ>, i>ta 'facitur' ποιε<τ>ται' est' [Roth: *tui facit ποιετα facitur tinaetae(ss)e* codd.]. Swoboda (1889: 14–15) reads 'τι<μ>τ<α>' est, more paleographically plausible; Della Casa (1962: 71–2) thinks that Nigidius establishes a *differentia* between *fit*, semantic passive of *facio*, and *facitur*, with the meaning of 'appreciate'; so one should rather read: *τιθετα esse*. More probably, like eventually Priscian, Nigidius limited himself to noting that *facitur* is an ancient form, analogically legitimate. See TLL 6.1.83.1–9.

⁴⁰ fr. 58 S. = GRFF 33 ap. Non. p. 21.22–3 M. = 31 L. *clamat, quiritur* [Turnèbe, Scaliger: *quiritatum* codd. : <qui> *quiritur* Swoboda]. This explanation could refer to *quiritus* in Lucilius' example (261–2 M. = 6 fr. 20 Ch.) quoted by Nonius (ibid. 18–21), and perhaps already by

ancient laws,⁴¹ and the language of the *Carmen Saliare*⁴² – a grammatical topic well-known at least from Aelius Stilo. Besides these technical issues, Nigidius was interested not in reconstructing the lost past as an antiquarian, but in developing the Chrysippean method of the ‘articulation of ethical concepts’ in a form of grammar that, because of its naturalistic foundation, maintained a strong connection with human behaviour.

One interesting consequence of Nigidius’ approach to etymology is the importance of the *differentiae uerborum*, supposed to show ‘philosophical’ definitions. Thus, *sempiternus* and *perpetuus* are different because the first is used for immortals, who are eternal (*semper*), whereas *perpetuus* applies to human beings, whose nature is to endure (*perpeti*) difficult situations.⁴³

Nigidius (Funaioli app. crit.). Var. L. 6.68 gives the same explanation, but it is also possible that the diathesis of this verb was at issue here. Thus, under the heading *de diuersa uerborum positione*, Diomedes *GL* 1.381.22–3 observes: ‘*quirito*: *Liuius* in Attico ‘*quirit*<*are*>’, *Varro ad Ciceronem* de <lingua Latina> [suppl. Goetz–Schoell app. crit. L. 6.68] *, *Fenestella* [FRHist no. 70 frg. 29] ‘*quiritatur*. *est autem* ‘*quiritare*’ *Quirites* *cier*. Flobert (1975: 206) interprets the deponent form as more expressive than the active one, like *murmuror* and *missor*, and sees it as inseparable from *quiritare*, which designates the cry of the boar (ibid.: 135 n. 2), even if the ancient etymology was followed by Émile Benveniste, who included *quiritare* among the delocutive verbs (‘to cry out *Quirites!*’).

⁴¹ Gellius 17.7 records that Q. Mucius Scaevola (*IAR*⁶ 7) asked his father Scaevola *pontifex* (*IAR*⁶ 3), M. Iunius Brutus (*IAR*⁶ 7), and M. Manilius (*IAR*⁶ 9) if the text of the *lex Atinia* (about the middle of the second century: *Law* 48 in Crawford 1996) was not only prospective, but also retrospective. In fact, forbidding the usucaption of *quod subruptum erit* ‘whatever shall (at some future date in relation to the text of the statute) be in a state of having been stolen’ was ambiguous. Gellius also testifies that P. Nigidius, *ciuitatis Romanae doctissimus, super dubitatione hac eorum scripsit in tertio uicesimo grammaticorum commentariorum*. For this reason, Dirksen (1851: 59–61) and Kretzschmer (1860: 8) thought that the entire chapter was borrowed from Nigidius. Editors are more cautious: fr. 34 S. = *GRFF* 8 ap. Gell. 17.7.8 *sic igitur – inquit – etiam istud, quod in lege est: si diuidas sepaesque duo uerba haec ‘subruptum’ et ‘erit’, ut sic audias ‘subruptum <erit>’ tamquam ‘certamen erit’ aut ‘sacrificium erit’, tum uidebitur lex in postfuturum loqui; si uero copulate permixteque dictum intellegas, ut ‘subruptum erit’ non duo, sed unum uerbum sit idque unitum patiendi declinatione sit, tum hoc uerbo non minus praeteritum tempus ostenditur quam futurum*. Nigidius does not give a solution: the forms of *esse* can be considered either on their own, as *uerbum suum*, keeping their temporal value, or with a preterit, which imposes its reference to the past on them.

