ECM - École Centrale de Marseille : UMR7316 (Pôle de l'étoile - Technopole de Château-Gombert - 38 rue Frédéric Joliot-Curie - 13013 Marseille - France)
ECM - École Centrale de Marseille : UMR7316 (Pôle de l'étoile - Technopole de Château-Gombert - 38 rue Frédéric Joliot-Curie - 13013 Marseille - France)
Abstract : We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01480525
Contributor : Nicolas Jacquemet
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Submitted on : Wednesday, March 1, 2017 - 2:20:16 PM
Last modification on : Friday, January 24, 2020 - 2:40:26 PM
Long-term archiving on: Tuesday, May 30, 2017 - 5:12:39 PM
Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Jason Shogren, Adam Zylbersztejn. Coordination with communication under oath. Experimental Economics, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2018, 21 (3), pp.627-649. ⟨10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x⟩. ⟨halshs-01480525⟩
