Names and grammar
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1. Introduction

Dealing with names and grammar concerns establishing the grammar of proper names [henceforth: names] in one or more languages. First, we should have a workable idea of what is to be understood by names and by grammar. Because “…finally onomastics is a branch of linguistics” (Algeo 2010: 93). Thus, we first have to deal with a long-time distinction. The last few decades, many people have been adopting Ronald Langacker’s (1987) distinction between the ‘established linguistic convention’ (formerly langue or ‘competence’) and ‘language use’ (formerly parole or ‘performance’), which appear to form a reasonable continuum. As a rule, grammar deals with the morphosyntactic peculiarities of a specific language. In this, we follow Haspelmath (2010), who contends: “Descriptive formal categories cannot be equated across languages because the criteria for category-assignment are different from language to language.” Thus, grammar is language-specific (compare Algeo 1985; 2010). The Chomskyan Universal Grammar seems to be a far-away ideal in approaching language research. By contrast, Haspelmath (2010) introduces the notion of ‘comparative concept’, thus avoiding speaking of ‘universal categories’. In this paper, we are advocating a cognitive view, and more specifically, an approach with a
constructionist flavour. In Construction Grammar (Croft 2001), it is argued that the
semantics of a linguistic expression determines its (morpho)syntax to a considerable extent.
Thus, the semantic status of names is mirrored by certain syntactic (called ‘symbolic’) constructions (see also Van Langendonck 2007, chapter 2). Unfortunately, as Croft (1990: 268, fn. 24) notes, only few data about names are available in the language typological literature because “most grammatical descriptions do not include information on proper names.” As far as Bantuist studies go, Van de Velde (2003) speaks of “a lack of the study of proper names, at least from a grammatical point of view.” Anderson (2004: 438) complains that “little theoretical attention in general linguistics has been paid to the morphosyntax of names.” To make things worse, contemporary ‘pragmatic’ or ‘discourse’ approaches to names do not show much interest in looking for grammatical criteria to characterize names, if only because their attention is focused on language use, not on established linguistic convention, of which grammar is supposed to describe the rules. Often, established linguistic convention and grammar are hardly taken into consideration (among others, Coates 2006a, b; 2009; 2012; De Stefani, and Pepin 2006: 132; 142; De Stefani, and Pepin 2010; Brendler 2008; and even Algeo 2010: 95 “…the individual use of names may form an important part of the theory of onomastics”, point 4). Nevertheless, all these people speak about (proper) names, common nouns, though seldom pronouns, without defining these nominal categories. Apparently, it is left to the speaker to determine what a name is in discourse since
grammarians are sometimes said to just make a mess of it. Of course, we cannot share this
defeatism, although the limited data available on names are undoubtedly insufficient to
constitute a representative sample of the world’s languages. But see Anderson 2007; Van
Langendonck 2007; 2010). A bias towards Indo-European (Western European, and
especially English) will be unavoidable here. This will not prevent us from taking into
account old and new morphosyntactic criteria for name status in some ‘exotic’ as well as
more familiar languages.

We will start from a semantic-pragmatic ‘comparative concept’ applying to the
essence of ‘properhood’, as Coates (2006 a, b) calls it. Thus, we regard a name as a nominal
expression that denotes a unique entity at the level of established linguistic convention to
make it psychosocially salient within a given basic level category. The meaning of the name,
if any, does not (or not any longer) determine its denotation (Van Langendonck 2007: 125).

Our task here is to find out to what extent the comparative concept of name
corresponds to language specific descriptive (sub-)categories in the languages for which we
have data, and to what extent these categories formally mirror the denotative and semantic
properties of names. As far as possible, morphosyntactic criteria will be connected with each
of the semantic-pragmatic characteristics, i.e. nominal status, unique denotation, categorical
(or: basic level) presupposition and the lack of defining sense. We will use a well-
established convention in the typological literature to distinguish the universally applicable
semantic-pragmatic comparative concept of name from the language-specific grammatical
categories of Name, by using initial capitalisation for the latter. Two important distinctions,
the established linguistic onomastic convention vs. the use of language and names, and name
vs. name lemma are to be established first. Then we will provide a characterisation of proper
names (section 2). We will conclude this chapter with a partial typology of names, organised
according to a scale of typicality.

1.1. Established linguistic and onomastic convention vs. the use of language and names.

The view that names have a unique denotation and can refer in discourse is in accordance
with Langacker’s (1987) notion of established linguistic convention (formerly *langue* or
competence), forming a continuum with language-use (formerly *parole* or performance). Just
as denotation is an abstraction from reference etc., established linguistic convention is an
abstraction from language-use. Only in established linguistic convention does it make sense
to speak of grammar or morphosyntax, which most linguists call the heart of the linguistic
system. In this way, names can be given a genuine place in grammar as a structural
category, like all other word classes.

The grammar of names describes their peculiarities in established linguistic and
onomastic convention. Langacker’s concept of established linguistic convention is flexible
and useful, also for names. As a part of it, we discern established onomastic convention.
Names enter established onomastic convention via bestowal or via gradual onymization.

This allows us to make three observations.

First, although it is admitted that acts of reference fix the denotation of proper nouns (Coates 2006b: 39; 2012: 121), it is not clear where this denotation finds its place if names are defined in terms of reference in language-use. Clearly, unique denotation pertains to established linguistic convention. The rejection of this uniqueness in Coates (2012) prohibits a distinction between names and pronouns since in this framework, both essentially refer in language-use, even if they appear to denote as well, but not uniquely according to Coates (2012). The lack of the notion of established linguistic convention led philosophers like Bertrand Russell ([1918] 1964: 201; 1919: 179) to claiming that genuine names were ‘logically proper names’, i.e. referring words like *this* or *that* (compare Kripke 1972: 345, fn. 16; see above). Ordinary names Russell called ‘shorthand descriptions’. Surely, referring words like *this* or *that* refer uniquely in a certain context, but the reference will differ in another context. However, taking Kripke’s term ‘rigid designator’ seriously, names denote uniquely in any context.

