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, The two main approaches are the 'theory-theory' and the 'simulation theory'. See Larrouy and Lecouteux (2017) and Guala (2018) for a brief presentation and a discussion in a game theoretical context

, ii In addition to the points discussed here, see also Mariotti (1995, 1997) on the problems of extending Savage's axioms to game theory

, model of 'motivationally salient properties', with a restriction to lexicographic weighing relations over property combinations, iii A conceptually related framework would be Dietrich and List, 2009.

, it is very likely that the small world representation of a player may fail to take into account some important features of the problem. In the case of Brexit, we can mention for instance the property of 'deterrence'-that the UK fails to recognise as salient for the EU-or the 'status of Northern Ireland', which has been set aside in our small world representation. The players may also be unaware of some strategies, pp.2018-2037

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