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Spelling out the Obvious:

Latin *quidem* and the Expression of Presuppositional Polarity

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In Danckaert (2013), the Latin particle *quidem* was analysed as a marker of emphatic affirmative polarity. Building on this proposal, the present paper elaborates on the pragmatic properties of this element. It is argued that *quidem* is not a neutral but a so-called ‘presuppositional’ polarity marker, which confirms a proposition which (i) is already part of the common ground but (ii) was not overtly spelled out in the (immediately) preceding context. In more formal terms, I propose that *quidem* gives rise to the conventional implicature that the speaker assumes that the content of his message might already by known to the addressee, or that it conveys information that the latter expects to hear or read. As such, *quidem* can be considered a “lexical marker of common ground”, in the sense of Fetzer and Fischer (2007).

**Keywords**: presuppositional polarity, grounding, discourse markers, Latin, conventional implicatures

1. **Introduction: getting to know *quidem***

This study is concerned with the Latin discourse marker *quidem*, a notoriously versatile element which in English is variously translated as ‘indeed’, ‘certainly’, ‘in fact’ or ‘admittedly’. Despite having received quite some attention in the recent (and less recent) literature (see esp. Solodow’s 1978 monograph), the meaning and function of *quidem* remain until today ill-understood. The main aim of this paper is to elucidate under which pragmatic conditions *quidem* can be used felicitously. Before starting the discussion, I first


The bottom line of Kroon’s approach to *quidem* is that the particle’s main function is to structure the discourse. Against the backdrop of a framework that assumes that longer stretches of discourse can be decomposed into smaller units which do not necessarily correspond to single syntactic units (say sentences or clauses), *quidem* is argued to signal that a given discourse unit is autonomous, but that it does not on its own constitute a complete, self-contained piece of information. Under this view, *quidem* explicitly articulates the discourse not only by setting apart a unit from its surrounding context, but also by linking it to another unit, which can either follow or precede the *quidem*-unit.

Kroon distinguishes three levels of analysis, viz., acts, moves and (in interactional contexts) exchanges. To illustrate this system, consider the short exchange in (1), from Kroon (2011, 183):

(1) Speaker 1: I have to go home. So let’s make a new appointment.
Speaker 2: But it’s only ten o’clock!

The hierarchical discourse structure of this fragment can be represented as in (2):

(2) I have to go home. ———— act$_1$ ———— move$_1$
    
    So let’s make a new appointment. ———— act$_2$ ————
    exchange
    But it’s only ten o’clock! ———— move$_2$

In the present context, the most interesting aspect of this analysis is the fact that the two sentences uttered by Speaker 1 together constitute one single (but complex) discourse move, consisting of two separate discourse acts. Kroon (2001, 185-186) suggests that *quidem* occurs in a discourse act which is part of a complex discourse move. More particularly:

 [...] the particle *quidem* [...] indicates that its host unit is informationally not complete and needs, for its proper interpretation, another piece of information with which it forms a conceptual whole [...]. Signalling conceptual incompleteness, as *quidem* does, seems especially opportune when the component parts of the conceptual whole are divided over separate communicative units, as is the case in example ((3)): 
Spelling out the Obvious: Latin *quidem* and Presuppositional Polarity

(3) consul [...] suos *quidem* a fuga reuocavit; 
ipse [...] missili traiectus cecidit.

`the consul did indeed rally his men from their flight; but he himself ... fell struck with a javelin` (= Liv. 41.18.11)

In this example quoted by Kroon, the description of the consul’s two actions consists of two discourse acts, which together constitute a single-but-complex move. In Kroon’s analysis, the occurrence of *quidem* in the first act signals the fact that the end of this clause does not coincide with the end of the larger move, but that additional information will be supplied to complete this first message.

Perhaps the most novel aspect of Kroon’s approach to *quidem* is the fact that she does not assume the particle to be endowed with any semantic content. Put differently, the fact that *quidem* in (3) is translated as ‘indeed’ is not to be taken to reflect an inherent property of *quidem*. Rather, the way this element is rendered in modern translations is variable and largely context-bound, whereas the sole core property of *quidem* is its discourse-structuring function.

It is not clear however whether Kroon’s analysis is tenable. For instance, in the particular case of (3), it is questionable whether *quidem* is at all needed to signal the tight bond between the two described events. One could argue that this relationship is sufficiently established (i) by the fact that two “acts” share the same subject (viz., the *consul*), (ii) as well as by the contrast between *suos* ‘his men’ and *ipse* ‘(he) himself’, which belong to one and the same reference set (‘the set of all Roman soldiers taking part in the battle against the Ligurians’). In addition, there is evidence that the lexical entry of *quidem* does in fact contain a semantic component, and by this token, that the function of *quidem* is not (purely) discourse-organizational. First, it is standardly assumed that *quidem* is a focus particle, which does more than structure the discourse. Second, it has recently been claimed that *quidem* also denotes (emphatic) affirmative polarity: this last point was proposed by Danckaert (2013), whose account is summarized in the following section.

1.2 Danckaert (2013)

As a starting point Danckaert (2013) takes the standard assumption that *quidem* is somehow ‘emphatic’ (see for instance Oxford Latin Dictionary, s.v. *quidem*: ‘particularizing and emphasizing a preceding word or phrase’; Solodow [1978, 13]: ‘*quidem* essentially emphasizes’). Translating this intuition into modern linguistic terms, one can say that *quidem* is a focus particle. In addition, and departing from the *communis opinio*, I make
two novel claims, namely (i) that syntactically, *quidem* always is a propositional focus operator rather than a particle inducing constituent focus, and (ii) that the basic semantic value of *quidem* is one of emphatic (focal) affirmative polarity. As the present paper is mainly concerned with the meaning rather than with the syntactic behaviour of *quidem*, here I will only elaborate on the claim that *quidem* is a polarity item.

In the languages of the world, there is a well known discrepancy between negative and affirmative polarity, in that the latter, unlike the former, is usually not expressed by means of overt morphology (Horn 2001: Chapter 3). This contrast is illustrated in (4a–b):

(4) a. John did **not** kiss Mary.  negative polarity: overt  
   b. John kissed Mary.  regular affirmative polarity: covert  
   c. John **DID** Kiss Mary.  emphatic affirmative polarity: overt

However, as shown in (4c), some expressions of affirmative polarity are in fact encoded overtly: these cases typically involve some type of emphatic affirmation rather than a neutral assertion. Danckaert (2013) suggests that *quidem* is such a marker of emphatic affirmative polarity. This claim ties in with (but is clearly distinct from) the standard view which says that *quidem* is a pure focus marker (Adams 1994; Spevak 2010).

Examples like (5), in which *quidem* is contrastively juxtaposed to *non* ‘not’, constitute a first piece of evidence in favour of the view that *quidem* is a polarity item. In this example, *quidem* indicates that the event expressed in its host clause **did** happen, in contrast with the event in the following clause, which did not (cf. *non*) happen:

(5) Eum uero, qui telum *quidem* miserit, sed *non* uulnerauerit, correptum rotatumque sternit nec uulnerat.  

   ‘He got hold of any man who threw a missile at him without actually wounding him, he swung him around but did not wound him.’ (= Plin. Nat. 8.51)

Assuming that the opposite of negation is affirmation, it seems logical to conclude that *quidem* in (5) encodes affirmative polarity. A second piece of evidence for this conclusion comes from a specific syntactic environment in which *quidem* frequently occurs, namely the construction called “epitaxis” in Rosén (2008). An example is given in (6):

(6) Decessit Corellius Rufus et *quidem* sponte.  

   ‘Corellius Rufus has died, and he did so by his own wish.’ (Plin. Ep. 1.12.1)

The phenomenon of epitaxis involves coordination of two sentences, the second of which is partially elided and only contains a sentence-modifying particle (optionally) and a single focalized constituent (obligatorily). Crucially, in the syntactic literature it has been claimed that this optional particle typically encodes affirmative or negative polarity (Merchant
2003; Winkler 2005). Finally, from the fact that *quidem* frequently co-occurs with modal adverbs like *certe*, *sane* and *profecto*, it was concluded in Danckaert (2013) that *quidem* does not have any modal force.