⁴² See fr. 9 S. = *GRFF* 5 ap. Non. p. 40.15–16 M. = 58 L. *Nigidius lib. XVIII: ‘itaque ex re in Saliaribus ‘aduanus tintinnat’ [FPL⁴ 14], id est sonat*, where the verb applies the image of the bells to the ritual pottery of the Salii. Swoboda (1889: 15–17), followed by Wissowa (s.v. ‘Atalla. 2’, *RE* 2.2 col. 1895; see *TLL* 2.1116.37–41), explains *aduanus* with reference to the Greek ἄττανον ‘saucepan, vessel’. Likewise, Afranius (*Com. CRF*³ 292), quoted by Nonius (ibid. 13–14) and by Festus (500.17–21 L.) with Naevius (*Com. CRF*³ 114), applied the same verb to the clanking of a slave’s chains; see Della Casa 1962: 60–5, who reads: *ita quaere in Saliaribus: ‘attanu<lu>s tintinnat’, id est sonat*. But the text is not certain: *ex re* is emended by Scaliger to *aere*, adopted by Lindsay in his Nonian edition; Rutgers (1618 : 286) reads *itaque ex aere in Saliaribus Altunus tintinnat*; Roehrig (1887: 52 n. 1), *itaque ex aere in Saliaribus Albanus* (with Lipsius) *tintinnat*. Both attribute this fragment to Nigidius’ *De diis* (see also Hertz 1845: 11 n. 1).

⁴³ fr. 1 S. = *GRFF* 1 ap. *Diff. Suet.* p. 289 Reifferscheid: *Nigidius in libro quarto * ait: ‘sempiternum immortalium rerum, perpetuum mortalium est; perpetuitas enim in nostra natura est, quae perpeti accidentia potest, sempiternitas infinita est, eo quod semper’*.

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The *differentia* between *stolidus*, designating a person with limited intellectual gifts, and *uanus*, a broader term, used both for frivolous individuals and for liars or deceivers, is attributed to Nigidius by Sulpicius Apollinaris. Gellius adds that Nigidius also gave the etymologies of these terms, and noted this elsewhere in his *Noctes*.⁴⁴ Another notable *differentia* makes the distinction between a false assertion (*mendacium dicere*), which simply does not match the reality, and the deceitful behaviour of someone who deliberately lies. This Stoic topic entails, as Nigidius clearly remarks, an ethical aspect, because the agent's inner intention determines the morality of his actions.⁴⁵

4 Nigidius' Morphological Naturalism

4.1 Derivation in Nigidius and Varro

Comparison between Nigidius and Varro permits us also to grasp the consequences of their naturalistic point of view in the field of morphology. Like Nigidius, Varro thought that words were originally assigned according to nature; it was nature that guided humans' lexical coinages, thus justifying the original and most appropriate etymological form of the words.⁴⁶ Nature, nevertheless, does not constrain human freedom, so that

⁴⁴ fr. 45 S. = GRFF 34 ap. Gell. 18.4.10 ex Apollinari didicimus 'uanos' proprie dici, non ut uulgus diceret, desipientis aut hebetes aut ineptos, sed, ut ueterum doctissimi dixissent, mendaces et infidos et leuia inaniaque pro grauibz et ueris astutissime componentes; 'stolidos' autem uocari non tam stultos et excordes quam taetros et molestos et inlepidos, quos Graeci μοχθηρούς et φορτικούς dicerent. (11.) ἔτυμα quoque harum uocum et origines scriptas esse dicebat in libris Nigidianis. quas requisitas ego et repertas cum primarum significationum exemplis, ut commentariis harum noctium inferrem, notauit et intulisse iam me aliquo in loco commentationibus istis existimo. This must be an allusion to Gellius 8.14, of which only the lemma survives: *lepidissima altercatio Fauorini philosophi aduersus quendam intempestiuum de ambiguitate uerborum disserentem; atque inibi uerba quaedam ex Naeuio poeta et Cn. Gellio non usitate collocata; atque ibidem a P. Nigidio origines uocabulorum exploratae*. See Hertz 1845: 20 n. 1, Kretschmer 1860: 56, Swoboda 1889: 17–18; the same hypothesis appears in the notes of Jacques Oisel and Johann Friedrich Gronovius, according to the edition of Gellius by the latter and his son, Jacobus Gronovius (Leiden, 1706: 812 n. 15). Showing that Nonius' borrowings from Gellius (from p. 50.9 M. = 71 L. *fures* to p. 55.3 M. = 77 L. *arcera*) follow the order of the books in the *Noctes*, Hertz (1886: 97–8) also incorporates into this lost Nigidian excerpt Nonius p. 51.13–15 M. = 73 L. = fr. 46 S. *rudentes ea causa sapientissimi dictos uolunt quod funes, cum uento uerberentur, rudere existimentur; atque hunc sonum proprium funium, non asinorum putant*.

