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Hizbullah’s Shaping Lebanon Statehood
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Abstract:
Since the end of the civil war in 1990, the Lebanese second Republic has experienced a dual security governance in the southern borderland region. While the State’s new legitimacy stems from the 1989 Taïf Agreement—which put an end to the civil war-, the Shia militia of Hizbullah emerged from the war with a sociopolitical and sectarian legitimacy among the Shia constituency of South Lebanon and southern suburb of Beirut. Soon after an agreement between Syria and Iran by the end of 1990, Hizbullah was granted a national duty to secure the southern part of the country – as expressed by the ideological notion of ‘resistance’ – in combating the Israeli occupation of a 850sq/km strip of land along the border. In the post-civil war era, under Syrian tutelage, Hizbullah received a full Lebanese State legitimization to harass the Israeli army in the occupied southern border zone, which eventually led to its withdrawal in 2000. Up to the Syrian military withdrawal in 2005, the territorial and functional ‘areas of limited statehood’ between the State and Hizbullah worked as a cooperation because of the Syrian control over both actors. With the arrival of a new pro-Western government, it then turned to a rivalry. In 2005 already, this rivalry was blatant over the borderland issues, with the two cases study of the Shebaa Farms and the assistance to the Southerners affected by the 2006 war. It turns to a confrontation in 2008 before an Agreement regarding the mode of governance was signed in Doha, allowing Hizbullah and the pro-Syrian forces a capacity to block any decision that may harm their interests. Since then, various forms of cooperation restarted, all of them in the general framework of a government control of state’s political orientations as an ally of the Syrian regime, raising the theoretical interest for the “mediated state” framework. This perspective complements the “areas of limited statehood” in conceptualizing the cooperation between the state and the non-state actor as an interdependency. Applied to concrete on-the-ground agreements, this type of relationship helped to frame the security governance issues at stake for the Lebanese state, from the marking of the Blue Line to the struggle against the jihadists groups on the Eastern border of the state. Therefore, less as a militia and more as a political force, Hizbullah appeared as a significant actor in the state building process in a constant negotiation with the other political forces of the Lebanese scene.

Keywords: Hizbullah – Lebanese state – governance – sovereignty – security – interdependence

Hizbullah’s Shaping of Lebanon Statehood

Introduction

In the MENA region, the debate about the nature of the State is not new. Traditionally, the Arab State analysis pertains to the Weberian tradition of centralization of power, with authoritarian regimes with the key role of the military in politics¹ and the rentier State model². Less studied are the new political and territorial features resulting from the fragmentation process observed in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. Aside of the resurgence of several authoritarian regimes, the emergences of various non-state armed actors have push some analysis to talk about a process of militarization in fragmented states like Iraq³. However, few researchers investigated the new roles of the emerging non-state actors in the shaping of the post Arab Spring states. With the case of Lebanon, a fragmented and weak state, this contribution intends to provide some insights by elaborating a typology of different configurations of areas of limited statehood. It also intends to explore the relationship between the Lebanese state and Hizbullah, the Shia militia and key political actors, and discuss its impact on the political order.
Since the end of the civil war (1975-1990), the Lebanese state’s second Republic has experienced a dual security governance spreading from the southern borderland region. While the state’s new legitimacy stems from the 1989 Taïf Agreement, Hizbullah emerged from the war with a sociopolitical and sectarian legitimacy gathered among the Shi’ites of South Lebanon and southern suburb of Beirut. In the framework of the Syrian tutelage era, Hizbullah succeeded to transform itself into a political party while keeping its weaponry to continue the struggle against the Israeli occupied strip of land in South Lebanon. From the Iran’s supported Amal-Hizbullah 1990 agreement until the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon in 2005, a tacit cooperation between Hizbullah and the Lebanese State persisted.

Things changed abruptly in 2005, after several years of political tensions, when the Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was assassinated. The national and international pressure over the pro-Syrian government perceived as complicit of this crime push the Syrian troops to withdraw from Lebanon. The summer 2005 legislative elections brought to power an anti-Syrian majority under the label of 14 March, by reference to a mass demonstration against the Syrian tutelage over Lebanon that year. As a pro-Syrian force, Hizbullah tried to shape a counter-movement with other political actors under the label of 8 March, a date of a massive demonstration to “thank” Syria for its support during the post-civil war era. While the 14 March took the lead over the government and started to bring a new geopolitical orientation for Lebanon – closer the US, Europe and Saudi Arabia – the 8 March coalition sat as a minority in the Council of Minister, for the first time including two ministers from Hizbullah. For the next three years, a new rivalry defined the relationship between Hizbullah and the government until a political deal was negotiated in the Doha Agreement (2008).

Since then, various modes of security governance cooperation resumed with several differences as Hizbullah appeared more powerful than before – notably after the 2006 war against Israel and internally after the coup of the May 7, 2008 against 14 March coalition. The Sunnis-Shi’ites divide reached unprecedented level of tensions following the involvement of Hizbullah alongside the Syrian regime to confront the popular uprising. In this framework, the debate on the illegality of Hizbullah weaponry reached another peak brought about by a Sunni contestation of its power, more and more perceived as a threat. But since 2014, the jihadist attacks on Lebanon’s Eastern borderlands helped Hizbullah to re-appear as a national saviour when it led the fight to stop the spreading of al-Qaeda/Islamic State combatants. And during the summer 2017, a new cooperation with the Lebanese Army appeared when both forces converged in a strategy to end the jihadist threat in the Qalamoun border region.

Among several theoretical and conceptual approaches to describe and interpret different configurations of political and security actors in non-Weberian contexts, the ‘areas of limited statehood’ conceptualization seems particularly appropriate to the Lebanese case. The article will attempt at investigating the main features characterising the both territorially and functional emergence of areas of limited statehood in Lebanon, in the south of the country but also in terms of economic welfare and security provision. In South Lebanon, like in other places under Hizbullah control, does ‘areas of limited statehood’ brought peaceful political and security order or intensification of conflict?

