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The Navy and the City. Conflict, cooperation and political competition in the urban governance of Toulon

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8 **Francesca ARTIOLI**
9 **The Navy and the City. Conflict, cooperation and political**
10 **competition in the urban governance of Toulon.**

11

12 ***Abstract***

13 This article contributes to the debate about urban governance in specialised European cities,
14 by focusing on the interplay between changes in national defence policies and local
15 initiatives. The paper is based upon qualitative research carried out in Toulon, a mid-sized
16 French city and the biggest military port on the Mediterranean Sea. Firstly, it explains how
17 the emergence of a new urban agenda aimed at diversifying the city from its military function
18 challenged existing relations between the city and the Navy. As a consequence, new areas of
19 conflict and cooperation can be observed. Secondly, it shows how political strategies adopted
20 by elected officials respond to the need to legitimise the new agenda and to constrain the
21 Navy to participate in it, while managing the military constituency. Despite a political
22 discourse that proclaimed convergence of interest between the city and the Navy, the
23 existence of a major conflict concerning the use and control of space doomed the partnership
24 to a (partial) failure.

25 **Keywords:** urban governance, political competition, policy failure, defence policies,
26 Toulon, Navy

27

28 *Introduction*

29 Current literature on European cities underlines that a proper understanding of the
30 dynamics of urban change needs to address not only the effects of economic change (the
31 various forms of spatial restructuring of capitalism) or interactions between local organized
32 groups and the political sphere, but also the effects of central government activities and
33 national policies, which play an essential role in steering urbanisation processes and leading
34 economic development (Le Galès, 2003; Haussermann, Haila, 2004; Giersig, 2008).

35 In a period of reorganisation of nation States, refocusing attention on changes in national
36 policies offers interesting insights on the ways resources and power are redistributed among
37 different level of governments, and on the consequences these changes have for cities
38 (considered as localised societies and political systems). The existing literature deals with the
39 urban consequences of welfare state reforms (Kazepov, 2005, 2010), and of metropolitan
40 development policies (Béhar, Estèbe 1999; Brenner, 2003), but there is a significant lack of
41 research on central government prerogatives and policies, namely defence policies.

42 This article contributes to the debate about urban governance and the mechanisms for
43 urban change. It focuses on the interplay between, on the one hand, transformations in
44 national defence policies and their effects at the urban level, and on the other hand, local
45 initiatives and political regulation. History shows that the fabric of European cities has been
46 influenced by the creation of military infrastructures, and that defence strategies have
47 contributed to the shaping of the geography of urban growth and decline (Hohenberg, Lees,
48 1995). In European countries defence expenditure is still between 1.5% and 2.5% of GDP
49 (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2010, for Europe 15), Ministries of Defence remain
50 among the biggest administrative bodies, and are the foremost owners of public real estate.
51 However, since the end of the Cold War, defence policies in European countries have been
52 changing, in terms of both their goals and how they are organised. After the high spending of

53 the 1980s, expenditures shrank in the 1990s and then stabilised in the 2000s (with national
54 differences corresponding to the degree of participation in the Afghanistan and Iraqi wars).
55 Intervention outside national territories became the main task for professionalised military
56 organisations. Furthermore, the geography of defence policies has changed. At the national
57 level, spatial reorganisation of armed forces within the national space entailed the
58 restructuring and/or the closedown of several military sites. This is particularly true for
59 countries in continental Europe, whose military geography was previously determined by the
60 East-West confrontation. These transformations can also be considered in terms of their
61 effects on local communities. National policies and government spending in all its various
62 forms (wages, pensions, military procurement, infrastructures, etc.) contribute to the
63 structuring of local economies and societies over time. Changes in the institutional resources
64 and economic weight of the military administration therefore have consequences in those
65 urban settings where these influence how the local society is organised.

66 This paper presents the case study of Toulon, the biggest military port on the
67 Mediterranean Sea, a mid-sized European city with around 170,000 inhabitants located in the
68 touristic French Riviera, and the central municipality of a metropolitan area of 400,000
69 inhabitants. Toulon was chosen for this case study because of the military specialisation of the
70 city. Indeed, the Navy has made a contribution to the structuring of urban development over
71 time, and is a relevant urban institutional actor in terms of employment, landholding and
72 political sway. The theoretical framework developed to analyse urban policies in Toulon
73 conceptualises this city as a *specialised European city*. Urban studies have investigated
74 specialised cities, mostly industrial cities and port-cities. Here, new forms of partnership
75 between local governments and economic interests have developed in response to economic
76 and political change (Section 1). Drawing on this research and their results, this paper focuses
77 on urban policies in Toulon, in order to analyse the interplay between State restructuring and

78 urban governance and to provide insights on local political responses to changes in nation
79 State policies. The way the empirical object is constructed therefore makes Toulon a relevant
80 case study for two complementary dimensions of urban change: 1. Toulon as a *military city in*
81 *times of State restructuring*, and where changing relations between local governments and the
82 military administration can be observed; 2. Toulon as a *specialized specialised European city*,
83 whose mechanisms of change are compared to those observed in other specialised cities (city-
84 ports and one-company towns).

85 The analysis of the evolution of the relationship between the Navy and the local
86 government allows explaining a pivotal period for urban change in Toulon. Two empirical
87 results are pointed out. The first is that the shrinkage of the contribution of defence activities
88 to the local development, along with the consolidation of national policies of decentralisation
89 and for metropolitan development, opened a window of opportunity for a new policy agenda.
90 The Mayor elected in 2001 promoted an urban agenda aimed at greatly increasing the
91 diversification of the city from its military function. This represented a challenge to existing
92 relations between the Navy and the city, and created new areas of conflict and cooperation
93 between urban elites. The second result is that, in order to understand the political strategies
94 designed both to legitimise and to constrain the mobilisation of the Navy in a local
95 development project, two factors must be taken into account: on the one hand, the material
96 and political resources available to the relevant actors; and on the other hand, the need for
97 elected officials to avoid alienating the military constituency and the consequent electoral
98 sanctions that this might have. Despite a political discourse that proclaimed convergence of
99 interest between the city and the Navy, the existence of a major conflict concerning the use
100 and control of space doomed the partnership to a (partial) failure.

101

102

103 **1. *Urban change in specialised cities: theoretical perspectives for the study of Toulon***

104 In the example this article studies, the Navy is an actor with authority and management
105 over significant resources in the city, external to urban government. Resources are defined
106 here as all those elements which can be used by actors in the policy process (Hassenteufel,
107 2008: 105). In this sense, resources are both material (expenditure and investment capacity,
108 land, organisational capacity, and know-how) and political (representativeness and
109 legitimacy). Interests and resources evolve in time, and both contribute to shape the strategies
110 of the actors in the policy process (Hassenteufel, 2008: 105). In pursuing an understanding of
111 urban policies in the city, reference needs to be made to theories that address two central
112 questions. Firstly, there is the relevance here of those theories which address the issue of
113 relations between urban governments and those actors who control relevant resources in
114 cities, and more precisely the theories that focus on cities specialised in certain activities. The
115 second field of research is the one that explores how relations among actors have been
116 changing during recent decades in European urban policies. This twofold approach provides
117 an explanation both as to how urban governance is conceptualised in the present case study
118 and also how the case of Toulon, a mid-sized military city, fits within existing research on
119 European cities and can be compared to its results.

