Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure

Sébastien Courtin (1) , Zéphirin Nganmeni (2) , Bertrand Tchantcho (3)

1 CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management
2 THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications
3 ENSPY - Ecole Nationale Supérieure Polytechnique de Yaoundé

This work focuses on the evaluation of voting power in dichotomous multi-type games endowed with a coalition structure. Dichotomous multi-type games, introduced by Courtin et al. [2016], model games in which there is a number of non-ordered types of support in the input, while the output is dichotomous, i.e. the proposal is either accepted or rejected. In a game with a coalition structure, it is supposed that players organize themselves into disjoint coalitions wich are defined a priori. We extend the well-known Owen index (Owen [1977]) and Banzhaf-Owen index (Owen [1981]) to this class of games. A full characterization of these power indices is provided.

Mots clés: Dichotomous multi-type games; Coalition structure; Owen power index; Banzhaf-Owen power index

Domaines: Economies et finances; Mathématiques [math]

Sébastien Courtin, Zéphirin Nganmeni, Bertrand Tchantcho. Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, 86, pp.9-17. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.003⟩. ⟨halshs-01545772⟩