By Lebanese state, I do not mean that there is such an entity separated from the society. Rather, I would follow Mitchell who shows clearly that the delineation of the boundary between state and society is an internal and historical process that each state shaped through
its own historical trajectory. In this view, the state is seen as a “common ideological and cultural construct” but in the meantime, has institutions we can observe empirically. In her case study of Lebanon, Obeid illustrated the marginalization process of the borderland region of Arsal in the Beqaa Valley. Interrogating the perception of the state by local inhabitants, she showed the multiples faces (wujjuh) of the state, perceived as distant but also expected to be closer and efficient. This paradox is understandable when one takes into account the triple presidential system Lebanon fell into in the aftermath of the civil war: the state appeared to be divided into three spheres of influence or centres of power led by the President of the Republic, the president of the parliament and the prime minister. In Lebanon, state governance has always been a matter of concern for citizens, highlighting the weakness of the centre once you reach territorial or social peripheries but historically also underlining its low governance capacity. In the following lines, I would like to try to rely on several conceptualizations in order to analyse the security governance dynamics between the State and the Lebanese Army Forces (LAF) and Hizbullah, mainly since 2005 and since the Syrian uprising in 2011 and the subsequent critical junctures faced by Lebanon on its eastern front.

The concept of ‘areas of limited statehood’ by Risse detailed the various types of areas the model deals with: functional, territorial, temporal, and social. The author stressed the importance of thinking of these dimensions in terms of degrees of statehood instead of dichotomies. More descriptive than analytical, these aspects are part of a functional understanding on governance – rule-making and provisions of collective goods. Therefore, one may wonder how this framework may deal with the hybrid entity of Hizbullah and moreover with the power/security issues related to the political history of this movement. It is noticeable that Hizbullah does not fit in the actors’ category of the framework as it stands between the traditional and civil society non-state actors and between the local and international actors. In a further attempt to grasp a larger articulation implied by the ‘areas of limited statehood’, Krasner and Risse identified three factors of successful authority for non-state actors: legitimacy as a necessary condition for success; types of task – multiple, complex – which may require a strong legitimacy and a higher level of institutionalization, the third factor. Effectiveness of enhancing state capacity and providing collective goods is related to institutional arrangement linking external and local actors. Authors also point that institutionalization can also be provided by the host state.

In order to explore the relationship between the Lebanese state and Hizbullah in terms of power relation with a focus on security issues, I rely on the mediated state perspective developed by Menkhaus. Menkhaus defined a mediated state as a political order in which “the government relies on the partnership (or at least coexistence) with a diverse range of local intermediaries and rival sources of authority to provide core functions of public security, justice, and conflict management in much of the country.” In applying this notion to a Middle Eastern case study, Stel is raising the issue of the power dynamics among actors and defined mediated stateness as the result of interdependence between the State and the non-state actor(s) in the shaping of any governance. In her attempt to operationalize this concept understood as a form of governance interaction, she highlighted the formal agreements as well as the de-facto division of tasks in the realms of security, welfare and representation, by assessing warfare capacity, political and ideological resources.

Both the ‘areas of limited statehood’ and the ‘mediated state’ frameworks will help to shape the following sections of the paper. To answer my questioning, I will explore three aspects of the Hizbullah-Lebanese state relationship. First, the paper will shed a light on the origins of this type of relationship trying to understand the process of institutionalization of this
cooperation in the post-civil war era up to 2005 and how the theoretical framework deals with political changes. Second, the security and functional governance dimensions will be analysed at various levels of power and at different periods of time. It will raise the question and factors of change in the relationship and how power relations affected the form and scope of governance on the ground. Third, the paper intends to identify several variations on security issues depending on territorial or functional areas of limited statehood, notably with the examples of South and Eastern regions of Lebanon. Overall, these sections may provide with a typology of different configurations of areas of limited statehood while concluding on the importance to expand the conceptual reflection while facing the new challenges of the post-Arab uprisings in the region.

1. Origins and scope of the initial cooperation (1990-2005)

During the 15-year long period of the post-civil war era under Syrian direct political influence, South Lebanon remained and strengthened its nature as an area of limited statehood. The limited territorial control and penetration by the state in this region was so for two main reasons: first the Israeli occupation of a strip of land along the international border with the South Lebanon Army (SLA) surrogate militia and secondly, the Hizbullah military control of similar surface including all the access roads and neighborhoods environment down to the occupied zone. The state’s support to Hizbullah – its infiltrations in the occupied zone, targeted attacks on Israeli soldiers or SLA strongholds – helped the Shi’i movement to build its national legitimacy as a resistance movement against “the Zionist enemy”. Hizbullah already enjoyed a rather strong legitimacy among the Southerners and a large scope of the Shi’ites of Lebanon for its quasi welfare capacity to sustain the Shi’ites since the 1980s, mainly in the Bekaa, the South and in Beirut’s southern suburb (al-dahiyeh). A second dimension of limited statehood is encapsulated by the movement’s armed “resistance” (muqawâma). A religious argumentation based on Shi’i cultural and symbolic references shaped the armed struggle against Israel as a religious duty for every Shi’ite believer. This turned to be a powerful argument for Hizbullah to mobilise in the Shi’i neighbourhood and clearly help the party to gain support of Shi’i constituencies, already in the first legislative elections in 1992, when Hizbullah obtained 12 seats (on 128) in the Parliament. This arrangement was fruitful for the party and the armed struggle up to 2000, when Israel decided to withdraw unilaterally from the occupied zone and abandoned the local Lebanese surrogate militiamen. Hizbullah then had to re-define the scope of the armed struggle as Israel did not evacuate the “Shebaa Farms” areas, which helps to justify, in the eyes of large segments of the Lebanese population, the continuation of its armed struggle. While 2000 was symbolically one of the greatest success for Hizbullah’s armed resistance strategy toward Israel, for some Christian groups opposed to the Syrian tutelage over Lebanon, the Israeli withdrawal meant the end of Hizbullah’s legitimacy to bear weapons and signalled the public emergence of a sovereignist discourse targeting Hizbullah.