120 **a. *Who governs in specialised cities?***

121 One of the main contributions classical middle-range theories of urban policies – *regime*
122 *theory* (Stone, 1989) and *urban growth coalitions* (Logan, Molotch, 1987) – brought to the
123 discipline was to underline that urban policies have to be understood beyond local
124 government action. Because these theories originated in the U.S.A., their applicability to
125 European cases is strongly debatable (Harding, 1991; Stoker, Mossberger, 1994; Le Galès,
126 1995), mostly because they incorporate assumptions about the role of the state and the market
127 in urban policies. Indeed, they do not fit the political economy nor the institutional design of

128 cities in Europe, where the state and the public sector in general have played a greater and
129 more sustained role in the organisation of urban societies. However, these theories orientated
130 urban research toward the study of coalitions between local governments and those actors
131 who occupy a strategic place in the definition of policy priorities, precisely because of their
132 control of relevant resources. From a different perspective, the European sociological tradition
133 analyses city governments and social regulation processes in cities which are specialised in
134 certain activities (one-company towns, city-ports, etc.). Instead of “who governs?” the main
135 question here concerns how social and political orders are constructed and maintained in
136 “localised societies” (Bagnasco, 1986), where a particular kind of activity or economic
137 organisation is dominant in the economic sphere (Pizzorno, 1960; Bagnasco, 1986). The
138 starting point for this kind of research is to assess how specific and localised activities
139 contribute to the structuring of the social organisation of the city. Thereafter, they focus on
140 how the State, the market and relations of cooperation/reciprocity interplay in producing and
141 sustaining a localised social organisation. In other words, they focus on regulation, which is
142 defined as the existence of a relatively stabilised system of coordination of different activities,
143 resource allocation and conflict solving between actors (Lange, Regini, 1989). A prominent
144 example is the study made by Arnaldo Bagnasco of the city of Turin in the 1980s, focused on
145 FIAT, the automotive company which has had a leading role in local development since the
146 beginning of the 20th century. Bagnasco established a “sociological profile” of the city,
147 starting from the understanding of how the organisation of FIAT contributed to the structuring
148 of other forms of organisation, and how it continued to interplay with them not only in the
149 sphere of industrial production but throughout the whole of urban society. The contribution
150 brought by this kind of literature to the present case study is to place the local policy process
151 within that of production and reproduction of localised society.

152

153 ***b. What has been changing? National policies and local governance in Europe***

154 Studies of the evolution of European city governments since the 1970s provide some
155 elements for understanding how macro-processes contributed to modifying the shaping of
156 urban policy-making, and transformed opportunities and constraints for urban governments.
157 Firstly, economic change has intensified pressures on municipalities. Large companies and
158 public sector organisations that used to provide stable employment in many localities have
159 been restructured, and this, together with the shrinking of traditional industries and the
160 increased mobility of capital and labour, has put cities in competition with each other in trying
161 to attract promoters and providers of production (Scott 2008). Secondly, changes in national
162 policies contributed to modifying policy-making. Devolution and decentralisation processes
163 increased responsibilities of local government institutions for the definition and
164 implementation of public policies (Bobbio 2002). Furthermore, the way state policies address
165 the problems of local development has changed. Until the 1970s national policies focused on
166 redistributive issues and on the direct sustaining of economic development. Along with the
167 reduction in State resources and the limitation on economic interventionism introduced by
168 European Union, national territorial policies became competitive-based in the allocation of
169 resources. They also became oriented towards promoting the mobilisation of local actors
170 (Brenner, 2004; Béhar, Estèbe, 1999; Pinson, 2009 for the French case). This has reinforced
171 competition among local governments in their struggle to attract resources from the national
172 State (Jessop, 1993; Brenner, Theodore, 2002; Brenner, 2004), and opened up political
173 opportunities for local leaders (Le Galès, 2003).

174 If attention is shifted from macro-processes to urban policies, empirical research shows
175 patterns of convergence in how European cities are governed, understood as how decisions
176 are taken in urban policies, and who participates in local policy-making. The main change is
177 the emergence of new forms of partnership between actors controlling relevant resources in

178 cities and cooperating for locally elaborated development projects. John observes, “even
179 though institutions (local government) do not vanish, institutionalised forms of local politics
180 have given way to more flexible and networked patterns of public decision-making” (John,
181 2001: 22–23). This has been defined as a shift from urban government to urban governance
182 (Le Galès, 1995). Urban governance is understood here as the process of coordinating actors,
183 social groups, and institutions to attain particular goals, which are discussed and defined
184 collectively in fragmented and uncertain environments (Le Galès, 1995). In this context,
185 Mayors have to play a relevant role in aggregating interests, mobilising actors who control
186 resources for local policy-making (private companies, universities, local elites), and solving
187 conflicts. In turn, this can increase mayoral political authority and recognition (John, Cole,
188 1999; Borraz, John, 2004). More precisely, several pieces of research demonstrate that in
189 French metropolitan areas there has been a reinforcement of political entrepreneurship on the
190 part of mayors since the beginning of decentralisation in 1982 (Lorrain, 1991; Prat, 2008).

191 The discussed changes take a particular form in cities which are specialised in some
192 activities. Indeed, similar strategies of elected authorities in building coalition for local
193 policies have been observed. Here, resource concentration is critical. Urban agendas in
194 specialized cities have required the implication of those actors under whose control are
195 concentrated material, financial and political resources (Pinson, 2009). Going back to the
196 example of Turin (i.e. a one-company town), when the mayor elected in 2001 launched a new
197 agenda for reinforcing the “new economy” in the city, the company FIAT was targeted as the
198 major partner of the project. FIAT’s participation was necessary both because of the resources
199 (employment, land, financial) controlled by the company, and because the participation of the
200 top management of the company brought an increased legitimacy to the urban agenda
201 (Chiamparino, 2002).

202

203 *c. Urban governance in Toulon as an empirical phenomenon*

204 This case study of Toulon combines the approaches from the literature that discusses
205 urban policies in specialised cities with the literature about urban governance in European
206 cities. This investigation of the policy process therefore integrates, on the one hand, analysis
207 of the effects of the military specialisation on local society, and on the other hand, analysis of
208 how relations between the Navy and the local government evolved in the context of changes
209 in resources available to them. For our purposes, urban governance – i.e. a specific form of
210 coordination for collective action – is an “empirical phenomenon” (Pierre, 2005: 453),
211 meaning that the observer must search for processes through which significant and resource-
212 full actors coordinate their actions in the pursuit of collectively defined objectives (Pierre
213 2005). Empirical research has established that there are two kinds of interrelated processes
214 which sustain the mobilisation of the resources of relevant actors (John, Cole, 1999; Pierre,
215 2005; Dormois, 2008; Pinson 2009). The first is the emergence of flexible local institutions
216 where decisions can be negotiated, which leads to the densification of information exchange
217 networks and long-term greater institutional capacities. The second is the recognition of
218 shared interests between actors, and the consolidation of a common framing of policy
219 problems (Stoker, Mossberger, 1994; DiGaetano, Strom, 2003; Kilburn, 2004; Pierre, 2005).

