Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
Jean-François Laslier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 10499
- IdHAL : jean-francois-laslier
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8334-1350
- IdRef : 069975124
Carlos Pimienta
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 784716
- ORCID : 0000-0003-1665-0086
Résumé
In the Approval Bargaining game, two players bargain over a finite set of alternatives. To this end, each one simultaneously submits a utility function u jointly with a real number α; by doing so she approves the lotteries whose expected utility according to u is at least α. The lottery to be implemented is randomly selected among the most approved ones. We first prove that there is an equilibrium where players truthfully reveal their utility function. We also show that, in any equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome is approved by both players. Finally, every equilibrium is sincere and Pareto efficient as long as both players are partially honest.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
|
Résumé |
en
In the Approval Bargaining game, two players bargain over a finite set of alternatives. To this end, each one simultaneously submits a utility function u jointly with a real number α; by doing so she approves the lotteries whose expected utility according to u is at least α. The lottery to be implemented is randomly selected among the most approved ones. We first prove that there is an equilibrium where players truthfully reveal their utility function. We also show that, in any equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome is approved by both players. Finally, every equilibrium is sincere and Pareto efficient as long as both players are partially honest.
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Auteur(s) |
Jean-François Laslier
1, 2
, Matias Nunez
3, 4, 5
, Carlos Pimienta
6
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
Université Paris Dauphine-PSL
( 300302 )
- Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny
75775 PARIS Cedex 16
- France
4
LAMSADE -
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision
( 989 )
- Place de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16
- France
5
PSL -
Université Paris Sciences et Lettres
( 564132 )
- 60 rue Mazarine 75006 Paris
- France
6
UNSW -
University of New South Wales [Sydney]
( 74661 )
- High St
Kensington, Sydney, NSW 2052
- Australie
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2017-07
|
Volume |
104
|
Page/Identifiant |
241-251
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Approval voting, Bargaining, Partial honesty, Consensual equilibrium
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.002 |
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