Following Krasner and Risse, the successful authority for non-state actors refers to the interactions of three variables, the legitimacy, the task(s) and the institutionalization process. In the 1990s post-war Lebanon, there is a strong agenda for the militia-cum-party to transform its military struggle on the southern front into a political leverage. And it is a fact that the internal structure of the movement knew some expansion during this decade as Hizbullah was able to take profit of the peace era in the political centre of Beirut to implant a stronger political force. The growth of Hizbullah’s apparatus is noticeable at the scale of several
municipality of the southern suburbs of Beirut as it became a major governance actor in health, education, and housing sector while being a job provider and a key supply actor for strategic resources (water, electricity, gas, oil). But in the meantime, in South Lebanon, the movement was also able to take profit from a state of war as a leverage for mobilization as well as for the legitimization of its role as a security protector of the State through the territory of the South. This can be a sort of wartime political ordering relying on its capacity to involve large segment of local inhabitants of the South, most of them being from the Shia sect. Hizbullah also gained international legitimacy as a key actor able to resist the occupation and launch attacks within the territory of the occupied zone. The successful enrolment of thousands of volunteers empowered Hizbullah in its moral and religious role and contributed to shape a “resistance society” or counter-society as the moral values at its core started to define what one started to call “the Islamic sphere” (hâla islâmîyya). Thus, one can see the national process of institutionalization that went along a growing legitimacy based on a more complex types of governance tasks mixing daily management of municipal environment and national sovereignty recovery.

As seen above, the territorial and functional dimensions of the areas of limited statehood appeared as changing processes, and the Israeli withdrawal of the occupied zone in the South changed the balance of power for Hizbullah despite the greatest victory this move was for its resistance policy. A double process of contestation of the Lebanese political order soon appeared. Firstly, in Lebanon an internal multi sectarian coalition of parties and key sectarian figures started to confront the logic of Syrian tutelage as well as the principle of a non-state armed actor threatening the Lebanese state. Symptomatically, opposition groups started to talk about Hizbullah as “a state within the state” by reference to PLO’ experience in Lebanon during the early 1970s. Secondly, an international post-11 September order leaded by US and France started to oppose to the Syrian tutelage and its Lebanese vassals (Amal, Hizbullah, SNSP, etc.) in the wake of the J.W. Bush regional strategy of “regime change” targeting rogue states. It eventually led to a UN resolution 1559 in 2004 which pointed the illegality of non-state armed groups, targeting primarily Hizbullah as a Syrian surrogate force, asking for its disband. The growing internal tensions between pro/anti Syrian Lebanese political actors led to a polarization of the political life and eventually to the assassination of the then Prime minister Rafic Hariri. Following it, massive demonstrations of 8 and 14 March 2005 respectively in support and against the Syrian tutelage over Lebanon gave a dramatic consistence to the political tension leading to the political shift during the Parliamentary elections that summer. The image of Hizbullah as a national force suffered from it and after the withdrawal of the Syrian troops in the Spring 2005, the movement decided to counterbalance the absence of state coverage in taking part to the executive power in the Council of ministers despite the fact it was under the lead of the anti-Syrian coalition of 14 March.

This change in the political order leaded to a new role for this non-state actor: becoming part of the State’s institutions. Hizbullah penetrated the State in order to keep a hand on political decisions but continued to deal with its own agenda outside the state, within perimeters, domains and continue its governance tasks towards a specific group among the Lebanese citizens, the Shi’i community. The area of limited statehood conceptual framework seems to lack theoretical resources to analyse a non-state actor group becoming part of the state governance structure while keeping an armed wing and a welfare capacity dedicated to its constituencies. The mediated state theory looks a bit more open to imagine a partnership as long as it provides a new and agreed security deal between the state and its surrounding actors and components. From this point of view, one may notice that several years were necessary to
find a new security deals among political actors, finally reached in May 2008 with the Doha conference. This agreement was the result of a major crisis of governance during which the State and Hizbullah clashed. While it appeared as a new power balance allowing the minority in the Council of Ministers to block any sensitive decisions, Berthelot underlines the paradox by saying Doha tried to make the dualist vision of the state cohabit inside the state institutions. This new type of relationship between the state and the Shi’i non-state actor needs now to be assessed.

2. The changing face of State-Hizbullah relationship

Three different examples of state-Hizbullah cooperation and competition over the functional (economic and security) dimension of the areas of limited statehood illustrate the varying relationship between the group and the Lebanese state over time: in 2000, following the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied zone; in the aftermath of the “July war” (harb tammuz) in 2006; and in 2011-2 with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s indictment as well as on the Lebanese state position towards the post-2011 Syrian civil war when facing the investment of Hizbullah in Syria. Relying on the same analytical factors – legitimacy, task, institutionalization – the three case studies underline the level of interdependency, highlighted by the mediated state framework. Moreover, the comparisons between the three cases may help to understand the different types of relationship between the State and Hizbullah and then identifying which key factors are actually affecting the form and scope of governance on the ground.

In 2000, the Lebanese state warmly welcomed the “liberation” of the South and granted Hizbullah for this success. On the day of the unilateral withdrawal of the Israeli troops, it is a fact that only Hizbullah militants surrounded by local inhabitants of various Southern villages of the occupied zone started to gather and marched toward the SLA compounds and barracks and avoided any revenge killings towards the SLA members. The liberation of prisoners by the civilians in the illegal SLA detention facility of Khiam was meant to shape the idea of the South liberated by its own people, under the supervision of Hizbullah. The absence of state actors and institutions during this process of recovery of the national territory is noticeable. In his speech on the day of the Liberation, the General Secretary of Hizbullah for the first time publicly express the political ‘moto’ that will become at the heart of its new legitimization speech, the interdependency of Hizbullah with the state and its population, three pillars that may guarantee Lebanon against any aggression. Since then, Hizbullah stick to this idea of an interdependency between the people, the state and the resistance until it became part of the Saad Hariri ministerial declaration in 2009 and was recalled as a key element for the success of the struggle against the Jihadists on the Eastern front during summer 2017. Few months after the “liberation” of the South in 2000, the President of the Republic, Emile Lahoud visited the symbolic location of the Beaufort Castle (qala’at Shqif), a medieval place held by the Israeli army and previously in the hand of the Palestinian combatants (fida’iyyin) in 1982. Lahoud left there a commemoration plaque acknowledging the state collaboration with Hizbullah (with no mention of the Lebanese army) to “liberate” the South. The institutionalization of Hizbullah in the South is the result of more than a decade of political and military involvement in Southern villages including the support to internal opposition in the occupied zone under SLA-Israeli ruling – in the late 1990s, dozens of Lebanese collaborators defected and flew to Hizbullah controlled areas. It created the conditions of the legitimacy of the Shi’i movement joining the popular demonstrations the day of the Israeli withdrawal. The large “mise en scène” of a narrative of the Liberation day with lots of film
Footages contributed to the construction of Hizbullah’s legitimacy as a component of the local population of the borderland.