220 Coordination for collective action is therefore considered as a possible outcome, rather
221 than as a necessary outcome resulting directly from macro-transformations. In fact, in inter-
222 organisational negotiation processes, gridlocks and interruptions are frequent (Stoker, 2011).
223 Further, the locally-specific distribution of resources (material and political resources) among
224 actors helps explain why certain policies are formulated in particular ways, and why some
225 possible outcomes are systematically left aside. For these reasons, the study analyses local
226 policy-making from the perspectives of resources available to the Navy and the local
227 government, and of relations between them. Two questions oriented the research: 1. How did

228 material and political resources available to the Navy and the local government evolve over
229 time? 2. To what extent do local actors cooperate, and through which processes collective
230 action is built up (common framing of policy problems, institution building)?

231 Drawing on the literature discussed above, two main hypotheses gave origin to the
232 fieldwork and were empirically tested. The first hypothesis concerns change in relations
233 between local government and the Navy, one of the most powerful actors in the city. Since
234 devolution and new national policies for territorial development provide incentives for the
235 emergence of local projects which imply the mobilisation of local relevant actors, new forms
236 of cooperation between urban elites were to be expected. This would make urban policies in
237 Toulon similar to those observed in other specialised European cities. The second hypothesis
238 relates to strategies of elected officials in the process. Since the Navy is as much a group of
239 inhabitants and voters as an institutional actor, it was expected that any loss or potential loss
240 this group suffered due to policy framing and implementation would have been likely to
241 evoke a response that followed a logic of blame avoidance.

242 Empirical results are developed in the three following sections. Section 2 defines how the
243 economy, the urban space and the political competition in Toulon have been influenced by the
244 military presence. Section 3 shows how a new urban agenda has emerged since 2001, and
245 explains how it challenged existing relations with the Navy. Finally, section 4 deals with
246 policy definition and implementation, and it analyses both how policy problems are
247 formulated by politicians, and relations between the City and the Navy in the implementation
248 process.

249 Data for this study were collected from 30 semi-structured interviews with Toulon elected
250 officials and civil servants (in the departments for planning, economic development and
251 general affairs), and with acting and retired military commanders. The main regional daily
252 newspaper (*Var Matin*, circulation 71,235), the official report of the municipality, published

253 once a month and distributed to all the households in the city and in the main public
254 buildings), and relevant city documents concerning urban public policies (collected during the
255 interviews and in the municipal archives) were analysed. Data on Toulon's inhabitants who
256 had a connection with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) were obtained from the Ministry itself
257 and from the administration of Toulon. The fieldwork aimed at tracing the evolution of
258 relationships between the actors of interest in the policy process, and at unfolding how they
259 framed their interests and resources. Interviews with retired civil servants, elected officials
260 and high ranked marines were particularly useful for the understanding how changes occurred
261 since the 1990s.

262 ***2. The Navy as a public administration and as a group of voters***

263 ***a. Toulon: the foremost military Mediterranean port or a touristic spot on the French*** 264 ***Riviera?***

265 Toulon is the foremost military port on the Mediterranean Sea, and currently 70% of the
266 French fleet of warships is based there, including France's only nuclear aircraft carrier. The
267 military presence influenced urban development in three relevant and inter-related issues:
268 political autonomy; economic development; and urban layout.

269 The first one is political. In the 17th century, the French monarchy established the military
270 dockyard in Toulon and, since then, urban development has followed the ups and downs of
271 national defence strategies and policies. Since the Navy is a hierarchical organisation whose
272 headquarters are located in Paris, decisions concerning local issues were taken at the national
273 level. The second issue is related to urban economy and employment (Table 1). For centuries,
274 the Navy has been the primary employer in the area, mostly because of activities related to
275 warship construction and maintenance. In the 1950s, half of the masculine population in work
276 was employed in this sector (Agulhon, 2000). From the end of the 1980s, public expenditure

277 in both naval and military sectors shrank¹. Even though the military port of Toulon continued
278 to be extremely relevant for national defence (because of the increasing strategic relevance of
279 the Mediterranean frontiers of Europe), employment in the military dockyard decreased. The
280 number of workers in the warship construction shrank from more than 7,000 in 1984, to
281 around 5,000 in 1994, then to 3,000 in 1998² and to 2,000 today³. These changes contributed
282 to rising unemployment rates in the 1990s⁴ (in Toulon 20% of the active population was
283 unemployed in 1999), to the failure of military subcontracting firms, and to negative net
284 migration rates (Toulon population decreased by 7% between 1982 and 1990, by 4% between
285 1990 and 1999, and then stabilised in the following decade)⁵.

286 Today, the Ministry of Defence is still the primary employer in the city (Table 1). The
287 Ministry of Defence provides 17,177 direct jobs out of a total of 75,931 jobs (22.6%). Toulon
288 had 167,816 inhabitants in 2006, of whom 70,764 were in work, and 8,310 worked for the
289 Ministry of Defence, which means that 11.7% of residents in work were employed by the
290 military administration. Moreover, 8,053 people in Toulon receive a military pension, which
291 is a significant share of 20.7% of the retired inhabitants in the city (75,931). However, the city
292 of Toulon is also located in one of most attractive regions for tourism⁶, and in recent decades
293 the metropolitan area has become a favoured destination for wealthy retired people, who

¹ At the national level, defence expenditures represented 3.6% of the GDP in 1988 (EU 15 mean was 2.7%), 2.7% in 1998 (EU 15 was 1.9%), 2.3% in 2008 (EU 15 was 1.7%). Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

² Sources: Hebert (1995) and Préfecture Maritime de la Méditerranée.

³ In 2003 the military dockyard company DCN became a publicly owned company governed by private law, and in 2007 its capital was opened to private investors.

⁴ In the context of French economic recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s an additional event which had negative effects for Toulon was the closedown, in 1986, of the civil dockyards located in the neighbouring municipality of La Seyne. 4,191 people used to work there. Source: Tixidor, Manuel; Martins Dias, Raphaël; Daviet, Sylvie (éd.) (2010). *Les difficultés de la reconversion à La Ciotat et à La Seyne-sur-Mer. Rives méditerranéennes*. (Industrie-Ville-Territoire en Provence), (4), p. 35–45.

⁵ During the last 30 years the population decreased in the city of Toulon and in the industrial city of La Seyne, but increased in the surrounding area (between 1982 and 2006 the agglomeration Toulon Provence Méditerranée as a whole gained 35,281 inhabitants, +7.8%). Source: INSEE.

⁶ In 2009, the PACA region ranked second (after Paris) for annual overnight stays. The Department of Var (one of six Departments of PACA region) has 30% of regional overnight stays. Source: Direction générale de la compétitivité, de l'industrie et des services (Ministère de l'Économie).