1.3 Outline of the upcoming analysis

In what follows, I adopt the syntactic and semantic proposals concerning the scope and the polar force of *quidem* made in Danckaert (2013). The main aim of this paper is to supplement these proposals by investigating in which pragmatic contexts *quidem* can be used felicitously. Recall that I am assuming that *quidem* is a propositional operator. Throughout the paper, I will refer to the proposition that functions as the argument of such operators as the operator’s “prejacent”. The research question addressed thus concerns the pragmatic status of the prejacent of *quidem*.

The core idea is that *quidem* gives rise to what Grice (1975) called a “conventional implicature”, i.e., a non-cancellable implicature which is automatically generated whenever a given lexical item is used. As I will argue in sections 4 and 5, the nature of this implicature is related to the information status of the proposition modified by *quidem*. To be more precise, I take *quidem* to signal that a given proposition is part of the common ground without having been uttered explicitly in the (immediately) previous discourse. This makes *quidem* a member of the class of so-called “presuppositional” polarity markers, which at a pragmatic level mainly function as a grounding device.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I offer some general background, focusing on issues of information structure at the level of the entire proposition. Next, I introduce the phenomenon of presuppositional polarity (section 3). I then turn to the actual analysis of *quidem*. In a first stage (section 4), I look at collocation patterns where *quidem* co-occurs with an element that overtly signals that a given proposition is hearer-old information. Finally, in section 5 I discuss a number of examples where no such additional element is present, but where the discourse status of the proposition modified by *quidem* can be deduced from the surrounding context.

2. Felicity conditions on the use of focal and polar expressions

As a starting point, I take the observation that not all propositions can be uttered felicitously without some amount of contextualization, i.e., in a so-called “out-of-the-blue” situation. Interestingly, both polarity markers and foci are known to be pragmatically odd when used at the very beginning of a conversation. The goal of this section is to determine the pragmatic status of the proposition associated with a focal or polar expression.
2.1 Background: what can be uttered out-of-the-blue?

Consider first the examples in (7) (taken from Horn 2001, 71–72, who refers to Ducrot 1973 and Givón 1978):

(7)  
\begin{align*}
a. & \text{ My wife is pregnant.} \\
b. & \text{ My wife is not pregnant.}
\end{align*}

The affirmative statement in (7a) can be uttered without too much context: if a man enters a room and communicates the happy news in (7a), it is likely that he will just be met with congratulations. In contrast, (7b) is odd at best when used to open a conversation: likely reactions include “Oh, but was she supposed to?” or “I didn’t know that you were planning to have a baby”. Intuitively, this negative statement seems to require some previous mention about (the possibility of) the speaker’s wife being pregnant.

Focus behaves very much like negation. For instance, only the neutral utterance in (8a) requires no special contextualization. Examples containing a focalized constituent, like the OSV-clause in (8b) and the object cleft in (8c), are much less felicitous without some previous mention of John and his kissing somebody else than Mary (whence the #-sign):

(8)  
\begin{align*}
a. & \text{ You know what? John just kissed Mary!} \\
b. & \# \text{ You know what? MARY John just kissed!} \\
c. & \# \text{ You know what? It’s Mary that John just kissed!}
\end{align*}

A perhaps somewhat more realistic illustration can be given with a “real life” example. The following short exchange is taken from Birner and Ward (1998, 33):

(9)  
\begin{align*}
\text{Customer: } & \text{ Can I get a bagel?} \\
\text{Waitress: } & \text{ No, sorry. We’re out of bagels. A bran muffin I can give you.}
\end{align*}

In the waitress’ reply, the direct object a bran muffin appears in a non-canonical, fronted position. In order for this word order pattern to be felicitous, a context is needed in which the preposed element is part of a set of comparable items, one of which has already been mentioned in the previous discourse.\(^8\) In the muffin example, a preposed direct object is pragmatically odd without any mention of any other baked breakfast good with which muffins can be contrasted:

(10)  
\begin{align*}
\text{Customer: } & \text{ I’m not sure what I should have for breakfast. What’s on offer today?} \\
\text{Waitress: } & \# \text{ A bran muffin I can give you.} \\
& \checkmark \text{ I can give you a bran muffin.}
\end{align*}
Other marked word order patterns are associated with different felicity conditions, but the principle is always the same: out-of-the-blue contexts typically prefer the canonical “discourse neutral” word order.

To return to Latin *quidem*, recall that this particle is assumed to have both polar and focal force. We therefore predict that *quidem* can only operate on propositions which do not convey brand new information. As will be shown below, this prediction is indeed borne out: *quidem* typically modifies a proposition which is already part of the common ground. Importantly however, as has repeatedly been observed in the literature, not all propositions in the common ground have the same pragmatic status. Thus Fetzer and Fischer (2007, 1):

> Recent research has shown that the content of utterances cannot be assumed to enter the common ground only because of the fact that they are being mentioned. Rather, grounding is a complex, sophisticated mechanism in which minimal signals play key roles [...].

In other words, some propositions are part of the common ground by virtue of the fact that they have been uttered explicitly, whereas others aren’t: the latter are merely “inferable”. As will be argued at length in sections 4 and 5, in the particular case of *quidem* there appears to be a special requirement saying that this proposition be not explicitly mentioned in the immediately preceding context.

### 2.2 The discourse status of propositions

In a seminal paper, Prince (1981) proposes a taxonomy of old and given information, which is later elaborated by Prince (1986, 1992), Birner (1997, 2006a,b) and Birner and Ward (1998). These studies mainly concentrate on the pragmatics of noun phrases. Works devoted to possible information states of propositions include Dryer (1996) (on focal operators) and Kaiser (2004) (on propositions containing a marker of emphatic polarity). Fully conscious of the fact that more fine-grained distinctions can be made, I will assume that old information comes in two kinds, namely old information that has been mentioned explicitly, and old information that hasn’t. The former I will call “discourse-old”, the latter “hearer-old”. This yields three different types of information status: (i) discourse-old information, (ii) hearer-old information and (iii) brand new information. This is summarized in Table 1:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>OLD</th>
<th>NEW</th>
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<td>(is already part of the common)</td>
<td>(updates the common ground)</td>
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### Table 1: Three types of information status
I will now have a closer look at the properties of these three categories. Since this paper is concerned with the information status of propositions, I will leave aside the discourse status of noun phrases.

Propositions that convey brand new information (“all focus sentences”) update the common ground with information which has not explicitly been mentioned earlier, and cannot be inferred from anything that has been said. As we saw earlier (section 2.1), they typically exhibit the so-called discourse neutral or canonical word order.

In contrast, discourse-old propositions have been uttered explicitly in the previous discourse. An example of a proposition that is typically discourse-old is the prejacent of a polarity reversing marker of emphatic polarity (of the type briefly mentioned in section 1.2.2). For instance, the Dutch contrastive affirmative particle *wel* requires its prejacent to be discourse-old:

\[(11)\]

A: Jan heeft Repelsteeltje niet gezien.
   ‘Jan didn’t see Rumpelstiltskin.’

B: Niet waar! Jan heeft Repelsteeltje *wel* gezien.
   ‘That’s not true! Jan DID see Rumpelstiltskin.’

The third and final category is the most interesting one for our purposes. Above, the common ground was defined as a set of propositions shared by both speaker and hearer. However, there are good reasons to assume that this definition is subject to contextual restrictions: not all propositions known or believed by speaker and hearer are always present in the common ground in every single conversation between the two speakers involved. Imagine for instance a situation in which John and Mary talk about a game of football, say Manchester United - Chelsea. Imagine furthermore that both John and Mary know that Rome is the capital of Italy. Despite the fact that this latter proposition qualifies as shared knowledge, it is quite unlikely that the proposition ‘Rome is the capital of Italy’ is part of the common ground while John and Mary discuss the abovementioned football game. However, this state of affairs can easily change, for instance when the discussion shifts from the English Premier League to the upcoming World Cup, to be held in Italy. Bill had told Mary a couple of weeks earlier that he was considering to buy tickets for a game of the English national team, which is set to take place in Rome. Mary now asks John about his plans:

\[(12)\]

Mary: Weren’t you planning to buy tickets for a match in Rome?
John: No, I changed my mind. Capitals are too expensive. I got tickets for a game in Naples in the end.

