The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games
Nobuyuki Hanaki
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 970714
Angela Sutan
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 8831
- IdHAL : angela-sutan
- ORCID : 0000-0001-6925-0970
- IdRef : 059609753
Marc Willinger
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 170514
- IdHAL : marc-willinger
- ORCID : 0000-0001-5880-3453
- IdRef : 029203651
Résumé
Recent experimental studies have shown that observed outcomes deviate significantly more from the Nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than when they are strategic substitutes. This "strategic environment effect" offers promising insights into the aggregate consequences of interactions among heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, but its macroeconomic implications have been questioned because the underlying experiments involve a small number of agents. We studied beauty contest games with a unique interior Nash equilibrium to determine the critical group size for triggering the strategic environment effect, and we use both theory and experiments to shed light on its effectiveness. Based on cognitive hierarchy and level-K models, we show theoretically that the effect is operative for interactions among three or more agents. Our experimental results show a statistically significant strategic environment effect for groups of five or more agents, establishing its robustness against the increase in the population size.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
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Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
Recent experimental studies have shown that observed outcomes deviate significantly more from the Nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than when they are strategic substitutes. This "strategic environment effect" offers promising insights into the aggregate consequences of interactions among heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, but its macroeconomic implications have been questioned because the underlying experiments involve a small number of agents. We studied beauty contest games with a unique interior Nash equilibrium to determine the critical group size for triggering the strategic environment effect, and we use both theory and experiments to shed light on its effectiveness. Based on cognitive hierarchy and level-K models, we show theoretically that the effect is operative for interactions among three or more agents. Our experimental results show a statistically significant strategic environment effect for groups of five or more agents, establishing its robustness against the increase in the population size.
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Titre |
en
The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games
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Auteur(s) |
Nobuyuki Hanaki
1
, Yukio Koriyama
2
, Angela Sutan
3
, Marc Willinger
4
1
GREDEG -
Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion
( 185786 )
- GREDEG - Bâtiment 2 - Campus Azur du CNRS - 250 rue Albert Einstein - CS 10269 - F
06905 SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS Cedex
- France
2
X-DEP-ECO -
Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique
( 444480 )
- École Polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex
- France
3
BSB -
Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)
( 336963 )
- 29 Rue Sambin-BP50608
21006 Dijon Cedex
FRANCE
- France
4
CEE-M -
Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010
( 532853 )
- 2 Place Viala
INRA - MSA
34060 Montpellier Cedex 2
- France
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Audience |
Internationale
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Date de publication électronique |
2018-11
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Comité de lecture |
Oui
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Vulgarisation |
Non
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Nom de la revue |
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Date de publication |
2019
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Volume |
113
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Page/Identifiant |
587-610
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Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Référence interne |
|
Collaboration/Projet |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
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Projet(s) ANR |
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Domaine(s) |
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Mots-clés |
en
beauty contest games, iterative reasoning, strategic substitutability, strategic complementarity
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DOI | 10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.006 |
UT key WOS | 000462110900034 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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