294 move there from other French regions⁷. Despite their relevance in the metropolitan economy,
295 military activities are not the most dynamic sector in terms of job creation⁸. In fact, the
296 leading economic sectors are those related to consumption, real estate and care services. In the
297 metropolitan area, the four sectors where the most jobs have been created between 2000 and
298 2006 were social services (+1,571 jobs), food and beverage service activities (+1,145), retail
299 trade (+1,053), and real estate and related services (+833) (Davezies, 2008b). Compared to
300 neighbouring municipalities in the metropolitan area, Toulon's touristic activities are
301 underdeveloped, both in terms of touristic flows and share of secondary residences⁹. This
302 tension between the military specialisation of the city and the touristic and residential
303 dynamics of the metropolitan area is at the heart of Toulon urban policies.

304

305 Tab I. (Defence in Toulon)

306

307 The third issue is the urban layout of Toulon (Map I). Toulon developed around the
308 military and civilians ports and within the narrow space between the hills and the sea, which
309 constrained urban extension. The constructible parts of the city have been completely
310 urbanised in four decades. Today, new real-estate developments are possible only through
311 projects of urban renewal which replace the existing built environment. The Ministry of
312 Defence is a dominant public landowner in the city. Firstly, because of the amount of the land

⁷ For Toulon metropolitan area: 15.8% of people who moved into the area between 1990 and 1999 were retired, which is a share similar to the Nice urban area (15%), and more than four times the share of "retired newcomers" in Rennes urban area (3.1%). The following decade had a similar trend (Davezies, 2008b).

⁸ The general trend since the beginning of the 1980s has been analysed by the economist Laurent Davezies (2008a) in his research into the redistribution of revenue among French regions. The city of Toulon is located in an area whose revenue has been increasing thanks to the "residential economy" led by the influx of retired people and tourists.

⁹ The metropolitan area had a hosting capacity of 20,849 beds for tourists, but the share of the city of Toulon is very small (5%) compared to the neighbouring municipalities of Hyères (55%), Le Pradet (13%), and Six-Fours-les-Plages (12%). Similarly, in the city of Toulon the share of secondary residences on total housing is 2.9%, far below the share of Hyeres (23.5%) or Six-fours-les-Plages (30%), and below the average of the department of Var (26.5%). Sources: Toulon Provence Méditerranée, Direction générale de la compétitivité, de l'industrie et des services, Ministère de l'Economie, INSEE.

313 under its control, which has been quite stable over time: today around 350 hectares (8% of the
314 total area of the municipality) are owned or legally controlled by the MoD, and 8 kilometres
315 of the shore (mostly in the historical city centre) are dedicated to military activities, and
316 closed to inhabitants and tourists. As a consequence, the plots of land the MoD owns, whose
317 location in the city would make them an easy investment for the creation of a surplus value
318 related to touristic developments, are not part of the land market. Secondly, there are laws
319 securing public control of State land property against ownership by other interests that could
320 be deemed to threaten their public functioning and use. *A fortiori*, the MoD can claim national
321 interest and military confidentiality. Beside land ownership, some parts of the city are subject
322 to building restrictions defined by the MoD, because of the technological and environmental
323 risks related to military activities. Finally, maritime shipping in the bay is submitted to rules
324 defined by the *Préfet Maritime*, the highest military authority in charge of the Mediterranean
325 Sea, and whose office is located in Toulon.

326 Shares of urban spaces and bay waters under military control are regulated (organised and
327 steered) according to a hierarchical organisation model, leaving local governments or other
328 relevant groups or organisations with little capacity for action. This contrasts with the general
329 course of urbanisation which has taken place in the Toulon metropolitan area under the
330 pressure of demographic growth of the post-war development¹⁰. In fact, after WWII the city
331 developed in a way that was broadly speaking unregulated because of speculative initiatives
332 of private developers. In addition, since the 1970s the French Riviera has become a coastline
333 which attracts tourists on a world-wide scale, and a profitable market of secondary residences
334 has developed in the metropolitan area. In the coastline of the PACA region, the land market

¹⁰ Around 40% of Toulon built environment was destroyed during WWII. The reconstruction and the post war economic boom was accompanied by a massive but weakly regulated urbanisation process (46.2% of existing buildings were constructed between 1949 and 1974). Source: INSEE.

335 is constantly under pressure and the Toulon urban area ranks third in France for the highest
336 prices for land for construction¹¹.

337 To conclude, the military administration in Toulon is a local powerful actor whose
338 transformations depend on decisions taken in Paris, an institution ensuring an economic
339 function thanks to military public expenditure, and a landowner having an influence on urban
340 spatial fix which limited alternative developments. The idea of dependence is deeply rooted in
341 the perceptions of Toulon city officials and is the cognitive framework within which the new
342 agenda for urban development is embedded (Section 3).

343

344

Map 1

345 ***b. Soldiers and war veterans in the political competition in Toulon***

346 Toulon has been governed by right-wing parties since the end of WWII. Indeed, Mayor
347 Maurice Arreckx ruled the city between 1959 and 1985, followed by his former vice-Mayor
348 François Trucy (1985-1995). In the metropolitan area the far-right party *Front National*
349 (National Front) has achieved significant electoral scores since the 1980s, and ruled the city
350 between 1995 and 2001, when a new right-wing Mayor was elected. Because of their number,
351 people living in Toulon who work or used to work for the MoD are a relevant part of the
352 urban electorate. The perception of this constituency and of its political preferences
353 contributes to shape what politicians offer during electoral campaigns, but also influences
354 choices in public policies, how these are decided, implemented and publicly legitimized
355 (Section 4). Following Weaver (1986), patterns of behavior of elected officials can be
356 understood taking into account their interests in claiming credit with constituents and clientele
357 groups for actions taken for their benefit, and in avoiding the blame for perceived or real

¹¹ Toulon urban area ranks third after Montpellier and Paris. Building land is 230 Euros/m², the average for the 100 more expansive urban area is 105 Euros/m². Source: SOeS, enquête sur le prix des terrains à bâtir, Ministère du Développement Durable, de l'Écologie et de l'Énergie, 2008.

358 losses imposed to some groups and constituencies. Two empirical results are relevant for the
359 understanding of electoral stakes related to the Navy and the resultant consequences on the
360 policy process. The first point is the very existence of a “*military world*”¹² in Toulon,
361 understood by elected officials as a distinctive group who contributes to structure political
362 competition¹³. Inhabitants related to defence activities are highly differentiated by age,
363 revenue and mobility, and therefore in their needs for local public policies (e.g. housing,
364 childcare, and care for elderly, etc.). However, in interview, local elected officials, both in the
365 ruling right majority and the left opposition, identify a local electorate related to the military
366 presence. When talking about political competition, interviewed politicians tend to consider
367 career soldiers, volunteer soldiers, veterans, and their families as being part of this same and
368 “*extremely important*” group. The second point is that this “*military world*” is considered to
369 occupy a specific space in Toulon localised polity. Indeed, interviewed politicians shared a
370 vision of the population related to defence activities as a right-wing oriented electorate.
371 Reliable statistical inferences about electoral choices of the military world cannot be made. In
372 fact, there are no national surveys dealing specifically with the political orientation of
373 members of the armed forces¹⁴. At the municipal level, home addresses of MoD employees
374 are not available, which makes it impossible to cross-reference residential data with election
375 results by polling station¹⁵. Nevertheless, in a city which has been right-wing oriented since
376 the 1950s, there is a consensus among elected officials that the military world is a

¹² The term “military world” is a label used by the deputy-mayor in charge of war veterans. The term includes the “*monde combatant*” (war veterans associations), but also career soldiers, volunteers, veterans, and their families. In general, all interviewed elected officials shared this vision of the existence of a specific electorate related to defence activities.

