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THE SPREAD OF A TRANSNATIONAL MODEL: ‘GATED COMMUNITIES’ IN THREE SOUTHERN AFRICAN CITIES (CAPE TOWN, MAPUTO, AND WINDHOEK)

MARIANNE MORANGE, FABRICE FOLIO, ELISABETH PEYROUX and JEANNE VIVET

Abstract

The worldwide spread of gated residential developments (GRDs) reached Southern Africa in the late 1980s, at a time of dramatic political and urban change. Their success has been primarily interpreted as an outcome of the transformations affecting cities, i.e. perceived decreased security and changing racial patterns. Such analyses are embedded in the fragmentation of urban societies and shed light on community or household strategies. Breaking away from this perspective, we argue that, although GRDs fit very well into unequal postcolonial, postwar or post-apartheid societies, they should also be envisioned as polymorphic real estate products tailored to care for the middle classes of the corresponding urban contexts. By focusing on the role of developers, estate agents and international aid networks in spreading this model in Cape Town, Maputo and Windhoek, we highlight the importance of market-related and political processes, as well as the influence of the local urban, political and town planning contexts on the adaptation of this private suburban housing product. The circulation of this model is geographically analysed in terms of scales and local contexts through a comparative approach that allows us to assess how it adapts to or disrupts inherited urban patterns and planning traditions.

Gated complexes in Southern Africa – seeing beyond urban fear

The worldwide spread of gated residential developments (GRDs) reached Southern Africa in the late 1980s, at a time of dramatic political and urban transformation linked to transitional contexts — i.e. post-apartheid (South Africa, Namibia), post-socialist and postwar (Mozambique) — and GRDs developed there in increasingly unequal urban societies characterized by major changes in social and racial structure as well as segregation patterns. Cities as different as Windhoek, Maputo and Cape Town witnessed a surge in GRDs. However, with the notable exception of South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Ghana, few publications have been dedicated to African case studies, particularly in a comparative perspective. The forms, reasons and contexts of GRD emergence in highly segregated cities as well as their impact on socio-economic patterns and urban integration in a context of political transition, have received little attention. Most of the case studies have been carried out in North America (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Le Goix, 2001; 2002; 2005), Europe (Blandy et al. 2004; Charmes, 2005; Blandy, 2006), Latin America and Asia (Caldeira, 1999; Capron, 2004). The economic, socio-political and historical dynamics underlying the development of GRDs have been analysed in a comparative perspective, although with limited focus on Africa (Webster et al. 2002; Capron, 2004; 2006; Billard et al., 2005; Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Glasze et al., 2006; Paquot, 2009; Bagaeen and Uduku, 2010). The aim of this article is, therefore, to deepen our understanding of the emergence, circulation and implications of GRDs in the context of Sub-Saharan African cities.

In view of the powerfulness of the image of the fortress attached to gated residential developments, their worldwide success was primarily interpreted as the result of the upper and middle classes’ fear of crime and seemed to summarize their desire to dissociate themselves from the urban poor (Davis, 1990 on the United States; Caldeira, 1999 on Brazil; Plöger, 2006 on Peru). Pioneering works focused on security issues, producing various typologies (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; ISS, 1997). Then the
perspective logically shifted to an analysis of ‘NIMBY’ behaviour among GRD residents (Minton, 2002; Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002; Paquot, 2009), with the occasional emphasis on psychology (Low, 2003).[F3] Some authors interpreted this ‘global spread’ in terms of ‘club economy’ and ‘shareholders’ democracy’ (Glasse, 2003a; 2003b; Glasse et al., 2006; Charmes, 2005) arguing that GRDs constitute a collective economic response, rooted in the alleged failure of the public authorities to provide services and security in particular. Such analyses led to an appraisal of the degree of privatization of space and facilities within GRDs (Smith-Bowers and Manzi, 2006), and of their consequences as far as town planning is concerned (Landman, 2004; Townshend, 2006; Giroir, 2007).

In Southern Africa, GRDs have been primarily interpreted as a reaction to the increasing mobility of the poor, and to the accelerating racial desegregation occurring in South Africa and Namibia. GRDs have been said to reflect the desire of the white middle classes to avoid contacts with the poor and the blacks, and to rebuild a sense of territorial control over their direct environment (on the concept of ‘comfort zone’ within a perceived hostile environment in South African cities, see Ballard (2004)). The private erection of ‘fortified enclaves’ has been said to reflect a ‘new apartheid’ in South Africa, where it is said that the fear of crime is put forward to mask a racist fear (Lemanski, 2004; 2006). Resorting to GRDs can indeed be seen as a hygienist and neocolonial reaction to a fading physical barrier between African ‘indigenous’ and white cities, the separation no longer being enforced by apartheid laws. Moreover, a high crime context in Cape Town and a rising concern about crime in Windhoek and Maputo, give ample room for GRDs to develop. Security issues may be more important there than in other developing countries such as Egypt or Turkey where social inequalities are also huge (Florin, 2005). GRDs in Southern Africa are said to reflect the privatization of security and residential space, which is supposed to make up for the public authorities’ inability to secure public space, linked to the perception that security is decreasing in formerly protected white areas.

Such analyses are embedded in the alleged fragmentation of urban societies (Bénit et al., 2007) and they shed light on the strategies of communities or households. In such a perspective, the socio-economic, political and historical contexts of the production of GDRs are dealt with as a mere background that influences and shapes the spreading of this model but that is not considered pivotal to understanding its success per se. Breaking away from this perspective, this article argues that one should also envision GRDs as polymorphic real estate products, tailored to fit the socio-economic diversity of the middle classes of the corresponding urban contexts. It focuses on the market-related and political processes linked to the spread of GRDs and on the influence of inherited urban forms on GRD development. While scholars exploring the rise of the GRD phenomenon have been focusing on security issues, individual preferences, household or community strategies and tactics, fear and ‘NIMBY’ attitudes, we would like to resort to another, less extensively studied perspective: the conditions under which GRDs are produced and their spreading mechanisms, pointing out the role of private stakeholders on the international, regional and local scales, as well as the importance of town planning policies in the successful spreading of the GRD model.

