Optimal Deterrence of Cooperation

Abstract : We introduce axiomatically a new solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility inspired by the core. While core solution concepts have investigated the sustainability of cooperation among players, our solution concept, called contraction core, focuses on the deterrence of cooperation. The main interest of the contraction core is to provide a monetary measure of the robustness of cooperation into the grand coalition. We motivate this concept by providing optimal fine imposed by competition authorities for the dismantling of cartels in oligopolistic markets. We characterize the contraction core on the set of balanced cooperative games with transferable utility by four axioms: the two classic axioms of non-emptiness and individual rationality, a superadditivity principle and a new axiom of consistency.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, A Paraître
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Soumis le : lundi 11 décembre 2017 - 15:30:08
Dernière modification le : mercredi 17 janvier 2018 - 11:48:04


  • HAL Id : halshs-01660957, version 1


Stéphane Gonzalez, Aymeric Lardon. Optimal Deterrence of Cooperation. International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, A Paraître. 〈halshs-01660957〉



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