⁴⁵ fr. 49 S. = GRFF 31 ap. Gell. 11.11.1–3 *uerba sunt ipsa haec P. Nigidii . . . : 'inter mendacium dicere et mentiri distat. qui mentitur, ipse non fallitur, alterum fallere conatur; qui mendacium dicit, ipse fallitur'*. (2.) *item hoc addidit [GRFF 31a]: 'qui mentitur – inquit – fallit, quantum in se est; at qui mendacium dicit, ipse non fallit, quantum in se est'*. (3.) *item hoc quoque super eadem re dicit [GRFF 31b] 'uir bonus' – inquit – praestare debet ne mentiatur, prudens, ne mendacium dicat; alterum incidit in hominem, alterum non'*. Nonius (p. 441.11–17 M. = 709 L.) echoes this passage. See Colish 1983: 21–2.

⁴⁶ See especially L. 6.3 *dicemus primo de temporibus quam quae per ea frunt, sed ita ut ante de natura eorum: ea enim dux fuit ad uocabula imponenda homini; 8.10 quare duc natura si quae [Dahlmann :*

transgressions (*L.* 8.8 *culpa*; 10.16 *imperitia*) of its norms in the lexical institution are always possible and *inconstantia* (*L.* 9.35) becomes the general feature of this form of linguistic activity. On the other hand, the insertion of a lexeme in the morphological inflectional pattern cannot but follow another form of *natura*, i.e. the intrinsic and systematic regularity of a given language.⁴⁷

Varro treats this topic extensively at the beginning of *De lingua Latina* book 9. After demonstrating that regularity prevails in every part of the universe (§§23–30), he shows that this feature is also more than marginally present in language (§§31–5). However, people who would be ready to admit the presence of analogy, order, symmetry, and regularity in nature (*genus analogiae naturale*), may also think that the presence of these principles in the products of the *ars* (*genus analogiae uoluntarium*) is merely accidental. From this perspective, the correspondence created by a craftsman between the two halves of a theatrical backdrop is not on the same level as the immutable trajectories of astral bodies; nor is language as an arbitrary product of human beings. Analogists do acknowledge an arbitrary component in the creation of anomalous derivations (*uoluntariae declinationes*), like *Roma* from *Romulus*, but at the same time consider the inflectional paradigms (*declinationes naturales*) as a necessary linguistic dimension, regardless of the speakers.⁴⁸ As a result, in their opinion, the field of analogy that mirrors natural regularity does not encompass derivational phenomena. This conclusion, which is echoed in other passages (*L.* 8.35; 9.50), is only nuanced in a single case, when Varro attributes to the analogists what was probably his own opinion, i.e. that derived forms *fere non discedunt ab ratione sine iusta causa* (*L.* 9.71; see also *GRFF* 88 *ap.* Gell. 3.3.10). Therefore, for example, the gladiatorial families took their names *Cascelliani*, *Caeciliani*, *Aquilianii*, and *Faustini* according to the *-ius* or *-us* endings of the basic forms *Cascellius*, *Caecilius*, *Aquilius*, and *Faustus*. In spite of that, in book 10, where he establishes three *diuisiones* permitting him to select the forms that can be judged to be similar or not, Varro endorses the Alexandrian standard precept: first,

† *si, quae* Goetz–Schoell] *imposita essent uocabula rebus, ne ab omnibus his declinandum* [Dahlmann: *declina{n}tus* Goetz–Schoell] *putarent.*

⁴⁷ See *L.* 10.53 *impositio est in nostro dominatu, nos in natura<e>: quemadmodum enim quisque uolt, imponit nomen, at declinat, quemadmodum uolt natura.* On the multiple values of *natura* in Varro's grammatical works see Garcea 2012: 31–2, 185–6, 194–8; see also de Melo, in this volume and Zetzel, in this volume.

⁴⁸ On *declinatio* in Varro, see especially Cavazza 1980, who correctly distinguishes between *declinatio uoluntaria* and *impositio*.

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invariable forms must be omitted (§14); second, as Aristarchus enjoined, derivational phenomena must be excluded (§§15–16);⁴⁹ third, each of the four morpholexical classes of the *uerba declinata natura* must be evaluated for its own sake, even if forms belonging to different classes can be identical (§17); fourth, the pronominal forms must not be taken into account (§§18–20), since only the nominal ones pass the analogical test.