This perspective does not invalidate other approaches. On the contrary, it aims to complement them, drawing on similar recent works on other cities and adding to the existing body of literature, by elaborating on the spatial spreading of the model through a multi-scalar comparative approach. In so doing, we do not deny the importance of security issues or social and racial components in this process. Also, we acknowledge the fact that GRDs generate exclusion processes and contribute to the diffusion of a certain way of life, social values and norms[F4] by echoing fears or reflecting on individual or
community tactics in an insecure environment. However, we propose to shed light on other, sometimes underestimated aspects of the phenomenon, with a view to completing the picture.

Following recent empirical studies,[F5] this article focuses on urban, political and town planning local contexts, and highlights their importance in the success and adaptation of GRDs as private suburban housing products in three Southern African cities. We rely on an empirical approach in order to analyse GRDs in a comparative perspective, and to assess how they adapt to or disrupt inherited urban patterns and planning traditions in three cities located in the direct periphery of Johannesburg, the economic heart of the region. We focus on private stakeholders, e.g. developers, estate agents, multinationals, NGOs and international aid networks: their influence is geographically analysed in terms of scales and local contexts, breaking away from the classic economic ‘offer and demand’ perspective.

The first section establishes the basis for a comparative approach between our three cities, by exploring how GRDs develop and adapt in contrasted local housing markets and urban contexts. Spatial spreading mechanisms at different scales, i.e. urban, national but also regional and international, are analysed in the second section. The third section focuses on the contrasted political and institutional contexts underlying the development of GRDs, on the public authorities’ reaction to what remains mostly a private developer venture, and on the tensions linked to the development of these controversial residential schemes.

GRDs in contrasted urban contexts

While Windhoek, Maputo and Cape Town are all characterized by strong social inequalities, they have inherited contrasting urban shapes and histories. Maputo epitomizes the segregated colonial capital city (1,099,000 inhabitants[F6]), founded by the Portuguese, where the supposedly beautiful and modern ‘cement’ city is surrounded by large unplanned African settlements (caniços), and where the land was nationalized in 1976 by the then socialist government. Windhoek exemplifies the medium-sized capital city (220,000 inhabitants[F7]) combining colonial and apartheid features with a tradition of town planning, architecture and urban design imported from Germany — the first European state to colonize South West Africa in the late nineteenth century — from the UK and from South Africa, which ruled Namibia for decades until the country gained its independence in 1990. Cape Town is a globalizing metropolitan and regional node of 3 million inhabitants (Cape Metropolitan Area[F8]) where local authorities are trying to promote the ideal of a European city with a ‘vibrant’ centre close to spectacularly preserved natural surroundings and beautiful scenery, beyond the legacies of colonial and apartheid segregation.

My estate agent’s vocabulary is rich: exclusive niche markets v. segmented housing markets

The expression GRD summarizes the variety of enclosed neighbourhoods in the three cities, in terms of architecture and size (individual houses, townhouses, blocks of flats, etc.), location (suburban or urban) and social stratification: GRDs may be restricted to the urban elite, or to a large and stratified middle class able to afford the extra costs generated by the closure (actually variable according to the degree of exclusivity of the complex).

In Maputo, GRDs constitute a narrow niche market for the upper class and expose blatant social inequalities, whereas in Cape Town the variety of complexes reflects the wider social spectrum in increasingly segmented local housing markets.[F9] In 2006 in Maputo, monthly rents ranged between
US$ 1,800.00 and 4,000.00, which appears disproportionate when compared to the local average monthly income of around US$ 50,000 developers target British, Portuguese, American, Brazilian, Zimbabwean or French renters/buyers, sometimes rich Mozambicans, and prices are negotiated in American dollars. In Cape Town and Windhoek, GRDs accommodate local middle to upper-middle income earners (Landman, 2003); the discrepancy is less important in Namibia (see Table 1) where only a few GRDs within the Windhoek municipal area offer leisure and sports facilities for instance.

Table 1 – GRDs: “all shapes and sizes” (mid-2000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price in US$</th>
<th>Cape Town</th>
<th>Maputo</th>
<th>Windhoek</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>210,000 to 1.4 M</td>
<td>55,000 to 210,000</td>
<td>80,000 to 90,000</td>
<td>78,000 to 270,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Maputo, the Brazilian term ‘condominios’ prevails. It refers to blocks of flats and conveys the idea of togetherness in condominios fechados (Capron, 2006). In Cape Town and Windhoek, the phenomenon has led to a complex marketing terminology. Developers speak of ‘estates’ to stress the idea of high living standards, with prestigious facilities; other terms, e.g. ‘villages’, ‘courts’, ‘parks’ and ‘clusters’ or ‘townhouses’, convey the idea of high internal density in denser urban areas. In Cape Town, GRDs range from several thousand to a few hundred units; in Windhoek the average complex size is low in comparison (29 units in 2001 — Sohn, 2003) (see Table 1).

As a result, in Maputo, around 30 complexes of five to ten hectares each are concentrated along the highly rated Costa do Sol. These were built either on vacant land or on land forcibly recovered from poor people who had erected caniços (informal settlements) in the area (see Figure 2). In Windhoek and Cape Town, the success of GRDs among the middle classes has led to their spatial spreading. In Windhoek, they are scattered in former white areas and are burgeoning on the southern and eastern outskirts of the city, where they tend to become a dominant feature of the new residential developments with, currently, hundreds of complexes concentrated in these suburbs (Figure 3). The trend has gone so far as to make GRDs the only residential option available in the ‘good’ peripheries, i.e. in the middle-range bracket in Windhoek, as was observed in Los Angeles (Le Goix, 2001, 2002 and 2005). While land reserves within the municipal area are limited, a number of up-market ‘lifestyle villages’ and large ‘nature estates’ have recently been built and planned a few kilometres away from the city. In Cape Town, security villages and golf estates are concentrated on the northeastern and southeastern urban fringes, whereas townhouses spread in the northwestern suburbs and in the inner city (see Figure 4). A recent survey undertaken in six of the northeastern suburbs where GRDs have sprung up recently and cover 246 complexes, revealed that GRDs tend to form clusters of rather small developments (of 2.9 hectares on average) and increased by 153% between 1998 and 2005 (Welgemoed, 2009). In both cities developers who were interviewed stressed that, while continuing to target the middle- and upper-income markets, they also address the demands of first-time home
buyers, e.g. young couples (which represents around 66% of their products in Cape Town), by cutting
down on construction costs and providing poor copies of exclusive complexes that cost only between
US$ 78,000.00 and 150,000.00.[F12]

Urban shapes, urban images

Beyond this variety, GRDs create spatial proximity between rich and poor, thereby limiting social
contacts. Walls not only separate but also allow for the spatial juxtaposition of neighbourhoods that are
functionally linked at different scales,[F13] i.e. when the poor work as domestic workers or gardeners in
GRDs (Lemanski, 2006; Salcedo and Torres, 2003). This is particularly true in Cape Town and Maputo.