For Hizbullah, the liberation of the South is also a victory for its ideological program based on the efficiency of the religious mobilisation and the armed struggle toward the occupation. It is a fact that Israeli government of Ehud Barak was pressured by the Israeli population to leave Lebanon as its human costs raised the worrying level of an average of 25 Israeli lives per year due to Hizbullah’s operations. Since 1998, Israel tried to negotiate its withdrawal against security guarantees – among them a demilitarized zone – but the Lebanese government refused any compromises. This position allowed President Emile Lahoud to refuse the recognition of the scope of the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000 and subsequently refused to deploy the national army up to the border. This state position marked by the continuation of the non-recognition of the Israeli entity eased the deployment of the Hizbullah militiamen up to the international border. It also eased a coordinated move between the State and Hizbullah regarding the Shebaa Farms area, a tiny piece of land in the in the mountainous confines of the tri-border space with Israel and Syria. Few weeks before the Israeli withdrawal, the President of the Parliament raised the issue of the Shebaa Farms, reminding the political actors with the existence of this piece of Lebanese land. Once the withdrawal was achieved, Hizbullah pointed its finger to the Shebaa Farms area that Israel did not evacuate to justify the continuation of its armed struggle. Another consequence of the Israeli withdrawal on the Lebanese sovereignty was the delineation of the Blue Line (a UN label designating the Israeli withdrawal line). In the delineation process by the UN mission, the Army special task force highlighted and documented thirteen Lebanese reservations along the Blue Line, thus defining a state position on the precise aspect of the international demarcation line with Israel.

In this first example, the power dynamics among actors shows a high level of interdependency between the state and Hizbullah. Formal arrangements and alignment in terms of representation and warfare resources seem here well organized, leaving the main role to Hizbullah with the task of sovereignty management in the former occupied zone. It is giving the impression that the areas of limited statehood have been normalized and that the governance cooperation between the state and the non-state actor is working very well. This partnership which followed formal arrangements and on-the-ground practices in security sector can be explained by the Syrian tutelage over Lebanon and its strategic agenda towards Israel. Therefore, it seems more accurate to talk about a mediated stateness than to an area of limited state capacity.

In the aftermath of the 2006 July war that saw Israel launching a 33-days war to erase Hizbullah, the relationship between the state and this non-state actor cannot be described as a cooperation but was more as a competition, a rivalry mainly between the Prime minister Siniora leading a pro-14 March government and the Shi’i movement. The national legitimacy of the latter slowly faded as the anti-Syrian movement grew in the context of a sectarian polarization of the political scene after the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005. In the same vein, the President Emile Lahud knew a delegitimization process in the aftermath of its prerogated mandate in 2004 and his involvement in the assassination of Rafic Hariri (as mentioned in the Mehlis report). Until the end of his mandate in November 2007, Emile Lahud was boycotted by Western states, by the Siniora government and was subjected to a public disgrace from the 14 March coalition which strongly undermined his capacity of action in politics. For its part, Hizbullah faced the challenge and regain a political legitimacy in shaping a new political alliance in February 2006 with the Christian Free Patriotic Movement,
FPM (al-tayyar) led by Michel Aoun. The exclusion of the FPM of the Siniora government – despite the fact it won a majority of Christian voices in election – eased the political alliance with Hizbullah and therefore revealing the new strategy of Hizbullah in the post-2005 era: expanding its influence among the Christian opposition and being part of the executive state power – to keep an eye on the post-Syrian state decisions. The Fuad Siniora government immediately raised several issues, the most sensitive one was precisely the Hizbullah weaponry. A national dialogue forum was created in early 2006 in order to bring together the leaders of each sectarian group that counts in politics to debate on a new national agreement outside any official state institution and discuss the shape of the post-Syrian state. Among them was Hassan Nasrallah who attended the first meeting early March 2006 after meditating on the mausoleum of Rafic Hariri. The eruption of the war worsened the relationship between pro and anti-Syrian actors as it hardened the point of view between 8 and 14 March parties. For the latter, Hizbullah was responsible for this war by provoking Israel with its killing and abduction of July 12, 2006. For the pro-Syrian forces, the war revealed the plot against Lebanon and Hizbullah saved the country from falling under the curse of an Israeli-Western alliance against Syria and Iran.

In the immediate aftermath of the entry into force of the cease-fire on August 14 -following the adoption by the UN Council of the resolution 1701-, the State and Hizbullah entered into a competition on various governance and sovereignty aspects. First of all, the Siniora government imposed mentioning the Shebaa Farms issue in the UN resolution 1701 as a matter of concern and further discussion under the lead of the UN General Secretary. The appearance of this topic reveals the attempt to re-take the lead over any national sovereignty issue. The claim over the Shebaa Farms territory became one of the key topics of Fuad Siniora since his appointment as Prime Minister in the fall of 2005. But despite the US sympathetic attitude toward the anti-Syrian government, Israel vetoed any change and the UN was unable (or unwilling) to acknowledge the documents (maps, land property acts) sent by the Lebanese authorities. For the UN, the Shebaa Farms were Syrian territories unless Syria was saying the contrary. In such circumstances, the mention of the Shebaa Farms in the UN resolution 1701 was seen as a victory for the Siniora government as he tried to challenge Hizbullah on the monopoly of the territorial sovereignty. Despite this symbolic gain, the Shebaa Farms territory remained until today as one of the main body of contention between Lebanon and Israel and no UN action have been taken so far in order to reassess the Lebanese claims. Hizbullah can continue to claim for this territory and use it as a legitimate battleground against Israel.

