The New Migratory Routes of Europe? Polish and Romanian Emigrations in a Comparative Historical Perspective

Aurore Flipo

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The Romanian Journal of European Studies

No. 7-8/2009

special issue
South-Eastern Europe and the European Migration System: East-West Mobility in Flux
The Romanian Journal of European Studies

ISSN 1583 - 199X EUV - Editura Universităţii de Vest, Timişoara

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The New Migratory Routes of Europe? Polish and Romanian Emigrations in a Comparative Historical Perspective

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ABSTRACT
This article steps back into history to describe the evolutions and transformations of migratory routes inside Europe. The question raised is the following: which are the particular variables determining the shape and the directions of migratory roads crossing Europe? To answer this question, this paper first uses data from 29 European countries censuses and migration data from National statistical offices in order to reconstitute those routes and analyse their shape. In a second part of the study, East-West movements of people and the particular cases of Polish and Romanian emigrations are put into an historical comparative perspective. Those migrations have strongly varied throughout the years, but display a clear and stunning parallelism, notably marked by a substantial shift during the past twenty years. Comparing both emigrations patterns using official data from several countries and survey data (Polish Social Diagnosis and British Labour Force Survey), we show that their patterns reveal the transformations of the European migratory system and elicit the role of different variables in the constitution of a particular migratory route. By comparing the general features of post‐enlargement Romanian emigration to Spain and Polish emigration to the United‐Kingdom, we suggest that those phenomena corresponds with a new type of mobility, concerning particularly the newest generations.

KEYWORDS
Europe ; Migrations ; Eastern Europe

European Mobility and the Fixity Myth

From Multiple Mobilities to the Concept of Migration

Located at the very edge of the Eurasian continent, the European peninsula has always been the theatre of varied and numerous movements of populations. Invasions, colonisations, empires and nomad tribes travelling on the European soil have long‐past moulded it as a mixed territory. Being a strategic junction between Africa and Asia, surrounded by seven seas, Europe is crossed over by many roads – commercial, military, cultural, human. Those roads are however intersected by many barriers, reflecting the extreme
fractionation of the European territory: fiefs, duchies, counties, kingdoms and States have produced the tens of thousands of kilometres of borderlines carving up contemporary Europe.

Then, the “migration question” inside Europe can only be analyzed in a relative perspective: to the Nation-State and its fantasies of homogeneity on one hand, and to the alleged fixity of peoples on the other hand. On the first, the scientific literature is well-stocked and recalls that nationalism is above all a tool of power and the nation a political concept – an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991; Dieckhoff 2000; Brubaker 1996). On the second, the present transnationalist and globalist perspectives can sometimes create the illusion that mobility is something entirely new, forgetting the historicity of mobility and nomadism in Europe, that were certainly marginal, but always existing. In this respect, Daniel Nordmann points out that “wandering phenomena are numerous and known in every country. In the ancien régime times, they were very common and impacted all the social and professional categories.” (Nordmann 2006). Similarly, many large-scale population displacements, related to religious persecutions but also to labour issues, are observable all along the Middle-Ages and the Modern age (Moch 1992).

Those two postulates, firmly anchored in the European political and historical mythology, constitute the basis of European nationalism through the (con)fused it suggests between people and territory and, consequently, create migration as a concept. Finally, the development of the industrial and capitalist society has contributed to create migration as labour and labour force mobility. Hence, if human mobility has always existed, migration as a concept finds its roots in the Modern age.

Emigration, immigration and demography in Europe

Long before immigration grew of concern for the European community, it is the emigration concept that has been developed (and experienced) first by Europeans on a large scale. Estimates of the amount of emigrants vary, but most historians agree on the basis that at least 50 millions of persons have left the European soil for the New Worlds at the period of the emigration peak, between 1860 and 1914 (Moch 1992). As we will closely examine later in this paper, emigration to the Americas have run on a much larger period and have impacted all European countries, although at different periods and rhythms.

Despite those facts, Europe is generally considered as an immigration continent because of the sudden and fast reversal of the flows that occurred at the turn of the nineteenth century. Western and Northern European countries have a positive migration balance since many decades, while it is assumed that Eastern and South-Eastern European countries remaining with negative balances will sooner or later reach the equilibrium. Nevertheless, many diverse migratory profiles still exist within Europe, in which demographic and socio-economic variables interplay (see Salt 2005).

Hence, many of the current studies on migration in Europe are models based on flux estimates, which emphasizes on current trends while sometimes overshadowing historical patterns. What can then the study of census tell us about the stock of immigrants in Europe?

First, one should recall that the 27 million people living outside the country they were born in represent only 3% of the 735 million Europeans. Then, among those 27 million people, 60% are coming from continental Europe and 26% from the European Union member-States. Adding the Mediterranean area as part of the European geopolitical space (i.e. Maghreb and Turkey), the European continent appears to be a relatively closed space, dominated by short-distance migrations. Indeed, long distance migrations are first and foremost expressed by European emigration, remaining important all along the twentieth century, rather than immigration to Europe. At last, the detailed study of censuses of 29 European countries show that coherent regional systems and migratory itineraries can be found within Europe.

