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“Traditional” Authorities and Development: Ouagadougou’s Kingdom facing globalization, Burkina Faso, former Upper-Volta, (from 1960 to present)


Б. Бешер в своем докладе «“Традиционные” власти и развитие : вожди Уагадугу перед лицом глобализации, Буркина-Фасо (с 1960 г. по настоящее время)» анализирует роль вождей в современный период, их место в реструктурировании социально-экономической жизни. Королевства мосси, расположенные в центральной части Буркина, и особенно королевство Уагадугу, до сих пор являются неудобным и неформальным посредником между столицей и контролируемой территорией. Несмотря на несколько “антифеодальных” выступлений против института вождей, особенно в период президента Ямеого (1960–1966) и Санкара (1983–1987), король Уагадугу, который имеет титул Моро Наба, и его подданные вожди, продолжают играть главную роль в развитии Буркина-Фасо. И большая ошибка считать их ретроградами. Фактически им удалось адаптировать свою традиционную роль к реалиям постоянно развивающегося общества Вольты. Вожди, решительно нацеленные на сохранение своей власти и престижа, попытались внести свою лепту в понимание концепции развития. Они ни в коей мере не осуждают технологические инновации или западный образ жизни, до тех пор пока прогресс означает уважение новых традиций, которые подчеркивают моральную и миротворческую роль вождя, тогда как
Ouagadougou, August 2, 2007. We expect Larle Naba Tigre, "minister" of Naaba Baongho, ruler of the most powerful Mossi\(^1\) kingdom of Burkina\(^2\). The notable is delayed. We have indeed every opportunity to discover his palace, which is being renovated. The Larle Naaba has developed big plans for this place. Starting with an altar of "traditional" medicine, as well as an impressive neo-traditional straw hut in which we await. It appears to us that this "amphitheatre" as the notable called it seems to be the symbol of the struggle led by the naaba to reconcile "tradition" and "modernity".

Everything here reminds us that the kingdom has long entered the globalization process. On the ground, we find a plastic parasol stamped with the CDP\(^3\) presidential party’s colours. On the walls, numerous photographs showing the "minister" in his chief posture and also close to the current President of Burkina, Blaise Compaore. The Larle Naaba seems to be a successful man. Former bank officer, he is also a businessman who has managed to combine old forms of legitimacy as an important "traditional chief", with a new one, as a businessman and as a parliamentarian. This dual legitimacy enables him to play a major role in the so-called "development" policy.

Indeed, to consider the chiefdom as incapable of change is a big mistake. Many "traditional" leaders have managed to adapt their function to an African society in flux. To think otherwise is definitely to paraphrase many representatives of the new elites, who entered under colonial domination in competition with the chiefs to hold a monopoly on the idea of "modernity" and "progress", the two blurry concepts which underlie the no-less vague concept of "development".

This paper will explore specifically the place that chiefdom plays in the socio-economic arena’s evolution since the independence of Upper Volta in 1960, to the present.
Pathways to Independence: "When chiefdom looks for itself" (from the end of the 19th century till 1966)

Place and role of the chiefs in the economic modernization process during colonial rule

In 1896, when French troops arrive in Ouagadougou, the Moogo economy hardly seems dynamic. Harvests are not sufficient to avoid recurrent food shortages. Production methods have not undergone significant changes since the founding of the kingdom in the late 15th century. The pre-industrial sector seems too weak. Mossi craftsmen don’t produce more than is strictly necessary: rudimentary tools for farmers, arms for combatants, as well as jewellery and other art objects, monopolized by the Royal Court. The Mossi are also reluctant to engage in long-distance trade. It is essentially the domain of the Yarse community as well as the Hausa from current Nigeria. Mossi markets, including Ouagadougou, are largely apart from the major trade routes in West Africa. It should be added to this bleak picture the fact that the economy is not monetized.

According to Captain Binger, the first French officer welcomed in Ouagadougou, Moogo was "numb". Indeed, the officers on duty after the conquest long believed that the kingdom held very few prospects, apart from providing workers for the French West Africa Federation (AOF), especially for Senegal and Ivory Coast, "model" French colonies.