From this little exchange, it becomes clear that both John and Mary know that Rome is the capital of Italy. However, at no point this was mentioned explicitly. Still, it seems to be part of the common ground. Crucially, it only enters the common ground when the topic of conversation changes from the national football competition to the championship in Italy. In other words, at some point the relevant proposition is “activated” (in Dryer’s 1996 sense), presumably through some process of associative inference (Ariel 1989). In the remainder of this paper, I will refer to propositions that enter the common ground without having been uttered explicitly as “hearer-old” propositions (borrowing Prince’s 1992 terminology).

Before we proceed, it is important to point out that the picture presented in Table 1 is only an idealization. In reality, the typology of given and old information is presumably much more fine-grained (see Dryer 1996). Having provided a rough typology of possible information states of propositions, I now turn to a special class of polarity markers, which is very selective as to the pragmatic properties of their prejacent.

3. Introducing presuppositional polarity

In this section, I introduce a class of emphatic polarity markers which require their prejacent to be hearer-old (i.e., be part of the common ground, but not mentioned explicitly in the preceding stretch of discourse). In the literature, polarity markers that are subject to this special felicity condition are usually called “presuppositional” (perhaps a bit unfortunately so). In the following sections, I illustrate this phenomenon with some examples from Italian, Spanish and German. Additional literature can be found in Zanuttini (1997, 67–84, on a number of Northern Italian dialects), Schwenter (2003, 2005, on Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese respectively) and Kaiser (2004, on Finnish).

3.1 Some case studies

An example of a negative presuppositional element is the Italian negative particle mica, which is discussed in detail in Cinque (1991 [1976]). mica either co-occurs with non, the neutral marker of sentential negation in Italian (as in (13a), from Cinque 1991 [1976], 314–315), or it appears on its own (13b):

(13) a. Non è mica freddo, qua dentro.

‘It is not cold in here.’
b. Mica fa freddo.
   ‘It is not cold.’

Importantly, the examples in (13° can only be used felicitously as a reply to (14a), not to (14b). From the former, it can reasonably be inferred that it might be cold, since putting on jackets typically happens in that particular circumstance. However, mica cannot be used to directly contradict an explicit claim:

(14) a. Mi dovrei mettere la giacca.
   ‘I should put my jacket on.’

In other words, mica can only cancel an implicit expectation, or in our terminology, a hearer-old proposition. Thus Cinque (1991 [1976], 314, emphasis as in the original):

La mia tesi è che, affiancando il mica al semplice non, il parlante vuol negare una aspettativa da parte di qualcuno piuttosto che una asserzione. Mica, cioè, ha un contenuto puramente presupposizionale [fn omitted ld]. Nelle affermative, il ‘qualcuno’ è un generico (comprendente sia il parlante che l’interlocutore) o l’interlocutore stesso. (“My thesis is that, when comparing mica to regular non, the speaker wants to negate somebody’s expectation rather than somebody’s assertion. Mica therefore has a purely presuppositional content. In affirmative propositions, ‘somebody’ is to be understood as a generic term (possibly either the speaker or the interlocutor) or the interlocutor himself.”)

The Spanish particle bien can be considered the positive counterpart of Italian mica. According to Hernanz (2007, 142), “bien cancels an implicit, and hence not overtly formulated, negative expectation”. Consider for instance the exchange in (15) (from Hernanz 2007, 142). On the basis of (15a-b), one might reasonably expect that Pepito does not eat pasta. However, this hypothesis is not uttered in the discourse. As shown in (15c), bien can be used to cancel this expectation:

   ‘Pepito is very thin.’

b. A: Pepito detesta la cocina italiana.
   ‘Pepito hates Italian cooking.’

c. B: ¡(Pues) bien come pasta (Pepito)!
   ‘But Pepito indeed eats pasta’. (approx.)
The constraint that this negative expectation be implicit is quite strict: *bien* cannot be felicitously used in a corrective reply to an explicitly uttered statement (Hernanz 2011, 31, her (28a,c)):

(16)  
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| a. | A: | La soprano *no* ha cantado.  
    |    | ‘The soprano didn’t sing.’ |
| b. | B: | *Bien* ha cantado la soprano.  
    |    | intended: ‘(But) the soprano DID sing.’ |

Furthermore, it is important to make a distinction between focal polarity on the one hand, and presuppositional polarity on the other. The difference between these two “marked” manifestations of sentential polarity can be illustrated by contrasting Spanish *bien* to its emphatic but non-presuppositional counterpart *sí*. A short exchange involving the latter is given in (17), in which it is shown that *sí* can contradict a previously uttered negative utterance:

(17)  
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| a. | A: | La soprano *no* ha cantado.  
    |    | ‘The soprano didn’t sing.’ |
| b. | B: | *Sí* ha cantado la soprano.  
    |    | ‘(But) the soprano DID sing.’ |

On the other hand, emphatic *sí* cannot be used to reverse the polarity of an implicit negative statement. As shown in (18), *sí* cannot contradict the inference that Pepito does not eat pasta, which can be drawn from A’s utterance in (18a):

(18)  
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<pre><code>|    | ‘Pepito hates Italian cooking.’ |
</code></pre>
| b. | B: | ¡(Pues) *bien* come pasta (Pepito)!  
    |    | ‘But Pepito indeed eats pasta’. (approx.) |
| c. |   | *Sí* come pasta Pepito.  
    |    | ‘But Pepito DOES eat pasta.’ |

From this, we can conclude that in Spanish, markers of affirmative emphatic polarity come in two kinds, namely a presuppositional (*bien*) and a non-presuppositional one (*sí*). This state of affairs is schematically represented in (19):

(19)  
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td><em>bien</em></td>
<td>[+Affirmative, +Emphatic, +Presuppositional]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td><em>sí</em></td>
<td>[+Affirmative, +Emphatic]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, both *bien* and *sí* are very selective when it comes to choosing a proposition to operate on: *bien* only wants a hearer-old proposition as its argument, whereas *sí*, much like
Dutch *wel* (cf. above), requires its prejacent to be discourse-old. Without going into further detail, suffice it to say that not every marker of emphatic polarity is presuppositional.\(^9\)

### 3.2 Discussion: asserting and implying

The denotation of both Italian *mica* and the Spanish *bien* can be said to consist of two parts. One the one hand, it contains a statement about the truth (*bien*) or falsity (*mica*) of a proposition, and on the other hand, a pragmatic specification is added to this. More specifically, something is said about the information status of the proposition. In both cases, the information status aimed at corresponds closely to the category of ‘hearer-old’ propositions identified in section 2.2.

What I would like to suggest is that these two meaning components are situated at two different levels of meaning. Whereas the first is essentially descriptive or truth-conditional semantic, I take the second to be pragmatic (or ‘expressive’, in the sense of Kratzer 1999) in nature. Furthermore, as the pragmatic import of presuppositional polarity markers seems to be fairly constant and predictable (i.e., not context-dependent), we are most likely dealing with a so-called conventional implicature, which, as the name suggests, is a fully conventionalized implicature associated with a particular lexical item (Grice 1975). With this under our belt, we can return to *quidem*.

