La coordination par le marché dans Social Choice and Individual Values : mérites normatifs ou mérites techniques ?

Abstract : The paper tries to clarify the status of the market in Social Choice and Individual Values. It shows how Arrow at first intended to propose a third theorem of welfare economics (Feldman [1991]), which would show that the market achieves not only Pareto-optimality, but also equitable social allocations. The impossibility theorem proves this is impossible. Arrow’s solution to impossibility is interpreted here as a further limitation of the market’s objectives. At the end of the book, the market is presented as a technical mechanism that guarantees economic efficiency, if it doesn’t take individual values into consideration.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01744985
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Submitted on : Tuesday, March 27, 2018 - 6:31:30 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, February 7, 2019 - 2:22:30 PM

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Irène Berthonnet, Vincent Desreumaux. La coordination par le marché dans Social Choice and Individual Values : mérites normatifs ou mérites techniques ?. Cahiers d'Economie Politique = Papers in political economy, L'Harmattan, 2014, 66 (1), pp.95-126. ⟨impossibility theorem welfare economics values social welfare function economic efficiency⟩. ⟨10.3917/cep.066.0095⟩. ⟨halshs-01744985⟩

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