Of course, this view of the negative economic situation of the Moogo should be considered with caution. Such a picture is indeed a way to legitimize colonial occupation, which is based - at least formally - on the "civilizing mission". With obvious paternalism, it was a matter of developing an under-exploited African land as colonial rules considered it. The pretext was found to reorganize economic structures, a project based on intensification and specialization of production, and its flow towards Western markets. Starting from 1899, the chiefs were ordered to collect poll tax which although providing
them with income, also makes them officials who can be revoked by the new rulers. The naaba are also sought to mobilize the workforce. All of these tasks weigh more and more heavily with the integration of the Moogo into the global economy, particularly after the creation of Upper Volta in 1919. At this time, Ouagadougou becomes the colony’s chief town in appreciation for the help provided by the sovereign to the French administration, and also the hub of economic policies generalized to the entire territory.

"Modernity" as a major stake of the competition between old and new elites

Despite some attempts to implement a policy of direct rule, the colonial power generally sought the cooperation of the Mossi chiefs. They were undoubtedly strategic actors in the establishment of the foundations of the colonial economy… at least as long as their interests were served! In fact, it should be recalled that when Upper Volta was dislocated in 1932, the region of Ouagadougou attached to the Ivory Coast and, consequently, its chief town in a neglected state, the chiefs adopted a passive resistance strategy aimed at slowing the recruitment of labour and tax collection. Despite everything, Ouagadougou became the nerve centre of Upper Volta, including after its reconstitution, in 1947. Indeed, the king’s capital benefited from major urban refurbishments. But while the Court adopts a more and more Westernized lifestyle and the princes attend classes in French, a new elite has gradually formed and is challenging the monopoly that the monarchy has assumed on the discourse of modernity.

Specifically, the old elites constitute a major obstacle for the so-called "enlightened", especially after 1945 and the first elections in AOF. Let us not forget that Moogo Naaba created his own party in 1945, and that he entered into rivalry with the African Democratic Union (RDA), founded by the Ivorian Houphouët-Boigny. Many Africans commoners generally close to the RDA
dread the chiefs in so far as they hold two forms of legitimacy: one linked to their customary function, and one deriving from their training as administration auxiliaries, sometimes at the head of the chain of command. Finally, from 1947, traditional competitors work with the support of the colonial administration, with the very influential Catholic Mission in Ouagadougou, as well as with some "enlightened" Mossi.

Moreover, the chiefs’ material and prestige capital allows them to maintain a social network used in the context of a "belly policy" in the words of Jean-Francois Bayart. As we can see, only a few years before independence, the ingredients were gathered for a bitter confrontation between old and new elites, and "development" issues played a major role.

**The twilight of independence: Maurice Yaméogo’s "anti-feudal" policy**

Since 1945 rivalry between chiefs and "enlightened" intensifies. Both sides hope to take over control of a territory destined for being independant. In 1956, the "Defferre Law" permits Africans to form their first government. King Naaba Saaga II (1942-1957), who is considered to be the saviour of Upper Volta - he obtained its restoration - has immense prestige, mainly from the Mossi, the majority within the colony. Under his rule, the chiefs emerge as major opinion leaders among voters of the Central Plateau. On the other hand, they seem to have much to be forgiven and the RDA leaders never miss any opportunity to recall their thankless role as suppliers of manpower in the forced labour context.

An entire discourse is built in the RDA associating the chiefdom with the "enemy of progress". It was at this time that Maurice Yaméogo, a great figure of the RDA party, emerged; he entered the government in October 1958. The disastrous coup d’état attempt led by King Naaba Kougri (1957-1982) aggravated a certain anti-chiefdom sentiment shortly before the independence of
Upper Volta. At that time, Yaméogo (1960-1966) assumed the presidency of the Voltaic Republic. The president is interested in setting up direct administration freeing the central power of the customary intermediaries. But, that is a colonial legacy, his administration is structurally and numerically deficient. This explains the many measures taken to oust the chiefdom from political and economic fields: banning the replacement of the vacant thrones in 1962, or the suppression of the naaba’s remuneration in 1965.

