La cartellisation des partenaires sociaux français : L’exemple de la réforme du financement syndical

Abstract : Alongside representatives of French employers, trade unions professionals form a cartel in the same way that some political parties are cartelised. These trade unions fight each other for the conquest of power but they also agree to make it almost impossible to create new unions. They share public and institutional resources and agree to maintain their power, resources and control over a large number of institutions, managed on a joint basis with employers' organisations. In 2014, this cartel obtained the creation of a tax on wages and salaries. The cartel members share the benefit of this tax without having to account for the use of these sums. This tax, and various subsidies, are the main resources of French trade unions and is considerably more significant than the dues collected from their members whose numbers are constantly dwindling. This system allows a discreet deregulation of French industrial relations but opens the door to a clear risk of corruption.
Document type :
Book sections
Complete list of metadatas

https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01847651
Contributor : Dominique Labbé <>
Submitted on : Monday, July 23, 2018 - 4:55:38 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 17, 2019 - 4:59:46 PM

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : halshs-01847651, version 1

Collections

Citation

Dominique Andolfatto, Dominique Labbé. La cartellisation des partenaires sociaux français : L’exemple de la réforme du financement syndical. Andolfatto Dominique. La démocratie sociale en tension, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, pp.67 - 83, 2018, 978-2-7574-2299-1. ⟨halshs-01847651⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

71