Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Book sections

Knowing Necessary Truths

Abstract : How account for the intuitive difference between simply knowing a necessary proposition, and knowing that it is a necessary truth? In the paper it will be shown that two-dimensional semantics does not do the job in an adequate way. A solution is provided which is based on Hintikka's worldlines. Assuming a slight extension of the syntax, modal epistemic logic can thus deal with classical puzzles like knowledge of identities.
Document type :
Book sections
Complete list of metadatas
Contributor : Manuel Rebuschi <>
Submitted on : Saturday, March 4, 2017 - 6:32:44 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, July 17, 2019 - 1:56:02 PM



Manuel Rebuschi. Knowing Necessary Truths. J. Redmond, O. P. Martins, Á. N. Fernández. Epistemology, Knowledge and the Impact of Interaction,, Springer, 2016, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-26506-3_10⟩. ⟨halshs-01483086⟩



Record views