In 1966, Yaméogo’s regime fell. The balance sheet of his presidency appears to be bitter: he, no more than the colonial authorities, did not succeed in doing without traditional chiefs. They continued to be solicited to raise poll taxes and their passive resistance, repeatedly expressed, contribute to the economic collapse of the state.

**Between policies of exclusion and informal alliance**

*The indecision of the military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s*

After Yaméogo’s downfall, General Lamizana (1966-1980) is placed at the head of Upper Volta. The task that lies ahead is immense. Speeches on the theme of "national recovery" are recurrent and the officer continues to urge all the "sons of the country" to build a "society of development". This is a time for unity and national concordance. Lamizana thus attempts to mute rivalries who opposed the old and new elites under the previous regime. Some chiefs or descendants of royal families are appointed to government, like Gerard K. Ouédraogo, who became Prime Minister in 1971 and affirms his commitment to “mainstream traditional leadership as a core that could contribute to evolution, economic advancement”\(^{11}\). The head of government intends to develop a clearly defined status for the chiefs. Meanwhile, Lamizana returned to a number of laws that had helped to weaken their position\(^{12}\). Their collaboration is even more
essential due to the fact that his administrative staff is barely more numerous than under his predecessor, and that the majority of Voltaics didn’t seem sensitive to economic issues identified in Ouagadougou. Nevertheless, despite the study of many projects developed by the departments of Lamizana, no statute for chiefs is finally adopted. Just like many colonial governors, the central government is reduced to implementing a strategy of informal alliances with them.

Chiefdom supports once again the central government in order to ensure further the proper functioning of the administration, to achieve food self-sufficiency and a balanced budget in the country. But the instability of the military government does not allow any progress towards the official integration of chiefdom at the highest levels of State. In 1980, Saye Zerbo reaches power without any change in the situation. The same applies when he is overthrown by Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo in 1982. However, the calm is the prelude to the storm for the monarchy under the regime of Thomas Sankara (1983-1987).

_Sankara’s Revolution: building a new economy for a new society_

Everything seems to oppose Sankara and Lamizana. The first by far the younger of the second is fond of Marxist and Third World literature. For the revolutionary leader, Voltaic society must break its "state of backwardness", a strangely similar issue to that of most colonial administrators. Its programme, known as the "Politic Orientation Speech" (DOP), clearly excludes chiefdom from the route of economic and social "modernization" engaged by the executive power, the "National Council of the Revolution" (CNR).

After the experience of Yaméogo’s rule, a new phase in the struggle against the chiefs is initiated by the state. For the Minister of Peasant Questions, economic progress “is not negotiable”, and especially not with the chiefs, accused of being "reactionary forces". Shortly after 1983, the remuneration of
traditional leaders by the state is stopped. The CNR also tackles symbols: thus King Kougri's electricity in the palace is cut off... because of unpaid bills! Sankara imagines he is encouraging the emergence of a new society, free of "feudalism", conscious of its interests, and opening for a development expected to lead Burkina on to the road to economic autarky. For CNR, it is in the country's interest to rid central government of customary intermediaries among rural masses who have to be educated and recruited; the buzzword of the time is "democratic centralism".

Despite the creation of CDRs, a basic and unprofessional administrative tool, the nationalization of land in Burkina, as well as a series of virulent speeches delivered against the chiefs, the power is unable to settle the problem of its relative lack of direct contact with the rural peripheries. In fact as lucidly noted Claudette Savonnet-Guyot, it is really hard to see clearly “how the new regime, if it wants to make the peasantry its main social base, could discharge into the dustbin of history those who were for so long a proven tool for communicating with the rural masses”\(^{17}\). It is precisely on the evolution of the local political arenas that underpins this observation, that we will turn now our attention.

*The issue of mass mobilization*

As we saw above, the new elites on power inherited the colonial legacy of a structurally deficient state. In fact, they have still problems to felt strongly the central power authority in countryside. As a consequence, the chiefs were imposed as key respondents between these two major parts of the chain of command. Since 1950, a first devolution process had been put in place to solve the problem by fragmenting the administrative areas, and thus better deploy its administrative staff throughout the territory.
The African Heads of State have pursued this strategy to ensure the autonomy of the administration faced with any kind of competition. While the regions and provinces were multiplied, new entities emerged with the intention of specializing development instruments, and bring in their midst technicians able to raise their expertise against chiefdom.