¹³ Interviewed elected officials were: the deputy mayors (right-wing) currently in charge of urban planning and of war veterans; the deputy-major in charge of relations with the Navy (in charge between 2001 and 2008); the principal deputy-major, also Member of Parliament (right-wing); the Senator who was City Mayor between 1985 and 1995 (right-wing); the vice-president of the PACA Region (until 2010), who is also a member of the left-wing group in the City Council; and a former member of the left-wing opposition in the City Council (until 2008).

¹⁴ National panels keep armed forces and police in the same professional category. These national samples therefore cannot be used for the purpose of this paper.

377 constituency strongly supporting re-elections of ruling majorities rather than the left-wing
378 oppositions. As the leader of the left opposition in the City Council commented, this is an
379 electorate which every politician in Toulon has to “*find a way to speak to, if he hopes to win*
380 *local elections one day*”. One way to give symbolic recognition to this group in Toulon is to
381 recruit well-known retired marines to participate to the electoral competition. In fact, the
382 composition of electoral lists shows their social representativeness and their linkages with
383 those groups who are considered as relevant constituencies (Lagroye et al., 2004). In the
384 electoral lists of the last two municipal elections there were retired marines both in socialist
385 and right wing lists, even if they were more numerous and higher ranked in the right wing list.
386 Retired marines were recruited by leading candidates of both parties because of their
387 professional affiliation, because “*if we do not have these people on the list, a share of the*
388 *population of the city is missing*”. Apart from the moment of electoral competition,
389 maintaining support from this group and avoiding the blame influence politicians’
390 motivations and activities. As soon as the current Mayor Hubert Falco was elected, he
391 appointed three councillors to be in charge of dealing with “military affairs” and veterans,
392 which was a quite significant number in view of the total number of councillors (22). More
393 precisely, one of them was in charge of the 70 or so associations related to the “*military*
394 *word*” registered in Toulon¹⁶, one responsible for ceremonies and official relations, and the
395 third one (who was a well known retired admiral) dealt with policy-oriented relations with the
396 Navy (Section 4b).

397 Although not completely homogenous, the “*military world*” is considered by local
398 politicians as a relevant right-wing constituency in political competition. For the ruling right-

¹⁵ The best way to understand how this group votes and how it is internally differentiated in its political preferences would be cross-referencing individual data with ecological data at the urban level.

¹⁶ 66 associations related to defence activities were found: 48 of them were war veterans’ associations, 8 of them were of retired career officers, and 10 of them were support, cultural and sportive associations for armed forces members and their families. These associations are highly supported by the Municipality: they receive subsidies,

399 wing Mayor, the political risk of electoral sanction is high. Discontent in military-related
400 public opinion is therefore something to be avoided.

401 **3. *How national policies and local political entrepreneurship challenged existing***
402 ***relations with the Navy***

403 **a. *The emergence of an urban agenda targeting the Navy as a major partner***

404 In the context of the shrinkage of defence expenditure of the 1990s (Section 2.a), changes
405 in national policies addressing urban and regional development and providing incentives for
406 cooperation among actors open a window of opportunity (Kingdon, 1984) for the local
407 government elected in 2001 to put forward a new policy agenda. The generally desired result
408 is the diversification of the dependence of the city upon military (and military-related)
409 activities in favour of enhancing touristic activities related to Toulon's location on the French
410 Riviera. This is aimed at transforming Toulon into a "*Mediterranean metropolis*"¹⁷ inspired
411 by, and in competition with, the neighbouring city of Nice which succeeded in combining
412 identity and functions of a well-established flagship touristic destination with the emergence
413 of one of the biggest clusters for R&D in France. The agenda in Toulon requires the
414 mobilisation of resources held or controlled by the Navy.

415 Two main changes made possible the emergence of a new policy programme. Firstly, the
416 Mayor elected in 2001 had greater political resources than the previous municipal
417 administration. Maurice Arreckx was the city's right-wing Mayor for almost 30 years (1957-
418 1985), and ruled a political system based upon corruption, sustained by the easy availability
419 of public money (Ardid, 1995; Martin, 1996). During the 1990s, a moral, economic and
420 political crisis hit the city, and several members of the economic and political elites were

a collective building with offices and common spaces, and dozens of ceremonies a year are celebrated in the city.
Sources: Prefecture du Var and Toulon Municipally.

421 swept away by lawsuits and scandals. After a highly contested far-right term of administration
422 (1995-2001), the right-wing mayor Hubert Falco was elected. He became city mayor with a
423 large majority, and benefited from a strong political legitimacy and central government
424 support because he had defeated a far-right city council¹⁸. Moreover, like most current French
425 mayors of big cities, he held posts in both central and local government. At the national level,
426 he had held ministerial posts since 2002, the most recent being as *Secrétaire d'État à la*
427 *Défense et aux Anciens combattants* (Secretary of State for Defence and for War Veterans).
428 The city council and the Mayor elected in 2001 therefore had high local recognition and
429 legitimacy, and a strong capacity to deal with the national government in order to defend local
430 interests and to get resources from the centre.

431 Secondly, new national policies for territorial development designed to concentrate the
432 allocation of public resources in key or leading places (Section 1) provided the Mayor with
433 incentives and resources to elaborate an urban agenda for a “Mediterranean metropolis”. This
434 contrasts with previous ways of policy-making. Indeed, city civilian authorities describe the
435 time from the end of WWII until the 1980s as a period where “*we didn't need anything*”, and
436 nobody felt the necessity to develop city projects because both military public expenditure
437 and the dockyards sustained local development without requiring any particular local
438 mobilisation¹⁹. Since 2003, the city has submitted three successful projects to the central
439 government call for projects. The first project was based upon the cooperation in planning
440 policies between institutions located in the same metropolitan area, as a way to override
441 administrative boundaries and metropolitan fragmentation. The second, this time designed to

¹⁷ The « Mediterranean metropolis » definition is used in the municipal magazine *Toulon Méditerranée Magazine* in all the articles about strategies for urban development.

¹⁸ During the far-right term municipal government was isolated, almost ignored, by the central government, as reported by both one of the Prefects of Toulon and by the Ministry of Defence of that time (both have been interviewed).

¹⁹ Maurice Arreckx deputy-Mayor and the former City Manager (hired in the 1970s) were interviewed.

