New method to detect convergence in simple multi-period market games with infinite large strategy spaces

Jørgen Vitting Andersen (1) , Philippe de Peretti (1)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne

We introduce a new methodology that enables the detection of onset of convergence towards Nash equilibria, in simple repeated-games with infinite large strategy spaces. The method works by constraining on a special and finite subset of strategies. We illustrate how the method can predict (in special time periods) with a high success rate the action of participants in a series of experiments.

Mots clés: multi-period games; infinite strategy space; decoupling; bounded rationality; agent-based modeling

Domaines: Economies et finances

Jørgen Vitting Andersen, Philippe de Peretti. New method to detect convergence in simple multi-period market games with infinite large strategy spaces. 2018. ⟨halshs-01960900⟩