In Maputo, GRDs face informal settlements: they are separated only by a street, which
reinforces the discrepancy between the ‘(formal) cement city’ and the caniços (Quembo and Lopes,
2005) at the local scale. This is due firstly to the fact that, during the colonial era, the ‘indigenous
population’ were not contained in designated African neighbourhoods (Mendes De Araujo, 1999), and
secondly to the relatively laisser-faire public attitude during the civil war: the deslocados (people who
fled from the war zone in the countryside and settled in the city) were sometimes temporarily allowed
to erect caniços on pieces of land where development is normally forbidden by the municipal zoning
plan, such as flood plains or mangrove swamps. These sites being located along the coast and close to
the city centre, they have now become highly valuable for developers who have progressively displaced
these poor communities so as to take over the land. Spatial proximity in Cape Town works at the city
level and echoes the apartheid city layout: GRDs are located a few kilometres away from squatter camps
in the northern suburbs or close to the black township of Khayelitsha (see Figure 4). In Windhoek,
however, most of the GRDs for middle-income groups are located on the opposite side to former black
townships and recent and rapidly developing informal settlements adjacent to them. Exceptions are to
be found in more central areas where GRDs were developed in the former buffer zone, between former
white and coloured areas.

GRDs have also been perpetuating the suburbanization that began in Cape Town in the 1950s in
a context of rapid urban growth, when the middle class deemed the city centre no longer suitable in the
1970s–1980s. In Windhoek, suburbanization took place mostly in the 1960s and the 1970s, although at a
slower rate, owing to the relatively small size of the city at the time. The rapid extension of the city took
place in the 1980s and 1990s. The British and American suburban models based on individual houses,
mono-functional zoning and low-density developments, shaped the landscape in both cities, although, in
the context of apartheid suburbanization, it encompassed the creation of buffer zones (highways, ‘green
belts’ and industrial zones) in order to separate the ‘white city’ from the townships meant for non-white
populations.

Where GRDs accommodate middle- to upper-class households, they constitute a walled version of
suburbia. Further empirical research would be needed to assess whether they reinforce broader
socio-economic segregation patterns, by fostering internal social homogeneity (see, for instance, Garcia
Sanchez (2004) in this regard) more than ‘traditional suburbanization’, i.e. the mushrooming of separate
houses on open plots in the peripheries. In South Africa, the developers who look for cheap land
opportunities in former white suburbs are sometimes accused of reproducing apartheid (Lemanski,
2004). This criticism reflects the nostalgic discourse of certain estate agents who implicitly refer to the
apartheid era: GRDs ‘allow people to raise children like many years ago, it gives a sense of freedom’
[F14] (Pam Golding, Cape Town). Nevertheless, ‘racial’ and, possibly, social mixing emerges in these
complexes as in any residential mixed suburb, whether closed or open. Further analyses are needed in this regard to draw conclusions from the socio-economic and urban disruption fostered by this model, as opposed to traditional suburbanization.

In Maputo, on the contrary, GRDs constitute a new and, somehow, unusual as well as exogenous urban layer. They disrupt the colonial city model that had led to the creation of a vibrant commercial and administrative city centre, with large public spaces designed and controlled by the public authorities (Sousa Morais, 2001). GRDs have given birth to a suburban residential neighbourhood stretching up to 10 kilometres away from the city centre, in a neighbourhood deprived of open and public space, except for the nearby beaches. GRDs are conceived as distinct entities, physically separated from the rest of the city, from the adjacent caniços and from one another by strips of waste land, resembling the pattern of certain Latin American cities (Salcedo and Torres, 2003).

What at first sight could appear as a standardized housing product under different appellations is adapted to the historical legacy of urban patterns. The discourses of developers and estate agents build on the myth of a semi-rural and community way of life in Cape Town; or that of a preserved African coastline in Maputo where condominios face the seaside; they also build on the sense of fake rural settings in Windhoek (Dorado Gardens, Kokerboom Park, Hochland Village), despite high densities within townhouses and their location in environments that often lack the scenery dimension, with the exception of those who enjoy a panoramic view of the city skyline. The recently developed nature estates and lifestyle villages outside the Windhoek municipal area emphasize the benefits of living in a natural environment close to the city. In Cape Town, developers sometimes even resort to anti-urban discourses to glorify the myth of rurality in a Jeffersonian perspective (vineyards, seaside and mountains), perceived as being protected from urban violence, pollution and traffic: for instance, the Garden Cities Company, originally created in 1919 by Cape Town tycoon Sean Stuttaford, now a section 21 (non-profit) organization managed by his son, presents itself as the heir of Ebenezer Howard. The promotional billboards of the GRDs, erected on rural land that the organization secured in the 1920s–1930s, mention Letchworth and Welwyn as well as the Garden City concept that Stuttaford discovered while touring London with Howard himself. Developers also resort to European references to fuel urban nostalgia (Gervais-Lambony, 2003): the Old World is often referred to in Windhoek through mythic heroes or historical figures (Cunivere, Camelot, Charlemagne, Nu Hamlet) and place names (Barcelona, Rome, Seoul, ‘Vini Vidi Vici’, Trafalgar Court) in reference to famous European cities, especially Italian ones.

