A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise

Joseph M. Abdou (1, 2) , Hans Keiding (3)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 PSE - Paris School of Economics
3 UCPH - University of Copenhagen = Københavns Universitet

We view political activity as an interaction between forces seeking to achieve a political agenda. The viability of a situation depends on the compatibility of such agendas. However even in a conflictual situation a compromise may be possible. Mathematically a political structure is modeled as a simplical complex and a viable configuration as a simplex. A represented compromise is a viable configuration obtained by the withdrawal of some agents in favor of some friendly representatives. A delegated compromise is a sophisticated version of a compromise obtained by the iteration of the withdrawal process. Existence of such solutions depends on the discrete topology of the simplicial complex. In particular we prove that the existence of a delegated compromise is equivalent to the strong contractibility of the simplicial complex.

Mots clés: Delegation; compromise; simplicial complex; contiguity; strong homotopy

Domaines: Economies et finances; Science politique; Topologie algébrique [math.AT]

Joseph M. Abdou, Hans Keiding. A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise. 2018. ⟨halshs-01910038⟩