### 3.3 *Quidem* as a marker of presuppositional polarity

We are now in a position to provide a pragmatic characterization of the prejacent of *quidem* in terms of the typology of information states introduced above. The claim is that this prejacent always constitutes hearer-old (inferable) information. Less frequently, it is “deactivated” discourse-old information, i.e., information which has been mentioned a good while before the statement containing *quidem* is uttered (cf. section 4.2 below). Put differently, the proposition modified by *quidem* is always in a broad sense known or accessible to the hearer, despite the fact that it has not been evoked in the immediately preceding discourse. This makes *quidem* a presuppositional polarity marker. On a par with the elements discussed in the previous section, we can say that the denotation of *quidem* consists of (i) a purely lexical, truth-conditional meaning component, which consists of a(n emphatic) affirmation of a proposition \( p \) (Danckaert 2013) and (ii) pragmatic component which takes the shape of a conventional implicature and says that \( p \) constitutes information that the speaker supposes to be known to the addressee. More formally:

\[
\text{(20) The expression ‘QUIDEM (p)’, where p is a proposition,}
\]
\[
a. \text{ asserts that p is true and}
\]
b. conventionally implies that the content of p is hearer-old or deactivated discourse-old information.

The remainder of this paper consists of a number of empirical arguments in support of the second part of (20). First, I look at contexts where the conventional implicature associated with *quidem* is overtly spelled out by an expression that independently signals that a given piece of information is already known. The givenness signalling elements that I discuss are two types of parenthetical clauses (sections 4.1 and 4.2), conjunctions introducing presupposed adverbial clauses (section 4.3) and the discourse marker *nam* (section 4.4). Next (section 5), I turn to cases of “bare” *quidem*, where only the surrounding context can help us to elucidate the information status of the proposition in which *quidem* occurs.

4. *Quidem* and hearer-old information: Evidence from collocation patterns

As was noted in Kroon (2005), *quidem* frequently occurs in parentheticals, which can informally be defined as (often clausal) constituents which occur inside a host clause, but are only loosely integrated in the latter (they typically are endowed with independent illocutionary force). Parentheticals can perform many functions, but they often serve to structure the discourse (see for instance Bassarak 1987, and the contributions to Dehé and Kavalova [eds.] 2007). In what follows, I look at the behaviour of *quidem* in two types of Latin parentheticals.

4.1 Parentheticals I: Hearer-old information

The first type of parenthetical which can readily be found in co-occurrence with *quidem* is a class of *ut*-clauses that overtly signal that a given piece of information is already known to the hearer. A nice example comes from Cicero’s *Brutus*:

(21) *quem studebat imitari L. Afranius poeta, homo perargutus, in fabulis *quidem* etiam, *ut scitis, disertus.*

‘The poet L. Afranius tried to imitate him (sc. Gaius Titius ld): Afranius was a very witty man, and, as you know, very eloquent in his plays.’ (= Cic. Brut. 167)

In this fragment, the speaker points out that he supposes his interlocutor to know that Afranius was an excellent playwright. However, it is the very first (and actually also the only) time that Afranius is mentioned in the entire work. As we saw above, these two properties, namely (i) not having been evoked explicitly but (ii) still being known by the hearer, are the hallmark of hearer-old information. In this particular case, the prejacent of
*quidem* qualifies as “given” information by virtue of the fact Brutus is a man of wide reading, who doesn’t need any instruction about which authors are good and which ones aren’t. A similar example from the same author is given in (22):

(22) Nuper *quidem*, *ut scitis*, me ad regiam paene confecit.
    ‘Recently, as you know, it almost caused my destruction, near the King’s House.’ (= Cic. Mil. 37)

In this case as well, the incident at the *regia* has not been mentioned before, at no point in the 36 preceding paragraphs. However, the parenthetical clause indicates that the speaker assumes his audience to be well aware of what had happened, to the effect that *quidem* can be assumed to modify a hearer-old proposition. Two additional examples about which very similar remarks can be made are given in (23)–(24):

(23) C. Curtius Mithres est ille *quidem*, *ut scis*, libertus Postumi, familiarissimi mei, sed me colit et obseruat aequa atque illum ipsum patronum suum.
    ‘C. Curtius Mithres is, as you know, that freedman of my good friend Postumus, but he pays as much respect and attention to me as to his former master.’ (= Cic. Fam. 13.69.1)

(24) me *quidem* semper, *uti scitis*, adversarium multitudinis temeritati haec fecit praeclarissima causa popularem.
    ‘This very case has made me a man of the people, although, as you know, I used to oppose to the boldness of the mob.’ (= Cic. Phil. 7.4)

I take the ‘as you know’ parentheticals to lend some initial support to the claim that *quidem* modifies hearer-old propositions. However, at this point some discussion is in order about the division of labour between the lexical semantics of *quidem* and its pragmatic meaning. As pointed out above (section 3.3), I take it that the lexical semantics of *quidem* only give rise to the assertion that a proposition p is indeed true, whereas I assume that its pragmatic meaning component, which requires that p be hearer-old information, is a conventional implicature. So what is the difference between *quidem* and the parenthetical clauses in the examples in (21)–(24), which both seem to convey that we are dealing with hearer-old information? I would like to submit that the latter do not implicate but assert that a given proposition is hearer-old information, without triggering any conventional implicature (*pace* Potts 2002, 2005). When *quidem* and an *ut scis* parenthetical co-occur, it is *quidem* that gives rise to an implicature, and the *ut*-clause that overtly spells out this implicature. Crucially, *quidem* doesn’t need such an explicit element to make its implied meaning come across, provided that the latter is judged by the speaker to be sufficiently clear. Consider for instance (25), which is only minimally different from (22) above:
Crebras exspectationes nobis tui commoues. Nuper quidem, cum te iam aduentare arbitraremur, repente abs te in mensem Quintilem reiecti sumus. Nunc uero censeo, quod commodo tuo facere poteris, uenias ad id tempus quod scribis.

‘You keep on raising our expectations of seeing you; then recently, when I thought that you were about to arrive, you postponed a visit to me until July. Now I do think that you should keep your promise and come as soon as is convenient for you.’ (= Cic. Att. 1.4.1)

In this example, Cicero’s using *quidem* is arguably licensed by the fact that Atticus (i.e., the addressee) is well aware that he has postponed a visit. To all likelihood, he had announced this himself in one of his previous letters. In such a case, adding an ‘as you know’ parenthetical would presumably be totally superfluous. However, note that *quidem* itself cannot be felicitously omitted. If it weren’t present, the information about the delayed visit would be presented to Atticus as brand new, which it obviously isn’t. Therefore, in order to avoid a reaction like ‘why are you telling me this? I knew this, it was I who wrote this to you!’ Cicero inserts *quidem* (‘yes, I know that you know this, I’m just reminding you’). An *ut scis* parenthetical (with or without *quidem*) probably would have encoded this message too directly.\(^\text{10}\)

I now turn to a second collocation pattern, namely one in which *quidem* co-occurs with parentheticals which also show that a given proposition is hearer-old, albeit in a less straightforward way.

**4.2 Parentheticals II: Deactivated discourse-old information**

Recall from the discussion in section 2.2.3 that I do not suppose the distinction between discourse-old and hearer-old information to be an absolute one. Rather, some propositions in the common ground are more activated or prominent than others. It should therefore come as no surprise that we also find instances of *quidem* that appear with a proposition that actually *has* been evoked explicitly. However, in these examples as well, it seems clear that the proposition modified by *quidem* has not been evoked in the *immediately preceding* context. In almost all of the cases, we can even be sure that there is a considerable distance between the moment a proposition is first mentioned and the moment it is repeated, accompanied by *quidem*. A first example comes from Pliny the Elder:

(26) *seriores supra dictis aliquanto narcissus et lilium trans maria, in Italia quidem, ut diximus, post rosam. uerum in Graecia tardius etiamnum anemone.*
‘Somewhat later than the flowers just mentioned come, overseas, the narcissus and the lily, which in Italy, as we have said, come after the rose. But in Greece, the anemone appears even later.’ (= Plin. Nat. 21.64)

In this example, Pliny mentions for the second time that in Italy, lilies bloom later than roses. The first time this fact was mentioned was quite a bit earlier, namely in paragraph 22 of the same book. Now, given the considerable distance between these two passages, it is not unlikely that even the more careful reader has already forgotten about this botanical detail by the time (s)he reaches paragraph 64.

