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Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting

Abstract : I conduct an axiomatic analysis of voting rules in a context where voters evaluate each candidate by assigning her an evaluation from a pre-established set. I focus on additive rules, which follow the utilitarian paradigm. Characterization results are provided for each of the two prominent additive rules: Evaluative Voting when the evaluation set is finite and Range Voting when the evaluation set is [0.1]. These results are first obtained in a simple setting of ranking rules – where candidates are compared according to a ranking of their attributes – and are then extended to a more general setting of voting rules.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02087667
Contributor : Caroline Bauer <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, April 2, 2019 - 11:52:22 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, September 22, 2020 - 3:54:22 AM

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Antonin Macé. Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2018, 79, pp.10-17. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.09.002⟩. ⟨halshs-02087667⟩

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