On the ground, another rivalry occurred when the assessment of the damages of the war started. The government appointed the Higher Relief Council (HCR) to take charge of the reconstruction despite the lack of experience in such matter and adopted a strategy of monetary compensation or directives to donor countries intervening in South Lebanon’s towns. At each stage of these processes, local political forces of Amal and Hizbullah were intervening with their own agenda, requests and claims, influencing the reconstruction process. Since the post-civil war era, the Amal movement under the lead of Nabih Berri as president of the Parliament was monitoring the “Council of the South” a state body dedicated to the relief and reconstruction of the Southern region of the country. According to a post-civil war agreement crafted by Iran and Syria in December 1990, Amal and Hizbullah had to share complementary state tasks in order to put an end to their political rivalry for the lead over the Shi‘i community of Lebanon. While Amal received a key role in the second republic with the Presidency of the Parliament and the management of the rebuilding of the South, Hizbullah was allowed to continue its armed struggle against Israel in the southern
borderland occupied zone, thus fighting for the state’s sovereignty. Under the Syrian post-civil war tutelage, a functional collaboration between the two Shi’i movements started and improved as their interests converged in maintaining a privileged relationship with the Syrian regime. In the context of the post-2006 war, this collaboration appeared rather clearly: while the Siniora government monitored the HCR, local municipalities in the South – most of them being either Hizbullah or Amal – were under the direct supervision of both Shi’i movements. Following the main trend of the State’s policy, Amal and the Council of the South adopted a “relief” policy in providing financial support and let Hizbullah taking the lead in most of the reconstruction processes. While these decisions took several months to be implemented, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the political Hizbullah stronghold became a central command for the movement to display its help and care for local inhabitants there and in the South. The movement mobilised its reconstruction department, Jihād al-bina, for implementing a reconstruction policy meaning being in control of the building plans up to the reconstruction companies doing the job in order to secure the whole process. Among the most salient measures taken were the street distribution of cash in the street, starting the first day after the war, to residents of the bombed southern suburbs. While the government appeared slow to help the victims of the Israeli shelling, Hizbullah played the card of the proximity and relied on its dense network of social activists and its ability to address the primary needs of the population in Beirut and in the South, regions mainly composed of its constituencies. In the reconstruction process, the arrival of several international and national actors to take part to the reconstruction / integration of the South, the Shi’i party succeeded to stay as a key actor and necessary mediator between the international donors and aid agencies (including USAID) in order to stay in control of the process but also in a clear competition with the state institutions and ministries.

As seen above, this second example shows a shift in the legitimacy of the non-state actor but no real changes in term of governance tasks. The government headed by the 14 March coalition was obviously trying to deconstruct the institutionalized position of Hizbullah and was able to recover its capacity of initiative on the international level (with UN resolution 1701 which implement and acknowledge UN resolution 1559) to raise sovereignty issue. At the national and local level on the contrary, the state failed to address as efficiently as Hizbullah the many tasks related to the reconstruction. The location of them, mostly in regions and villages under Hizbullah influence, can partly explain this failure while the lack of preparation and coordination among institutions and ministries of the state are other factors of explanation. The absence of partnership and coordination between the state and the non-state actor is clearly highlighted by the framework of the areas of limited statehood and shows the absence of any mediated state by contrast with the year 2000.

A third example refers to the dynamics of competition and cooperation between the state and Hizbullah in the aftermath of the Syrian popular uprising. As mentioned above, the 2008 Doha agreement followed by the election of a new consensual President Michel Sleiman and in 2009 by the Legislative elections put an end to instability in Lebanon. This paved the way for a new deal between the two coalitions, 8/14 March. In early 2011, Hizbullah chose to bring down the government under the lead of Saad Hariri, a prominent figure of the 14 March, as it feared the possible indictment of some of its members by the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) set up to bring light on the assassination of Saad’s father, the former Prime minister Rafic Hariri on February 14, 2005. Najib Miqati, a pro-Syrian Sunni billionaire, was then designated by the President to form a new government. In such “friendly” political affiliation of the Miqati government, Hizbullah felt more confident in facing the STL indictment of four of its members by end of June 2011, a clear blow in its image of pure and
moral political movement. As expected, none of the state security apparatus tried to launch a manhunt of any of the four men and Nasrallah himself explained in a speech that the party would never give them to the Tribunal, perceived as an “American-Israeli conspiracy”, and will “cut off the hand” of anyone who tried to. The full cooperation of the state with Hizbullah by refraining from bringing to justice the four suspects on this file shows the powerful capacity of the Shi’i movement to bypass international justice but also to have succeeded to reshape the Lebanese political order following its interests and political orientation.

The interdependency between the state and Hizbullah was confirmed one year later with the promotion of the state “dissociation policy”, thus illustrating the mediated state at another security level. Initiated by the President Michel Sleimane with the Baabda Declaration, intended to protect Lebanon from the regional turmoil, the Miqati government promoted a “dissociation policy” in June 2012. This policy was set up to put Lebanon out of the regional confrontation, presenting itself as a “neutral” actor in the Syrian conflict. With regard to the massive repression that hit the Syrian population, this posture – also manifested by an absence of condemnation of Syria by Lebanon at the Arab League Summit – allowed Hizbullah to follow its own survival strategy as it started to a military collaboration with Damascus late 2011. For its part, the ‘dissociation policy’ helped the Lebanese state to hide the pursuit of its cooperation with the Baathist regime, notably in chasing Syrian dissidents in Lebanon and deporting them to Syria (Al-Nahar, August 3, 2012). In less than one year, this “dissociation policy” appeared not sustainable and was delegitimizing and dividing the government.

As soon as the government fell after Prime minister Miqati resigned in March 2013, the political system entered in one of its starkest crisis during which none of the political coalitions were ready to make concessions. As a consequence, the Lebanese state stopped functioning and the crisis soon affected the legislative process (the Parliament chose to extend its own mandate instead of having elections in such a tensed environment), and the executive powers – on 330 days of government vacuum since March 2013 and a lack of any state’s presidency for more than two years (starting on May 25, 2014). The political vacuum opened a new security governance issue in Lebanon. While the state operated a retreat, the LAF stayed as the only national symbol of the Lebanese state and maintained their posture as a neutral actor in the political turmoil. Facing this vacuum but also the spreading the Syrian divisions between pro/anti Assad regime in Lebanon, Hizbullah openly supported Bachar el-Assad few weeks after Miqati’s resignation. The Shi’i movement justified its intervention in Syria on the pretext of avoiding the fall of Syria “in the hands of the US, Israel or the takfiris” (L’Orient le jour, May 1, 2013). It later added the goal of fighting “extremists” in Syria to keep them outside Lebanon and therefore preventing them to enter the country. As a strategic calculus, Hizbullah put on the top of its priority a collaboration, actually a mediated state, with the Syrian regime in supplying its troops in the battle of Qussayr (May 2013) and other key battles (Homs, Aleppo, etc.), thus helping the Baathist regime to overcome the insurgency and re-conquer the main Syrian cities.