The European Migratory System: an Overview

Data used

To estimate the movements of population in Europe through an historical point of view, census data has been collected in 28 European countries (EU 27+ Norway). Those census data have been

1 Except Italy, for which data is not complete; and Slovenia, for which data could not be obtained.
released between the 1990s and the beginning of the years 2000, the oldest being from Malta (1985) and the most recent from Belgium (2004). The number of born abroad European citizens in each of those countries has been obtained using a simple crosstabs calculation. The most important foreign-born population from outside Europe has also been reported in the table, in order to provide a clearer vision of different migratory movements.

Those data provide a picture of the stock of living and present persons born abroad in each European country, but not of the fluxes (whether current or past). They thus constitute the visible traces of about a century of movements of persons in Europe. In almost all cases, the data is not biased by the different nationality policies, as the numbers displayed are based on the country of birth and not on nationality, in order to control the generational effects (ancient migrant generations’ losses of original nationality) and to provide a good comparability. However, in some cases the statistics are based on nationality (Belgium and Germany) which, in the case of Germany, blurs a great part of the migratory movements. In those cases, statistics should be interpreted as some expression of the presence of national minorities, which are correlated with migration but should not be considered as such. Another bias comes from the probable under-estimation of post-war movements, because of the nature of data (especially in the German case), of the chaos of this period and of the displacement of frontiers. Finally, census data provide no information on emigration directed outside Europe. Although imperfect and incomplete, those data provide nevertheless a good start for analysis.

**Historical overview of European migrations**

In absolute terms, the European country having provided the highest number of emigrants bound for Europe is Italy, having a total of 1.4 million persons born on its territory but living in some other country of the European Union. Italy is followed by Germany, Poland and Portugal. In relative terms, Ireland is the first European emigration country with the equivalent of 12% of its current population born on its territory but living somewhere else in Europe (mostly in the United-Kingdom), followed by former Czechoslovakia (7.6%) and Portugal (6.2%).

The country having the most important population coming from another European country is Germany (3.9 million from the continent Europe and 2.5 million from the member-States of the current EU), followed by France (2.3 million from the continent Europe and 2.2 from the EU). France and Germany are also the countries having the most important total immigration: 7.3 million of foreign citizens in Germany and 5.8 million of foreign-born citizens for France. However, the highest rates of foreign-born populations are to be found in Luxembourg (29%), Estonia and Latvia (19%) and Austria (12%).

The following table displays the main country of origin of the immigration (number of persons born in that country), and the main country of destination of the emigration for each European country (number of persons born in the country but living abroad).

**Table 1.** Cross-tabulation of European censuses: main results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Census year</th>
<th>Main country of origin of immigration (all continents)</th>
<th>Main country of origin of immigration (EU)</th>
<th>Main country of destination of emigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Serbia (143 077)</td>
<td>Germany (140 099)</td>
<td>Germany (189 336)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Italy (183 021)</td>
<td>Italy (183 021)</td>
<td>France (126 440)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Russia (12 792)</td>
<td>Romania (7 354)</td>
<td>Germany (42 419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Slovakia (285 372)</td>
<td>Slovakia (285 372)</td>
<td>Austria (54 627)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Germany (24 951)</td>
<td>Germany (24 251)</td>
<td>Sweden (40 921)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Russia (190 599)</td>
<td>Lithuania (4 326)</td>
<td>Sweden (9 964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Russia (36 289)</td>
<td>Sweden (28 040)</td>
<td>Sweden (189 341)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Algeria (1 353 125)</td>
<td>Portugal (606 107)</td>
<td>Belgium (114 943)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Turkey (1 947 938)</td>
<td>Greece (359 361)</td>
<td>France (208 735)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Albania (403 852)</td>
<td>Germany (101 425)</td>
<td>Germany (359 361)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The two following maps picture the main movements of population within Europe, taking basis on the table 1. The first map illustrates the main countries of origin of immigration in all European countries, and the second one displays the main country of destination of each European country’s emigration².

2 Towards European countries only
Taking a look at those maps, three main features can be underlined, contributing to explain the directions of those migratory routes. First, we can ascertain the existence of regional sub-systems constituted by multiple population exchanges and transfers between small numbers of countries. In the second map, it appears very clearly that some countries could be qualified as magnets, and act as barycentres of those sub-systems. The second main migratory route is formed by the relationship between ex-colonizing powers and their ex-colonies. Finally, a third type of mobility is related to migration policies implemented by the State towards the refugees and the guest workers.

_Migratory routes and types of migrations_

Four main sub-systems can be found. The first one is the Scandinavian group. On the first map, it appears that each Scandinavian country involves an important migration from its closest oriental neighbour. Indeed, the biggest group of foreign-born Finnish residents comes from Russia; in Sweden, they come from Finland, and in Norway, from Sweden. However, it appears on the second map that Sweden is clearly the most common destination for emigration in all the Scandinavian area including Iceland, Denmark and Estonia. In 2003, Sweden had in total 290 124 residents from Scandinavian origin, representing one third of its total immigration.

