Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection
Résumé
We consider an infinitely-repeated principal–agent relationship run with stationary contracts. The agent has private information on his persistent cost parameter and, under limited enforcement, both parties can breach the contract. The optimal stationary contract with limited enforcement is made of two distinct pieces. For the most efficient types of the agent, the contract entails bunching with a fixed payment and a fixed output. For less efficient types, the contract exhibits downward output distortions below the Baron–Myerson level that would have been achieved had enforcement been costless.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection
|
Résumé |
en
We consider an infinitely-repeated principal–agent relationship run with stationary contracts. The agent has private information on his persistent cost parameter and, under limited enforcement, both parties can breach the contract. The optimal stationary contract with limited enforcement is made of two distinct pieces. For the most efficient types of the agent, the contract entails bunching with a fixed payment and a fixed output. For less efficient types, the contract exhibits downward output distortions below the Baron–Myerson level that would have been achieved had enforcement been costless.
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Auteur(s) |
David Martimort
1, 2
, Aggey Semenov
3
, Lars Stole
4
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1171428 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
University of Ottawa [Ottawa]
( 237693 )
- 75 Laurier Avenue East, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5
- Canada
4
Booth School of Business [Chicago]
( 219707 )
- États-Unis
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2017-10
|
Volume |
159
|
Page/Identifiant |
18-22
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Contract enforcement, Optimal control, Adverse selection, Stationary contract
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.007 |
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