The most striking feature of Nigidius' morphological researches is that his more explicit naturalism leads him to apply analogy to every aspect of language, including derivational phenomena, which cannot be arbitrary. So, in relation to adjectival and adverbial coinages, he strives to find the specific function of each suffix.⁵⁰ In the case of adjectives ending in *-ōsus*, Nigidius compares the forms *religens* and *religiosus* in order to show that those ending in *-ōsus* always presuppose a pejorative excess;⁵¹ the same value is clear in *bibosus*, a deverbative parallel to *bibax*, not formed on a nominal stem like other adjectives ending in *-ōsus*, and only attested in

⁴⁹ See L. 10.16 *quare proinde ac simile conferri non oportet ac dicere, ut sit ab Roma Romanus, sic ex Capua dici oportere Capuanus, quod in consuetudine uehementer natat, quod declinantes imperite rebus nomina imponunt, a quibus cum accepit consuetudo, turbulenta necesse est dicere. itaque neque Aristarchii neque alii in analogiis defendendam eius susceperunt causam, sed, ut dixi, hoc genere declinatio in co<m>munis consuetudine uerborum <a>egrotat, quod oritur e populo multiplici <et> imperito: itaque in hoc genere in loquendo magis anomalia quam analogia.*

⁵⁰ Nigidius probably also studied verbal derivation. He treated the forms ending in *-urio*, since Nonius attests that he explained an otherwise unattested *nixurio* parallel to *enitor*: both had the specific meaning of 'to give birth to', but their proper meaning was 'to struggle up, to strive'. As regards *nixurio*, Nigidius observed that often the effort was unfruitful: fr. 40 S. = GRFF 13 ap. Non. p. 144.18–20 M. = 210 L. Nigidius commentariorum grammaticorum XXV: '*nixurit, qui niti uult et in conatu saepius aliqua re perpellitur*'. He also analysed verbal forms ending in *-sco*: fr. 2 S., above n. 38; fr. 3 S. = GRFF 3 ap. Nonius p. 437.23–6 M. = 704 L. '*uetustiscere*' et '*uetascerere*'. *quid intersit, Nigidius commentariorum grammaticorum lib. X deplanauit: 'dicemus quae uetustate deteriora fiunt, 'uetustiscere', 'inuetascerere, quae meliora*'. According to Keller 1992: 317–18, '(in) uetasco ne s'applique en général pas aux êtres animés. D'autre part, il se distingue de *senesco* . . . en ce qu'il n'implique que rarement l'idée de déclin: c'est, le plus souvent, "vieillir" au sens de "s'affermir / s'affirmer par le temps"'. As the suffix *-isc-* becomes widespread in Late Antiquity and replaces *-isc-*, Keller (1992: 318 n. 17 and 338) also thinks that we should restore an original *uetustescere* (cf. *incuruēfisco, frangēfisco, flaccōfisco, perdolēfisco, longēfisco, mītēfisco*).

⁵¹ fr. 4 S. = GRFF 4 ap. Gell. 4.9.1–2 Nigidius Figulus . . . in undecimo commentariorum grammaticorum uersum ex antiquo carmine refert memoria hercle dictum: '*religens esse [<ted> esse Fleckeisen : esse <ted> Ribbeck TRF³] oportet, religiosus ne fuas*' [Fleckeisen, Ribbeck TRF³, Marshall : *religiosum nefas* MSS, Funaioli]. *cuius autem id carmen sit, non scribit. atque in eodem loco Nigidius: 'hoc – inquit – inclinamentum semper huiuscemodi uerborum, ut 'uinosus', 'mulierosus', 'religiosus', significat copiam quandam inmodicam rei, super qua dicitur. quocirca 'religiosus' is appellabatur, qui nimia et superstitiosa religione sese alligauerat, eaque res uitio assignabatur*'. Gellius (4.9.12–14) does not agree with this general evaluation, since qualities are never in excess, as forms like *ingeniosus* confirm. See Mayer 1975. This distinction is essential for the *differentia* between positive *religiosus* and negative *superstitiosus*, on which see Varro GRFF 175 = *Res divinae* fr. 47 Cardauns ap. Aug. *Civ.* 6.9; Servius, *Aen.* 6.596.