The second sub-system consists of the Germanic empires’ heritage. Hence, empires are still very visible on European maps as soon as we look at mobility. Indeed, most of the Slovakiens emigrants are to be found in Czech Republic, while Czech predominantly head on to Austria, who themselves rather go to Germany. A very striking picture of power relations within the Germanic empires is to be found here. Hence, more than half of the foreign-born population in Austria comes from a country having been, at one point or another of its history, under Austrian rule. In the second map, we can see that Germany appears to be the “magnet area” for the entire Mitteleuropa region.

A third sub-system can be constituted around the Russian presence in the Baltic area. The persons born in Russia are the dominant foreign-born population in all the ex-Soviet area and in Finland,
counting for one fifth of Estonian and Latvian populations. Indeed, the Russian presence in Europe matches the blurred and changing frontiers, over time, of the Muscovite power.

The last apparent sub-system can be drawn around France and the Western and Mediterranean area. This system involves movements from one side to the other of the Mediterranean Sea, going up Spain and Italy. It appears on map 2 that France has been for many years the main magnet country of West-Southern Europe, although this position has been challenged by the transformation of Spain and Italy into countries of immigration.

More generally, it seems quite striking, while taking a look at map 1, that a great part of intra-European migrations are occurring between neighbouring countries and are often somehow reciprocal, even though asymmetrical. For instance, people born in Albania make up the largest emigrant group in Greece, people born in Bosnia make up the largest emigrant group in Slovenia, while Slovenian-born people rather go to the neighbouring Austria, and people born in Ukraine constitute the largest emigrant group in Poland. Similarly, the most common destination country for Lithuanian-born people is Poland, while Romanian-born people are numerous in Bulgaria. Finally, the largest movements of people in the British Isles occur from one part to another of the Irish Sea.

Those regional systems can be explained by historical and political variables (empires and federations’ heritages, old kingdoms and frontiers’ displacements). They also sometimes constitute consistent cultural and linguistic entities (Slavic area, Latin area, Scandinavia, British Isles).

Another type of migratory route can be observed on these maps, which is the one relating the former colonizing countries to their former colonies. Indian migration to the United-Kingdom, Angolan migration to Portugal and Algerian migration in France belong to this category. It appears that such migrations occur on a much bigger geographical distance than the ones we described previously. However, the institutional and political distance is much shorter, as colonies belonged to the influence area of the colonizing country (notably by language, education, elite formation and political institutions).

The last type of movements which can be observed on the maps corresponds with migration policies implemented by some countries in order to receive citizens from other countries. This can be for political reasons (refugees) but on a much larger scale for economic reason (work migrations). This last one is visible on the map with Turks and Greek migrations in Germany and Portuguese, Spanish and Italians in France. Refugee flows are illustrated by people born in ex-Yugoslavia, dispersed through Europe but particularly present in Austria and in Germany. As it appears on the map, those migrations can be defined geographically as middle-distance ones.

The determinants of the European migratory routes

Using the maps, we have separated the European migrations into three main groups, depending on the type of variable relating a country to another: mostly geographical and cultural for the first one, historical and political for the second one, and finally economical and political for the third. It also appeared that those types corresponded with various scales of distance between the countries related.

However, as soon as we look closely at each migration, those distinctions appear to be very artificial. Geographical, economical, political and historical variables are always intertwined in all migrations, even if one variable seems more determining at the first glance. For instance, colonial migrations are often also economical, and can resemble very much the guest workers migrations. Hence, the historical, economical or political categories do not seem to be the most accurate variables to explain the relative coherence of migratory routes in Europe.

Taking a look at the second map, it appears that a large magnet zone can be defined in the North-West of Europe, starting from Sweden to France through Germany and the Netherlands. Whether it is on a political perspective, due to the imperial and colonial influence zones, on an economical perspective, due to North-Western Europe’s leading status during industrialization and the establishment of modern capitalism, or due to its geographically central position, the main feature defining those countries is the status of regional powers.

Hence, the main variable determining a migratory route seem to be the existence of a geopolitical ensemble comprising a centre and one or several peripheries, where movements tend to occur from
the peripheries to the centres, revealing asymmetrical power relations between regions within Europe. The fact that North-Western Europe is the historical centre of the European Union in terms of political and economical construction, and also the historical centre of European mobilities, do not result from coincidence.

The general study of censuses in Europe points out to a diversity of migration patterns that, although very different, seem to obey a similar logic. However, in order to distinguish the role of different variables in the determination of migratory route, it seems necessary to reduce the scope of the observation. Indeed, census data, although rich and inspiring, are incomplete. Moreover, for the purpose of clarity and consistency, we used only part of the data through the main destination and origin countries of migration only. If those routes are far from being incidental (they account for almost 40% of all emigration and immigration numbers as based on the censuses), for some countries the diversity of origins is such that taking in account only the most numerous group provides a very limited picture of the historical movements. To bring more accuracy to this general framework of analysis, one needs to resort to other types of data, including historical knowledge and scientific literature, and consequently reduce the field of research.