**Urban fears**

The security aspect is not developed equally in Cape Town and Windhoek, where security is mentioned in second or third position in the discourse of estate agents; quality of life and investment come first (Morange and Vivet, 2006). However, in direct opposition to its South African counterparts, Maputo (Folio, 2007a) is described as a safe city in public discourses, tourist guides and the Internet website of the Foreign Affairs Department. The success of GRDs in Maputo owes less to a feeling of increasing insecurity and violence than the quest for a certain lifestyle (see below). Windhoek, which used to be considered a safe city, remains far less exposed to violence than South African cities, especially Johannesburg, but it has experienced escalating crime rates since the 1990s and the issue of crime is at the forefront of media coverage and public debates, which fuels feelings of insecurity. According to local cultures and to the image of the city cultivated by all stakeholders, the fortress-like aspects of GRDs are thus contrasted. Developers and residents both agree that there are few or no GRDs in Windhoek
displaying the same ‘fortress’ aspects as in South African cities. In Cape Town, GRDs are sometimes considered by both the residents and the actual municipality as a good alternative to the threat of road closures that are spreading in Johannesburg, i.e. community-based types of organization that have created huge controversy in the city (Dirsewef and Wafer, 2006; Peyroux, 2005; 2006, Bénit-Gabaffou and Morange, 2008; Bénit-Gabaffou et al. 2009). Johannesburg actually acts as a powerful bogeyman at the national level from this point of view (Morange and Didier, 2006). In Maputo, despite the perception of increasing criminality, entrance guards rarely carry firearms and several interviewees said that they favoured a gun-free environment.

**Circulations: local trends, international influences**

The success of GRDs can be traced back to multi-scalar spatial circulations. At the city level, developers play a key role in reproducing this housing option, a success which is reflected in extending waiting lists: they sell mainly from the plan, as shown on the blueprint. At the regional scale, South Africa is a ‘leading nation’ due to its economic and historical links with Maputo and Windhoek. At the international scale, the collapse of both the apartheid and socialist regimes, as well as the shift towards neoliberalism, have led our three cities to be brutally inserted into globalization, thereby accelerating the spreading of GRDs. This multi-scalar approach reveals the variety of factors accounting for the success of GRDs: short-term marketing strategies and fads, longer-term and inherited land opportunities, regional economic links, as well as the cultural features of local societies, either because of the strength of regional links or because of an international cultural gap.

**Circulation at the city and national levels**

In Cape Town, whether local entrepreneurs or major international companies, private developers introduce GRDs as trendy property products; they offer low financial risk and maximum return on investment: ‘from a developer’s perspective, that’s very easy. If you say security complex, people don’t think, they buy it immediately. It is a marketing tool’ (Asrin Property, a small Cape Town local development and building family company founded in 1994 that has around 30 operations to its credit and is now expanding its activities to Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal). ‘The developers, they all use the same concept. They saw that something works. They know that it is what people want’ (Pam Golding, Cape Town branch — one of the largest independent property companies in Southern Africa founded in 1976; it is based in Cape Town and became internationally active when it opened up its London office in 1986 and forged an alliance with the UK-based Savills Property Group in 1999. Palm Golding has offices in various cities in Namibia, and recently opened an office in Mozambique).

Consequently, developers act as spreading agents for this housing concept at the national scale: there is evidence of this kind of spatial circulation in South Africa, which contains many interconnected cities. The above-mentioned Garden Cities Company started building GRDs in the Cape Town area when its director came back from a business trip in Johannesburg, where he had been seduced by this architectural concept. To sell GRDs, a small Capetonian developer admitted to resorting to the ‘GASH-concept’ (‘good areas/small homes’) that he discovered while working as a builder in Durban. During the interview, he also mentioned his knowledge of the Johannesburg market, which is situated in the economic heart of South Africa and has a pioneering role in the diffusion of this model to other South African cities. Moreover, the model builds on spatial proximity at the city scale, where the juxtaposition of complexes becomes a selling argument in terms of property value, exclusivity and security. In Cape Town a developer secured a large piece of farm land in Kuilsriver where he built an upper-middle-class
complex containing 200 m² to 300 m² houses on a fake golf course, called Zevendal. After this success he built a denser complex next to the first one, targeting the middle class: Zevenzicht is marketed as ‘a residential estate at a price you can afford’, i.e. US$ 20,000.00 a plot and US$ 52,000.00 a house. The duplication is reflected in the similarity of the name, which is also meant to offer a sense of place. This two-step process allowed him to secure funding and increase the value of the land, and thus the return on investment, from US$2,000.00 to US$ 15,000.00 per house. This might explain why GRDs tend to form clusters on the outskirts of suburbs or within actual suburbs where land is available (Welgemoed, 2009). In Windhoek, planning policies also explain the clustering of GRDs as the municipality promotes higher-density zoning and authorizes joint ownership/sectional title (a condition for GRDs to be established) in certain areas.[F15] favouring the spatial concentration of townhouses.

Circulation at the regional and international scales

At the regional scale, economic links contribute to GRDs’ spreading. Namibia’s economy is closely tied to that of South Africa due to their political history, through the Southern African Customs Union and the Common Monetary Area, as well as through extensive trade and financial flows. Ninety percent of Namibia’s imports originate from, and many Namibian exports are aimed at or transit through, South Africa. Major South African property and real estate companies are present in Windhoek, such as Pam Golding and Seef Residential Properties (a firm founded in 1964 and represented by 200 branches in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Botswana), as are prominent South African firms. Similarly, in Mozambique, after the peace agreement was signed in October 1992 and apartheid was abolished in South Africa in 1991, the country opened up to neoliberalism, and economic growth in Maputo took off thanks to the development of the Maputo Development Corridor backbone.[F16] A transnational economic regional entity then (re)emerged: in 2001, Mozambique superseded Zimbabwe as South Africa’s first economic partner while South Africa superseded Portugal as the first foreign direct investor in Mozambique (Daniel et al., 2003).[F17]

While South Africa is conquering the regional market and disseminating its executives in the region, Johannesburg is once more playing a key role in this diffusion: over 250 South African companies are operating in Mozambique and the employees of, for instance, Shoprite, Nandos, Vodacom and Absa are accommodated in GRDs which are sometimes erected by the actual company itself (see Box 1). Rents are often paid directly by employers or by embassies in the case of diplomatic staff. Foreign and local developers are involved in the construction of GRDs (South African as well as Portuguese and Brazilian developers, as in Luanda): a Portuguese developer recently built the Super Marès condomínio.