Laberius (fr. 52 Panayotakis *ap.* Gell. 3.12.4).⁵² As regards adverbs ending in *-im*, Nigidius recognizes that *expulsim* and *cursim* are formed on the stems of verbs of motion,⁵³ and – *adsimulanter* ‘analogically’ – creates similar adverbs for human behaviours that are similar to those of different animals; these are probably purely theoretical creations since they are not attested anywhere.⁵⁴

4.2 The Inflectional συμπτώχεια

Also in the field of nominal inflection, Nigidius’ analogy turns out to be a general principle, which goes beyond single morphological patterns. With regard to the controversial status of the *ũ*-stems, Nigidius and Varro were in agreement on proposing the genitive *-u-is* and the dative *-u-ī*, since these forms, found in Terence, established a parallel with the genitive and dative singular of consonant stems (*duc-is duc-i*) and *ĩ*-stems (*caed-i-s caed-i*), thus contributing to the assimilation of *ũ*-stems to a nominal group with a firmer identity. The fact that these forms had the same number of syllables in both cases may also have influenced their selection.⁵⁵

⁵² fr. 5 S. = GRFF 26 *ap.* Gell. 3.12.1 *bibendi avidum* P. Nigidius in commentariis grammaticis ‘*bibacem*’ et ‘*bibosum*’ dicit. See Panayotakis 2010: 349. Although these passages are not attributed to Nigidius, Swoboda (1889: 6–8) hesitantly puts forward Nonius p. 28.24–5 M. = 41 L. (*mulierosus*), pp. 21.31–22.2 M. = 32 L. (*uirosa*), and pp. 433.26–434.1 M. = 698–9 L. (*morosus*) as, respectively, fr. 6, 7, and 8 of the *Commentarii grammatici*. See Carilli 1997: 72–6.

⁵³ fr. 11 S. = GRFF 7 *ap.* Non. p. 104.31–3 M. = 149 L.: Nigidius *commentariorum lib. XX: ‘cuiusmodi genus aduerbiorum a uerbis motus* [Mercier : *aduerbii motu* codd.] *quod uenit* [Mercier : *quae uenit* codd. : *quae ueni* <un> t Lindsay], *ut ‘expulsim’, ‘cursim’*. As Varro’s example (*Men.* 456) given by Nonius (ibid. 28–30) proves, *expulsim* (sc. *ludere*) is a technical term for handball: see TLL 5.2.1811.70–6. Swoboda (1889: 8–11) strives to prove that, in the long section on adverbs by Nonius, other forms ending in *-im* would have been taken from Nigidius’ *commentarii*, even in the absence of any explicit attribution: see fr. 13–33 S.

⁵⁴ fr. 12 S. = GRFF 22 *ap.* Non. p. 40.22–4 M. = 58–9 L.: Nigidius *commentariis grammaticis: ‘sunt etiam adsimulanter [adsimulanter Lugd.] dicta haec: ‘canatim’, ‘suatim’, ‘bouatim’; quae ab animalibus sumuntur’*. Swoboda 1889 *app. crit.*: ‘*adsimulanter* utrum sit “ad exemplum aliorum aduerbiorum, quorum similis est forma et vis”, an “similitudinis cuiusdam significandae causa”, incertum est’. Della Casa 1962: 87 n. 158: ‘circa l’avverbio *adsimulanter* . . . mi pare invece più adatto al contesto, intenderlo come “creato per analogia”, “formato in modo analogo”; ‘Nigidio ha creato *adsimulanter*, cioè per analogia, ma per dimostrare la falsità del procedimento, i tre casi ben noti: *suatim*, *canatim*, *bouatim*. La forma vera, se fosse stata analogica, sarebbe stata *suĩtim*, *canĩtim*, *bouĩtim*’ (p. 90). Yet, according to Schaffner-Rimann 1958: 46, ‘Durch Bedeutungswandel des ursprünglich deverbativen *priuatim* . . . entsteht eine kleine Gruppe von Adverbien mit der Bedeutung „nach Art von”, abgeleitet von Substantiven, Adjektiven und Pronomina possessiva (z.B. *suatim*, *tuatim*, *bouatim*, *rusticatim*)’.

⁵⁵ fr. 63 S. = GRFF *test.* 26 *ap.* Gell. 4.16 M. *Varronem* [GRFF *test.* 26 = fr. 18 G.–S.] et P. Nigidium, *uiros Romani generis doctissimos, comperimus non aliter elocutos esse et scripsisse, quam ‘senatus’ et ‘domuis’ et ‘fluctuis’, qui est patrius casus ab eo, quod est ‘senatus’, ‘domus’, <‘fluctus’> huic ‘senatui’, <‘domui’> ‘fluctui’ ceteraque is consimilia pariter dixisse*. See Lomanto 1993, Garcea 2012: 225–6.