In this respect, I will try to show how migrations from post-communist Europe, and particularly Poland and Romania (which provided most of them), are singularly interesting. First, emigration from those countries has been relentless, although irregular, all along the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Then, the routes and directions followed by those migrations have strongly varied, although displaying a clear and stunning parallelism. Finally, the European map of Polish and Romanian migrations has deeply changed over the past twenty years, revealing important transformations of the European migration system. Hence, the comparative study of those migrations can elicit the role of the historical, social and economical variables in the constitution of a particular migratory route.

Migrations in Central Europe: revealing of the transformations of mobility in Europe?

**Historical overview of Polish and Romanian migrations to the West**

The Exodus and the New World

The migration trajectories of Polish and Romanian people display striking similarities, related to European history in general and Eastern European history in particular. Hence, important waves of economic migration have started to occur in Poland from the nineteenth century on, mainly directed towards the United-States (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918; Brozek 1977). Emigration also started from Romania to Northern America (the United-States and Canada) approximately at the same period, although much smaller than the Polish one (Nugent 1995). Those migrations can be considered to be part of the larger movement of emigration from Europe, which occurred mainly between 1840 and 1910, and constitute the massive exodus of Europeans to the Americas. Indeed, although the colonization of the New World began in the sixteenth century, the main migration wave from Europe occurred in the nineteenth century, with a peak around 1870 (Bryceson 2005).

At that time, Romania and Poland were divided territories. Romania was divided between Transylvania, partly under Austrian rule since the sixteenth century, and the Moldavian and Wallachian territories, for which Ottoman and Russian empires competed. Poland on the other hand was divided into three parts between the Prussian, Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. The first waves of emigration from Poland originated from the Prussian territories, but Russian and Austro-Hungarian territories also soon began to send important numbers of migrants across the ocean to the United-States, Canada and Brazil. Quite interestingly, one of the most important emigration zones at that time was already Silesia, also being the region displaying the highest emigration rates nowadays (GUS, 2009). At the very same period, it was also the Austro-Hungarian part of Romania (Transylvania, Banat and Crisana-Maramures) that was displaying the highest rates of emigration. The germanization of Silesia and the magyarization of Romania probably explain a great part of this common phenomenon, linking back to the local level the question of power relations we evoked in the
first part of this paper. Both migrations also shared the same main destination: Chicago and its region. Although many historians consider the economical “backwardness” of those regions, mostly peasant, as being the cause of the “Great Emigration”, one could also say that the transformation induced by the beginnings of modernization and its effects on peasantry probably played a major role (see for example Balog 2008; Sayad 1999).

Emigrations from Poland and Romania to the Americas have kept going on during the first half of the twentieth century, mostly for economic reasons and mainly from rural areas to the American great urban centres. Migration of Central European Jews also became very important during the 1930s, adding to the flux of economical migration the flux of the persecuted, and after 1945 of the displaced persons.

Today, it is estimated that between 10 and 22 million Americans are of Polish ancestry; while between 450 000 and 1.1 million are of Romanian ancestry. All in all, it seems that emigration from Central and Eastern Europe to the Americas in the first half of the twentieth century constitutes the last wave of European settlement in the New World and is in line with most of its general features. The somewhat late nature of the Central and Eastern European transatlantic emigration, compared with Western ones, could be explained by a later industrialization. However, this explanation should be explored using detailed data, as some emigration regions were, on the contrary, relatively well industrialized at the same moment they were sending many migrants (such as Silesia or Banat). The mechanisms of “push” involved on a local level are quite obviously more complex than a simple matter of industrial development. Moreover, all the European countries involved in transatlantic emigration have been so at different periods and rhythms, and in this matter Eastern Europe does not differ from the general trend.

Table 2. Average emigration rate to the USA, per decade (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1851-60</th>
<th>1861-70</th>
<th>1871-80</th>
<th>1881-90</th>
<th>1890-1900</th>
<th>1901-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austro-Hungary</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Isles</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>141.7</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>107.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fenenczi and Willox 1929, quoted by Bryceson 2005: 35

The persistence of some emigration regions across the decades, even with a radical change in the destination countries, raises many questions. Some sociologists have pointed out the existence and spread of an emigration habit or even maybe habitus through local communities (see Potot 2002). The study of “transnational families” (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002) also elicits the existence of migration patterns that involve many generations. However, applying those hypotheses to emigration regions would need analyses that greatly exceed the scope of this paper.
Paris and the Nationalist School

Another common point between Romanian and Polish emigrations’ history is to be found in the elites’ mobility. Although there is no evidence that peasant families from Banat and Silesia actually met during their exiles to the Americas, on the other hand there are many evidences that elites had been deeply socializing in the turbulent Paris of the years 1830-1870. Both countries were in quest of national unity and modernisation. The romantic and revolutionary exaltation in the exiles’ capital provided them with a rich and fertile growing turmoil for their ideas.

