Discrete Choice under Oaths

Nicolas Jacquemet (1, 2, 3) , Stephane Luchini (4) , Jason Shogren (5) , Verity Watson (6)

1 PSE - Paris School of Economics
2 UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
3 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
4 AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques
5 UW - University of Wyoming
6 Health Economics Research Unit

Using discrete choices to elicit preferences is a major tool to help guide public policy. Although Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) remains by far the most popular mechanism used to elicit preferences, its reliability still is questionable. Using an induced value experimental design, we show that standard benchmarks achieve no more than 56% (hypothetical answers with no monetary incentives) to 60% (real monetary incentives) of payoff maximizing choices. Herein we demonstrate that having respondents sign a the truth-telling oath reduces non-payoff maximizing choices by nearly 50% relative to these benchmarks. The explicit and voluntary commitment to honesty improved decisions. Further, we show that it is the explicit commitment to honesty induced by the truth-telling oath improves choices, not just any oath mechanism, i.e., an oath to task or to duty did not improve choices.

Mots clés: Discrete Choice Experiments; Stated Preferences; Oath; Truth-telling; External validity; Welfare

Domaines: Economies et finances

Nicolas Jacquemet, Stephane Luchini, Jason Shogren, Verity Watson. Discrete Choice under Oaths. 2019, 21 p. ⟨halshs-02136103⟩