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Following the same formal and analogical criterion, Varro introduced uniformity into the paradigms for *io-* and *o-*stems, recommending a double <I> in the isosyllabic genitive and vocative singular (*GRFF* 252 = 120 G.–S. *ap.* Char. 98.17–23 B.: *Lucii, Aemilii*). Nigidius, for his part, acknowledged the current *exilis* spelling for the genitive singular of *io-* stems (in other words, simply <I>)⁵⁶ and, at the same time, used allographs to distinguish cases with archaic but not totally obsolete graphemes. In all likelihood, he adhered to existing Lucilian proposals; so the same morpheme \bar{i} , represented by <I> in the genitive singular, was completed or substituted by <E> in the other cases, a spelling that gave a *plenius* aspect to the word by referring to a multiplicity:⁵⁷

- a) *Valeri* genitive and vocative are homographs but not homophones; if one knows the morphological category, the right accent will be applied, i.e. differently from the genitive *Valéri* (< Valéri- \bar{i}), the vocative should have its stress moved back (*Váleri*).⁵⁸

According to Kretzschmer 1860: 97, followed by Swoboda 1889 *app. crit.*, Gellius took this information from Caesellius Vindex's *Lectiones antiquae*.

⁵⁶ See already Lucilius *GRFF* 32 = 1294–5 M. = H fr. 3 Ch. *ap.* Char. 98.23–99.7 B.: genitive singular *Caeli, Numeri*. The incomplete but intelligible version of the Neapolitanus IV A 8 (*nū quā ll hoc intulisset nisi et numerum per .i. huius ciendū crederet*), which Keil (*GL* 1.78.10–12) follows with some corrections (*numquam enim hoc intulisset, nisi et 'Numerium' per I, huius <'Numeri'>, faciendum crederet*), has to be preferred to any attempt to change the text according to the *codex Dusaë*, as Barwick (p. 99.3–6) and the most recent editors of Lucilius do (*numquam enim hoc intulisset, nisi <et 'Caelium' et> 'Numerium' per i<i> huius <'Numerii'>, faciendum crederet*). In fact, this version implies that Charisius made a mistake: Lucilius contrasted not the genitive ending in *-i* with the genitive ending in *-ii* (which was not yet used at his time), but the genitive (or vocative) ending in *-i*, which was compatible with the hexameter, with the remaining forms, which were incompatible with the hexameter.

⁵⁷ See Lucilius *GRFF* 10 = 358–61 M. = 9 fr. 8 Ch. *ap.* Ter. Scaur. *GL* 7.19.1–5 (p. 27.8–12 Biddau): singular *pīlum*, plural *peila* (vs. feminine singular *pīla*); *GRFF* 10a = 362–3 M. = 9 fr. 9 Ch. *ap.* Char. 99.7–10 B.: genitive singular *Luci, Corneli, Cornifici*; *GRFF* 10b = 364–6 M. = 9 fr. 10 Ch. *ap.* Vel. Long. *GL* 7.56.7–9 (p. 29.4–6 Di Napoli): genitive singular *pupilli, pueri, Lucili*, nominative plural *puerei*; *GRFF* 10c = 367–8 M. = 9 fr. 11 Ch. *ap.* Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.15: genitive singular *mendaci, Furi*, dative *furei*; *GRFF* 10d = 369–70 M. = 9 fr. 12 Ch. *ap.* Vel. Long. *GL* 7.56.11–12 (p. 29.8–10 Di N.): dative singular *illi*, nominative plural *illei*. See Chahoud, in this volume.

⁵⁸ fr. 35 S. = *GRFF* 9 *ap.* Gell. 13.16.1 P. *Nigidii uerba sunt ex commentariorum grammaticorum uicesimo quarto . . . : 'deinde – inquit – uoculatio qui poterit seruari, si non sciemus in nominibus, ut 'Valeri', utrum interrogandi an uocandi sint? nam interrogandi secunda syllaba superiore tonost quam prima, deinde nouissima deicitur; at in casu uocandi summo tonost prima, deinde gradatim descendunt*'. Gellius himself explains what he read in Nigidius (§3): *summum autem tonum προσφδίαν acutam dicit, et quem accentum nos dicimus, uoculationem appellat, et casum interrogandi eum dicit quem nunc nos genetiūm dicimus*. Yet the issue has become highly controversial, since Cocchia (1887: 387–91) thought that Nigidius used *casus interrogandi* and *casus uocandi* for two different intonations of the vocative, when it is used, respectively, for a question or an apostrophe. Moreover (Fay 1915), Gellius would have misinterpreted a grammatical reference to the *casus interrogandi* (instead of 'case of the form *interrogandi*') of *mei* in *Pseud. 6 mei te rogandi et tis respondendi mihi* (quoted at 20.6.9),

