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Who'll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from Tax Evasion Games
Abstract : Using two earned income/tax declaration experimental designs we show that only partial liars
are affected by a truth-telling oath, a non-price commitment device. Under oath, we see no
change in the number of chronic liars and fewer partial liars. Rather than smoothly increasing
their compliance, we also observe that partial liars who respond to the oath, respond by
becoming fully honest under oath. Based on both response times data and the consistency
of subjects when several compliance decisions are made in a row, we show that partial lying
arises as the result of weak preferences towards profitable honesty. The oath only transform
people with weak preferences for lying into being committed to the truth.
Cited literature [47 references]
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02159905
Contributor : Nicolas Jacquemet <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, June 19, 2019 - 10:18:11 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, July 13, 2021 - 3:18:55 AM
Contributor : Nicolas Jacquemet <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, June 19, 2019 - 10:18:11 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, July 13, 2021 - 3:18:55 AM
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