Second, there is a continuum from established onomastic convention to the use of names in speech and writing. We may use a name just once, and then forget it, so it does not enter established onomastic convention. For instance, referring to an unpopular guest, we could say: *Hitler is coming tonight*. In this example, *Hitler* is a new referent in discourse
only, not a denotatum in established onomastic convention, yet. That is one extreme. The other extreme for names is that many have been functioning in society for centuries, for instance family names, or city, country, river names, and the like.

Third, the notion of established onomastic convention allows us to recognize there are well established names known and used in only small communities, such as nicknames in a family, e.g., Dutch *Ons Pop* ‘Our Doll’, called that by her father. This is an established name in this minimal community (Van Langendonck 2007: 286). The other extreme is that there exist names known worldwide, such as *Africa* or *Mandela*.

1.2. Name vs. name lemma (proprial, appellative, other lemmas)

Another important distinction is that between lexical items and the way they are used in different contexts. Thus, names need to be distinguished from name lemmas. The term name lemma indicates a dictionary entry with an onomastic valency. For instance, the lemma *Mary* has the potential to be used as a name with one or more sublemmas that underlie each a name. Thus, the lemma *Mary* underlies a high number of names, such as Mary, the mother of Jesus, Mary Stuart, and so on. Since the lemma *Mary* is typically used as a name, it can be called a *proprial lemma*. Proprial lemmas always allow common noun uses, be it marginally, as in *I was thinking of a different Mary*. Proprial lemmas could be further subdivided into personal name lemmas, place name lemmas, and so on, according to the
type of name they are most typically used to denote. Again, this does not exclude a personal name lemma such as Mary to be used to denote the name of a boat, for instance. We have seen that a proprial lemma can be used as a common noun (a different Mary). Conversely, names can be based on all kinds of lemmas. Thus, for instance, an appellative lemma is assigned to a name like the film name Gladiator, and a phrasal lemma to a novel name such as the Old Man and the Sea. In many languages the etymology of most personal names is transparent and it is sometimes stated that “names have a meaning” in such languages. A more accurate way to characterise these languages is to say that they have no or few proprial lemmas and that personal names tend to be based on appellative lemmas. Finally, common nouns can be derived from names metaphorically or metonymically, as are Napoleon and Jane in (1-2). Such common nouns are called deproprial in Van de Velde (2011).

(1) That soldier is a second Napoleon.

(2) She purports to be another Jane.

2. Characterization of names.

In this section we will characterise names as nouns (2.1) with unique denotation (2.2) that have an inherent basic level sense (2.3), no defining sense (2.5), but optionally connotative meanings. We will argue that names can be considered to be the most prototypical nominal category (2.4) and we will compare names with pronouns (2.6).
2.1. Names and nouns.

Ever since Antiquity, it has been held that names are nouns (or possibly noun phrases). Classical terminology speaks of *onoma kyrion* (nomen proprium), and *onoma proseigorikon* (nomen appellativum). So both names and appellatives are considered nouns (Gary-Prieur 1994: 243). Following Hudson (1990: 170) one can regard personal (and other) pronouns as nouns too. In this way, we have three kinds of nouns. Anyway, few scholars seem to dispute the thesis that names are nouns or at least nominal expressions. For Coates (2006a: 373) names are noun phrases though not typically nouns. Anderson (2004: 436; 2007) contends that names “are no more nouns than are pronouns or determiners”. If a pronoun is a kind of noun there is no problem. However, it seems hard to view a name as a kind of determiner, at least syntactically, even if the determiner is considered the head of the ‘noun phrase’ (Anderson 2004: 456; but see Van Langendonck 1994).

From a cross-linguistic perspective, trying to determine whether names are nouns may not be the most meaningful goal, since the answer depends on how one chooses to define the comparative concept of *noun*, especially in languages such as Straits Salish where parts of speech distinctions are not very clear cut. The question can better be answered on the language specific level, where the semantic-pragmatic comparative concept of name provided in the introduction can correspond to zero, one or more than one grammatical
categories of Name. The grammatical characteristics of Names in a given language should be compared to those of Common Nouns in that language. In English, for instance, Names can take (non-restrictive) determiners, just as Nouns and unlike Pronouns, e.g. *that* modifying *George Bush* in (3), and *Britain’s* modifying *Jeremy Irons* in (4). See Section 2.6 for more discussion of the difference between names and pronouns.

(3) **That** George Bush is a nice guy. (Vandelanotte and Willemse 2002: 22)

(4) *Britain’s* Jeremy Irons was present at the premiere in New York. (Vandelanotte and Willemse 2002: 25)

Still in English, Names can be grammatically differentiated from Common Nouns thanks to their ability to appear as the identifying element in close appositional patterns of the form

[(definite article + ) noun + (definite article + ) noun], e.g. *Fido the dog*. (Van Langendonck 2007: 4, 131; Idiatov 2007). The unit that does not characterize but identify is a name (noun), i.e. *Fido*. The appellative *dog* indicates the categorical presupposition. This grammatical criterion for distinguishing Names from Common Nouns seems to be valid for most Indo-European languages (e.g., French *la ville de Paris*, Dutch *de stad Amsterdam*, or Polish *miasto Kraków* ‘(the) city (of) Cracow’). In other languages, such as the Gabonese Bantu language Orungu, this criterion cannot be used to distinguish Names from Common Nouns, but agreement provides a grammatical criterion (see Van de Velde and Ambouroue 2011 for Orungu and Van de Velde 2009 for Kirundi).
2.2. The unique denotation of names

The unique denotation of names entails their definiteness, as well as their incompatibility with restrictive relative clauses and their inability to refer back anaphorically.