The examples in (27) and (28) illustrate the same usage of *quidem*. In (27), Celsus repeats an instruction concerning the removal of a specific type of tunic. This time, the earlier mentioning was 5 paragraphs earlier (viz., in 7.19.3):

(27) *Quamcumque autem tunicam quis uiolauit, illam quoque debet excidere: ac mediam *quidem*, ut supra dixi, quam altissime ad inguen. imam autem, paulo infra.*

‘But whenever somebody damages a tunic, he has to cut it away as well: the middle tunic, as I said above, as high up to the groin as possible, and the inner one a bit lower.’ (= Cels. 7.19.8)

Finally, in the third example of this type Quintus Curtius picks up information that had already been mentioned a bit earlier, namely in 7.3.19–22 (the actual crossing takes place in paragraph 7.3.22):

(28) *Alexander Caucasum *quidem*, ut supra dictum est, transierat, sed inopia frumenti quoque prope ad famem uentum erat.*

‘Alexander had crossed the Caucasus, as was said above, but through lack of grain he was close to starvation.’ (= Curt. 7.4.22)

What the speaker (or author) does in all of these three cases is remind the hearer (or reader) about a given piece of information. Moreover, by inserting *quidem*, he manages to do this in a polite way. By bluntly repeating twice the same information, the speaker might give the impression that he supposes his addressee to have a bad memory. On the other hand, adding *quidem* suggests that the speaker supposes the message to be known, or at least not unfamiliar.

A slightly different set of examples is given in (29)–(32), all from Cicero’s correspondence. In each example, Cicero picks up a topic that his addressee had brought up in an earlier letter (Atticus in the first three examples, Appius Pulcher in the fourth; cf. also the discussion of example (25) above). This is overtly signalled by the parenthetical *ut scribis* (‘as you write’):
(29) colloquere tu *quidem* cum Silio, *ut scribis*, sed urge.
‘You shall indeed talk to Silius, as you write, but hurry on.’ (= Cic. Att. 13.5.1)

(30) *sed nunc quidem*, *ut scribis*, non utrumuis.
‘But this time indeed we are not free to choose, as you write.’ (= Cic. Att. 14.19.1)

(31) *sed et haec et alia coram, hodie quidem*, *ut scribis*, aut cras.
‘But these and other things we will discuss personally, today, as you write, or tomorrow.’ (= Cic. Att. 15.22)

(32) *uideo enim et pericula leuiora quam timebam et maiora praesidia, si quidem*, *ut scribis*, omnes uires ciuitatis se ad Pompei ductum applicauerunt, [...].
‘I see that the dangers are smaller than I feared, and that our resources are bigger, if indeed, as you wrote me, all forces of the state have united themselves under Pompey’s leadership.’ (= Cic. Fam. 3.11.4)

In these cases the distance between first and second mention of the same information is even bigger, since it spans two different texts. Still, as it is his addressee who is responsible for introducing the relevant proposition into the common ground, Cicero has all reason to assume the information that he repeats in his own letter to be familiar to this addressee. By this token, the second mentioning can felicitously be accompanied by *quidem*.

Next, I turn to a completely different type of item that signals that a given proposition constitutes (hearer-)old information, namely a special class of adverbial subordinators.

4.3 “Peripheral” adverbial clauses

In this section, I discuss the behaviour of *quidem* in a special class of adverbial clauses, namely those that invariably convey discourse-old or hearer-old information or, in other words, whose content does not update the common ground. This type of adverbial clause has been shown to be available in many languages, and has also received a lot of attention in the literature on Latin (Fugier 1989; Pinkster 1990, 34–36, 2009, 2010; Mellet 1995; Danckaert 2012, 79–83). I will refer to these clauses as “peripheral” (as opposed to “central”) adverbial clauses (Pinkster 1972, 1990; Haegeman 2010). Consider for instance the pair in (33) (and observe that the second *because*-clause is set off from the main clause by a comma):

(33) a. Federer ended his career *[because he was getting old]*.
    b. John must be at home, *[because the lights are on]*.

Both bracketed clauses are causal adverbial clauses, but they have quite different properties. Interpretively, the first *because*-clause simply states the reason why the event...
expressed in the main clause came about: there is a causal relation between a tennis player getting older and his decision to retire. (33b) on the other hand illustrates a different type of because-clause, which is sometimes called an “epistemic” causal clause. Differently from (33a), this type of clause states the reason why the speaker is confident about the assertion made in the main clause. Importantly, there is no direct causal relation between John’s being home and the fact that the lights are on: the latter state of affairs did not cause the former. A major difference between the two types of causal clauses is that only the epistemic type can be introduced by the given that (which literally says that the information to follow is known or inferable). For most speakers, the connectives since (in its causal use) also only introduces clauses of the peripheral type:

(34) a. *Federer ended his career [given/since he was getting old].
    b. John must be at home, [given/since that the lights are on].

Very similar is the contrast between the two conditionals in (35).

(35) a. Federer will win the match [if he serves well].
    b. John must be really hungry, [if he has only been eating salads the last two weeks].

The “real” conditional in (35a) simply provides a condition that needs to be fulfilled in order for Federer to win his match. Peripheral conditionals (called “indirect” conditionals in Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech and Svartvik 1985, 1088-1089) also provide a condition, but not one related to the event expressed by the main clause. Instead, they name the condition that needs to be fulfilled in order for the speaker’s assertion in the main clause to be felicitous. Differently from causal connectives, in the case of the conditionals there is only one lexical item that can introduce the two types of clauses. However, there are other ways to distinguish them. For instance, only pseudoconditionals can be modified by adverbials like indeed or as you say (the latter not being used parenthetically):

(36) a. *Federer will win the match [if indeed/as you say he serves well].
    b. John is probably really hungry, [if indeed/as you say he has only been eating salads the last two weeks].

The two types of adverbial clauses can be distinguished in Latin as well (see Fugier 1989; Pinkster 1990, 34–36, 2009, 2010; Bolkestein 1991; Mellet 1995). Causal clauses provide a very interesting case: apart from polysemous subordinators like cum and quod, Latin also has two specialized conjunctions: quia can only introduce central causal clauses, whereas quoniam and (causal) quando always introduce a clause of the peripheral type (at least in the classical period; cf. Mellet 1995). The two types are illustrated in (37)–(38):
(37) Nam [quia dentibus carent], aut lambunt cibos, aut integros hauriunt.  
‘Because they [sc. flat fish] have no teeth, they either lick up their food or swallow 
it whole’. (= Col. 8.17.11)

(38) [Quoniam de frumentis abunde praecepimus], de leguminibus deinceps disseramus.  
‘Since we gave sufficient instructions about cereals, let’s now discuss pulses’. (= Col.  
2.10.1)

The *quia*-clause in the first example states the reason why flat fish have to suck up or 
swallow their food: they have no teeth. No such relation of cause and effect holds between 
the two clauses in (38): it doesn’t follow from having said enough about cereals that one 
should go on to discuss pulses.

In any event, the most important difference between peripheral (or thematic) 
adverbial clauses and their central counterparts is that that only the latter can (but need not) 
update the common ground. Instead, peripheral adverbial clauses contain discourse-old or 
(inferable) hearer-old information and are thus predicted to be compatible with *quidem*.

The *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Glare 1968) lists two lexicalized combinations 
“subordinating conjunction + *quidem*”, namely, *siquidem* and *quandoquidem*. *Quando* was 
identified above as a conjunction that typically introduces a peripheral adverbial clause. *Si* 
on the other hand can introduce both clauses of the central and the peripheral type: Latin, as 
many other languages, did not have a specialized conjunction to introduce 
pseudoconditionals. Leaving aside *siquidem* for the moment, I will first look at 
conjunctions that unambiguously introduce either central or peripheral adverbial clauses.