The goal was simple: to pass over customary mediators in terms of information. Thus, the radio, the most popular media, aired from 1964's "rural education campaign" to heighten peasantry awareness of the imperatives of increasing yields. In 1984, the CNR increases the power of issuance of the Burkina Radio-Television (RTB), the successor to the Volta-Vision created in 1963\(^\text{18}\).

Many measures were also expected to enable the recruitment of workers. The best known is the creation of the "National Popular Service" (SERNAPO) in 1984, and which seeks to mobilize all the major men and women in the form of both military and civilian service. Finally, efforts have been made in improving transport infrastructure with this form of compulsory labour. In the same time, we can notice some adjustment of local socio-economic arenas, which is characterized by the growth and greater heterogeneity of development actors coinciding with the proliferation of NGOs, mostly since the 1970s.

Finally, it’s true that the state has seen some success, including "immunization" and "Alpha Commando" operations\(^\text{19}\). But several obstacles explain the relative failure of these policies. First, the slogans launched from Ouagadougou were generally misunderstood by rural populations\(^\text{20}\). Then, attitudes could not be changed in one day. Consequently, the appeal to chiefdom on the matter has been systematic.

The fall of the Sankara’s regime in 1987 does, however, highlight the failure of the state to act effectively in development while bypassing the customary chain of command and awareness. Sankara’s right-hand-man and successor, Compaore, has understood this.
The Naaba, moral guarantors of a development model challenged? (1987 to present)

The use of old elites of a state in deadlock

Despite a forced narrowing of the gap between the revolutionaries and the chiefs on the ground, the lack of close cooperation between the old and new elites certainly has severely limited the development efforts of the CNR. Compaore, on coming to power, appears to have understood the lesson. Without immediate reversal of the broad guidelines of the Revolution, he is, however, determined to carry out his "rectification". The anti-feudal issues soften. This is because the new scheme called "Popular Front" (FP) is still fragile. Again, the rhetoric of national unity and mobilizing all becomes the leitmotif of the FP. Shyly initially, chiefs are invited to address the country's economic situation, and pass on the watchwords of central authority to the rural masses. From October 1987, Compaore announced his willingness to restructure the role of the old elites in the economic development process.

While neo-traditional forms of development associations are being set up, chiefs gradually align themselves with power during the years 1988-1989. This openness to the chiefdom is symbolically started in the holding of the "National Sittings" from 8 to 10 January 1988. They are an opportunity to take stock of four years of revolution. The "traditional" leaders are invited. They were expected to feel the wounds of a society divided by the revolution.

However, Compaore is not willing to see his room for manoeuvre curtailed by chiefdom. That’s probably why decentralization policy entered a new turning point for the “real involvement of our peasantry in all development initiatives” as said the President\(^\text{21}\). But for the chiefs, the important thing is acquired: they are no longer humiliated, and derive from their alliance with the
new presidential party, the removal of CDRs and a place in a possible 2nd Chamber in the Assembly as provided by the Constitution of the 4th Republic, which was adopted in 1991 with the overwhelming support of the naaba.

The chiefs then respond to what the FP sees as the three pillars of development: unity, democracy and economic liberalism. However, the signing of a Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP) with the IMF can only cause concern to the old elites. The Bretton Woods institution's interest is for Burkina to adopt a more proactive decentralization policy. Consequently there is a great risk for them to be deprived of the essential relay role for the state to rural peripheries. In 1993, five laws on decentralization are adopted, which confirm these fears22.

In short, the policy of reconciliation between the central power and the chiefs led them to remain influential where they are less popular, namely in the cities, while the village, where their authority unfolds, would no longer be one in which they still have a chance to weigh heavily on the guidelines on development.

**Chiefdom on all fronts of the contemporary development**

Despite the rising power of progressive technician elites at local level, decentralization barely has any effects. From the government point of view, this policy has not revolutionized the relationship between central administration and rural areas. This is the conclusion of a government that expresses the wish to see the work of chiefs “to facilitate the task of mobilization, which is vital to the development process”23. We must face the facts: the distrust of the people of the political class has been able to impede the decentralization process which we know is not immune to corruption also practised at the head of the state.