In Windhoek, cultural links reinforce regional spreading: people of Dutch, German, British, French and Portuguese ancestry represent about 7% of the Namibian population, the second largest proportion in sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa. Afrikaans speakers share a similar culture and way of life with the white and coloured populations of neighbouring South Africa, which facilitates the circulation of GRDs. Conversely, in Maputo, the clientele is mostly composed of expatriates (Gomez, 2003): the cultural gap they encounter on hitting Mozambican soil pushes them into GRDs, although they might not actually favour this type of housing option in their own country. As they plan short-time stays in Mozambique, they accept this way of life as being temporary. In ‘Indy Village’ (Sommershield), accommodation can be rented on a daily or weekly basis. Moreover, they are used to living in such complexes (they have in the past, in other cities) and put forward the notion of ‘habit’ during the
interviews (Folio, 2007b). Being highly mobile, they value the ‘lock-up-and-go’ advantage offered by GRDs and the fact that houses are fully equipped. They also value the fact that the body corporate of the condominio takes care of internal maintenance; they can call the complex manager in the event of internal damage to the house, etc.

The influence of NGOs, public or private charity organizations, international private investment corporations and multinationals on the local housing market, and the way these contribute to the importation of Western lifestyles and living standards have been observed and described in other developing countries, such as Ghana, in the Greater Accra Region, concerning which Grant (2005) talks of ‘transnational houses’. In Angola, oil companies such as Total accommodate their foreign employees in Luanda Sul. The situation in Maputo is more complex due to its proximity to South Africa, which has an influence on the Mozambican city. This influence, combined with international trends, leads to an interlocking of regional and international scales in the spread of the GRD model and overlapping temporalities. In Maputo, GRDs have developed through a complex three-step cycle.

The first GRDs were built by public authorities and public companies during the civil war, with a view to accommodating the workforce of international development and aid programmes (see Table 2). For instance, Campo residential was designed for Italian expatriates working for the Mozambican Ministry of Health. In the early 1990s, embassies, NGOs, and UN and national agencies settled down en masse in Maputo, and GRDs followed — PMA Park for the World Food Program in 1995 and for US Aid employees in 1996; Helena Park in 1998 for South African diplomats — offering expatriates the only modern housing stock available in the city and a ‘Westernized’ way of life. Running water and electricity are problematic in the rest of the city, not to mention the state of public roads, after the city infrastructure partially collapsed during one of the longest and most violent civil wars in twentieth-century Africa (Serra, 2003). Condominios contrast dramatically with the city’s flats and houses, which are old and damaged (Lachartre, 2000), and offer a level of quality and cleanliness that is found nowhere else, except in the wealthy suburbs of Sommershield. Moreover, non-Portuguese speakers do not have to house-hunt. In the mid-1990s, foreign investors and South African firms settled in Maputo and built GRDs to accommodate their employees. A third generation of GRDs emerged in Maputo in the early 2000s, controlled by real estate companies and designed to accommodate Mozambicans as well as foreigners. In Sommershield II, the manager reported that, besides diplomatic staff from Holland, Norway and Belgium, the condominio accommodated local entrepreneurs from the Pakistani community. Similarly, in the late 1990s, a naturalized South African citizen of Indian origin, partnered with two Mozambican developers, launched the SOMOCOL development company that erected six condominios. The approval and support of the municipality is more easily secured when a foreign developer operates in association with local companies through joint ventures, or even applies for Mozambican citizenship. When the municipality witnessed a slowing down in building permit applications linked to international cooperation programs (Sr. Aderito Chambe, 5 June 2005, Técnico de Planificação urbana do Município de Maputo), private developers took over. This third generation of GRDs, privately built, may contribute to trivializing this housing product and, in the long term, lessen the specificity of the Mozambican case, while the first generation of condominios already badly needs upgrading. What used to be an exclusive and showy option for the upper class might become an ordinary housing option.
Table 2 – Three generations of *condominios* in Maputo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction year</th>
<th>Complex</th>
<th>Built by / belongs to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Oásis</td>
<td>State (expatriates of the Soviet Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Parque Sabié</td>
<td>Department of agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Parque Miramar</td>
<td>Prédial, Mozambican management company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Parque Wona Mar</td>
<td>Fishing Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Renamo</td>
<td>Occupied by ex-Renamo guerilla soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>GEPE</td>
<td>Department of education</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>Vila Sol</td>
<td>Department of public roads</td>
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<td><strong>2nd generation</strong></td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>PMA</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>USAID</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Manica Village</td>
<td>Built by Manica Fret Service / belongs to Millenium BIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Casa própria</td>
<td>Co-ownership association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Helena Park</td>
<td>South African Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Campo residential</td>
<td>Department of Health/Italian cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>4 Estações</td>
<td>Mo zal</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>Sommershield II</td>
<td>SOMOCOL*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>Bella Vista</td>
<td>SOMOCOL</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>Mo zal</td>
<td>Mo zal</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3rd generation</strong></td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>MOTUR</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Nª 4182</td>
<td>SOMOCOL</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Sommer Glades</td>
<td>SOMOCOL</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Habitacional 5 Av.</td>
<td>SOMOCOL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After Folio and Quembo’s field work (2004) and A. Gomez (2003)

* directed by a South African citizen – an Indian, who successfully applied for the Mozambican citizenship

| Public | International Aid | Private |
Box 1 Maputo and Windhoek: GRDs, economic development and ‘company villages’

In 1998, the Mozal aluminium smelter was launched in Maputo. The shareholders in this venture are BHP Billiton (an Anglo-Australian Resources Company), Mitsubishi, the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd and the Mozambican State. In 1999–2000, Mozal built five condominios to accommodate its executives (see Table 2). The Mozambican State, eager to attract foreign investment, leased the public land at a discount price. The condominios were built by a Chinese firm and a local developer based in Maputo city centre, and were initially occupied by South Africans (60% of the residents in 2005), Australians and French nationals for a monthly rental of US$ 1,800.00. Since then it has been gradually opening up to the local elite.

In Ludwigsdorf, a very sought-after address in the capital, one finds an example of ‘company village’ (see Figure 3): it is owned by Exclusive Properties, a subsidiary of Namdeb Properties. Namdeb Diamond Corporation (Pty) Limited is owned in equal shares by the Namibian government and De Beers Centenary AG. This housing estate locally known as ‘Valco Village’ was built in 1986. It includes 38 houses and collective facilities (tennis, swimming pool, playground, and clubhouse). Units are let out to expatriates, employees of associated companies on a short-term lease basis, as well as to private tenants.

