Aggregation of Bayesian preferences: Unanimity vs Monotonicity

Abstract : This article reconsiders the issue of Bayesian aggregation by pointing at a conflict that may arise between two logically independent dominance criteria, Pareto dominance and statewise dominance, that are commonly imposed on social preferences. We propose a weaker dominance axiom that restricts statewise dominance to Pareto dominant alternatives and Pareto dominance to statewise dominant alternatives. The associated aggregation rule is a convex combination of two components., the first being a weighted sum of the individuals' subjective expected utility (SEU) functional, the second being a social SEU functional, with associated social utility function and social belief. Such representation establishes the existence of a trade off between adherence to the Pareto principle and compliance with statewise dominance. We then investigate what are the consequences of adding to our assumptions either of the two dominance criteria in their full force and obtain that each of them is equivalent to discarding the other, unless there is essentially a common prior probability.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, June 14, 2017 - 6:51:33 PM
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  • HAL Id : halshs-01539444, version 1



Federica Ceron, Vassili Vergopoulos. Aggregation of Bayesian preferences: Unanimity vs Monotonicity. 2017. ⟨halshs-01539444⟩



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