The chiefs position themselves as the best defenders of the interests of the territories in which they have authority. They also recall that the exercise of their customary charge coincides with the objectives vested in development.
Strategies have been implemented in order to drive a wedge between the records of legitimacy gained by merit, and those inherited by "tradition". The training of chiefs has itself significantly evolved. The old elites were able to erase the borders between the new ones.24

Academic or professional careers help partially to legitimize the commitment of some Mossi chiefs on all fronts of development, including those requiring significant technical skills. In addition, they can count on their networks, both among the people in their customary charge, but also among the technocrats from the major urban centres, as well as popular media like newspapers, radio and television.

Chiefdom’s main area of intervention is undoubtedly that of rural development for which they bring their knowledge of local control and preservation of the environment. The chiefs are also present on sensitive subjects such as the fight against AIDS. The distinctive signs of their customary charge immediately visible give the messages they convey an additional force. This powerful media strike largely explains the reasons that regularly lead administrative authorities and policies, the presidents of NGOs and international institutions such as the UNDP, to make regular visits to Moogo Naaba Baongho, who is also chairman of the committee regrouping the "chiefs" in the country. The "blessing" given by the king to plans submitted certainly facilitates their acceptance in the countryside, inasmuch as it is thus heard by the entire customary chain of command.

Finally, a question remains: is the monarchy a moral landmark in a runaway globalization process? Development, as the power or the community fabric - mostly of foreign origin - who implement it, is seen as a product of globalization. It is also, for many Burkinabe, an identity threat through dissolution of values considered as "truly African." It follows that the chiefs capable of inventing tradition convey an idealised vision of their institutions. It is based on the idea that no person other than the naaba is also close to the
people. The discourse of the old elites borrows much from the metaphor of the family. That’s what Boussouma Naaba Sonré, told us: “The village leaders are close to the people because they are virtually the same family. The confidence is there...” 27. The idea that chieftdom would be a class apart, exonerated by a smidgen of legitimacy and moral purity is not new, but speaks with force since the 1990s, which, according to historian Claude-Hélène Perrot, are those of the "Return of the Kings" across Africa 28.

The chiefs were able to turn these concerns to good account, which make them appear as cultural and moral landmark in the face of an uncontrolled globalization. However, as we have seen, contemporary royalty itself is the result of the much-maligned process and also sometimes pay a high price for it, a growing fringe of the population believing that the chiefs have come to forget the "traditional virtues" of unselfishness and fairness on which their reputations were based...

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1 The Mossi (or "Moaga" sg., "Moose" pl.) are the largest ethnic group in Burkina. They represent about 50% of the total population. Established on the Central Plateau, the Mossi have formed a political space: the Moogo, or literally "the World", shared among a dozen independent kingdoms. The most influential is in Ouagadougou at the head of which prevails Moogo Naaba ("naaba" means "Chief", e.g. the man who hold the power to command, the "naam"). He, like all the Mossi kings, has "ministers" or "Kug Zidba." Those ones are also "Chiefs of prince" and command District Chiefs and Villages Chiefs. For more information on the history of Moogo in precolonial times, see: Étard Moogo M. L’émergence d’un État ouest-africain au XV siècle. P.: Karthala, 2003, P. 394.

2 Burkina Faso is the name given in 1984 to the former Upper Volta, French colony in West Africa founded in 1919, abolished in 1932, and then restored in 1947. This country of 274,000 square kilometres with a population of about 13.7 million people is among the world's poorest. According to the ranking done by the United Nations in terms of the human development index, the country lies at the 174th largest in the world on the 177 States identified. The economy still relies heavily on the agricultural sector which employs over 80% of the total population, and in particular on cotton production. Famous for its relative stability, at least since 1987, Burkina is one of the West African countries which attracts the most foreign NGOs.

3 «Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès» («Congress for Democracy and Progress»).