Thus, Hizbullah affirmed itself as a powerful regional player, capable of supplying different regimes when its strategic interest is at stake thus highlighting its interdependency with Lebanon’s state and Syria’s regime. In a shift of perspective, space can be requalified as a manner of assessing the balance of power between states and Hizbullah: Instead of seeing the Bekaa Valley and South of Lebanon as a Syrian strategic depth, the war in Syria and the weakness of the Syrian state highlighted the possibility of analysing Syria as Hizbullah’s strategic depth. This shift appeared even more plausible when one starts to compare the
governance efficiency of Hizbullah in many domains and the lack of state’s capacity both in Lebanon and Syria. Symptomatically, in a commemoration speech on May 25, 2013, Hizbullah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah underlined the necessity for Lebanon to become a “state of resistance” to protect its citizens in such a dangerous environment. This state of resistance, explained Nasrallah, is not the military domination of the state by Hizbullah, it’s the acknowledgement of the pertinence of Hizbullah’s regional analysis. This means a full support to the Lebanese Army and state institutions that recognize the positive key role of Syria (“the backbone of the resistance”) and Iran in Lebanon’s survival in front of Israel. It already was the line of argument regarding the Lebanese state in Hizbullah’s new charter displayed in 200935 but it turns to be, in Nasrallah’s 2013 terms, a new solidarity trend due to the war in Syria, “fortifying the resistance and its backbone, fortifying Lebanon and its backbone” (Live speech on Youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHHnYwr2044). Clearly, the high legitimacy of the Shi’i movement is crucial for the efficiency of this rhetoric based most of the time on several reminders of the previous military and political successes of Hizbullah as a resistance movement.

3. Security issues: watching out South, East

Hizbullah military interventions alongside or with the diplomatic cover of the Lebanese state raised the question of their impact on security: what comes out of a collaboration between the state and a non-state actor: peaceful security or conflict risks? As seen above, there are several figures depending on geopolitical variables and moments in the history of Hizbullah’s existence as a militia, a party and a regional power. The territorial dimension is a key component of Hizbullah’s identity shaping and political growing power towards the state. In the political history of this non-state actor, the area of limited statehood is clearly territorial as it further allowed the movement to target a specific category of the population and providing goods and policies on the long-term. Two examples of this identity/legitimacy building will be highlighted in this section: the key experience in South Lebanon and the more recent investment on the Eastern border region.

First of all, one needs to keep in mind Hizbullah emerged and developed initially during the civil war as a militia and as a quasi-welfare system during the breakdown of the state in a slow process of delegitimization and absence of any power to implement decisions and provide goods to its citizens36. Although initially centred in the Bekaa Valley, the Shi’i movement then moved and implanted in South of Lebanon after Israel withdrew its army behind the “security zone”, the occupied buffer zone of South Lebanon, in June 1985. Built on a religious ideology of resistance aiming at waging war against the occupation and erecting an Islamic republic in Lebanon, Hizbullah’s invested itself into the shaping of a Shi’i Islamic society, seeing itself as a revolutionary movement – on the model of the Iranian Islamic revolution – and therefore provided the Southerners (most of them Shi’ites) basic welfare resources like water and food, housing, health care and financial support for those involved in the party. Within five years and up to the end of the civil war in 1990, Hizbullah have created strong ties that bounded the movement with the local Shi’i southerners37.

The rebirth of the Lebanese state thanks to the Ta’if agreement and the Syrian indirect ruling of the country did not mean the immediate return of the state in the South. Like most of the civil society in Lebanon at that time, everyone organized its life thanks to local support and private transnational (family) funding. The return of the state in the South like in many parts of the country was very slow and its liberal economic trend made it rather limited. Thus the
territorial dimension overlapped a function dimension of the areas of limited statehood: Hizbullah continued to provide services, health care and supply to the population in the South like a quasi-welfare system. Like other sectarian groups in the society, the party expanded its scope of governance and developed its own schools, universities, medical centres, medias, associations, youth movements, NGOs, etc. as a whole environment bound by religious values and political commitment to the resistance ideology. Tehran and Damascus put the Lebanese elites in front of a new post-war division of tasks in terms of state governance between the secular Amal, the other Shi’i movement, and Hizbullah. While the latter received the duty to defend the South and continue its armed struggle toward the Israeli to recover the occupied land, Amal movement, an old and strong ally of the Baathist regime, received the civil governance resources for the South, namely the creation of the Council of the South, under the lead of Amal leader and President of Parliament, Nabih Berri. At odds during the last years of the 1980s, the two Shi’i parties shaped a close collaboration in the South under the Syrian strategic vision thus allowing Hizbullah to dedicated most of its resources to its armed struggle. One can define this collaboration as a mediated state or a successful territorial and function cooperation in the area of limited statehood.

The content of this collaboration policy between the state and the non-state actor needs to be detailed in order to qualify the type of effects it produced on its environment. Hizbullah strategic agenda historically pushed for a confrontation with the Israeli troops and surrogate SLA militia. And it is a fact that during the 1990s, the policy of harassment, abductions and armed operations inside or on the verge of the occupied zone pushed the Israeli army to retaliate brutally, shelling villages, UN compound, and caused heavy casualties and mass displacement in Lebanon, particularly in 1993 (Operation Accountability) and 1996 (Operation Grapes of Wrath). On the other hand, one must underline the side effects of such operations: An international pressure to regulate and limit the confrontation to the occupied zone, the set up of an international observatory group and finally the pressure of the Israeli civil society on its political leaders to withdraw their troops from Lebanon (achieved in May 2000). The unilateral Israeli withdrawal was a testimony of the persistence of the political antagonism and raised the issue of the peace period that followed. While Hizbullah continued its cross-border operations and abductions in order to follow its prisoners exchanges policy until the 2006 war, the region of South Lebanon have been extremely peaceful when compare to the previous period. This evaluation also need to take into account the war effects with the reinforced presence of the blue helmets following the UN resolution 1701, the deployment of the state’s army in the South after 29 years of absence and the subsequent withdrawal of Hizbullah militiamen and their weaponry.

