Information Transmission in Hierarchies

Abstract : We analyze a game in which players with unique information are arranged in a hierarchy. In the lowest layer each player can decide in each of several rounds either to pass the information to his successor or to hold. While passing generates an immediate payoff according to the value of information, the player can also get an additional reward if he is the last player to pass. Facing this problem while discounting over time determines the player's behavior. Once a successor has collected all information from his workers he starts to play the same game with his successor. We state conditions for different Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria and analyse the time it takes each hierarchy to centralize the information. This allows us to compare different structures and state which structure centralizes fastest depending on the information distribution and other parameters. We show that the time the centralization takes is mostly affected by the least informed players.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01491930
Contributor : Lucie Label <>
Submitted on : Friday, March 17, 2017 - 4:13:21 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, July 26, 2018 - 2:46:02 PM
Long-term archiving on : Sunday, June 18, 2017 - 1:24:25 PM

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Simon Schopohl. Information Transmission in Hierarchies. 2017. ⟨halshs-01491930⟩

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