, 0001) 0.002*** (0.00005) Gestational age 22-35 weeks -0.0919*** (0.0094) -0.0543*** (0.0085) -0

, ) -0.042*** (0.001) Number of previous C-sections 0.2729*** (0.0018) 0) Postal code income per person -6, Act, pp.8-10

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