- b) *magni amici* singular genitive and plural nominative are homographs and homophones; the augmentation in quantity in the plural should become explicit with a supplementary <E> (*magnei amicei*).⁵⁹
- c) *terrae* singular genitive and dative are homographs and homophones; the augmentation presupposed by the act of giving in the dative should become explicit by substituting <E> (*terrae*) for <I> (*terrai*).⁶⁰
- d) the genitive of *ego* (*mī* < *meī*) is written with <I> alone, whereas the dative *mī*, with its semantic augmentation, should be rendered with the expansion of <E> (i.e. *miei*).⁶¹

The evidence is too meagre for any generalization, but it seems probable that here Nigidius applied the same principle that governs his etymologies, which consists of analyzing the material dimension of a word as associated with some semantic features of the word itself. Since Sommer (1909), this principle, also found in Lucilius,⁶² has been called συμπάσχειν-*Theorie*, from the formulaic expression συνέπαθεν ἢ φωνῆ τῷ σημαιομένῳ which the grammarian Trypho used in his lexical analyses. Its allegedly Stoic origin, at least from an orthodox point of view, is problematic, because it is

read as *mei interrogandi* ... (for *me interrogandi* ... see Nonius 501.14 M. = 804 L. app. crit.). See Ronconi 1971a: 285–98, Della Casa 1962: 83–5. Although *casus interrogandi* ‘genitive’ is paralleled by *casus nominandi*, *dandi*, *accusandi*, *uocandi* (Pisani 1960), scholars have argued for the other hypothesis. They infer the analogy λόγος κλητικός : κλητικὴ πτώσις (*casus interrogandi*) = λόγος ἐρωτηματικὸς : *casus uocandi* from Ammonius *In Int. CAG* 4.5.5.10–12 (Ronconi 1971b: 299–304) or note that Aristotle (*Po.* 1457a18–23) also refers to the intonations of a question and a command as ‘πτώσις’ (De Martino 2006), even though Aristotelian πτώσις covers every form of non-declarative utterance. Starting from the *interrogatio* used to ascertain the case of an inflected form, Belardi and Cipriano (1990) rather think that *casus interrogandi* is a plural, designating all the oblique cases (and each of them); *casus nominandi*, for its part, would be a controversial πτώσις and *casus uocandi* a holophrastic form.

⁵⁹ fr. 36 S. = GRFF 10 ap. Gell. 13.26.4 *id quoque in eodem libro Nigidiano animaduertimus: ‘si huius – inquit – ‘amici’ uel huius ‘magni’ scribas, unum I facito extremum; sin uero hi ‘magnei’, hi ‘amicei’ casu multitudinis recto, tum ante I scribendum erit E, atque id ipsum facies in similibus’.*

⁶⁰ fr. 37 S. = GRFF 11 ap. Gell. 13.26.4 *item: si huius ‘terrai’ [Ascensius 1530 : terrae ψ] scribas, I littera sit extrema, si huic ‘terrae’, per E scribendum est. For Della Casa 1962: 76, ‘Dato che la sopravvivenza di questo esito arcaico era soltanto documentata per il genitivo e non per il dativo, Nigidio poteva concludere, in base all’uso, che l’*ai* fosse da mantenersi per i soli casi del genitivo.’*

⁶¹ fr. 38 S. = GRFF 12 ap. Gell. 13.26.4 *item: ‘mei’ qui scribit in casu interrogandi, uelut cum dicimus ‘mei studiosus’, per I unum scribat, non per E; at cum ‘mi<tte mih>ei’ [Holford-Strevens forthcoming a: miei δ : mi ei Φ : mei Fγ], tum per E et I scribendum est, quia dandi casus est. This question is strongly debated: Belardi and Cipriano (1990: 49–53) think that the issue is the homophony of *mī*, so Nigidius would have proposed a genitive *mī* (< *meī*) and a dative *miei*. Nevertheless, *mī* for genitive and dative is not a standard form and such an intervention would therefore be inexplicable. Holford-Strevens forthcoming b rightly adds a marker for the dative and simply thinks that the opposition I vs. E holds for *me-i* genitive and *mih-ei* dative, even if they are not homophones.*

⁶² See Chahoud, this volume.

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based on the correspondence between corporeal and incorporeal items; nevertheless, nothing prevented ancient grammarians from thinking that they relied on Stoic authorities, who took a lively interest in universal $\sigma\upsilon\mu\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$.⁶³

4.3 Word Classes

A last point deserves some attention. Nigidius' interest in semantic motivation in every aspect of language leads him also to study aspects that are generally alien to this field, especially the complex topic of connectives.