2.2.1. Names as definite noun phrases

Definiteness is well established as an inherent feature of names (cf. among others Sørensen 1958; Dalberg 1985: 129; Löbner 1985: 299; Pamp 1985: 113; Wotjak 1985: 7, 13; Abbott 2002; but see Allerton 1987; Lyons 1999; Anderson 2003: 351, 394; 2004), just as personal pronouns (Löbner 1985: 300). The feature ‘definite’ is often understood as displaying a presupposition of existence in the universe of discourse, at least in its prototypical occurrences (Van Langendonck 1979; compare 1991; Kleiber 1992). It does not come as a surprise that names, which have a fixed denotation, suggesting uniqueness and existence, are bound to have this grammatical meaning. The syntactic evidence we will adduce for the definiteness of names will pertain only to their denotative use as arguments (see Van Langendonck 1981). Sometimes, languages show an overt distinction between this use and other uses. Greek, for instance, puts a definite article before personal names in argument position, i.e. in the denotative use of names, though not in vocatives or name-giving utterances (e.g. *I name this child X*, Anderson 2004: 441-442; 456).
A diagnostic for the definiteness of names in (colloquial) English can be found in the following observation: NPs that occur in right dislocation and are announced by a cataphoric personal pronoun, have to be definite. It turns out then that, like other definite NPs, names can occur in right dislocation in this way, at least in colloquial speech (Quirk et al. 1972: 632):

(5)  a. He’s a complete idiot, that brother of yours.

       b. It went on far too long, your game.

(6) *He’s a complete idiot, a neighbour.

(7) He’s a complete idiot, John.

Announced by a personal pronoun (he, it), the definite NPs of a proprial, pronominal or appellative nature that brother of yours, your game, John are able to appear in right dislocation. For the indefinite appellative NP a neighbour, this possibility is excluded. Apparently, it is only definite NPs, with their presupposition of existence and uniqueness, that can occur as ‘afterthoughts’, in this case; well-known referents that the speaker wants to recall, just to be sure the hearer will think of the right person or thing.

Since names are inherently definite, the addition of an overt definiteness marker is superfluous and definite articles are often found to express other notions than definiteness with names. Certain types of names have a fixed determiner in English (e.g. the Nile), which can be argued to have a classifying function. We come back to this in Section 3.1.2. We also
find an expressive use of the article, such as the augmentative use of the article with Flemish forenames in certain dialectal areas, e.g., *de Jan* “the John”. In German, the article has almost lost its expressivity with first names because of its frequency in discourse (e.g., *der Johann*). In other contexts, the addition of a definite article is honorific: *La Callas*.

When a name appears with an indefinite article in English, the latter expresses merely countable singularity (its original function), while the propriality and therefore the definiteness of the name are preserved, as in:

(8) a. A devastated Claes entered the court room.

\(=\) Claes entered the court room as a devastated man

(9) b. This idiot of a Jack!

\(=\) Jack is such an idiot!

It is useful at this point to remind of the distinction between names and the name lemma on which they are based. In the Gabonese Bantu language Orungu, definiteness is marked on nouns by means of their tone pattern. Many personal names are based on an appellative lemma with an indefinite tone pattern, e.g. *ngùwà* ‘a shield’. Used as names, these nouns are definite, as is the phrasal name of the French movie *Un prophète* (A prophet).
2.2.2. No restrictive relative clauses with names

Restrictive modifiers limit the extension of a given NP. Therefore, names are incompatible with such modifiers (see Sørensen 1958; Seppänen 1971; 1982; Vandelanotte and Willemse 2002). The most conspicuous of restrictive modifiers is the relative clause. As a rule, the English relative pronoun *that* refers to inanimate appellative antecedents and introduces a restrictive clause. A zero form can be used for any restrictive clause if it is not intended to ‘replace’ the clause’s subject, e.g.

(10) The city *that* I visited was nice.

By contrast, proprial antecedents do not allow such restrictive devices because of their unique denotation, e.g.

(11) *Ghent *that* is the most beautiful city in Flanders, was one of the biggest in medieval Europe.

(12) *Mary I saw smiled.

2.2.3. Anaphoric relations

Since names display a fixed denotation, one can expect that they cannot refer back in the discourse to any other kind of NP, at least in the standard anaphoric way. Lakoff (1968: 17–19) and Cole (1974: 671) pointed this out, setting up a cline going from the strongest
anaphoric elements (clitic pronouns) to the weakest (names). (Van Langendonck 2007: 153).

Examples could be:

(13)  
   a. Napoleon was the emperor of France. He lost at Waterloo.  
   b. *He was the emperor of France. Napoleon lost at Waterloo.

(14)  
   a. Quisling was at power during the war. The prime minister betrayed his country.  
   b. ?*The prime minister was at power during the war. Quisling betrayed his country.

With this criterion, the most marked difference between personal pronouns and names is brought to the fore. Personal pronouns display the least specific denotation whereas names show the most rigid reference because of their fixed extension. At the same time, we can see that in this in this respect, names differ least from multidenotative NPs like the prime minister in (14).

2.3. Names (not lemmas) have an inherent basic level sense

A crucial characteristic of names is that they have an inherent categorical presupposed sense (compare Coates 2012: 125). Philosophers like Geach (1957, section 16) and Searle (1958) argue that this categorical sense is necessary for every use of a name to preserve the identity of the referent. Likewise, certain psychologists see a categorical, and more exactly a basic level sense in names. La Palme Reyes et al. (1993: 445) establish
(15) \([\text{Freddy: dog}] = [\text{this: dog}]\)

which is to be read as “Freddy in the category DOG” is “this in the category DOG”.