Neoliberal gating and contrasting town-planning cultures

Considering the specificities of the political debates in post-apartheid and postcolonial contexts, which are centred on the transformation of cities into more equitable and socially integrated spaces, GRDs are facing surprisingly little opposition from public authorities. They consider GRDs as a ‘private affair’ that they can only supervise, and as an option that fits their agenda in terms of urban growth management. A compromise seems to have been reached around the need to cater for suburbanization in what seems to be a win–win solution: the cost of servicing the land and building roads is outsourced to the private sector in exchange for the privatization of space. However, contrasting degrees and forms of delegation exist, which brings us back to the importance of local and national political contexts: the local perception of GRDs by the public authorities is informed by their political and institutional cultures, their financial resources, as well as the nature of neoliberalization processes, globalizing South African cities being well ahead in this matter.

Public reactions and limits applied to gates?

Despite their possible exclusionary effects in terms of social fragmentation, segregation and NIMBYism, GRDs are spreading without any opposition from public authorities. In Maputo, both local and national public authorities facilitate the construction of GRDs because of the perceived need to attract foreign investment and international aid. In Windhoek, there is no public contestation from the local authorities. Opposition to GRD developments comes from wealthy residents of former white high-income neighbourhoods who complain that high-density housing may have a negative impact on land and property value, and that it might generate insecurity (Sohn, 2003). One might expect greater and perhaps more violent public reluctance to emerge in South Africa, where public space, human rights and freedom of movement constitute major concerns. However, even in this context GRDs are not directly contested by public authorities.
A controversial national debate which took place in the mid-2000s on the privatization of public space, targeted road closures as opposed to estate developments, focusing particularly on Johannesburg where enclosures are highly developed (Harrison and Mabin, 2006). This debate might have outshone actual concern over the GRD phenomenon: as the Commission stressed, the issue of privately developed estates where roads are private was not addressed in this debate. As exemplified by the Cape Town case study, GRDs have only recently generated public debate about their impacts on the urban fabric, the environment and social exclusion, and public authorities have only just started to point out the contradiction. A municipal councillor and former member of the town planning committee declared: ‘We must not find creative ways of protecting past practices’, reflecting the ANC’s hostility toward what it sees as a form of neo-apartheid. However this realization was not followed by action, even while the ANC ruled the city (from 2003 to 2006). Echoing the general climate of controversy surrounding gates and booms in the local press, a gated development policy was released in 2007 (City of Cape Town, 2007a), that generated fantasizing comments about a possible public ban on GRDs. During the participation process that surrounded this policy, some residents and associations expressed negative views regarding the social exclusion fostered by GRDs, but they were outnumbered by the comments of associations or developers/consultants in favour of GRDs, comments that were based on security considerations and that criticized the bias toward ‘human rights paranoia’ (City of Cape Town, 2007b).

Apart from the short introduction (‘the city discoursages gated developments’), this policy document does not address political issues. It focuses on access to public space, general planning issues, traffic implications, the sizes of the complexes, the general layout of the building plan, etc. (see Figure 4). True to its strong town planning tradition, the municipality of Cape Town addresses GRDs as traditional suburbanization best controlled by the classic planning rules and regulations that have prevailed since the 1950s, i.e. the enforcement of a zoning scheme; it has not proved capable of imagining new tools to manage them. The policy neither prohibits nor encourages gated developments. Rather, it provides guidelines to regulate them. Recommendations concerning social inclusion remain vague: ‘Locating gated developments ... in existing communities should avoid creating utter extremes of wealth next to each other’. As pointed out by Welgemoed (2009), the 2008 policy has had very little impact on the mushrooming of GRDs so far.

(Sub)urbanization and growth-related challenges in contrasting contexts

The necessity of sharing the cost of (sub)urbanization with the private sector is a major concern for public authorities in fast-growing cities characterized by urban sprawl or postwar reconstruction. It pushes public authorities to pave the way for GRDs through a laissez-faire attitude or even direct encouragements.

In Maputo, private condominios make up for the lack of public resources linked to the postwar context, and public authorities rely on private actors to rapidly provide world-class modern infrastructure and services. As a result, the municipality even turns a blind eye to the building of such complexes on land where construction is supposed to be restricted (Vivet, 2010). Since 2005 in the ‘condominios neighbourhoods’ of Maputo, water sanitation has been contracted by property owners to a private company (Néoquimica). Such public facilities do not exist along the Costa do Sol. The central state owns the land in both rural and urban areas, and resorts to long-term leaseholds to encourage developers to build. Land is often allocated through complex channels and procedures suffering from a lack of transparency, which leads to clientelism.
In Cape Town, GRDs are developed on privately owned land, with municipalities letting market forces operate. By building GRDs, developers in Cape Town partly relieve public authorities from the burden of providing bulk services in the fast-growing suburban peripheries and on the remote outskirts of the city. In Windhoek, the city is the largest owner of vacant land, which was secured during apartheid. The municipality sells fully serviced plots and provides infrastructure (roads, water, waste water services and electricity) up to the plot boundaries (except in low-income areas where different servicing and selling procedures were established in the late 1990s). Internal connections are then cared for by developers when they buy large plots and subdivide them later in order to build townhouses. There is no privatization in the delivery of public services as these are supplied by the public authorities. Moreover, in Cape Town and Windhoek, roads within greenfield developments are built by the developers and are privately maintained by the Home Owners Associations [F21], like internal communal areas, which alleviates public budgets. A local councillor even proposed that GRD residents should get rate rebates, pushing the logic of space privatization one step further toward fiscal fragmentation (City of Cape Town, 2007b). In the post-apartheid context, this perception is also linked to the perceived necessity of concentrating scarce public resources on deprived areas, while letting market dynamics accommodate affluent neighbourhoods.

Finally, in Windhoek and Cape Town, the policies of the public authorities and the objectives of developers converge on the need for densification: the former aim to reduce the cost of service provision and promote the ‘compact city’ ideal against urban sprawl; the latter seek to maximize returns on investments by increasing densities. In Cape Town, a specific procedure allows developers to increase densities within fenced developments as opposed to open suburbs where homeowner associations oppose densification. In Windhoek, the municipality encourages high-density developments and joint ownership in a number of areas through its town planning requirements. This is due to the land shortage linked to the fact that the city is nested in a long and narrow valley surrounded by mountains (Peyroux, 2004), and to the fact that it sells large pieces of land to developers in order to save on servicing costs (Sohn, 2003). The promotion of higher density also meets the need to develop more affordable housing options for residents in a context of rising residential costs. In Maputo, public and private agendas converge on the displacement issue and land control by public authorities. Developers can then enforce the displacement of the poor from strategic lands (although they have to offer them an option to relocate) with the blessing of the public authorities, sparing the latter the trouble of implementing politically difficult evictions.