Gellius 17.13 devotes a thorough analysis to *quin*, starting from a taxonomy of the combinations that this particle can engender with different illocutional modalities: *quin particula, quam grammatici 'coniunctionem' appellant, uariis modis sententiisque conectere orationem uidetur* (§1).⁶⁴ Following a pattern that recalls the Stoic list of ten $\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\tau\epsilon\lambda\eta$, he relies on an implicit truth-conditional criterion that allows him to distinguish *increpare, interrogare, and exhortari* (§2a) from *confirmare* in a positive or negative way (§§2b–9). Then he resumes his topic, adding a reference to the etymology of *quin*, considered as a compound (< *qui* + *ne*), and to its precise, evidently motivated meaning, that is not its simple connective function. Nigidius treated both aspects in his grammatical work.⁶⁵ Although Gellius does not develop this further, the fact that Nigidius gave a *certa significatio* to a conjunction places him on the side of the Stoic critics against the Aristotelian definition of $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\delta\epsilon\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ as an asemantic unit (*Po.* 1456b38–1457a2), and more specifically in favour of the recent developments of the Stoic 'grammar'. It was in fact Posidonius (fr. 45 E.–K. *ap.* Apollon. *Conj. GG* 2.1.214.4–20) who, after affirming that conjunctions and prepositions belong to the same category, showed that $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\delta\omicron\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\delta\omicron\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota$ are semantically different because they have different prefixes with identical verbal themes. Similarly, in Nigidius' eyes, reconstructing the etymology of *quin* revealed the proper meaning of

⁶³ See Trypho fr. 130–1 Velsen *ap.* *EM* 566.4–8 s.v. $\lambda\iota\mu\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$; 794.4–8 s.v. $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\eta}\tau\eta\varsigma$; Belardi 1990, Sluiter 1990: 27–33.

⁶⁴ See Garcea 2000: 153–69 for a more detailed study of this chapter, which is probably entirely borrowed from Nigidius' *Commentarii* (Kretzschmer 1860: 55–6, Mercklin 1860: 653).

⁶⁵ fr. 52 S. = *GRFF* 32 *ap.* Gell. 17.13.10 *hanc uero particulam, de qua dicimus, nisi quis didicerit compositam copulatamque esse neque uim tantum coniungendi habere, sed certa quadam significatione factam, numquam profecto rationes ac uarietates istius comprehensurus est. quod quia longioris dissertationis est, poterit, cui otium est, reperire hoc in P. Nigidii commentariis, quos grammaticos inscripsit.*

this connective, which was further specified by its insertion into different types of sentences.

Prepositions also share similar properties. In a form like *aestumo*, which he connects with **abaestumo*, Nigidius remarks that the prefix *ab* adds a totalizing feature to the verbal stem of *aestumo*, as in *abnumero* compared to *numero*.⁶⁶

5 Conclusion

In conclusion, although his *Commentarii grammatici* are poorly known because of their fragmentary status, Nigidius seems to subscribe to a general form of naturalism that made him believe in an organicistic universe mirrored by the ‘pansemantic’ and phylogenetically justified universe of language. When he reconstructed the articulatory symbolism of the Latin personal pronouns, Nigidius chose a Stoic example that was not disconnected from the rest of his work. Differently from the not always successful combination of naturalism and Alexandrian formal grammar in Varro,⁶⁷ Nigidius multiplied complementary forms of the same conception: ethical etymologies, combined with similar *differentiae uerborum*, and a broad idea of morphological analogy, where every linguistic item, and every formal transformation, not only for inflectional but also for derivational processes, should be significant. For the same reason, Nigidius did not refrain from searching for semantic values also in such word classes as conjunctions and prepositions, which the traditional linguistic debate tended to consider as simple supports for signifying units.

⁶⁶ fr. 51 S. = GRFF 24 ap. Gell. 15.3.4 *inuenimus autem in commentario Nigidiano uerbum ‘autumo’ compositum ex ‘ab’ praepositione et uerbo ‘aestumo’ dictumque intercise ‘autumo’ quasi ‘abaestumo’, quod significaret ‘totum aestumo’ tamquam ‘abnumero’*. This compound is not otherwise attested (TLL 1.112.48–51); only *Gloss.* 2.233.21 translates it as ἀπαριθμῶ. For this interpretation of *autumo* as Nigidian see also Johannes Scotus Eriugena *de floratio de Macrobio GL* 5.600.19–22 (p. 17 app. crit. De Paolis), exc. *Bob. de Macrobio GL* 5.632.6–8 (p. 17.1–4 De Paolis), and *frg. Bob. de uerbo GL* 5.637.27–30 (p. 26.17–21 Passalacqua), passages that echo Gellius (Schoemann 1871: 39–40) rather than a third, common source (Kretzschmer 1860: 56).

⁶⁷ On Varro’s theories on grammatical genre and number see Garcea 2012: 184–6, 194–8.