Thus, there is a deictic component in names (this), as in pronouns, but there is also a
categorical appellative sense (dog). One can therefore situate names between pronouns and
common nouns from a semantic point of view (see Molino 1982: 19; Van Langendonck
2007: 169-171; Hollis and Valentine 2001; Valentine, Brennen, and Brédart 1996; James
2004).

The inherent categorical sense of names is presupposed and therefore cannot be
negated. A fortiori, in a sentence like \(\text{London is on the Thames}\), the existence of London is
presupposed, as is its basic level category city. Obviously, we can say \(\text{London is not a city}\).
But in this special case, the asserted sense contradicts the presupposition. The basic level
categories for which the individual members typically receive a name, are to a certain extent
culture specific. Thus cows typically have a name in Kirundi (Bantu, Burundi), but not or
much less often in present-day English. Note that person is usually not the basic level
category for personal names, nor is place the one for place names. In such highly salient
categories the basic level tends to be lower on the hierarchy, man and woman for human
beings, city, country, village, etcetera for places.

In the remainder of this section, we will adduce neurolinguistic and morphosyntactic
evidence for the presupposed inherent categorical meaning of names. Neurolinguistic
evidence is reported in Bayer (1991, see Van Langendonck 2007: 110-113 for discussion),
who worked with a patient (H.J.) suffering from so-called deep dyslexia, which means that
she can observe written texts exclusively via a semantic route and not by means of a
transmission from grapheme to phoneme. Such patients cannot read nonsense words, they
have difficulties reading abstract words or grammatical morphemes and reading concrete
common nouns often gives rise to paralexia, e.g. reading hammer when axe is written. H.J.
is unable to read names. However, she always recognises them as names and for personal
names she could usually specify whether the name bearer is a man or a woman. She could
also identify place names as names for cities, countries or rivers. Bayer concludes that there
must exist a minimal lexical categorical sense belonging to the semantic memory,
specifying: the categorical presupposition. Bayer also reports on a different type of response
that H.J. gave when asked to read names, viz. connotations. Thus, the name Australia
triggered the basic level sense ‘country’, but also connotations such as ‘far away’ and
‘kangaroos’. We will come back to these non-lexical connotative meanings in Section 2.7.

Strong morphosyntactic evidence for the categorical sense of names can be found in
the Burundese Bantu language Kirundi (Van de Velde 2009). As in the great majority of
Bantu languages, nouns trigger noun class agreement in Kirundi. Noun classes are overtly
marked by means of a nominal prefix, so that the agreement pattern triggered by a noun is
largely predictable form its prefix. This is not the case for Kirundi Names, however, which
trigger the same agreement pattern as the common noun that is used to refer to their basic level category. Thus, names for dogs agree according to the noun class of the common noun imbwa ‘dog’ (class 9) and personal names agree according to the class of the common noun umuuntu ‘person’ (class 1). This is illustrated in (16) by means of the name Rukara, based on the lemma that underlies the common noun urukara ‘blackness’ (class 11). Agreement prefixes are marked by means of roman numbers in the glosses.

(16) a. Rukara a-rikó a-rafuungura

Rukara I-is I-eating

‘Rukara (a person) is eating.’

b. Rukara i-rikó i-iraryá

Rukara IX-is IX-eating

‘Rukara (a dog) is eating.’

More grammatical evidence for the basic level sense of names can be found in the choice of an interrogative pro-word in name questions such as What is x’s name (Idiatov 2007: 61-94, 2010). In languages that differentiate between ‘who’ and ‘what’, the choice between both is determined by two independent parameters, viz. entity type and type of reference. Entity type distinguishes between PERSONS and THINGS (i.e. non-persons). Type of reference distinguishes between IDENTIFICATION and CLASSIFICATION or categorisation.

‘Who’ is prototypically used in questions for the identification of a person, whereas ‘what’
is used to ask for a categorisation of a thing. The name question *What is x’s name* is non-canonical in that it asks for the identification of a thing (i.e. a name). In order to deal with this non-canonical situation, many languages avoid the choice between ‘who’ and ‘what’, using other interrogatives such as ‘how’, ‘which’ or ‘where’. In languages that do not use this avoidance strategy, the choice between ‘who’ and ‘what’ very often depends on the categorical sense of the name that is expected as an answer. If the name of a human being is expected, ‘who’ will be selected. If the basic level category of the name is non-human or inanimate (depending on the language), ‘what’ is selected. This is illustrated in (17) with an example from the Sepik-Ramu language Namia from Papua New Guinea (cited from Idiatov 2007, who obtained the example from Becky Feldpausch, p.c.). Note that English selects ‘what’ in such questions, irrespective of the categorical sense of the expected answer.

(17) [A:] ne-k(a) ili tal(a)? [B:] John

2SG-POSS name who PROP

[A:] ‘What is your name?’ [B:] ‘John’

Finally, the presence or absence of a categorical sense distinguishes names from other words with unique reference, such as *the internet, the universe* or *the sun*. These words for singleton categories lack a basic level categorical presupposition: [the x (the) internet] and [the x (the) universe].
2.4. Names as the most prototypical nominal category

If we look at the grammatical features that are relevant for names, it is striking that names tend to have the unmarked feature value. Therefore, it could be argued that names are the most prototypical nominal category. This conclusion runs counter to Langacker (1991; see chapter 1).

We saw in Section 2.2.1 that names are definite. As to definiteness, it has been argued in Van Langendonck (1979) that it is the unmarked counterpart of the feature [+/- definite]. Karmiloff-Smith (1979), Mayerthaler (1988) and Croft (1990) have come to the same conclusion on various grounds: early acquisition, experiential and typological evidence. In fact, definiteness is the most natural state of a referring expression, i.e. definite and referential go together (Van Langendonck 1994). As for the feature number, names are mostly singular (and countable): Kevin, Mary, London, the Rhine, and so on. Sometimes they show a collective plural: the Andes, the Philippines.