Neoliberal practices, public–private partnerships and the era of technopoliticians?

In addition to the above-mentioned reproduction of traditional planning practices, however, the spread of GRDs does entail some alterations in planning practices, reflecting what Peck (2004) and Brenner and Theodore (2002) consider to be a neoliberal inflexion of urban planning, i.e. relying increasingly on private actors and appointed boards in decision-making processes. Municipal staff accept to act as ‘techno-politicians’ (Zunino, 2006).

In Blaauwberg (Cape Town), a weekly committee examines applications for GRD building permits so as to speed up what is considered a classic township establishment process. Public authorities rely on homeowners’ associations to help them prepare building permit files. Bodies corporate are asked to maintain internal public spaces; they write internal Constitutions that municipal services approve. Developer Milnerton Estates in this regard even worked together with the municipal
services on a local urban master plan, a 25-year prospective planning document. It relieves overworked and understaffed municipal services in the property boom context.

In Windhoek, the public authorities also control land development while letting GRDs develop. The relationships between the City and the estate agents shifted over time from suspicion to partnership. After unsuccessful attempts to regulate land speculation during the 1990s, the City of Windhoek established a commercial partnership with the Institute for Estate Agents whereby the City receives a commission when municipal land is sold by estate agents (Sohn, 2003).

In Maputo the success of GRDs reflects another form of intriguing public–private compromise: the land remains public but a private housing market has been developing since the passing, in 1991, of the national law on freehold and private property in the post-socialist transitional period. Public authorities compromise on the socialist tradition by promoting private housing while developers’ strategies adapt to this context (Jenkins, 2001). The municipality insists on having local entrepreneurs involved in housing developments, South African developers set up joint ventures with Mozambican land leaseholders; some of them apply for Mozambican citizenship to bypass administrative bottlenecks and conquer the market. Moreover, the land belongs to the State and developers pay an ‘authorization fee’ granting them permission to occupy public land for 50 years.

In Cape Town and Maputo, the principle of public–private partnership is naturalized, which threatens public legitimacy and prerogatives. In Cape Town, developers compare GRDs to ‘public townships’, where the infrastructure remains public, implying that they assume a role that no one else endorses: [GRDs] introduced ... a new approach to high density housing to South Africa'; ‘this planning aspect enables the concept of density planning to be used as opposed to the practice of the minimum erf sizes being the criterion of township subdivision ... in South Africa' (Garden Cities). In Cape Town, they claim that that they ‘fund infrastructures ... which would normally have been funded by municipalities ... the local authorities are having to put what money they have into previously disadvantaged areas. We understand this ... developers must be prepared to take some responsibility for standard setting ... particularly now, in a South Africa where local authorities are beset by budget constraints’ [F23]. In Windhoek, public control over urban planning, land development and land sales remains strong.

Conclusion

If choosing to live in a GRD is multifactor-related, it is also linked to a TINA (‘There Is No Alternative’) situation, which is scale- and context-dependent. In Maputo, GRDs constitute the only viable residential option for the international temporary workforce and the restricted local elite which aspire to a ‘Westernized’ way of life in postwar and post-socialist contexts. In Windhoek, where urban standards have been kept high by the city, GRDs tend to become a dominant feature of new residential developments. This is because of the need to densify residential areas in an urban environment characterized by land scarcity within a basin surrounded by mountains and hills. In Cape Town, GRDs convey the ideal of a mythical rural way of life in a secure environment that constitutes an alternative to road closures.

This variety and adaptability account for the success of GRDs in contrasting urban contexts. Conversely, their capacity to water down the specificities of the cities they are entering and to alter the inherited urban form and patterns is uncertain: GRDs might contribute, for example, to modifying Maputo’s European model in the long run, by paving the way for a North American suburban model; in
Cape Town and Windhoek, they contribute to increasing density in the peripheries, and thus modify the ‘one house–one plot’ suburban model. In Windhoek GRDs are also said to contribute to the creation of two diverging types of urban environment perpetuating a dual landscape: while modern suburban architecture reproduces the status quo for the (mostly white) urban elites, differential design and architecture solutions are promoted for low-income populations based on ‘community’, ‘tradition’ and ‘vernacular architecture’, as exemplified by the promotion of owner-built informal settlements which have been theorized as being ‘culturally and economically appropriate’ (Müller-Friedman, 2008: 43). Yet, this capacity will probably depend on their longevity. It leaves us with this question: do GRDs constitute a mere fashion doomed to disappear, for example, once urban growth or insecurity is reversed, or more likely once the private offer slows down, possibly leading to new forms of suburbanization that are yet to come, or to a return to open suburbs?

Irrespective of their longevity, GRDs have already disrupted planning practices in Cape Town and Maputo: through their spreading, the private sector tends to be implicitly considered as the main legitimate producer of urbanization in the peripheries, because local authorities delegate suburbia production to private developers. In Windhoek, while the private sector is involved in promoting and building townhouses, the city remains the main owner of urban land while still benefiting from a strong command of urban planning and land development. As exemplified by our comparative approach, the actual form and degree of delegation vary according to the political, historical and institutional contexts leading to contrasting patterns of governance. They reflect the capacity of neoliberalization to adapt and adjust to local contexts through constant interaction and reshaping that produce ‘actually existing forms’ of neoliberal urbanism (Brenner and Theodore, 2002).

