D. Acemoglu and M. O. Jackson, History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol.82, issue.2, pp.245-295, 2015.

R. Benabou and J. Tirole, Laws and Norms, NBER WP, p.17579, 2011.

S. Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine "The Moral Sentiments": Evidence from Economic Experiments, Science, vol.320, issue.5883, pp.1605-1609, 2008.

E. Dal-bó and P. Bó, Do the right thing': The effects of moral suasion on cooperation, Journal of Public Economics, vol.117, pp.28-38, 2014.

P. Dal-bó and G. R. Fréchette, The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence, American Economic Review, vol.101, issue.1, pp.411-429, 2011.

T. Dohmen, A. Falk, D. Huffman, U. Sunde, J. Schupp et al., Individual risk attitudes: Measurement, determinants, and behavioral consequences, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol.9, issue.3, pp.522-550, 2011.
DOI : 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01015.x

URL : https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article-pdf/9/3/522/10314305/jeea0522.pdf

J. Duffy and D. Fehr, Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games: experimental evidence on the role of precedents, Experimental Economics, vol.21, issue.3, pp.573-600, 2018.

A. Falk and M. Kosfeld, The Hidden Costs of Control, American Economic Review, vol.96, issue.5, pp.1611-1630, 2006.

R. Fisman and E. Miguel, Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets, Journal of Political Economy, vol.115, issue.6, pp.1020-1048, 2007.
DOI : 10.1086/527495

G. Friebel and W. Schnedler, Team governance: Empowerment or hierarchical control, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.78, issue.1-2, pp.1-13, 2011.
DOI : 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.12.003

URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00978261

R. Galbiati, E. Henry, and N. Jacquemet, Dynamic effects of enforcement on cooperation, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol.115, issue.49, pp.12425-12428, 2018.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01971468

R. Galbiati, K. H. Schlag, and J. J. Van-der-weele, Sanctions that signal: An experiment, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.94, pp.34-51, 2013.
DOI : 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.002

URL : https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/1679762/131818_Sanctions.pdf

M. M. Galizzi and L. E. Whitmarsh, How to measure behavioural spillovers? A methodological review and checklist, Frontiers in Psychology, vol.10, 2019.

L. Guiso, P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales, Long-Term Persistence, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol.14, issue.6, pp.1401-1436, 2016.
DOI : 10.1111/jeea.12177

URL : https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article-pdf/14/6/1401/10408411/jeea1401.pdf

M. A. Nowak and S. Roch, Upstream reciprocity and the evolution of gratitude, Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, vol.274, pp.605-609, 1610.

A. Peysakhovich and D. G. Rand, Habits of Virtue: Creating Norms of Cooperation and Defection in the Laboratory, Management Science, vol.62, issue.3, pp.631-647, 2016.

D. Sliwka, Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes, American Economic Review, vol.97, issue.3, pp.999-1012, 2007.

J. Van-der-weele, The Signaling Power of Sanctions in Social Dilemmas, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol.28, issue.1, pp.103-126, 2009.