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Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion

Abstract : Donors usually need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients. A risk is that donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. Using psychological game theory, we design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion toward the recipient is stronger than toward the donor. Testing the predictions of the model in a laboratory experiment, we show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of the guilt. However, structural estimates indicate that the effect of guilt on behaviour is higher when the guilt is directed toward the recipient.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01981632
Contributor : Nelly Wirth <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, January 15, 2019 - 10:56:13 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, April 30, 2020 - 3:12:06 PM

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01981632, version 1

Citation

Giuseppe Attanasi, Claire Rimbaud, Marie Claire Villeval. Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion. 2019. ⟨halshs-01981632⟩

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