5 Beucher B. La Figure du Moogo Naaba, chef des Mossi de Ouagadougou, sous la domination française: pérennité d’une fonction et singularité des hommes (1896-1958) // Des Français Outre-mer. P.: Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2005, P. 139-152.

6 The "enlightened" or the "fortunate few" are those Africans who were trained in European secular or religious schools. Their way of life, their careers in jobs, are close to the colonial sphere. Generally these commoners are also auxiliaries in French administration.

7 It is the Upper Volta’s Interest Defence Union (UDIHV), which became a year later the Voltaic Union (UV). The party, chaired by King Naaba Saaga II aims at rebuilding the Upper Volta, the modernization of Moogo and more generally of the colony. Supposed to counteract the RDA, the UV was supported by the
colonial administration, but had to face criticism of the elites in the West Volta who saw it a way for the monarchy to impose its hegemony on the whole Voltaic territory.

8 « Rassemblement démocratique africain ». At this time, the RDA was considered as "anti-colonial" and "communist" and as such fought against both by the French Administration and the Catholic Mission.


10 All dates indicated in parentheses correspond either to the duration of the reign of the king or that of the presidential mandate of the Heads of State cited.

11 « Discours-programme prononcé par le Premier ministre, M. Ouédraogo Kango Gérard », February 11, 1971 // Archives of the National Assembly of Burkina Faso (AAN) 1P 482.

12 For example, in 1968, District Chiefs are once again allowed to receive payment for rendered services to the state. This is equivalent to half of that was paid to them before 1964. However, village leaders continue to be elected by universal suffrage, which clearly shows the limits of the open-door policy implemented by Lamizana.


16 « Committees for the Defence of the Revolution ». These structures are set up across all divisions in the country: the sectors in the city, villages, townships, departments and provincial regions. Thereafter "service" CDR are set up in addition to the previous professional branch or social group. Everyone can join these committees, provided that the candidates fight against the “revolution enemies”, e.g. the “profitiers who belong to the middle class and the “feudal”.


19 These initiatives led in a few weeks respectively 2.5 million children to take precaution against smallpox, meningitis or yellow fever and 35,000 people to receive basic literacy classes. See: Jaffré, B. Burkina Faso. Les Années Sankara. De la Révolution à la rectification, P.: L’Harmattan, 1989, P. 94-97.

20 In 1985 the state press admits itself that “the revolutionary language (concepts, organizational principles...) is not easily accessible to the mass.” See: A la découverte des CDR géographiques. Aujourd’hui le secteur 11 // Sidwaya, №352, September 12, 1985, P. 5. The issue of land and agrarian reform (RAF) is significant in this respect. In fact Sankara’s regime was unable to explain the issues and define its contours. The appeal to the “chiefs of land” (Tengsoaba sg., Tengsobademba pl.), distinct from “polit chiefs”, e.g. those who hold the naam, ended up being solicited with little success.


22 Indeed, chiefs are superbly ignored and still have no place in state institutions. In addition, it is anticipated that the administration of the villages should be entrusted to "administrative persons" without anyone really knowing who they are. Finally, an Act of May 12, 1993 provides for the election of councillors at the level of villages, urban areas, departments and provinces while organising these administrative units in the form of committees for youth, women and old without mentioning the chiefs. However, nothing prevents them filling those administrative functions. See: Sawadogo R. L’État africain face à la décentralisation. P.: Karthala / Club du Sahel et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, 2001, P. 38.


24 This is the case of Naaba Lilgou of Gon (Tenkodogo region), a former official of state, region director of road infrastructure of Ouahigouya (Yatenga) in 1994, inducted chief of a small village of 2,000 inhabitants in 1996. The same is true of Naaba Kiiba II, District chief of Manga (Tenkodogo region) since 1992, a former student of the " National School of Magistracy " (ENAM), and of the International Institute of Administration in Paris (IIAP) before also becoming a member of parliament.

25 For example, on December 3, 2003, 12 chiefs of Burkina met Dori sponsored by the UNDP and UN-AIDS, in order to popularize prevention messages to the rural people.


27 Oral Interview with His Majesty King of Boussouma Sonré Naaba, Ouagadougou, Burkina National Assembly, on July 26, 2007.