As for the features definiteness and number, there is an essential difference with common nouns: where we have a dichotomy of plus and minus in the features of one and the same common noun, e.g., the city vs. a city; city vs. cities, there is no such opposition in one and the same name. Pluralia tantum like the Andes, the Philippines are rare and are not even ordinary plurals since they are not quantifiable: *(the) many Andes. Even in such
plural names we find an element of singularity: the plurality is construed as a unity, a
singularity, a fact we have accounted for by calling pluralia tantum collective plurals.

2.5. Names have no defining sense.

To come to grips with the notion of ‘sense’, we can put specific questions asked by Stephen
Ullmann and other scholars, such as: What does the word ‘table’ mean? Or What do you
understand by ‘table’? If these are questions that make sense, then the word has ‘sense’, i.e.
definitional lexical meaning. Indeed, we can give a definition of the word table, as found in
dictionaries. Usually, such words, in this case the common noun table, show polysemy, i.e. a
coherent set of semantic features, of which often one is prototypical. For instance, Webster’s
dictionary defines a table as a piece of furniture consisting of a smooth flat slab fixed on
legs; this sense is akin to the sense of a tablet or a contents list, and so on. On the basis of
these senses, we can find the referents. By contrast, in the case of names, the designation
prevails over the meanings. As Ullmann (1969: 33) contends: “One cannot possibly say that
one understands a name; one can only say that one knows whom it refers to, whose name it
is.”IV It does not make sense to ask: What does the word ‘London’ mean? or: What do you
understand by ‘London’? This applies to pronouns as well: it does not make sense to ask:

What do you understand by ‘he/she’, or ‘this’? So, neither names nor pronouns appear to
have sense, i.e. definitional lexical meaning, let alone a polysemous structure. In the
remainder of this section we will discuss three morphosyntactic patterns that reflect the absence of a defining sense of names.

2.5.1. The non-restrictive relative construction with *which*

Predicate nominals, nouns or NPs that function as a predicate, contain only an intension, not an extension. In English, they can be modified by non-restrictive relative clauses introduced by *which*.

(18) Obama is (the) president, *which* McCain will probably never be.

Since for names, as well as for personal pronouns, it is essential to have denotation and not descriptive meaning, neither names nor personal pronouns can appear in these patterns (Van Langendonck 2007: 146-148):

(19) *The president is Obama / him, *which* McCain will probably never be.

2.5.2. The *[for + NP]* construction

For similar reasons, names and pronouns are excluded from the constructions exemplified in (20):

(20) For a schoolboy he is not performing badly

The *for*-phrase can be paraphrased as: ‘although he is a schoolboy’. This makes clear that the object NP of the preposition *for* behaves as a kind of a predicate nominal. Normally,
predicate nominals can be definite, as in: Obama is the president. This seems, however, not to be the case in this pattern:

(21) *For the schoolboy he is not performing badly.

To patch up the pattern with a definite NP, a few operations are indispensable. First, a relative be-clause has to be added; second, a qualitative, evaluative element has to be inserted, either an evaluative noun or qualitative adjective accompanying the noun, compare:

(22) For the idiot that he is, he is not performing badly.
(23) For the modest schoolboy that he is, he is not performing badly.

However, if the noun in question is not a common noun, but a name, the sentence cannot be patched up:

(24) ?*For the modest Leroy that he is, he is not performing badly.

For non-personal names, the test works even better. An example involving place names is the following:

(25) a. For the hectic river that it is, the Rhine is not that polluted yet.

    b. *For the hectic Rhine that it is, this river is not that polluted yet.

### 2.5.3. Names and homophonous coordination

It has been observed by McCawley (1968: 144) that homophonous NPs cannot be coordinated.
(23) *The employees and the employees are male and female respectively.

Instead, a single NP must be used:

(24) The employees are male and female respectively.

However, this rule is not always valid. For instance, with names homophonous conjunction is permitted to a certain extent (Van Langendonck 1981). At least two different cases are possible:

(25) a. Johnson and Johnson have set up a new subsidiary.

b. London and London are two different cities.

In (25a) we have to do with the name of a company formed by the coordination of twice the same family name; in (25b) it is about the capital of the UK the name of which emigrated to the USA to become the name of another place.

A still different example is from German (Dobnig–Jülch 1977):

(26) Toni, also die Tochter von nebenan, und Toni, der Sohn der anderen Nachbarn, kommen heute nicht.

‘Toni, so next door’s daughter, and Toni, the other neighbors’ son, are not coming today.’

In instance (26) first names with identical lemmas are coordinated. After each name a loose apposition is inserted so as to clarify the identity of the referent without harming the proprial
character of the lemmas. Especially cases such as (26) are similar to that of personal
pronouns and demonstratives employed deictically, i.e. with a pointing gesture:

(27) a. Yóu and yóu should leave.

       b. Thís and thís will have to be removed.

The rationale behind these examples may be that no two homophonous NPs containing a
lexical sense could be conjoined. In Hansack’s (2004) framework, we would have to say that
no two homophonous NPs with denotata belonging to the same set could be conjoined.
However, two such NPs containing a combination of a deictic word and a common noun are
possible, e.g.,

(28) Thís man and thís man will be fired.

In (28), each time, man has the same meaning and belongs to the same set of denotata. The
rule would then have to be qualified as follows: two (or more) homophonous NPs cannot be
coordinated unless they emphasize some deictic element (extension) in them, whether an
intensional element is present or not. Apparently, names come closest to such ambivalent
expressions as thís man. It should be recalled that this ambivalent structure combining a
deictic (extensional) element and a categorical (intensional but presupposed) element is
inherent in names. The difference with the type [deictic + appellative], e.g. this man lies in
the fact that this NP shows the ambivalent status on the level of the construction, while
names unite the two aspects in them on word level. This resemblance explains the
grammaticality of both (25 a,b) and (28).