442 promote the development of R&D clusters, involved enhancing the collaboration between
443 local government, research institutions and local firms. Both projects meant an inflow of
444 financial resources from the central government specifically limited to the elaboration of
445 policies that required partnership with relevant institutional and economic actors at the local
446 level. The third project, related to decentralisation, transferred ownership and management of
447 the civilian port to local authorities. This meant that the local government in Toulon acquired
448 greater power in setting the shipping rules in the bay, power which was formerly shared by
449 the Ministry of Defence and by the Ministry of Transport.

450 All these initiatives put forward a new encompassing vision for the city. The main idea is
451 to “*open the city to the sea*”, and to make Toulon exploit the potential of its position on the
452 French Riviera, as neighbouring cities were doing. This would be done through: the
453 development of touristic activities on the city marina; the enhancement of maritime civilian
454 transport; and the development of R&D in marine and submarine fields. For elected officials,
455 the Navy is the most relevant partner for a successful implementation of such an agenda.
456 Indeed, transforming Toulon into the so-called “*Mediterranean metropolis*” implies the
457 mobilisation of two kinds of resources locally associated with the Navy. Since the city does
458 not have a relevant university, but rather all the most advanced research centres are related to
459 the Navy, its research and development activities are considered as the main source for further
460 developments in R&D. Secondly, what is seen as decisive for the implementation of the
461 agenda is the urban space (land and water) controlled by the Ministry of Defence.

462 ***b. Conflicting interests about the use and control of urban space***

463 Both mutual interests and the nature of the resources targeted by Mayor Falco need to be
464 taken into account for any understanding of conflict and cooperation between the city and the
465 Navy. To some extent, the Navy participates in a local partnership in those realms which are
466 clearly identified as of converging interests. The military administration and the local

467 government office for economic development collaborate with firms in the marine and
468 submarine sector, within the institutional and financial framework made possible by the
469 national call for R&D clusters. The military administration orientates local firms towards
470 strategies which are more liable to correspond to the future needs of the armed forces.
471 Moreover, Toulon has become one of the key places chosen by the MoD to promote and
472 make visible its new “policy of sustainability”. The Navy is a partner in a project for the
473 improvement of the poor quality of bay waters, which is part of the metropolitan project
474 developed by all the municipalities around the bay, and led by Toulon’s local government, in
475 response to the national call.

476 However, the cooperation between military and political elites is hindered by conflicts
477 about urban spaces. On the one hand, action over urban spaces is one of the most important
478 and defining characteristics of city government. Through zoning, it provides the leverage
479 which allows local authorities to influence which activities are located in the city. As such, it
480 is an instrument that helps to regulate the benefits which different groups can derive from a
481 specific pattern of activities (Harvey, 1985). In Toulon, the decentralisation of civilian port
482 management has made the development of consumption-oriented activities one of the sought
483 after evolutions for the city. Political elites put forward a project for the waterfront renewal
484 which implies a shift from military to civilian use of a great part of the Eastern coast of the
485 bay and a revision of the shipping rules in the bay. Inspired by some well-known urban
486 experiences such as those of Genoa, Bilbao and Cardiff, and supposed to symbolise the
487 “Mediterranean metropolis” this responds to a strategy of touristic development. Furthermore,
488 given the lack of land for development in Toulon, the land owned by the military
489 administration in the city centre (close to the port and to the military hospital) constitutes an
490 opportunity for the acquisition of land by the city through political negotiations, and
491 potentially at below market price. On the other hand, the first interest of the Navy in Toulon is

492 to maintain and ensure the conditions necessary to its own functioning. Given that land use,
493 property disposal and spatially defined security rules are the material means for the military
494 institution to function, the necessity of maintaining some control over those elements is a
495 permanent goal of the military administration. Moreover, the Navy considers Toulon its key
496 military port in France, whose strategic relevance is going to increase (rather than decrease, as
497 it is the case for some ports on the Atlantic Ocean) as a consequence of the concentration of
498 geopolitical crises in the Mediterranean area. Enhancement of military activities in Toulon
499 with the building up of new infrastructures is planned for the years to come.

500 The emergence of a new agenda aimed at “opening the city to the sea” therefore led to the
501 emergence of diverging interests about the use and control of urban space, and challenged
502 existing relations. Interviewed about this issue, city officials and military commanders who
503 have been in post in recent years described a power struggle in the making²⁰. When the land is
504 at stake, the ideas of “*standing firm*,” “*sticking to our guns*” and “*showing who really rules*
505 *the city*” are more than frequent. However, both the direct ownership and the authority to set
506 the rules over significant shares of land and waters (Section 2) make the Navy an institutional
507 veto player for changes in the use of urban space. A veto player is an actor whose agreement
508 is required for a change of the status quo (Tsebelis, 2000). In other terms, local projects for
509 urban renewal need the approval and/or the cooperation of the military administration because
510 of the location and the amount of urban space under military control.

511

512

²⁰ Interviewed military commanders were: the deputy commanding officer for the Mediterranean- CECMED (since 2008); the deputy commanding officer for the Mediterranean- CECMED (2005-2008); the responsible for external communication of the CECMED; the retired admiral in charge of relations with the Navy in the local government (2001-2008); the deputy commanding officer for the Mediterranean-CECMED (1991-1996); the commanding officer of the service for military infrastructures; the commanding officer of the service for military housing; the deputy commanding officer for the Mediterranean, later in charge of relations with the Navy in the metropolitan agglomeration.

513 **4. Political strategies for implementing policy-making and avoiding blame**

514 The investigation of urban governance as an empirical phenomenon requires focusing on
515 relations among actors in the policy process. Since the early 2000s, the newly-elected Mayor
516 adopted several strategies to establish cooperation with the Navy and to mobilise its
517 resources. These strategies are the results of trade-offs between electoral motivations – i.e.,
518 managing electoral risks related to the particular sociology of the city – and wanting to
519 implement public policies. The institutionalisation of bi-lateral meetings, the use of political
520 resources to reach the central government, and a political construction of losses and gains
521 framing policy problems are the main strategies developed for the management of the
522 relations between the city and the Navy.

523 **a. Issue framing, causal stories and blame avoidance: the political construction of**
524 **losses and gains**

525 Since 2001, elected authorities of Toulon have developed a *new public framing* of the
526 military presence, which was absent during previous mandates²¹. This framing is part of the
527 political communication, and is publicised in the monthly municipal newspaper distributed to
528 all households (*Toulon Méditerranée Magazine*) and in the interviews released by elected
529 officials to the regional newspaper, *Var Matin*. The framing of the military presence
530 challenges the distribution of material resources in the city, as well as the prominent role of
531 the Navy in urban development, while pursuing strategies of avoiding blame (Weaver, 1986)
532 from the military constituency. Indeed, strategies for managing the military electorate are

²¹ The analysis of the policy framing is based upon three main sources: the reading of the monthly municipal newspaper since the beginning of the 1990s, and more precisely the comparison between the Front National term (1995-2001) and the right-wing terms (since 2001); the analysis of official documents for urban planning and economic development; interviews with local elected officials and civil servants, active and retired. For the list of interviewed elected officials see footnote n° 12. Interviewed civil servants were: the City General Manager (since 2008), the former City General Manager (who became in 2008 the new Port Authority Manager), the manager of Housing Service (formerly manager of Urban Development Service), the project manager of the “Grand Projet Rade” (Communauté d’agglomération Toulon Provence Méditerranée), the General Manager of the Communauté d’agglomération Toulon Provence Méditerranée, a researcher in the Toulon Agency for Urban Planning (AUDAT).