Hizbullah’s acceptance of this UN resolution was a significant step in the peace building process in South Lebanon. First it legitimized the UN mission as well as acknowledged the presence of the Lebanese army and therefore the return of the state in its fiefdom. Secondly, Hizbullah’s attitude towards the UN troops progressively shifted from tensed to cool since 2006, allowing a new type of collaboration along the Blue Line, monitored by the UN with the creation of a tripartite committee bringing together the Lebanese and Israeli army officers alongside the UN mission command. In 2012, Israelis and Lebanese agreed on the erection of a wall on a segment of the Blue Line near Kfar Kila and showed a daily collaboration between UN-Lebanese Army-Hizbullah in the demolition of the technical fence and the building of the wall. The Shi’i movement never objected this process of marking the Blue Line as a process intending to avoid any misunderstanding on the location of the borderline. In fact this marking process is not contradictory with the continuation of its institutionalization as a deterrence actor toward Israel. After the 2000 withdrawal, the core
territorial contestation on the border is located in the Shebaa Farms still under Israeli occupation thus justifying Hizbullah weaponry and resistance strategy – in other words the core elements of its very existence as a powerful actor. Neither its tasks, nor the legitimization of this non-state actor are affected by the erection of the Blue Line as long as a zone of confrontation persist as illustrated by Hizbullah’s attack targeting an Israeli military patrol in the Shebaa Farms area in January 2016 in retaliation of the killing of Iranian and Hizbullah officers near the Golan Heights few days earlier (L’Orient le Jour, January 29, 2015).

The previous example tends to show a disturbing “interest for war” of Hizbullah. However, another recent example may also highlight another side of the core interest of Hizbullah nowadays, signalling its slow change of perspective since 1990. Since 2011, the Eastern border of Lebanon, mainly the barren land (jurd) of Arsal, a mountainous area of the anti-Liban linked to the Qalamoun mountainous region on the Syrian side, became a smuggling area and a refuge for Syrian insurgents. In the summer 2014, near the village of Arsal and a giant refugee camp for Syrians, a group of 700 jihadists of al-Qaëda’s local branch of Jahbat al-Nusra (the forerunner of Hayat Tahrir al Sham) alongside militiamen of the Islamic State (IS) arrived from the Qalamoun region and stormed LAF positions and took hostages among troops. In the following month, an implicit collaboration between Hizbullah (on the Syrian side) and LAF (on the Lebanese side) started to squeeze, surrounded and corner the jihadists in the mountainous area. But on the ground, it appeared that while LAF was trying to negotiate to free its captured soldiers in 2014 and 2015, Hizbullah launched several assaults against the jihadists with a full (pro-Hizbullah) media coverage43.

Taking opportunity of this border security emergency, Hizbullah presented its mobilisation against IS as a national duty to protect the Lebanese sovereignty at its eastern borders. Its mobilisation started to involve the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, created in 1998 to gather pro-Hizbullah non-Shi’i combatants. A Hizbullah informant explained: “Its (the Brigades) objective was initially to make the resistance against Israel a national resistance, not just a Shiite resistance.” (Al-Monitor, August 27, 2014). The Shi’i movement explain also the recent recruitment of young Christians in the Bekaa in these Brigades since 2012 as part of a reflection on the limited combatants reservoir the Shi’ites may have in front of IS’s larger Sunni reservior. Therefore, since autumn 2014, Hizbullah deployed a larger mobilisation in Lebanon – its military operations in Syria brought the internal recruitment process under pressure – following the crisis in Arsal but also the suicide attacks and car bombs that targeted the Beirut Shi’i suburbs in 2013 and 2014.

During the summer 2017, the jihadists of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Islamic State were surrounded by the LAF, Hizbullah and Syrian Army on both side of the border. The military campaign that went on in July-August must be analyse carefully as it shows different aspects of the territorial and functions (security) dimensions of the area of limited statehood. Since the election of the new Lebanese President Michel Aoun, a new era of cooperation between the State and Hizbullah at the political level seemed to have brought Lebanon back on track of the Doha agreement deal. In such an environment, the LAF has to acknowledge the military action of Hizbullah and may develop a closer collaboration on the ground, contrary to the previous years when Hizbullah followed its own agenda. Moreover, for the LAF, the upcoming battle with the jihadists on the Eastern front was an opportunity to showcase its new capabilities to its international backers (US, UK, France and more recently Saudi Arabia) after a decade of support. Due to the political opposition to Hizbullah of all these states, any cooperation between LAF and Hizbullah cannot be revealed without risking the withdrawal of their support to the LAF.
In this sense, the unilateral decision of Hizbullah to lead the first phase of the confrontation with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in the South of Arsal followed a double agenda: first, highlighting its military efficiency in the defense of Lebanon’s national sovereignty and secondly, sending a message to the international backers of the LAF. Therefore, once the jihadists were repelled from Arsal region by the end of July, the General secretary of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, declared that the Shi’i movement was “at the service of the LAF” for any further confrontation with the Islamic State militants then still occupying a 46 square miles area in the Jurd of Arsal and Qalamoun (Al Manar, August 4, 2017). In order to avoid any further problem with its backers, the LAF clearly stated that there was no coordination neither with Hizbullah nor with the Syrian Army when they began the second phase of the offensive “Fajr al-Jurd” on 20 August 2017. The fact is that on both side of the border, the LAF and Hizbullah moved and squeezed the Islamic State jihadists the same day. Symbolically, the success of this offensive was granted to the LAF and promoted in the medias (Al-Monitor, September 15, 2017).

The functional dimension of the area of limited statehood is here at stake: several observers acknowledged the skills and military capacities of the LAF in its manoeuvres during this operation thus underlining the fact that the LAF do not need Hizbullah anymore to secure the Lebanese state. Nevertheless, on the ground, the reality of the power balance appeared as soon as the jihadists were cornered: Hizbullah negotiated their surrender and the return of the dead bodies of the remaining Lebanese troops as well as the liberation of Hizbullah fighters (L’Orient le Jour, September 14, 2017) in exchange of their safe transfer to Deir el-Zor, a city at that time still in the hands of the Islamic State. The capacity to make this deal showed the powerful role of Hizbullah as a mediator between Lebanon and the Syrian regime who agreed to let the jihadists cross the country. In his speech delivered upon this military victory and during the negotiation with the Islamic State and with Damascus, Hassan Nasrallah underlined the importance to secure a strong partnership with Syria in order to avoid any other jihadist threat on the border, and called for a normalisation of the relationship between Beirut and Damascus (L’Orient le jour, 25 August, 2017). In the aftermath of this battle, the Lebanese President of the Republic acknowledged the key role of Hizbullah as a guarantor of Lebanon’s security and as a part of the global peace solution in the region. For the head of the Lebanese state, this collaboration with Hizbullah is fruitful and cannot cease as long as there are threats posed by Israel (Al-Monitor interview, September 21, 2017).