2.6. Names between pronouns and appellatives

Language philosophers have tended to view names as a kind of indexicals, closer to personal
pronouns or demonstratives than to common nouns. Although this view is also supported by
some linguists (e.g. Anderson 2004, 2007), most linguists seem to find it harder to
distinguish names grammatically from common nouns. We have already pointed out in
Section 2.1 that English Names can take determiners, just as Common Nouns, but unlike
pronouns. Moreover, we have seen that names and pronouns are at opposite ends of a cline
in anaphorocity (Section 2.2.3), bringing to the fore the most marked difference between
pronouns and names. This section compares names and pronouns in some more detail,
pointing out differences and commonalities. Overall, names share more commonalities with
common nouns than with pronouns. We will limit ourselves here to giving three differences
between names and pronouns.

First, in Dutch both proprial and appellative NPs can be construed in left dislocation
such that the coreferential demonstrative die / dat figures in the sentence proper, e.g.

(29) Karel / De baas, die lacht altijd.

lit. ‘Charles / The boss, that laughs all the time’
But we cannot do the same with personal pronouns (Van Langendonck 2007: 170):

(30) *Hij, die lacht altijd.

lit. ‘He, that laughs all the time’

Second, English and Dutch personal pronouns still display case distinctions (I – me / ik – mij, etc.) while common nouns and names do not. Third, as Anderson recognizes (2007: 118, 197-198, 201-203), derivation and compounding is typical of names and appellatives, not of pronouns. Often, names and appellatives share the same classifiers or affixes, e.g.

(31) a. Compounding: Sherwood Forest / rainforest

   b. Derivation: Spain > Span-ish / fever > fever-ish (p. 197)

      Elizabeth-an / republic-an (p. 198)

Anderson (2007: 201) argues that “the inflectional and derivational morphology of names … cannot be identified with noun morphology,” but it is not clear why.

Coates (2006) argues in favour of the opposite thesis from Anderson’s, i.e. that names are nouns and noun phrases. He does not even mention pronouns in this context. In fact, names are said to be distinguishable from common nouns only at the (pragmatic) level of language use. Maybe the truth lies in the middle: names can be considered a nominal category to be situated between pronouns and appellatives (Van Langendonck 2007: 169-171). Names are a kind of nouns and form an open class, pace the opposite claim of
Anderson (2004; 2007). A number of arguments have been provided for this thesis in Van Langendonck (2007).

2.7. Names can have connotations

An aspect of the meaning of names that we have not mentioned so far is the different types of optional connotative meanings that they can have. These are not essential for the characterization of names and have no or much less morphosyntactic correlates. At least four types of connotative meanings can be distinguished.

First, names with a transparent etymology can give rise to associative meanings related to the name form. Thus, the family name Baker may remind us of a baker. This type of connotative meaning is exploited in personal name-giving in many cultures. Old English dithematic names such as AElf-wealda‘elf-king’ (Insley 2007), for instance, had a wishing character. In literature too, this type of connotations is often exploited, as in the name Snowwhite. Second, there are connotations that come in via the denotatum and can be exploited in discourse to identify or to characterize the name-bearer. No polysemy is involved here (see also Semenza 2009), e.g. Obama is president of the United States, Obama has a wife and children, Obama does not eat hamburgers, and so on. The third type of connotative meaning that can be distinguished are emotive meanings such as augmentative, diminutive or honorific. These can be inherent in certain names, for instance if the name
contains a diminutive or augmentative suffix, as in the Dutch first names *Jan-tje, Marie-ke* and *Bert-ie*, where *-tje, -ke* and *-ie* are diminutive suffixes. Needless to say, bynames and nicknames tend to have strong emotive connotations. Although connotative meanings are not part of the lexical meaning of names, contrary to their categorical presupposition, morphosyntactic correlates can be found. In Kirundi, for instance, personal names can trigger diminutive or augmentative agreement patterns in order to add an endearing or deprecating connotation. Example (32) shows three possible agreement patterns with the personal name controller *Taama*. The first is agreement of class 1, according to the noun class of the basic level term ‘person’ (see ex 16 above). The second (32b) and third (32c) are augmentative agreement of class 7 and diminutive agreement of class 12, respectively (Meeussen 1959: 191, cited via Van de Velde 2009: 234).

(32) a. Taama  a-raaje

   Taama  I-arrives

   ‘Taama arrives’

b. Taama  ki-raaje

   Taama  VII-arrives

   ‘Taama arrives’ (augmentative)

c. Taama  ka-raaje

   Taama  XII-arrives
‘Taama arrives’ (diminutive)

Fourth, there are what Cislaru (2006; 2012) calls ‘facets’ of meaning. Although the basic level meaning of city names is ‘city’, and that of country names is ‘country’, these geographical names often adopt additional meanings (animate), induced by metonymy. English examples are:

(33) Paris elected a new mayor < The citizens of Paris elected a new mayor

(34) America decided to declare war on terror < The Government of The United States of America decided to declare war on terror

Personal names, especially of artists, can stand for the work the artists produced:

(35) Rodin se trouve dans la troisième salle du musée (Lemghari 2011)

‘(The work of) Rodin is to be found in the third room of the museum’

3. A partial typology of names

This section provides a partial typological classification of names in which we will show that there is a grammatically relevant cline from more to less typical types of names. A fuller account dealing with more types of names can be found in Van Langendonck (2007: 183-255). Individuals in the psychosocially highly relevant categories of persons and settlements normally have a name. The names for settlements and especially persons are also the most typical names from a grammatical point of view. Towards the bottom of the cline
we often find mismatches between what counts as a name from a semantic-pragmatic point of view (cf. our comparative concept in Section 1) and what is construed as a Name from a grammatical point of view in individual languages. We find categories for which only some members have a name that behaves as a Name, whereas names of other members are construed as Common Nouns, e.g. the category of diseases. Non-prototypical names can have unusual properties such as being uncount, or recursive. For the analysis of certain types of names, such as brand names, the distinction between name and proprial lemma turns out to be crucial.