533 visible both in the political construction of losses and gains which are expected from the new
534 agenda, and in the public discourse about the decree of consensus in the relations between the
535 city and the Navy.

536 Issues framing is the process of “image making, where the images have to do
537 fundamentally with attributing cause, blame and responsibility (...). Conditions, difficulties or
538 issues do not have inherent properties that make them more or less likely to be seen as issues
539 to be dealt with through public policies” (Stone, 1989: 282). Rather, using narrative causal
540 stories political actors deliberately portray them in ways calculated to gain support for their
541 side. The construction of arguments establishing causal linkages between events is relevant
542 not only because it places a problem on the policy agenda, but also because it provides an
543 interpretation of the past and, by the same token, defines the range of possible ways of solving
544 that problem in the future, and excludes alternative possible solutions. The analysis of the two
545 main arguments about the Navy framing the new agenda reveals a strategic presentation of
546 history. This is aimed at normalising the military presence in Toulon (i.e., making the Navy
547 an urban actor among others) and mobilising the institution’s resources for a future win-win
548 situation, which will benefit both the city and the Navy. The first point focuses on the land
549 issue. City officials in charge of urban development and planning put forward that historically
550 , the military presence constrained the development of the city and its waterfront in the past.
551 Then, it is claimed that armed forces have been restructuring, and that contemporary and
552 highly technological armed forces no longer need such a large amount of property. In
553 consequence, it is argued that the military administration could easily transfer some of it to
554 the city and make it available for a “*civilian-use reconversion*”. This historical narrative is
555 accompanied by the claim that the city will never attempt to obtain a single “*strategic square*

556 *metre*²² controlled by the Navy. The statement is understandable as a way of avoiding blame:
557 it establishes that the city (the local interest) is never going to harm national defence interests.
558 However, what is “*strategic*” is undefined, and therefore open to conflicting definitions and
559 negotiations. The second point concerns the *normalisation* of some services and benefits in
560 the city , historically provided by the military administration to its members in an exclusive
561 manner. The idea of “sharing” (“*partage*” in French) recurs in all the interviews with city
562 officials in post. It is justified by the claim that military activities are no longer the core of
563 city economic development. Therefore, the institution should renounce some of its advantages
564 in the city, both in terms of spaces and services (marines used to have their own shops, their
565 own leisure clubs, and the MoD still rules a quasi-autonomous system for social housing).
566 Marines are “*Toulon citizens just like any others*”²³, and they have no reason not to share their
567 benefits with all of Toulon’s inhabitants. At the same time, is argued that policies of urban
568 renewal and economic diversification are going to generate benefits for everybody, including
569 MoD employees. Being city inhabitants and voters, they are expected to benefit from urban
570 policies and future economic growth. To summarise, public framing of the new agenda starts
571 from the idea that the Navy was an exogenous power having a strong influence on city
572 development. Then, it shifts toward the representation of a future where the city empowers its
573 own capacity for action, which is going to generate benefits for everybody. Based upon the
574 construction of the chronological causal narrative, the framing implies that the perceived
575 domination of the Navy over city development is to be transformed into an equal and
576 negotiated relation for the common good.

577 The other main strategy is keeping “out of the public sphere” (Weaver, 1986: 385) the real
578 degree of consensus — in fact, its weakness — in the relations between the city and the Navy.

²² The “strategic square metre” is a motto used by all interviewed local officials in post when asked about the land issue. It has been used firstly by the Mayor and then regularly quoted by civil servants and deputy-mayors, and by the municipal newspaper.

²³ Interview with the Principal deputy-mayor.

579 The way the military presence in Toulon is framed by local government has been poorly
580 perceived by interviewed high-ranking commanding officers. But, they had less access to the
581 public local arena for making their opinion heard than the local government. It is hard to
582 argue that the Navy is a weak organisation with limited political and institutional resources.
583 However, as far as local affairs are concerned, its ability to go public in the urban arena is
584 bounded by the limited freedom of expression of marines (and of high-ranking civil servants
585 in general) and by their belonging to a hierarchical organisation dependent on the political
586 power in Paris. On the one hand, high-ranking marines who rule the Navy in Toulon cannot
587 publicly oppose the Mayor, and on the other hand, elected officials do not have any interest in
588 making public a conflict in which a relevant and complex constituency is implicated. As a
589 consequence, there is no mention in either the main regional newspaper nor in the municipal
590 magazine of conflicts between urban elites. In turn, the “*perfect harmony*” and the
591 “*industrious collaborations*” between the city and the Navy are publicised on a regular basis
592 in these same publications.

593 ***b. Political strategies for policy implementation and the partial failure of the local***
594 ***partnership***

595 Along with policy framing, two main strategies have been undertaken by the municipality
596 during recent years in order to advance the urban agenda. The preference of using one
597 strategy as against the other depends on the power struggle and the degree of consensus
598 relevant to the particular issue between the Navy and local government. The
599 institutionalisation of bi-lateral meetings at the local level between the mayor and the Préfet
600 Maritime (the highest military authority in Toulon) has been the main general strategy
601 adopted by Mayor Hubert Falco to deal with every-day policy-making with the Navy. Indeed,
602 the meetings were launched at the beginning of the 2000s to discuss with the Navy the new

603 urban agenda, the content of policy documents and policies that demanded collaboration²⁴.
604 Those meetings are based upon established procedures: periodicity, location, pre-defined
605 agendas, and some of them have been given a recognisable name, “*Les rencontres Mairie-*
606 *Marine*” (“City-Navy meetings”). It is a process of stabilising relations between civilian and
607 military hierarchies. Indeed, through the stabilisation of norms, they become permanent and
608 self-reproducing institutions which reduce uncertainty and enhance commitment, favouring
609 collective action (Hall and Taylor 1997; Di Maggio and Powell 1997). Further, since 2002 ,
610 two retired Navy admirals have been charged to help local government offices for working on
611 policies requiring collaboration with the Navy. Retired admirals are both policy brokers and
612 experts in the policy process because they belong to both worlds (Hassenteufel 2008). They
613 are former high-level commanding officers, with personal relationships with several still-
614 serving officers and they are generally held in high respect by the military hierarchy. They
615 thus have social resources that enable them to lead debates and to have their views taken into
616 account. In addition, they have a deep knowledge of how a military institution functions. In
617 the everyday making of local policies, they are the ones to be consulted concerning the
618 organisation chart (“*which is the right office to contact?*”), the values and the norms of the
619 military institution, and the best language to be used.