The occasional denunciation from academia (see Lemanski, 2004 on Cape Town) or from progressive residents’ associations, targets gating, fortification and fragmentation in relation to post-apartheid concerns, and is sometimes located within a broader context of globalization and free-market policy orientation, as is seen in a case of academic criticism in Windhoek[F24]: in Cape Town, some associations raised their voices to defend the municipal Gated Development Policy and the restrictions it allowed, or to demand a stricter legislation, mentioning the apartheid legacy in abrupt terms: ‘in context of our recent past (that confused and separated us), selfishness is not a reason to create this monster’ (City of Cape Town, 2007b)[F25]. In Maputo, criticism remains almost nonexistent, possibly because the phenomenon is restricted to the foreign international elite associated with the economic opening and the reconstruction of the country by international aid, and because it does not seem to echo more vital and direct post-socialist and postwar issues. The political resistance to the spread of GRDs, therefore, seems to be influenced by broader political concerns shaped locally and according to inherited political fights or conceptions, which brings us back to the necessity of unpacking not only ‘actually existing’ forms of neoliberalization, but also ‘actually existing’ forms of opposition and contestation of current policies.

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[F1] Following Smith-Bowers and Manzi (2006), we talk about GRDs to avoid the social connotations embodied in the expression ‘gated community’.

[F2] For South Africa, see the work of Landman, Lemanski, Ballard, Dirsuweit and the authors of this article. For Ghana, see Grant, 2005.
In Maputo, we were able to make an inventory of GRDs since the phenomenon is confined to a specific area. In Windhoek, we used the registration of body corporate plots in residential areas, which account for enclosed townhouses, and we cross-checked the information with geo-referenced cadastral data and aerial photographs (collected from the Department of Planning, Urbanization and Environment of the City of Windhoek). In Cape Town, GRDs are so widespread and numerous that we could not resort to a field survey. Moreover, centralized data cannot be found: the municipal services act on an atomized basis. The use of aerial photographs or a systematic survey of building permits would have required extensive work that we chose not to carry out for financial reasons and time-related constraints. Instead, as in Windhoek, we interviewed estate agents, property developers, town planners, city valuers, engineers, consultants and residents (in 2004) and we resorted to secondary data (from Welgemoed, 2009).

In these quotations, the emphasis is always ours.

[3] This conception has been challenged in Los Angeles (Boudreau et al., 2004) for example.
[4] For example, see Thuillier (2000) about the Clubs de chacra of Buenos Aires and their upper-class social agenda.
[9] In Maputo, we were able to make an inventory of GRDs since the phenomenon is confined to a specific area. In Windhoek, we used the registration of body corporate plots in residential areas, which account for enclosed townhouses, and we cross-checked the information with geo-referenced cadastral data and aerial photographs (collected from the Department of Planning, Urbanization and Environment of the City of Windhoek). In Cape Town, GRDs are so widespread and numerous that we could not resort to a field survey. Moreover, centralized data cannot be found: the municipal services act on an atomized basis. The use of aerial photographs or a systematic survey of building permits would have required extensive work that we chose not to carry out for financial reasons and time-related constraints. Instead, as in Windhoek, we interviewed estate agents, property developers, town planners, city valuers, engineers, consultants and residents (in 2004) and we resorted to secondary data (from Welgemoed, 2009).
[10] *Agência de Informação de Moçambique*.
[11] These prices apply to foreigners only. A house is rented for an average rental of US$ 1,500.00; it costs US$ 500.00 to 800.00 a month to secure it by resorting to a private security company (US$ 1,500.00 for a flat).
[13] It is difficult to appreciate the extent to which the gate contributes (or not) to the residents’ ‘entrenchment’ from the rest of the city, as opposed to practices observed in open suburbs. Pioneering works on this topic exist that relate to other parts of the world (Lacarrieu and Thuillier, 2004; Blandy and Lister, 2005; Roitman, 2007).
[14] In these quotations, the emphasis is always ours.
[15] This is the case in areas targeting middle-income groups. In areas developed for higher-income groups, the municipality enforces lower density zoning and stipulates in the sales conditions that no sectional title should be allowed (and thus no townhouses). Higher standards of development are also specified. This promotes individual houses on larger plots of land. These conditions are meant to preserve the ‘quality and standard of living’ (‘Council rejects RCC bid’, *The Namibian*, 1 September 2006).
[16] The annual economic growth rate is 7.4% a year, according to the World Bank; the national annual income per inhabitant doubled in the past ten years.
[18] Before the creation of local authorities in 1995 (the Municipal Districts Act) and 1997 (the Local Authorities Act), urban development was the state’s affair in this highly centralized country.
[19] In 2005, the South African Human Rights Commission — a national institution created to support and promote human rights as defined by the Bill of Rights of the 1996 Constitution, released a highly publicized report and various recommendations on road closure (Landman, 2005). The commission did not find road closure unconstitutional, but stated that security measures cause social division, dysfunctional cities and lead to further polarization of society.
[21] In some cases, the roads may remain public and the public authorities have to maintain them. In Cape Town, only access monitoring is allowed, not booms or gates.
[22] One must remember that ‘incorporation’ is impossible in South African and Namibian cities, which minimizes the perceived political risk.
[24] ‘The Politics of Illusion: a Defect of Vision’ by Andre du Pisani, Professor of Politics and Philosophy at the University of Namibia (UNAM), *The Namibian*, 28 July 2006. Criticism of gated communities is located within a broader critical analysis of the fortification and privatization of urban life as well as of the ‘commoditization’ of urban space (as exemplified by malls) as brought about by globalization and free market policies. Market-led urban development and its implications in terms of inequity are denounced along with the gap between official political discourses promoting equity and social cohesion and the reality of an increasingly fragmented and unequal society.
Figure 1 A town-planning approach to GRDs: avoiding the ‘canyon effect’ (source: Cape Town, *Gated Development Draft Policy*, 5 June 2007, page 16)

Figure 2 Morphology of Maputo City and Distribution of the Condominios, 2005

Figure 3 Land and Housing Value and Spatial Distribution of Body Corporates in Windhoek, 2001 (*source*: City of Windhoek, 2004)

Figure 4 Cape Town gated communities in context — a suburban product linked to urban growth

Figure 5 Maputo: Sommershield II, an upper-class complex, built in 2000 by SOMOCOL on a piece of land occupied by informal settlements (*caniços*), on the outskirts of the city centre, close to the Eduardo Mondlane University and the beachfront

Figure 6 Cape Town: urban growth on the northern edge in the fast-developing suburb of Durbanville where middle-class gated communities have been booming since the early 2000s. The suburb is under construction (the road is not tarred yet) and three workers are heading home after a day’s work on a nearby construction site

Figure 7 Standardized townhouse complexes have become a dominant feature of suburban developments in Windhoek