I conducted a search on the digital database of Brepolis (www.brepolis.net). In all of 
the texts of the period ‘Antiquitas’ (which ranges from ca. 200 BC to ca. 200 AD), I looked 
for all the cases in which one of the conjunctions I selected (namely *quia* ‘because’, *donec* 
‘until’ and *antequam* ‘before’ for the central, and *quoniam* ‘because/since’ and *quando* 
‘because/since’ for the peripheral type) was immediately followed by *quidem*. The results 
are summarized in Table 2:

**Table 2:** Distribution of *quidem* in central and peripheral adverbial clauses
A clear picture emerges: *quidem* is readily allowed in peripheral adverbial clauses, but not in clauses of the central type, which can be interpreted to mean that *quidem* is interpretively incompatible with brand new or genuine discourse-old information.\(^{16}\)

A quick inspection of a number of examples confirms that the embedded proposition modified by *quidem* conveys hearer-old information, as predicted. For instance, the *quoniam*-clause in (39) communicates that warm temperatures provide more favourable conditions for living organisms to come into being than cold ones:

(39)  
\[
\text{Hae tot partes eius fertiles rerum habent quiddam teporis, quoniam \textit{quidem} sterile frigus est, calor gignit.}
\]

‘Many a part of this which can bear fruit is endowed with some warmth, given that cold is of course sterile and warmth gives life.’ (= Sen. Nat. 2.10.4)

Seneca no doubt considers this a general truth, which wouldn’t come as a surprise to his addressee. In my next example, the *quando*-clause provides background information to the main clause (‘yes, this subject has already been brought up’):

(40)  
\[
\text{Nunc aegritudinem si possimus depellamus. Id enim sit propositum, quando\textit{quidem}}
\]

\[
\text{eam tu uideri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo.}
\]

‘Let us now if we can, free ourselves from sadness, even though you proposed this subject, since you said that in your opinion sadness can fall upon a wise man, which I think is not true at all.’ (= Cic. Tusc. 3.25)

As it turns out, it was the addressee himself who proposed that the subject of *aegritudo* be discussed: we can therefore be confident that the content of the *quando*-clause was already known to the hearer when it was uttered.

A similar picture emerges for conditionals with *quidem*. Recall that *si* can introduce adverbial clauses of both types. However, in most of the cases in which *si* is combined with *quidem*, it seems best to interpret the conditional as a peripheral one. For instance, the *si*-clause in (41) is a not a real conditional, in which the polarity of a given proposition is at stake. Rather, the *si*-clause states the condition under which the conclusion drawn in the main clause is valid:
Sequitur igitur, ut etiam vitia sint paria, siquidem praeitites animi recte vitia dicuntur.

‘It follows then that all vices are equal, if it is correct to qualify the depravities of the mind as vices.’ (= Cic. Parad. 22)

The si-clause (‘depravities of the mind are vices’) does not contain anything unexpected, making the condition a rather trivial one. Similarly, the pseudoconditional in (42) can be translated as ‘if it is indeed the case that Baiae has become a healthy place’:

Gratulor Baiis nostris si quidem, ut scribis, salubres repente factae sunt.

‘I congratulate our Baiae, if indeed, as you write, it has become a healthy place.’ (= Cic. Fam. 9.12.1)

Observe that the si-clause in this last example contains the parenthetical ut scribis,17 which as we saw overtly signals that a given piece information is hearer-old.

4.4 Nam

A fourth and final element that often can be found in the same context as quidem is the discourse marker nam. This particle has been described by Kroon (1995, 171–209) as an element that indicates that a given text unit adds some subsidiary information to another, more central discourse unit. This subsidiary information can take the shape of an explanation, an elaboration, a justification, and the like (see Kroon 1995, 146–149). In any event, a nam-unit is backgrounded. Importantly, this text unit does not systematically coincide with a single clause or sentence: it can for instance be an entire paragraph. nam thus clearly has different syntactic properties than quidem (cf. section 1.1). Observe furthermore that nam does not itself indicate that a given text unit constitutes old or given information. As has convincingly been shown in Kroon (1995), nam has primarily a text structuring function. However, it is very compatible with a proposition that is already part of the common ground: a typical situation in which nam occurs is one in which a less straightforward claim (the central unit) is corroborated by a more obvious argument (the subsidiary piece of information introduced by nam). Therefore, nam is predicted to be able to co-occur with quidem. This prediction is indeed borne out.18 Two relevant examples are given below:

[context: Hamilcar’s sons, the famous Hannibal and the lesser known Hasdrubal are compared. The author gives reasons why Hasdrubal is also a force to be reckoned with.]

nam itineris quidem celeritate ex Hispania, et concitatis ad arma Gallicis gentibus, multo magis quam Hannibalem ipsum gloriari posse.
‘For he indeed had more reason to boast than Hannibal himself, by travelling so quickly from Spain and by arousing the Gallic tribes to war.’ (= Liv. 27.44.7)

(44) Penes quos igitur sunt auspicia more maiorum? Nempe penes patres; nam plebeius quidem magistratus nullus auspicato creator.

‘Who has the right to take the auspices according to traditions of our fathers? The patricians of course. For no single plebeian magistrate is elected under auspices?’ (= Liv. 6.41.5)

In (43), the author first enumerates some of Hasdrubal’s more spectacular military successes. He goes on to add how quickly he came from Spain to Italy to support his brother. The information about Hasdrubal’s travelling is not entirely new: it was narrated a couple of paragraphs earlier (Liv. 27.39). It can be considered discourse-old information of the ut supra diximus (‘as we have said earlier’) type (cf. section 4.3.2). In (44) on the other hand, the nam-unit provides extra information to the answer to a question just asked, justifying that this answer is indeed an appropriate one. Observe however that the question asked is not a genuine information seeking question. Rather, it is a rhetorical question, the answer to which is presupposed by the speaker to be known to the hearer. It seems fair enough to suppose that the audience was familiar with the fact that plebeians could not take auspices.

I would like to conclude that the interaction between nam and quidem lends further support to the claim that quidem typically occurs with implicit old information.

5. Interpreting “bare” quidem: Scrutinizing the context

In this fifth section, I turn to cases where quidem is not accompanied by any overt marker that highlights the hearer-old information status of its prejacent. In cases like that, it is only possible to assess whether this proposition does indeed express hearer-old information by carefully inspecting the wider discourse context. We predict that we will only find quidem in contexts where the speaker has reasons to assume that what (s)he says is either known, or somehow obvious, inferable, expected or uncontroversial.

A thorough analysis of a number of instances of “bare” quidem is of great importance, as we obviously want to exclude the possibility that the proposed pragmatic effect concerning the hearer-old information status of a given proposition, actually is not an implicature triggered by quidem, but only an assertion made by the elements that happen to be present in the same context (viz., parenthetical clauses, nam, ...). On the basis of the examples in this section, in which quidem appears on its own, I will conclude that the generalization proposed in the previous section, which said that it is possible (but not
obligatory) for the implicature triggered by *quidem* to be spelled out overtly, can be maintained. In order to make the discussion somewhat homogeneous, I will restrict myself to text examples from early Roman comedy (i.e., from Plautus and Terence), which have the particular advantage that they come with a fairly rich context, where the flow of information can quite easily be reconstructed. Therefore, we can to assess with sufficient confidence whether a given piece of information is hearer-old or not.

My first example comes from Plautus’ *Casina*. The fragment in (45) is taken from a passage in which Cleostrata complains to her friend Myrrhina about her husband, who does not give her the freedom she desires. In particular, he now asks her to give up the slave girl Casina, whom Cleostrata has brought up with her own money. Cleostrata suspects he is asking this because he is in love with the girl, and is reluctant to give in. This is how Myrrhina reacts:

(45) Myrrhina: Unde ea tibist?
Nam peculi probam nihil habere adducet
clam uirum, et quae habet, partum ei haud commodest,
quin uiro aut subtrahat aut stupro inuenerit.
hoc uiri censeo esse omne quicquid tuumst.