In the years 1840, the Romanian students unite in Paris around Bălcescu. They attend the lectures of the Polish nation’s bard and champion Adam Mickiewicz at the Collège de France, himself inspired by the French intellectual Jules Michelet and very close to the Polish nationalist Juliusz Słowacki. In Paris, they patronize the Hôtel Lambert where they discuss about revolution with the refugees of the Warsaw’s Insurrection (Czatoryski, Krasyński), but also with the French Romantics Delacroix, Lamartine and George Sand. In February 1848, the departing shot of the Peoples’ Spring is set in Paris and the capitals are set aight in the empires. Brothers Brătianu intend a failed uprising in Moldavia, while Słowacki leads Poznań against the Prussian occupant. Although neither Poland nor Romania will regain unity before 1919, the period is one of intense change. During the second half of the XIXth century, Paris will provide a stove for European nationalist elites preparing the aftermath of the empires.

During the twentieth century, Paris will progressively loose its status as the capital of political exile. The French capital is ravaged by the Second World War, occupied by Nazi forces and collaborates with the Shoah. Most of the political opponents and Central European Jews will then choose New-York or London, where the free government of Poland will be established until 1989.

However, Paris’ aura as an intellectual capital remained and numerous Polish and Romanian intellectuals settled there during the Cold War. In 1946, Jerzy Giedroyć establishes in Maisons-Laffitte the prestigious review Kultura, in which many great intellectuals and dissidents from both countries collaborated.

Roads to Germany: Aussiedler, Einwanderer et Gastarbeiter

At the end of the Second World War, the « ethnic » Germans dispersed in all Mitteleuropa will be invited to return to Germany. Because of the massive damages inflicted to the Central European territories by the Nazi forces and the Anschluss, this invitation was seldom peaceful and cordial. In Poland, where the war had been particularly harsh, millions of Germans are expelled, notably from Silesia, but also from the territories recovered by the Potsdam treaty. From Stettin (Szczecin), Breslau (Wrocław), Opplin (Opole) or Dantzig (Gdańsk), hundreds of thousands of Germans are deported to the Western side of the Oder-Neisse line. The exact number of expulsions is still uncertain. The historian Tomasz Kamusella estimates their number at 7 million, including undeclared ones (Kamusella 2000). In Romania, the Saxons of Transylvania were not expelled by the government after the war, but mostly evacuated by the Wehrmacht in 1944, when Romania finally gets on the Allies’ side. Finally, one also has to consider the case of minorities within the post-war States, who frequently affected by the massive displacements.

To react to the expulsion politics led in Central Europe, the German government has implemented a specific migration policy directed towards ethnic Germans from those territories: the Aussiedler law. This policy granted automatic German citizenship and nationality to people of German ancestry living in the whole Eastern side of the Oder-Neisse line and expressing the desire to settle in Germany. According to the German Ministry of Home Affairs, Germany has received 12 million refugees in the aftermath of the war, 36 000 repatriates per year between 1950 and 1984 and 2.7 million more between 1985 and 1999. The total amounts about 16 million people, mainly from Poland and Romania. Because of the nature of the German data (by nationality) and of the Aussiedler policy (granting nationality automatically), it can be considered that movements of people from Central Europe to Germany are largely under-estimated by the German census. Hence, it is necessary to use specific Aussiedler databases to give a figure of them.

3 www.bmi.bund.de
According to the German Ministry of Home Affairs, the number of repatriates under the Aussiedler policy between 1950 and 2005 is of 4.5 million, including 1.4 million from Poland, 2.3 million from the ex-Soviet Republics and 430,000 from Romania. Poland and Romania have provided most of the repatriates in the first period (between 1950 and 1990), because of the presence of important German minorities in those countries, but also for economic reasons. Hence, it is rather to stop this flux than to stick to some essentialist vision of German ethnicity that the law was changed in 1990 to introduce quotas.

Indeed, the German policy has conducted to a “parallel use of law” (Diminescu 2003) and has provided the main gate and model for immigration from Romania and Poland during the communist times by the system of invitations (Michalon 2003). Even though not always staying in Germany, many economic migrants from those countries have transited through Germany to reach other Western countries. On the graphics below, it appears clearly that the legal provisions added in 1990 have almost put an end to Aussiedler immigration from Poland and Romania.

![Aussiedler repatriates in Germany according to country of origin between 1980 and 2002](source: Bundesministerium des Innern, 2009; auslaender-statistik.de)

At the same time, an important economic migration began to gain structure during the 1980s and the 1990s, first complementary to the Aussiedler migrations and then replacing it after 1990. Those migrations are generally short-termed and pendular. The petty trade of manufactured goods from West to East through the communist block, and the raw products travelling the other way round in peoples’ bags and suitcases created a complex and quite efficient parallel economic system of international trade and the often only way to obtain foreign currencies. The Democratic Republic of Germany was in relatively good economic shape compared to its Eastern neighbours, particularly in the harsh years of the Communist empire’s agony. Thus, DRG soon became a nexus on East-West roads, and the so-called Russian markets bloomed in the cities bordering the iron curtain (Vienna, Berlin). Among the numerous petty traders, sellers and carriers, some managed to make their way to the West. However, this was not the most common case, as most of these mobilities were not directed towards settlement (either permanent or even temporary) (Wallace 2001). These “circular migrations” (Okolski 2001) sustained an important economic sub-system and their protagonists had often no intention to settle abroad.