3.1. Personal names

Personal names are arguably the most prototypical names. The number and types of names that are bestowed on persons are highly culture specific, as are the principles that guide the choice of a name. A discussion of personal names in European societies can be found in Van Langendonck (2007: 187-196). Before moving on to other types of names, it is useful to point out that personal names do not always originate in a name giving act. The process of onymisation, the gradual evolution of a name, can be observed with personal names as with other types of names. Van Langendonck (2007: 194) gives the example of the Flemish first name – byname combination Suske de Verver ‘Francis the Painter’, in which the byname obviously has a transparent origin in the appellative painter. In the process of onymisation,
the primary accent moved from the first syllable of the first name to that of the byname

(Súske de Verver → Suske de Vérver). At the same time, de verver was semantically

bleached, losing its asserted lexical meaning, so that the now byname could continue to be

used when its name bearer was no longer a painter. When animals such as pets receive a

name, this name tends to have the properties of personal names.

3.2. Place names

Often, interesting insights and generalizations can be gained in recognizing the validity of a

synchronic view. A case in point is the synchronic semantic and formal place name

hierarchy, as defended in Van Langendonck (1998; 2007: 204-212). Here, we can observe a

synchronic formal cline, based on basic level categories:

ZERO MARKING, as in city and town names: London, Berlin

SUFFIXING, as in country names: Fin-land, German-y

ARTICLE PREPOSING, as in names of, e.g. fields, regions and rivers: the Highlands, the Rhine

The use of CLASSIFIERS plus possibly an article, as in names of seas, oceans or deserts: the

North Sea, the Gobi desert.
This formal markedness hierarchy apparently corresponds to a cline in human organisational involvement: maximal in cities and countries, but minimal in regions, rivers, seas, or desert. Anderson calls it an “anthropocentric” cline. If just the English examples are cited (as in Anderson 2007: 115, 187), we see no distinctions in gender since in English all place names exhibit neuter gender. In this way, we cannot observe the interesting interaction between gender and basic level sense that does occur in languages like German, where the prototypical articleless names of cities and countries have neuter gender, whilst the more marked categories systematically construed with articles (der Rhein ‘the Rhine’, die Nordsee ‘the North Sea’) continue the historical appellative gender. Last but not least, English shows the human place names omitting the article, whilst the non-human place names tend to adopt the article. This can be observed where the names of former colonies or regions lose their article when they become independent countries: the Ukraine > Ukraine, The Congo > Congo, the Lebanon > Lebanon.

3.3. Names of months

Names of months are ambiguous between a non-recursive (36a) and a recursive / generic (36b) reading, which is admittedly an untypical feature for names.

(36) a. June was hot

b. June is always hot
This semantic characteristic of month names has been adduced to argue against their name status. However, non-recursivity is not a defining semantic characteristic of names in our view. Grammatical evidence in a typologically and genealogically diverse set of languages shows that the category of months is rather similar to those of persons and places in that its individual members typically receive a name. From that perspective names of months are typical names.

According to the close appositional test, names of months are Names in English, since we can speak of the month of June. In the Bantu Language Kirundi too, names of months display the grammatical properties of Names, including agreement according to the basic level categorical term ukwêzi ‘month’ (Van de Velde 2009: 229). Likewise, in Rapa Nui, spoken on the Easter Island, where names of months are marked by the morpheme a, indicating onymic status, e.g. i a hori iti ‘in August’ (Idiatov 2007; Van Langendonck and Van de Velde 2007: 459-461).

3.4. Trade and brand names

When dealing with trade and brand names, the distinction between name and name lemma is of crucial importance, since the same lemma is typically used as a name and as a common noun. Lemmas such as Ford can therefore be called proprio-appellative lemmas. In example
(37a) *Ford* is the name of a brand, whereas in (37b) it is a common noun used to refer to a product of this brand. In the latter use *Ford* has a defining sense.

(37)  
\(a\). Ford is a familiar brand.  
\(b\). Jane bought a Ford yesterday.

Note that several names are based on the multidenotative lemma *ford*, for individuals of different categories. In (38a) *Ford* is the name of a person, in (38b) that of a company. Thus, in the examples (37-38) we are dealing with three different names and one common noun, all of which are semantically linked by metonymy.

(38)  
\(a\). Ford founded a car industry.  
\(b\). Ford is an American car company.

3.5. Numbers

Numerals have versatility that is comparable to that of the proprio-appellative lemmas underlying trade and brand names. They can be construed at least as names (39a, b), as appellatives (39c) and, probably most frequently, in an attributive function (39d) (likewise Langacker 1991: 86):
a. Three is a sacred number.

b. the number seven

c. He has millions of books.

d. People normally have ten fingers.

Grammatical evidence for analysing numerals as names in some uses can be seen in (39b), where _seven_ occurs in a close appositional construction. The Bantu languages provide grammatical evidence as well. In the Gabonese language Orungu numbers trigger an agreement pattern typical for Names in subject position of clauses similar to that in (39a) (Van de Velde and Ambouroue 2011: 135). Kirundi is interesting, in that the same number can be alternatively construed as a Name (40b) or as something in between a Name and a Common Noun (40a), with a preference for the latter.

(40) a. Ga-taanu ga-kwirikira ka-ne

12-five XII-follows 12-four

‘Five comes after four.’

b. Ga-taanu gi-kwirikira ka-ne

12-five VII-follows 12-four

‘Five comes after four.