**Conclusion**

This paper aimed to explore the changing competitive/cooperative relationship between the Lebanese state and Hizbullah since 2005 onwards, with a strong focus on a territorial and functional illustration of the areas of limited statehood. The territorial dimension of ALS in Lebanon refers to the status of the southern and eastern part of the country while the functional dimension to the provision by both the state and Hizbullah of economic and security goods for the Lebanese society. The article has shown how, across different historical moments, the equilibrium between the two actors has changed and how the ideological orientation of the actors in place in state’s key position in the government, at the Presidency of the Republic or as the Speaker of the Parliament shaped the intensity of their cooperative/competitive dynamics.
Krasner and Risse provided with three conceptual tools to assess the type of relationship developed between the state and a non-state actor. Based on the legitimacy, the tasks and the institutionalisation of the non-state actor, we have seen in the second section of the paper how these tools are able to highlight the various combinations they compose in order to understand where are the strengths and weaknesses of the non-state actor. In the case of Hizbullah, the comparison of three different historical periods in its relationship with the Lebanese state showed how strong the continuation of the complex tasks of delivering governance goods to a significant segment of the Shi’i society framed by the party’s constituency and the Islamic sphere (hâla islâmiyya) its values shaped. In the meantime, the comparison also highlighted the variation of the movement’s legitimacy, which can reach a low level at the scale of the whole Lebanese nation. Moreover, the indicator of the institutionalisation of the non-state actor underscored the government’s strategy to challenge Hizbullah, notably in the aftermath of the 2006 war, with the return of the state apparatus in South Lebanon and the withdrawal of Hizbullah’s weaponry, following the UN resolution 1701.

Provided as an analytical tool to complete the ALS tools, the Menkhaus framework of the “mediated stateness” seems to better highlights the understanding of changes in the relationship between the state and the non-state actor in assessing the nature of the interdependency between them. This perspective appeared of high interest in assessing high level cooperation through formal governance arrangements and on-the-ground practices in the realms of security, welfare and representation. Examples are rather interesting during the Syrian tutelage era and after the Doha agreement (2008). The latest political developments in Lebanon, particularly the nomination of Michel Aoun, a political ally of Hizbullah, as the new President also provide with more examples of renewed cooperation and interdependency on security issues on the Eastern borderland region, having impacted on the security dimension. In the meantime, we have seen in the latter example the importance of external actors (regional states and powers) when it comes to the security sector. Their support to the LAF is linked to the promotion of a certain definition of the Lebanese state, clear of any Hizbullah interference. In this view, the turning point has been the year 2005 following the Syrian withdrawal of Lebanon and a new state governance led by the anti-Syrian coalition of 14 March with the support of western powers. The various security governance dynamics showed different configuration of ALS since then. The territorial dimension is often not separated from the functional one as seen in Southern and Eastern borderland regions.

In the post-2011 era, after the eruption of the Syrian uprising and war, a polarized national environment brought back sectarian affiliations as key identity in politics. The blocking of the state with the governance crisis, until the presidential election of October 2016, gave Hizbullah the opportunity to affirm its territorial grip on Lebanon’s eastern border. In the meantime, it also expanded the functional dimension of ALS at the national level when it comes to security issues as illustrated with its stands alongside the Syrian regime in 2013 (in order to prevent the spreading of the jihadists in Lebanon) and its promotion of a new security partnership with the Syrian regime in 2017. Beyond a binary opposition with the LAF or the state apparatus, the case study of Hizbullah / Lebanese state highlighted the many configurations a non-state actor can develop within the margins and the realms of the state.

Notes
Joseph Maila talked about "un Etat-trepied" highlighting the emergence of three centers of power in a possible rivalry at the head of the state as a consequence of the Taïf agreement. See Maila, "L’accord de Taïf deux ans après".

Risse, “Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited Statehood”, 9-12.

Ibid., 9

Krasner and Risse, “External actors, state-building…”, 547.

Menkhaus, “Governance without Government…”, 78.

Stel Nora Marie. “Mediated stateness as a continuum…», 2-5.


Krasner and Risse, *ibid*.

As stated in the Memorandum of Understanding following the 1996 Israeli operation «Grapes of Wrath». See Hollis and Shehadi, *Lebanon on Hold*, 40.

Harb, *Le Hezbollah à Beyrouth…*., 145.

Berthelot, « Quelle avenir… », 142.

Krasner and Risse, *ibid*.

Norton, *Hezbollah…*, 118.

Khatib, Matar and Alshaer, *The Hizbullah Phenomenon*, 73.


The plaque reads ‘On 24 May 2000, the dawn of liberation broke (bazagha fajr al-tahrir) in the era of the President of the Republic, General Emile Lahoud’. See Volk, « When Memory repeats itself… », 304.

Meier, *Shaping Lebanon’s borderlands*.


Favier, « la spirale de la crise… », 15.


For detailed examples, see Al-Harithy, ed. *Lessons in Post-War…*, chapter 2.

Lamloum, « retour sur les traces… », 222.

Chapuis, « La reconstruction post-2006… », 38.

Geisser, « ‘The People want the Army’ : is the Lebanese Army… ».

Finally, the opposite just happened few months later when the jihadists started to target the Shi’i suburbs of Beirut and the Iranian Embassy.


El-Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State…*


Lamloum, « L’histoire sociale du Hezbollah… ».


Norton, *ibid*.

While some of the heavy weaponry have been transfered in central regions of the country, several UN crackdowns in private houses unveiled hidding places of Hizbullah’s weapons in southern villages.

Meier, *ibid*., 199-201.

Blanford, « The Lebanese Armed Forces… ».

Interviewed by Blanford, *ibid*.

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