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Article dans une revue Journal of Economics and Management Strategy Année : 2019

Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts

Résumé

Are public contracts less adaptable than private contracts? Using a comprehensive set of contracts for a standard product, we compare procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find that public-to-private contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private-to-private contracts and that the use of rigidity clauses in public contracts rises when political risks are more salient. We argue that a significant part of the increased rigidity of public contracts is a contractual adaptation to limit political hazards from political opponents and interested third parties.
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Dates et versions

halshs-02057712, version 1 (05-03-2019)

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Jean Beuve, Marian Moszoro, Stéphane Saussier. Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2019, 28 (2), pp.316-335. ⟨10.1111/jems.12268⟩. ⟨halshs-02057712⟩
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