620 By contrast, for land disposal the Mayor used his political resources to deal directly with
621 the central government and get around the local institutional veto. In a context of multilayered
622 governance, the existence of a constraint in a specific level of government can lead an actor to
623 displace the action to a level where power relations are more liable to be favourable and the
624 request more readily taken into account (Kriesi, 2007). As pointed out earlier, Mayor Hubert

²⁴ The meetings take place both at the municipal and at the metropolitan level. The main issues are the policies for urban development related to R&D project, the project for the quality of the bay waters (Section 3), issues related to urban planning (an agreement for the renewal of an ancient military tower, the tearing down of a wall that hid the sea but enclosed a military area, negotiations about the risk-perimeters surrounding the military base). At the very beginning, land disposal was also included in the topics, but later abandoned.

625 Falco belonged to both the local and national level of government, and benefited from strong
626 support from the central government (Section 2). When he got his first national governmental
627 charge in 2002, his double responsibility gave him direct access to the Minister of Defence,
628 Michèle Alliot-Marie. From that moment he mobilised his political resources in Paris in order
629 to move around the blockages at the local level and to obtain satisfaction in some of his
630 claims about the land through political negotiations. In 2004, conflicts about the land became
631 acute in Toulon because of increasing pressures for land disposal, and civilian-military
632 relations at the local level were interrupted for three years. The *casus belli* was the sports hall
633 developed on a parcel of military land close to the naval base, and supposed to symbolise the
634 “*renouveau*” of the city. The transfer of the land to the city was obtained thanks to political
635 pressure on the MoD in Paris, and Navy officers in Toulon resented that the public equipment
636 was built on what they consider to be “*stolen land*”, and which the Navy still needed. Once
637 the sports hall was built, an agreement regulated time-schedules between the inhabitants and
638 defence employees and the maintenance responsibilities for the building; however, this ended
639 in bitter conflict, with mutual accusations of renegeing on these responsibilities. The episode
640 showed the absence of locally constituted forums for conflict resolution about the land. It
641 epitomised diverging interests and the absence of a stable bargaining context. Since then, the
642 definition of what parcels of land can be given to the municipality (the non “strategic square
643 meters”) has been dealt with at the national level, following the classic French pattern where
644 local interests are represented in Paris thanks to the holding of multiple posts at different
645 levels of government (Goldsmith, Page, 1987). Furthermore, the negotiations about the
646 waterfront failed to reach a conclusion, because national interest and the strategic relevance of
647 Toulon were invoked in Paris to protect military activities in the bay.

648

649

650 **5. Conclusion**

651 This article has used in-depth analysis of the evolution of relations between urban
652 government, the Navy and a professional group (the marines) living in the city to understand
653 both the transformation of urban policies and the way conflicts which arise are dealt with in a
654 military city. The analysis has allowed the perception of the interplay between national and
655 local levels, State policies and urban regulations.

656 It was demonstrated how changes in national policies (both defence and addressing urban
657 and regional development), along with an increase of the political legitimacy and
658 entrepreneurship of the mayor in Toulon, opened a window of opportunity for a new policy
659 agenda of diversification requiring cooperation with the Navy. The Navy was perceived by
660 elected officials as an exogenous power which made the area historically dependent on
661 decisions taken at the national level. Since the 2000s, existing relations between the city and
662 the Navy have been challenged. The Navy has been seen as one of the most relevant partners
663 that needs to be involved in successful local development strategy, mostly because of its land
664 ownership and technological skills and expertise. The analysis of the attempts to build up a
665 policy coalition involving the Navy focused on the political and institutional techniques aimed
666 at institutionalising civil-military relations. The establishment of routine meetings and hiring
667 of retired admirals are complementary strategies that stabilise bargaining and reduce
668 uncertainty. However, the most relevant common issue, land control, is dealt with by using
669 political resources at the national government level. The Mayor, exploiting his double
670 responsibilities (local and national), obtains satisfaction by direct recourse to the central
671 government in Paris. The shift from the local to the national level and the interruptions in
672 institutionalised meetings lead to the conclusion that the absence of regulation at the local
673 level prohibits conflict solving. A second result concerns political variables in urban
674 governance. It was argued that the particular strategies used to deal with conflicting interests

675 need to take into account both the need for establishing cooperation and mobilising the
676 Navy's resources, and also the wish to control and so preclude possible electoral sanctions
677 from this military-related constituency. Indeed, the weight of the "military world" as a
678 constituency favours strategies aimed at constructing losses and gains expected by the new
679 policy agenda as a win-win situation, while managing conflicts behind closed doors. Here,
680 this paper showed that broadening the analysis from organised interest and institutional
681 context to electoral stakes and political competition allows a better understanding of the ways
682 issues are framed and conflicting interests are managed.

683 Toulon has been conceptualised as a specialised military city, and the analysis was
684 therefore constructed drawing on results shown in case-studies of other kinds of specialised
685 cities (one-company towns, port-cities). On the one hand, the study of Toulon shows to what
686 extent changes in a military city are close to what is recounted by the literature about
687 specialised cities. On the other hand, it provides elements for understanding how exactly a
688 military city can change in times of restructuring of defence policies and of the nation State.
689 Urban policies in Toulon are similar to those in European cities where a particular activity
690 was dominant. Indeed, new forms of partnership between the local government and the Navy,
691 i.e. one the most relevant actor in the city, have developed in response to political and
692 economic change. Because of political entrepreneurship of elected officials and of shrinking
693 resources available to the dominant actor, the latter has become a partner in some local
694 projects. However, Toulon is also a relevant case of a (partial) failure in urban governance,
695 which suggests directions for further research. This case study of a military city shows how
696 the emergence of flexible forms of coordination for collective action is not an automatic
697 pattern of change in specialised European cities. In Toulon, the kind of actor involved is
698 revealed to be crucial for the understanding of urban governance and its limits. Indeed, the
699 Navy is a State institution whose priorities in national security make it an actor with concerns

700 and interests which preclude it being fully involved in coalition for urban development.
701 Furthermore, resources available to the military administration enable it to maintain its
702 constraints upon the implementation of the new urban agenda. This case study therefore
703 qualifies how exactly partial urban governance emerged in the city. If governance is not linear
704 and it is often incomplete (Jessop 1993, Stoker, 2011), it is very pertinent for urban research
705 to test the set of conditions which foster or hamper this form of collective action.
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Table I. Proportion of inhabitants of Toulon related to the Ministry of Defence*

	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Inhabitants		
Toulon inhabitants (2006)	167,816	
Toulon inhabitants in work (2006)	70,764	
Toulon inhabitants working for the MoD (2009)*	8,310	11.7% of inhabitants in activity
who are career soldiers	5,807	8.2% of inhabitants in activity
Retired inhabitants (2006)	38,870	
People in receipt of a military pension (2010)	8,053	20.7% of retired inhabitants
Share of labour market		
Jobs in Toulon (2007)	75,931	
MoD direct jobs (2009)**	17,177	22.6% of total jobs

*Reliable data on families and children were not available


**Data on people working for the military procurement agency (DGA) were not available. The total number of those working for the MoD is therefore slightly under-estimated

Sources: INSEE, Agence d'Urbanisme de l'Aire Toulonnaise (AUDAT), Ministry of Defence (Data collected and processed by the Author)

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857 **Map I. Urban space under military control**

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