The presence of important familial and neighbouring networks established in Germany through the Aussiedler law on one hand, and of many roads, travel itineraries and connexions opened by petty trade on the other hand, explains that Germany has become the main country of destination for both
Polish and Romanian emigrants during the second half of the twentieth century. Their presence is difficult to evaluate as they involve different types of movements (including short-term migrations with a tourist visa, seasonal work, pendular migrations, etc.) and different types of legal regimes (Aussiedler, tourist visas, guest workers, irregular). Moreover, the question of whether ethnicity can be clearly defined in the German case is still disputed and ambiguous (Michalon 2003b). In the case of Central European migrations, it seems preferable to treat the ethnic factor as a “practical category” of analysis (Brubaker 1996) than as a substantial data.

Whether it be exclusively ethnic or not (and whatever ethnic can mean), the repatriation policy in Germany has obviously created a specific imaginary which also contributes to the determination of migratory roads. While some analysts question the possibility of resurgence of a Mitteleuropa after the European Union’s enlargements, it seems obvious that this imaginary remains vivid: between 1988 and 2000, 2.6 million of Germans have made use of the agreements passed between Germany and its former territories to settle in “the homeland of their distant ancestors” (Conte 2002), mainly in Poland and Romania.

Finally, a third gate from Central and Eastern Europe to Germany has been opened in the years 1990 and 2000 through the gastarbeiter (guest workers). This term was originally designed to apply to foreign workers under bilateral agreements of workforce export between Germany and various countries during the 1950s and 1960s (Italy in 1955, Turkey in 1961 and Yugoslavia in 1968), substantially leading to settlement even though the German government was not concerned with any question of integration of those minorities (see Weiner 1986). Progressively, the term “gastarbeiter” has been used to refer to all sorts of immigrant workers, whether under agreement procedures or not. For instance, it is primarily through tourist visas that migrations of Polish and Romanian citizens took place from the years 1990 (Glorius 2008; Wallace and Stola 2001), also leading to settlements (see graphics below).

![Germany (2002)](image)

Stock of residents of Eastern European nationalities in Germany, 2002 (German census, 2002)

In the beginning of the years 2000 Germany accounted for over 40% of all the East Europeans immigrants in Western Europe (see table below), mainly from Poland (43%) and Romania (22%).
Table 3. Stock of Eastern European nationals or Eastern-European born people in the countries of EU-15, in thousands of persons, according to national censuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>BG</th>
<th>CZ</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>HU</th>
<th>LV</th>
<th>LT</th>
<th>PL</th>
<th>RO</th>
<th>SI</th>
<th>SK</th>
<th>TOT</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>BE</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>7.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>7.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>328</td>
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<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>9.05</td>
<td>6.81</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>8.71</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The predominance of Germany in Central and Eastern European emigration could have thus led to the growth and development of those migratory routes with the European Union enlargements. The presence of an important settled diaspora and various networks would have presumably led to the intensification of those networks, in line with the cumulative process of migration described by Castles and Miller (Castles and Miller 1993). However, Germany together with Austria has implemented various policies in order to avoid such phenomena and is until today the most restrictive European country concerning the free circulation of people.

At the opposite end of the European migration policies, the United-Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden have adopted the most liberal positions, granting free circulation and (almost) free settlement to the citizens of the 2004 enlargement. Similarly, Spain has proceeded to a massive regularization of Romanian workers in 2007, and has removed all restrictions to the free circulation and settlement of the European Union’s citizens in 2009.

The new faces of East-West mobility

As we briefly described, many variables contributed to the constitution of Germany as the main country of destination for Romanian and Polish emigrations. Although Germany remains an important destination country, comparing the maps of the main East-West migrations in 1990 and 2008 reveals the existence of a major shift in those routes (see maps 3 and 4). Post-enlargement emigrations from Poland and Romania seem to have deeply changed, not only in their patterns and trajectories, but also in their nature. Although we will not dive into details in this paper, pointing out the main features of the “new faces” of Polish and Romanian mobilities can help understand this change.

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4 "<" is used when the amount is under 1000 or, for Slovaks, when they have been considered as Czechoslovaks, here in the column CZ.

5 Each national census refers to a particular year (see in the bibliography, “Statistical Sources”)
Main Eastern European born populations in selected Western European countries, 1991-2000
(source: national censuses)

Main Eastern European born populations in selected Western European countries, 2008 (source: official statistics of immigration)
The redrawing of East-West migratory routes

While looking at these maps, it appears clearly that Southern Europe has become one of the main magnet areas for emigration from the post-communist States. According to the national migration databases, in 2008 there were close to 3 million Romanians, Bulgarians and Albanians in Mediterranean Europe (Spain, Italy and Greece), although immigration from those countries was fairly marginal in the years 1990.

Germanic Central Europe does not seem to attract most of its oriental neighbours anymore, but it still attracts its southern neighbours from the Balkans. For instance, the most important communities in Austria are no longer the Czechoslovaks, Romanians and Poles, but rather the ex-Yugoslavs. Similarly, Serbs and Croats now represent important communities in Germany, where Romanians are less present and the number of Poles have very slightly increased.