In (40b) the number five has the two typical grammatical characteristics of Names in Kirundi, viz. the absence of the so-called augment – a word-initial grammatical morpheme –
and an agreement pattern determined by the class 7 categorical term \textit{igitigiri} ‘number’ (see Section 2.3). In (40a) the augment is lacking, but the agreement pattern is the one predicted by the overt class prefix \textit{ga-}, viz. agreement pattern 12. The Name construction in (40b) is stylistically marked as learned, or even pedant. This seems to be typical in situations where the same item can be construed as a Name or as Common Noun.

3.6. Names of diseases and biological species

As we move further away from the most prototypical types of names, we encounter categories for which only some members receive a name, whereas other members are designated by means of an appellative. The distinction is not random. Phenomena that are familiar tend to be treated as one of a kind, i.e. categories of their own, and they are not designated by means of a name. On the other hand, unfamiliar phenomena tend to be treated as belonging to a category of which the individual members receive a name. We will look at names for diseases and biological species here.

Names of diseases are apparently never Names in English, but in Dutch it depends on the disease (compare Van Osta 1995). Apart from the fact that names of diseases behave as mass nouns in common noun use, they seem to differ as for the capacity of taking on a proprial function and to appear in close apposition. As the close appositional constructions in (41) show, names of diseases that are new, exotic and/or are to be taken seriously appear to be treated as genuine names. They are capitalized as well in spelling.
(41) a. *De ziekte Aids breidt uit in Afrika.

‘The Aids disease expands in Africa.’

b. *De ziekte Ebola heeft vreselijke gevolgen.

‘The Ebola disease has terrible effects.’

By contrast, ordinary diseases are not capitalized and cannot appear in apposition except in coordinate structures, compare:

(42) a. *De ziekte (de) griep komt elk jaar terug.

‘The influenza disease returns every year.’

b. De ziektes griep, mazelen en rodehond vind je overal.

‘The diseases influenza, measles and rubeola are found everywhere.’

c. Griep kan nog gevaarlijk zijn.

‘Influenza can still be dangerous.’

So it seems that words for ordinary or older diseases are hardly construed as names, but that new and exotic terms for illnesses can be given name status more easily.

From a grammatical point of view, names of subspecies low on the biological taxonomy are sometimes Names in Bantu languages. Evidence can be found in the Cameroonian language Eton (Van de Velde 2008: 111; Van de Velde 2006: 232) and in Kirundi, where all names for species of beans agree according to the noun i-gi-haragé ‘bean’ (Van de Velde 2009).
3.6. Autonyms

In Section 1.2 we saw that proprial lemmas such as Mary are construed as common nouns in certain contexts. Likewise, any other lemma can be construed as a name with the presupposed categorical sense of ‘word’. In this usage, called autonymy, linguistic expressions refer to themselves. Autonyms have the grammatical characteristics of names in English, as they can occur in close appositional constructions (43).

(43) The words stand for and about (Meyer 1992: 84)

Moreover, autonyms need not be preceded by an article in English.

(44) ‘Bank’ is a homonymous word.

Languages differ as to whether autonyms have the grammatical properties of Names. One language that is like English, in that autonyms belong to the grammatical category of Names, is Orungu (Bantu, Gabon). In this language, Names trigger agreement of class 1 on verbal targets. This can be seen in the metalinguistic statement on the word ônémé ‘tongue, language’ in (45). If ônémé were construed as a common noun, it would have trigger a prefix of agreement pattern 5 on the copula (Van de Velde and Ambouroue 2011).

(45) ônémé èrê n împiβíní mbání

ônémé. NTP 1.is with 10. meaning X two
‘Oneme has two meanings.’

4. Conclusions

Starting from the comparative concept of (proper) name, we distinguish between established linguistic convention and the use of language, and subsequently between name and name lemma. Names are nouns with unique denotation, they are definite, have no restrictive relative modifiers, and occupy a special place in anaphoric relations. They display an inherent basic level and can be argued to be the most prototypical nominal category. Names have no defining sense. They can have connotative meanings, but this has little grammatical relevance. We have stressed the need for relying on grammatical criteria, which are too often ignored in approaches to names.

The approach developed in this chapter aims at being universally valid in two ways. First, the pragmatic-semantic concept of names defined in the introduction is cross-linguistically applicable. It is distinct from language-specific grammatical categories of Proper Names for which language-specific grammatical criteria should be adduced. Second, our approach takes into account all types of proper names. The question of what counts as a name, very often debated in the literature, should be answered on two levels, keeping in mind the distinction between proprial lemmas and proper names. The language specific question as to what belongs to the grammatical category of Names does not necessarily yield
the same answer as the question of what can be considered to be a name from a semantic-
pragmatic point of view. Mismatches are most likely to be found at the bottom of the cline
of nameworthiness introduced in Section 3.

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Notes

1 Moltmann (2013) deals with ‘sortals’ and close appositions with names from a different perspective.
ii Surely, not all close appositions give us the basic level meaning, e.g., *President Obama* does not say that Obama is necessarily a president. Mostly, the basic level meaning is not overtly expressed, especially not in prototypical names such as personal names, where it is taken for granted.

iii Arabic numbers are used to gloss overt noun class markers in examples of Bantu languages, whereas Roman numbers mark noun class agreement prefixes. Wherever possible, we follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules, with the following additions: NTP non-definite tone pattern, PROP proper name.

iv Similar observations were made by Nicolaisen (1995: 391); for German: Boesch (1957: 32) and Debus (1980: 194). But Brendler (2005: 108–109) rejects the relevance of such statements since he adheres to a kind of maximum meaningfulness theory for names, although he (2008) speaks of nomeme (compares to ‘name’), archinomeme (compares to ‘proprial lemma’), and of a number of other terms.

v McCawley’s (1968: 144) generative semantic rule ran as follows: „There is a transformation which obligatorily collapses the conjoined subject *the employees and the employees* into a single occurrence of *the employees.”