Cleostrata: Tu *quidem* aduorsum tuam amicam omnia loqueris.
‘Where did you get her? It doesn’t suit a decent woman to have any property without her husband knowing, and a woman who does surely didn’t acquire it legally, but stole it from her husband or got it from a lover. If you ask me, all you possess is actually your husband’s. // Look at that: you’re speaking against your friend with every word you say.’ (= Pl. Cas. 198B–204)

Instead of backing her friend up, Myrrhina unexpectedly sides with Lysidamus, Cleostrata’s husband. Cleostrata seems puzzled by her friend’s outburst: in her first reaction, she basically restricts herself to the observation that she won’t get any support from Myrrhina. This observation is accompanied by *quidem*. Now why is this felicitous? Note that Cleostrata’s words don’t contain any new or unexpected information, certainly not from Myrrhina’s perspective. Rather, they can be considered to be a summary of Myrrhina’s words, from Cleostrata’s point of view. Therefore, they clearly qualify as hearer-old information as defined above: nothing really new is said, but nothing is literally repeated either. In the light of the analysis developed thus far, it seems logical to conclude that it is *quidem*’s contribution to highlight this.

Slightly different is (46), taken from Plautus’ *Trinummus*. The old man Philto is sermonizing his son Lysiteles, warning him to stay away from bad company and to follow the path of virtue. Lysiteles reacts by describing what an exemplary son he actually is, but
to no avail, the old man just continues moralizing. At a certain point, he brings up the classical argument ‘you don’t have to do this for me’:

(46) Philto: Quid exprobras bene quod fecisti? tibi fecisti, non mihi:
   Mihi quidem aetas actast ferme, tua istuc refert maxume.
   ‘Why are you making a fuss about your good behaviour? This is to your advantage, not to mine. I am an old man, my time is almost over: it’s really just for your own good.’ (= Pl. Trin. 318)

By saying that he himself is an old man, Philto is obviously not telling anything new. Lysiteles knows this, and Philto assumes that his son is fully aware of this. Therefore, the use of *quidem* is appropriate in this context: it is used by the speaker to activate a “dormant” piece of information, which was known throughout but not considered to be especially prominent or salient in the hearer’s mind.

My next example is part of longer dialogue from Terence’s *Adelphoe* (‘The brothers’), between the slave Syrus and his master’s brother Demea. The latter is a farmer who only recently arrived in Athens in order to find his two sons, who are living the good life in the big city, and are staying at their uncle’s house. At a certain point, Demea is looking for his brother. Syrus is reluctant to help the old man, but then starts to tell him where he should go to find his brother, and he explains the route to him. At various points, Demea confirms that he knows where the different landmarks that Syrus mentions are located, thus proving that he knows his way around in Athens. At a certain point he even notices that Syrus is trying to fool him, by literally sending him down a blind alley:

(47) Syrus: postea est ad hanc manum sacellum: ibi angiportum propter est.
   Demea: quodnam?
   Syrus: illi ubi etiam caprificus magna est.
   Demea: noui.
   Syrus: hac pergito.
   Demea: id quidem angiportum non est perium.
   ‘At the end you’ll find a shrine at that side: nearby there is an alley. // Which one? // The one with the big wild fig-tree. // I know where that is. // Then you go down there. // But that’s a blind alley! // Oh dear, silly me! I was wrong: return to the colonnade. That’s definitely a shorter way and you’re less likely to get lost.’ (= Ter. Ad. 575B–580)
quidem appears at the point where Demea points out that Syrus’ description must be wrong. In this exchange, the use of quidem has an interesting rhetorical effect. By using this particle, the old man says more than just ‘you must be wrong, that’s a blind alley’. Rather, in a rather subtle way he accuses Syrus of consciously lying to him. What he actually means is something like ‘that’s a blind alley, and you bloody well know this, you spent all of your life in Athens!’, but instead of putting it so bluntly (which he can’t afford to do, as he still needs Syrus to give him the information he so badly wants), he opts for the more polite formulation by using quidem, which only implies an accusation along these lines.19

On the basis of the three examples discussed so far, it seems that we can maintain that quidem appears with hearer-old information, even in the absence of elements that signal this overtly. More evidence comes from a special class of quidem-clauses, where one can argue that direct (visual) perception is the reason why the speaker assumes that a given proposition is already known to the hearer.20 For a first example, we return to Plautus. In the following fragment from the Bacchides, the clever slave Chrysalus is trying to extract money from his rich but not-so-smart master Nicobulus:

Nicobulus: Cerae quidem haud parsit neque stilo; sed quidquid est, pellegere certumst.
‘Read it when you want: I promise I’ll be listening. // For sure he hasn’t spared wax or stylus, but whatever it is, I’ll certainly read it through.’ (= Pl. Bac. 995–996)

At the point where we enter the exchange, Chrysalus has just handed his master Nicobulus a letter, allegedly written by Nicobulus’ son Mnesiloctus, who is asking his father for money, to be given to Chrysalus. When Nicobulus observes that the letter is quite long, and the tablets on which it is written had already been opened: this we know because Nicobulus had already complained about the handwriting being too small (l. 990A). Moreover, the slave had commented upon this by saying that the letters are only small for people with bad eyesight (l. 990C–991A). In other words, at the point where the remark about the length of the letter is made (i.e., when the proposition containing quidem is uttered), both discourse participants had seen the letter, and they both know that the other one has seen it. Therefore, any remark about a superficial physical property of the letter as for instance its length (which can easily be evaluated upon quick visual inspection of the wax tablets) qualifies as hearer-old and can felicitously be accompanied by quidem.

The direct perception licensing the use of quidem can also be auditory in nature. In (49), the slaves Phaniscus and Pinacium are listening at the door of Theopropides’ house, to hear whether there is any partying going on:
Phaniscus: *Hic quidem* neque conviviarum sonitus<\textsuperscript>({t}), it[\textit{id}]em ut antehac fuit, neque tibicinam cantantem neque alium quemquam audio.

‘There’s not any sound of a party here, like there used to be: I can’t hear a flute player nor anyone else.’ (= Pl. Mos. 933)

As both slaves are standing in front of the same house, it is quite likely that Phaniscus assumes that Pinacium also hears that there isn’t any party hubbub. To indicate this, he adds *quidem* to his message.

In the next category of examples, no visual or auditory clue is present to suggest that a given piece of information is known to the addressee, which of course makes it less obvious that this information is hearer-old. What the speaker can do to remedy this state of affairs is to add a justification of why (s)he thought it appropriate to use *quidem* anyway. An example in which this is the case comes again from Terence’s *Adelphoe*. As the girl Pamphila is about to give birth without there being anybody to help her, her mother Sostrata and her old servant start to panic:

Sostrata: Miseram me, neminem habeo, solae sumus; Geta autem hic non adest; nec quem ad obstetricem mittam, nec qui accersat Aeschinum.

Canthara: Pol is *quidem* iam hic aderit: nam numquam unum intermittit diem, quin semper ueniat.

‘Oh dear, I have nobody, we are all alone. Geta (a slave, ld) isn’t here, and there’s nobody to send for the midwife or to fetch Aeschines. // He will soon be here: he never skips a day, he always comes.’ (= Ter. Ad. 291–296A)

First, Sostrata is wondering how she should fetch Aeschines, who is Pamphila’s lover and the father of the child. Sostrata’s old nurse Canthara then points out that they shouldn’t do anything, as Aeschines will come anyway. This message is accompanied by *quidem*, indicating that this constitutes an obvious piece of information. She goes on to clarify why this is so (cf. *nam*): apparently Aeschines is a very reliable person, who comes to visit Pamphila every day. Therefore, Canthara judges it uncontroversial that that particular day will not be an exception to the rule.

Finally, I would like to discuss a potential counterexample to the claim that *quidem* cannot occur with a proposition that conveys new information. In contrast with all of the examples we have encountered thus far, the following sentence appears at the very beginning of a new scene:

Euclio: *Hoc quidem hercle quoquo ibo mecum erit*.