Finally, new countries and regions appear on the East-West map of migrations: the United-Kingdom, Ireland and Scandinavia are nowadays the most common destinations for Polish citizens, but also for Lithuanian, Latvians, Estonians, Czechs and Hungarians. New migratory routes seem to cross Europe, no longer determined by geopolitical regional ensembles: from the East to the West, but also quite clearly East-North and East-South.

Polish migration: from Germany to England?

Although Germany remains an important immigration country for Polish citizens, the settlement of Poles between 2002 and 2008 did not increase much. Germany has been overtaken in a few years by the United-Kingdom (with an increase of 728% of Polish residents) and Ireland, both being the main destination for emigrating Poles nowadays.

Those numbers should be put into perspective as various evidences show that Germany is still chosen for short-terms and pendular migrations, especially for men. Indeed, the restrictive German policy probably under-estimates the real number of Polish residents by generating irregular statuses. However, the Polish Social Diagnosis Survey and the British Labour Force Survey results, crossed with official data of emigration from Poland and from the United Kingdom, suggests that the United-Kingdom is undoubtedly the first destination country and accounts for at least 30% of all emigration from Poland.

In the United-Kingdom, Polish citizens account for about 8.3% of all foreign-born residents and 13% of foreign residents (ONS, 2009). They thus represent the second most important immigrant population in the country after the Indian-born people (10%), but the first national minority (Indian nationals representing only 9% of foreign residents).

England is the main immigration region in the United-Kingdom, attracting 85% of the Polish population. In 2005, 43.5% of all foreign work in Great-Britain was to be found in Greater London. However, John Salt and Jane Miller consider that this predominance could soon be reversed by “the propensity of Eastern European workers to distribute themselves geographically more widely” (Salt and Miller 2008). Indeed, according to the British Labour Force Surveys, the relative importance of Greater London in Polish immigration dropped from 36.6% in 2004 to 18.5% in 2008, including only 5% for London intramuros. It seems that Polish immigrants tend more to make for territories with low ratios of immigrants, where they consequently represent a very dominant national minority (31% of all foreigners in Wales, 36% in Scotland and 65% in Northern Ireland).

Romanian migratory routes to Spain: similar trends?

Although clearly separated (mainly to the North for Poland and to the South for Romania), Polish and Romanian migrations keep on displaying very similar patterns. In Spain, Romanian emigration has massively increased and Romanians have become the first national minority in three years, representing 14% of foreign residents in 2007. Although there is some evidence that they have been largely under-estimated in the previous years\(^7\), its relative importance compared to other foreign groups in Spain has increased very rapidly.

\(^6\) Polish Social Diagnosis Survey, 2007
\(^7\) See Potot, 2007. Concerning the Polish emigration in the United-Kingdom, analysis of Labour Force Survey datasets show that there is no significant « administrative » appearance of Poles (the number of pre-2004 migrants is residual compared to the post-2004 ones).
Indeed, Romanian and Polish migrants share the same position in Spain and the United-Kingdom with respectively Indian and Moroccan minorities. The extent to which large-scale immigration from Eastern Europe is correlated with a policy of marginalization and contention of extra-European immigration in the European Union would need deeper analysis, but as many authors have proven, Eastern Europeans are more likely to compete with Indians and Moroccans on the work market than with British or Spanish people, the foreign work market being often quite strongly separated from the native one (Portes, 1998).

From a territorial point of view, Romanian migration in Spain also seems to resemble the Polish one. Although Madrid remains an important destination, statistics shows that one out of four Romanian resident in Spain lives in a town under 10 000 inhabitants (Viruela Martínez, 2006). The same tendency is visible in the United-Kingdom. Indeed, although the nature of data (survey instead of register) makes the comparison difficult, Adrian Favell notes that “nowadays in Great-Britain it seems almost impossible to be served dinner or a drink in a rural pub without encountering a worker from Eastern Europe” (Favell 2008).

This is mainly due to the nature of employment and the recent transformations of the economy. Indeed, the growth of the low-paid tertiary sector in the United-Kingdom and Spain are directly connected with the transformations of migration patterns in those countries. Rural migrations no longer pertain to agriculture only, but also more and more to tourism (Williams and Hall 2002) and services to the urban and cosmopolitan upper class. The ageing of population in Spain and the United-States also produces a vast sector of care and social services, where immigrant work force is of major interest, whatever the welfare State model is. Indeed, private companies of care in the United-Kingdom have been recruiting directly in Eastern Europe through specialized human resources structures, while informal networks provide most of the badanti in Italy.

However, the apparent “wider” territorial distribution of Eastern European workers in Western Europe should not overshadow the persisting forms of concentration and segregation related to the structure of foreign workers’ employment. Rafael Viruela Martínez notes that in Spain, “despite the fast diffusion process, the spatial distribution of Eastern Europeans is characterized by concentration, as more than half of the Romanians and 60% of the Bulgarians live in hardly a hundred of municipalities” (Viruela Martínez 2008). In Great-Britain, territorial segregation is hard to estimate with the data available, as it often doesn’t provide detailed geographical information. However, it seems that professional segregation has been growing over the past few years, as shown in the table below.

