Group Targeting under Networked Synergies

Mohamed Belhaj (1) , Frédéric Deroïan (1)

1 AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques

A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We consider bilateral public contracts à la Segal (1999). The paper shows that the synergies between contracting and non-contracting agents deeply impact optimal contracts: they can lead the principal to contract with a subset of the agents, and to refrain from contracting with central agents.

Mots clés: multi-agent contracting; network; synergies; aggregate effort; optimal group targeting

Domaines: Economies et finances

Mohamed Belhaj, Frédéric Deroïan. Group Targeting under Networked Synergies. 2018. ⟨halshs-01790947⟩