‘By heaven, wherever I go, I will take this with me.’ (= Pl. Aul. 449)
However, to all likelihood, the information conveyed in this example is not be considered new or unexpected in any sense. What Euclio is holding (i.e., the hoc ‘this’ he is probably pointing at or showing to the audience) is nothing less than a pot of gold. Knowing what a stingy old man he is, the last thing the audience expects is that he won’t take care of his treasure, and, in his own logic, Euclio probably expects other people to consider it perfectly normal that if one possesses a pot of gold, one never leaves it unattended.

In sum, it seems that in all of the examples discussed, a convincing case can be made for the central claim of this paper, viz., that *quidem* modifies a proposition whose content qualifies as hearer-old information.

6. Conclusion

Building on earlier work in which it was proposed that *quidem* is a propositional operator expressing emphatic affirmative polarity (Danckaert 2013), this paper deals with the pragmatics of *quidem*. The main claim is that *quidem* is a presuppositional polarity marker, used to confirm that an expected state of affairs does indeed hold. More specifically, it is proposed that *quidem* signals that a given piece of information is or might already be known to the hearer without having been communicated explicitly. Pragmatically, the particle functions as a grounding device (and not as a discourse structuring element, *pace* Kroon 2005, 2011), which allows the speaker to give a clear indication about the information status of a particular message.

In order to provide an accurate characterization of the type of proposition in which *quidem* appears, I adopted a framework in the tradition of Prince (1981, 1992), which assumes that not all information that is part of the common ground has the same pragmatic status. A basic distinction was made between propositions that are part of the common ground by virtue of the fact that they have been uttered explicitly, and propositions that can equally be considered to be shared by speaker and hearer, although they have not been evoked explicitly (“hearer-old propositions”). On the basis of collocations of *quidem* with elements that independently show that a given proposition is hearer-old, as well as of detailed analyses of a number of contexts in which *quidem* appears on its own, I concluded that *quidem* can indeed be characterized as a polar particle that confirms an implicit expectation of the hearer.

More generally, this paper shows how valuable insights into the pragmatics of old languages can be gained from modern linguistic theories, as well as from detailed case studies of modern languages. I firmly believe that this research strategy (which was previously pursued in e.g. Kroon (1995) and related work, but is by no means the standard
in the field of classical philology) opens up potentially very interesting avenues for further research.

**Notes**

1. Abbreviations used in references to Latin text fragments are as in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Glare 1968), except for fragments of the letters of Fronto, for which I refer to the exact location in Haines’ Loeb edition (volume and page).

2. On topic continuity as a cohesion creating device, see Halliday and Hasan (1976) and related literature.

3. Kroon (2011, 179) accepts this, but seems to assume that the focal usage of *quidem* is different from the one where it acts as a discourse coherence creating device.

4. This view is explicitly held in Adams (1994, 3–5) and Spevak (2010, 20), among others.

5. Interesting comparative evidence comes from Dutch, which is one of the relatively few languages which has a lexicalized marker of affirmative polarity, viz. *wel*. The “epitaxis” construction in this language typically involves this particle, as in the following (attested) example:

   (i) *In Ierland waar het roken in cafés en restaurants inmiddels ook verboden is verklaard, zou het aantal hartaanvallen ook zijn gedaald, en wel met 11 procent.*
   ‘In Ireland, where smoking in bars and restaurants is now forbidden, the number of heart attacks allegedly has lowered, and it did so with 11 percent.’
   (http://www.preventievegezondheidszorg.com/rokenkrant.php; retrieved via a Google search, 20.11.2011)

6. The upcoming analysis is not couched within any particular theoretical framework. The only background assumptions made are (i) that apart from being asserted or presupposed, propositions can also be implied (Grice 1975), and (ii) that the participants in a given discourse situation share a so-called “common ground”, (iii) which is made up of propositions, which can be classified in terms of (among other things) their information status (given vs. new information). I take it that the validity of my conclusions on *quidem* can be evaluated in any framework that is compatible with these assumptions.

7. An issue that will not be touched upon is the frequent collocation of *quidem* with (i) contrastive connectives like *autem*, *sed* and *uero*, and (ii) pairs of contrastive foci or topics (with or without a contrastive connective), which led Solodow (1978) to propose that the core meaning of *quidem* is one of contrastivity. In fact, there is reason to assume that these facts are not to be taken to mean that the semantics of *quidem* itself involve any notion of contrastivity. A detailed account of the relation between *quidem* and contrastive expressions is proposed in Danckaert (in prep.). However, as the details of this account are quite intricate, I will not here elaborate any further on this particular issue.

8. For comparative data on topicalization in German, see Jacobs’ (1997) notion of I(ntonational)-Topic.

9. Conversely, it presumably is also not the case that every presuppositional polarity marker is emphatic.

10. A reviewer objects that my interpretation of example (25) should take into account the fact that the following clause contains a contrastive connective (in this case *uero*). According to this reviewer, the latter forces the presence of *quidem* (“*quidem*, if it would [sic] mean what the author thinks, could have been omitted. It cannot, because *uero* follows”). Similar objections are raised about (some of) the following examples, the context of which equally features a contrastive expression. However, this view is clearly mistaken: *quidem* can perfectly happily occur in contexts without any contrastive particle, as is also...
acknowledged by Solodow (1978, passim), the ultimate champion of *quidem*-as-a-marker-of-contrastivity. See Danckaert (in prep.), and section 1.3 of this paper.

11. Other examples of this type include Cic. Tusc. 3.79, Ver. 3.176; Fro. Ep. Haines L.62 (*ut dixi*); Plin. Nat. 11.33 (*ut supra diximus*), Cic. Rep. 2.9, Amic. 15 and Tusc. 3.52 (*ut supra dixi*), de Orat. 2.254 (*ut ante dixi*), Fam. 1.7.2 (*ut perscripsi ad te antea*) and Har. 30 (*ut dixi antea*).

12. For this reason, these adverbial clauses can be called “thematic” (in the Prague School sense of the word).

13. See also Thim-Mabrey (1982), who discusses the German conjunctions, *weil, denn* and *da*. Note that central adverbial clauses differ from their peripheral counterparts in more ways than hinted at in the main text. One important thing to mention is the relative independence of the latter with respect to the superordinate clause. For instance, peripheral adverbial clauses are often said to have illocutionary force of their own (see, e.g., Pasch 1987 for discussion, as well as Danckaert 2012, chapter 2 for additional references).

14. Tellingly, only central adverbial clauses can be clefted or appear as the nuclear scope of focus-sensitive particles like *even* and *only* (Johnston 1994; Verstraete 2007).

15. Note that *quando*, as opposed to the other connectives in Table 2, is not monosemic. Apart from its use as a causal (and less frequently, as a temporal) connective, it can be used as a temporal interrogative. Therefore, I did not indicate the total number of attestations in the relevant corpus. Moreover, I only included those cases where *quando* and *quidem* were spelled as one word, so as to be sure that no interrogative uses of *quando* were included.

16. The same observation is also made by Kroon (2005). For a syntactic correlate of this explanation of the ban on *quidem* in central adverbial clauses, see Danckaert (2012, 83–93).

17. See Declerck and Reed (2001, 83), who mention the “echoic” character of pseudoconditionals.

18. Some additional examples (chosen at random) include Liv. 27.9.12; 27.44.7; 28.41.11; 39.27.6; 44.22.7; Sal. Jug. 3.2; 24.9; 31.20; Cic. Dom. 69; Har. 39; 53; Phil. 3.19; 8.30; 14.2; Caec. 2; 37; Clu. 110; 127; 171; Planc. 70; Balb. 58; Sest. 55; Brut. 35; Orat. 67; 110; 122; Inv. 1.26; 1.27.

19. A more direct objection presumably would have involved the particle *at* (on which, see Kroon 1995, chapter 12).


References


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Trained as a classical philologist at Ghent University, Lieven Danckaert obtained his Ph.D. at the same institute with a dissertation on Latin word order. His main research interest is in Latin linguistics, with a special focus on syntax. In his current postdoctoral research project, he carries out a corpus based study of the
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