**Table 4.** Indicators of ethnicization in selected industrial sectors (source: Labour Force Surveys 2004 and 2008, United-Kingdom)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main industrial sectors</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Other Nationalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONSTRUCTION</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>-5,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>1,9</td>
<td>-10,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARGO HANDLING</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-1,3</td>
<td>-0,6</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>20,2</td>
<td>4,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRIAL CLEANING</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-3,4</td>
<td>6,2</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-15,9</td>
<td>12,8</td>
<td>11,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOTELS</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-5,9</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>5,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-21,4</td>
<td>17,5</td>
<td>5,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAT INDUSTRY</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-0,5</td>
<td>-0,4</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-22,8</td>
<td>41,4</td>
<td>6,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYEE</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-6,1</td>
<td>13,3</td>
<td>4,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-8,9</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>8,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_A Change in Nature? Youth and the Labour Markets_

As American migration studies pointed out, foreign work is usually restricted to low-paid and low-status jobs in “non-desirable” geographical areas. In this matter, one could say Polish and Romanian migrations, although documented and free, did not contradict the general rule. However,
much of such studies base their argument on the fact that migrants are recruited for their lower qualification level (Castles and Kosack 1973; Borjas 1989).

Evidence shows that in the case of Polish and Romanian people, migrants are frequently far from being under-qualified. Rafael Viruela Martínez points out that “especially amongst youth who do not obtain a job because of the education system’s crisis, Romanian people abroad make up a workforce over-qualified for the occupations they have” (Viruela Martínez, 2006). The same phenomenon appears for young Poles. Although the Labour Force Survey does not include data on non-British diplomas, Polish people’s declared age of school leave suggests than more than 55% of them have been to university, including about 18% of Masters’ degree holders. Interviews with Polish migrants in England have also shown that the failure of university to give jobs to its graduates is very often quoted as a reason for emigrating, illustrating the existence of an “education crisis” there too (Flipo 2009). For high school graduates, it often appeared a better option for the future to emigrate than to go to university, even though education remains a top value for migrants.

Hence, Polish and Romanian migrations did not only change in their directions, they also somehow changed in their nature. Post-enlargement migrants are more qualified, younger, but also less gendered: 51.8% of Romanian migrants in Spain and 52.4% of Polish migrants in the United-Kingdom are women. However, this is very particular to Spain and the United-Kingdom, as it appears that most of the other destinations of Romanian and Polish emigrations are gender-separated (Viruela Martínez 2008; Polish Social Diagnosis 2007, GUS 2008).

In fact, data analysis suggests that Polish migration to the United-Kingdom and Romanian migration to Spain correspond with this “new generation” of young migrants, while other “traditional” patterns of migration still co-exist (for instance Polish migrations to Germany and Romanian migrations to Israel). Hence, it appears clearly that youth’s position in Central and Eastern European countries explain in a large extent the formation of this mobile “low-cost generation” caught in a long-lasting process of transition (Flipo 2009).

Conclusions

This paper tried to reconstitute the main transformations and evolutions of intra-European mobilities through history, taking basis on Polish and Romanian emigrations in a comparative perspective. The choice has been made to focus on intra-Schengen mobility, first because of the impossibility to cover the whole range of migration movements occurring on the European soil while also privileging an historical point of view, and also because of the specificity and uniqueness of a “free-circulation” zone. However, it is clear that so-called “extra-European” migrations should not be separated from intra-European ones in order to understand the contemporary migration in Europe in a global point of view.

From the data analyzed, one can see that European migratory routes have changed in many times of history: at first to the Americas, then to North-Western Europe, that could be qualified as the “historical centre” of European migrations, and finally, towards the neighbouring circle of those countries (Spain and Italy on the Southern side, Great-Britain and Ireland on the Western side, although the first one is also part of the historical centre, and Scandinavia on the Northern side). In the first part of this paper, we considered the hypothesis of asymmetrical power relations between regions to explain the mobility within geopolitical units. In that sense, it could be considered that the redrawing of European migratory routes reveals the European integration and its status as a global geopolitical unit. Many authors have underlined the peripheral position of Eastern Europe within the continent, after the fall of communism (Berend 1996) and after enlargement (Rupnik 2007). The shape of European governance has led Jan Zielonka to talk of “Europe as an Empire” (Zielonka 2007). Hence, one could consider that mobilities within Europe tend to confirm this hypothesis and illustrate the growing salience of transnational lines to describe inequalities between European citizens (see Barbieri and Corrossa 2009).

At last, the changes that occurred on the European scene in the last two years will probably have repercussions on the current migratory system. The economical bankruptcy of Spain and the raising
tensions in the United-Kingdom have already faded on migration policies: Spain has implemented policies for “helping” the return of Romanian migrants, while Gordon Brown has announced his desire to “take measures” in favour of the employment of natives. However, history shows that migration routes always manage to adapt to changes, as sudden as they could be. Although repeatedly predicted by political discourses and the media, a large-scale return of emigrants has not been observed in Romania or in Poland. In a free circulation area, permanent leaves or permanent returns may no longer be the rule. However, so far no one really knows what kind of consequences this can have on this “mobile” generation’s lives and families.

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